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MANZIKERT TO LEPANTO

THE BYZANTINE WORLD AND THE TURKS 1071-1571

Papers given at the Nineteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham, March 1985

edited by

ANTHONY BRYER and MICHAEL URSINUS

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EDITORIAL NOTE

ANTHONY BRYER AND MICHAEL URSINUS

A note is called for to explain why over 200 Byzantinists and Hellenists, Ottomanists and Turkologists, from 18 countries, gathered in Birmingham from 23-25 March 1985 to discuss "Manzikert to Lepanto: the Byzantine world and the Turks, 1071-1571". The meeting, the papers of which are edited here, arose from developments which were largely academic but partly institutional.

To take the lesser, institutional, factor first. British Universities are not alone in being littered with the debris (often in outdated library holdings) of great projects which lie abandoned after their academic entrepreneurs have left, when they can safely be sacrificed to the knife of subsequent cuts. At first sight Birmingham is an improbable home for the founding, let alone survival, of the project which gave rise to the Symposium of 1985. Jane Austen's Mr Elton entertained "no great hopes from Birmingham. I always say there is something direful in the sound"[1]. By 1902 Compton Mackenzie had even less expectation of its Greek: "the University of Birmingham is not a very stern Alma Mater"[2]. Yet, with hopes, some sternness and considerable imagination, the University of Birmingham committed itself to both Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies in the salad days of the early 1960s, to which it had the temerity to add Ottoman Studies to complete an unique triple alliance of disciplines in the colder climate of 1984, long after the founding fathers had gone — leaving their books to the project.

From 1967 the University's Department of Extramural Studies

1 *Emma*, chapter 36.

2 C. Mackenzie, *First Athenian Memories* (London, 1931), 195-96.

collaborated with Birmingham's Byzantinists in organising an annual Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, which became more than local conferences by 1971. From 1978 the University's Centre for Byzantine Studies and Modern Greek has also held the meetings for the British National Committee of the International Byzantine Association with the sponsorship of the British Academy. In 1983 a Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies arose from the chrysalis of the Committee and the Symposia became its Annual General Meeting. The Symposia began performing a transhumance from Birmingham elsewhere in Britain in alternate years in 1982 (Edinburgh), followed by Oxford (1984) and Manchester (1986). Like the annual U.S. Byzantine Studies Conference (from 1975) and Australia'a equivalent meeting (from 1981), the British Symposia are open to all; unlike them they are directed to a specific theme and retain a sense of Extramural didacticism.

The theme for 1985 was partly inspired by the arrival of a 'new blood' Ottomanist at Birmingham. The event was not haphazard. Birmingham's Centre had already declared an interest by collaborating with Harvard on a four-year project in late Byzantine and early Ottoman society, which culminated in a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in 1982[3]. But while the formal teaching of Byzantine Studies in Britain appeared marginally less under threat than Modern Greek by 1984, Ottoman Studies seemed to be in an even more parlous state. This view comes, of course, from the struthocamelotic vision of those, like your editors, who thought that the state of a subject depended upon how many designated lecturers were being paid from public funds to pursue Byzantine, Ottoman or Modern Greek Studies — in Birmingham's case under the roof of a single Centre. But taking our heads out of the sands, we saw a wider academic need for our Symposium than a single celebration of a local institutional, if related, development in Birmingham.

Not unlike other countries, in Britain Ottoman Studies are even

3 *Continuity and change in late Byzantine and early Ottoman Society*, ed. A. Bryer and H. Lowry (Birmingham-Washington D.C., 1986).

younger than Byzantine: founded in effect by Paul Wittek and Victor Ménage at SOAS, London. As *'Orchideenfächer'* both share the same problems of vast orchards and few skilled labourers. But there are two more such common characteristics which impelled the choice of the Symposium subject. *First,* while neither Byzantinists nor Ottomanists would regard 1453 as a beginning or an end, there has been a growing preparedness to move into the other's field — not to pursue the legendary ancestry of Osman, or to seek 'Byzance après Byzance', but to assess the common experience of the same lands and peoples over several centuries. Thus the Symposium did not, for example, attempt to demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was the Byzantine Empire in disguise but aimed at comparisons of how Byzantines and Ottomans, Greeks and Turks lived and reacted in the land of Rum, between confrontation and symbiosis. The battle of Manzikert of 1071 was one obvious terminus; the symbolic date of Lepanto in 1571 was much disputed as the other (F. Braudel's revisionism has evidently been re-revised). But it was a convenient end, for many aspects of Orthodox communal life in the *Tourkokratia* changed by then. To do this we aimed to bring together as many active Byzantine and Ottoman scholars as possible. As this does not seem to have been done on this scale before, their very meeting was a virtue of the Symposium: both sides claim to have learnt from the encounter. Indeed, what had emerged was a *second* characteristic: Byzantinists and Ottomanists found they were talking the same language.

This was because both sides had independently been going through a bout of re-appraisal of their historical method, and in both cases had looked to contempory historiography of western Europe in their period. This most dictated their common social and economic, intellectual and material concerns. The historic necessity of national schools of Balkan and Turkish historiography hardley obtruded, because it did not interest us, although we unwittingly concluded the Symposium on Greek National Day with an Ottoman Court Feast. Some thought that in view of the awesome quantity of Byzantine and Ottoman evidence — partic-

ularly Ottoman — which has still to be digested, that we were trying to run before we could walk in allowing ourselves the indulgence of discussing what we should be doing with it. For example, if the English Domesday Book, which has been available for nine centuries and subjected to scholarly analysis for one century, still stimulates a minor industry of interpretation which shows no sign of abating, what hope is there for the vastly greater range of *tahrir defteri,* Ottoman Domesdays, of which serious discussion of the fraction that is available has only begun in our generation? But mutual exposure of ignorance was right in the context of the revelation of what seemed to be largely common aims and interests. The meeting of the two disciplines and the discovery that they were approaching roughly the same questions in roughly the same way made the Symposium peculiarly invigorating.

Not all Spring Symposia of Byzantine Studies have been published[4]. This is because it is notorious that the heady champagne of a conference such as this goes flat when served again in cold print in the light of day. We believe that the papers presented here are an exception. They are arranged according to the original discussion groups of the meeting, to which some of the 28 volunteered communications have been added where appropriate to the theme. Not all the main papers are included. Some will

4 One-hour *videotapes* were made at the VIIth Symposium, 1973 (The Ceremonies of Constantine Porphyrogenitus); the VIIIth, 1974 (Byzantine Society and Economy); and the Xth, 1976 (Mark Antonios Foskolos, *Fourtounatos*). The *papers* of the following Symposia have been published:

IX, 1975: *Iconoclasm,* ed. A. Bryer and Judith Herrin (Birmingham 1977) (out of print).

XII, 1978: *The Byzantine Black Sea = Archeion Pontou,* 35 (1979), available from the *Epitrope Pontiakon Meleton,* Kolokotronis 25, Athens 125, Greece.

XIII, 1979: *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition,* ed. Margaret Mullett and R. Scott (Birmingham, 1981), available from the Secretary, Centre for Byzantine Studies and Modern Greek (CBS&MG), University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, England.

XIV, 1980: *The Byzantine Saint,* ed. S. Hackel (a special number of *Sobornost,* London, 1981), available from the CBS&MG.

XVI, 1982: *The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX to XIII Centuries,* ed. M. Angold (BAR International Series 221, Oxford, 1984).

XVIII, 1984 (Oxford): see the previous *Forschungen.*

appear elsewhere or be incorporated into larger works, and others are not here for the good reason that their authors (for whom we have great sympathy) just never found time to write them up for publication. But for the sake of record, the missing papers are noted below, and abstracts of them are published in the *Bulletin of British Byzantine Studies,* 12 (1986), 41-54[5].

There are three *Framework Lectures* (Angold, Lilie, Majer), to which COLIN HEYWOOD (SOAS, London), added a fourth at the Symposium, on "The Ottoman State in the fifteenth century: Mehemmed II and his historians".

Discussion Section I, on *Security and Warfare* (Bartusis, Finkel), was at the conference completed by papers by COLIN IMBER (Manchester) on "Turkish pirates and Ottoman fleets (1300-1453)"; and by A.R.E. NORTH (Victoria and Albert Museum, London), on "Byzantine and Ottoman arms and armour".

Discussion Section II, on *Contacts and Inheritance* has papers by Flemming and Kyrris (the latter the only one which we have not edited), to which we add communications by Ellis, Belke and Paviot. Missing is STEPHEN REINERT (Dumbarton Oaks and Rutgers), on "Bayezid I (1389-1402) in Byzantine and early Ottoman historiography".

Discussion Section III, on *Societies and Economies* (Hopwood, Slot) is enriched by three others which were to have been delivered at the Symposium, but through illness or travel problems were not: we welcome Faroqhi, Asdrachas and Dimitriades to the feast at last. RUDI LINDNER was also to have spoken in this Section, on "Turanian nomads and Anatolian shepherds", to balance Hopwood: see his *Nomads and Ottomans in medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, 1983). Of related communications not represented here, we are happy to report that of our most venerable Turkish Symposiast, FARUK SÜMER, has since been published as *Yabanlu Pazarı.*
during the Seljuk period (Istanbul, 1985).

Discussion Section IV was on *Monasteries, Tekkes, and their*

5 Available to members of the Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies; for membership forms apply to its Secretary, CBS&MG.

fates (Lowry, to which we added Balivet). Missing is KLAUS KREISER (Bamberg) on "The economies of the late Byzantine monasteries and early Ottoman *tekkes*".

Discussion Section V looked *Beyond Byzantines and Ottomans* (Nielsen and Collins, to whom we have attached McGann and Eskenasy). Not a rag-bag: it is just what the theme proposes.

Discussion Section VI was on *Patronage in art and literature* (Petković, to whom we are pleased to add Gavrilović, Kiel and Calofonos in support). Missing, but widely known for their publications elsewhere, are papers by MANOLIS CHATZIDAKIS (Academy of Athens, and Secretary-General of the International Byzantine Association), on "Le patronage d'art pendant les premiers temps de la Tourcocratie en Grèce"; JULIAN RABY (Oriental Institute, Oxford), on "Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-81) and the Greek heritage"; and ROSEMARY BANCROFT-MARCUS (Lausanne), on "Authors and patronage in Crete during the period of Venetian rule to 1669"[6].

It is a pleasure to thank ADOLF M. HAKKERT, Symposiast and also publisher of the Oxford Symposium of 1984 in these *Forschungen,* but we are especially grateful to our speakers, whether authors or not, for making what was, we sensed, the right academic meeting at the right time. Some events cannot be reproduced here: an exhibition of *Twelfth-thirteenth-century Muslim coins and their classical and Byzantine prototypes,* organised at the Barber Institute of Fine Arts by NUBAR HAMPARTUMIAN and MICHAEL URSINUS (a field on which work continues); and, not least, the taste of an Ottoman Court Feast for the season, cooked by SYLVIA BUTTERWORTH.

No *cranbo repetite,* we serve you a pretty substantial menu from a memorable Symposium.

6 We have attempted to impose the Dumbarton Oaks conventions for editing and abbreviations, but so long as they are internally consistent have, in some cases, left transliteration to the vagaries of individual contributors.

POSTSCRIPT, 1990

To contributors and readers, more than apology but an explanation is due to the lateness of this publication of a Symposium held in 1985. It had already passed through two proofs by 1988. In 1989 our publisher regretted that the bulk of the proofs had been lost in the post somewhere between Birmingham, Gran Canaria and Athens, and offered to reset them. Your editors agreed to start again, because even after four proofs (which somehow gather imperfections), the Symposium *rechauffe* seemed to retain useful and distinctive flavours. I am grateful to Annegret Strauss for help with the second set of final proofs.

Inexorably five further Spring Symposia of Byzantine Studies have been held since this Editorial Note was written. Abstracts of papers given at each are published in the subsequent *Bulletin of British Byzantine Studies*. To complete the list in note 4 above, they were:

XX, 1986 (Manchester): *Church and State in Byzantium,* ed. Rosemary Morris (Birmingham, 1990).

XXI, 1987 (Birmingham): *The Byzantine Eye* (not published).

XXII, 1988 (Nottingham): *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, Frank Cass, 1989).

XXIII, 1989 (Birmingham): *Salonica: The Second City* (not published).

XXIV, 1990 (Cambridge): *Byzantine Diplomacy,* to be published, ed. Jonathan Shepard.

XXV, 1991 (Birmingham): *The Sweet Land of Cyprus,* to be published ed. Anthony Bryer and George Georghallides.

Inexorably, also, my co-editor Michael Ursinus has moved on to the Chair of Ottoman studies at Freiburg University, but has happily been replaced in Birmingham as Lecturer in Ottoman Studies by Johann Strauss. The success of the XIXth Spring

Symposium, 1985, presented here, and the subsequent firm embodiment of Ottoman Studies and Modern Greek by Drs Ursinus and Strauss in Birmingham have also led to a change of the Centre's own title.

ANTHONY BRYER,
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University of Birmingham

THE FRAMEWORK : 1

THE BYZANTINE STATE ON THE EVE OF THE BATTLE OF MANZIKERT

MICHAEL ANGOLD / EDINBURGH

The battle of Manzikert may not matter very much. Battles seldom do. It does not even seem to have been, in military terms, a particularly serious defeat for the Byzantines[1]. At other times, it might have been shrugged off. As Romilly Jenkins wrote, "If such a battle had been fought in 1021, instead of fifty years later, it would scarcely have obtained a mention in our history books"[2]. The assumption is that the structure of the Byzantine state was a great deal stronger at the end of Basil II's reign than it was half a century later. My purpose will be to test this assumption, but this is to presume that there was such a thing as the 'state' at Byzantium. Paul Magdalino has singled out 'state' along with 'snobbery' as "one of those words which one applies to the ancient and medieval world at the risk of one's scholarly credibility"[3]. There can be little doubt that the idea of the 'state' existed at Byzantium. As David Jacoby put it, "The abstract concept of *politeia,* or *res publica,* implied the existence of public law and public taxation"[4]. But this thought can profitably be turned around: it was the existence of public law and public taxation that gave meaning to the abstract concept of *politeia*. In this sense, the state existed at

1 J.C. Cheynet, 'Manzikert. Un désastre militaire?', *Byzantion*, 1 (1980), 410-38.

2 R. Jenkins, *Byzantium: the Imperial Centuries AD 610 to 1071* (London, 1966), 370.

3 P. Magdalino, 'Byzantine Snobbery', in *The Byzantine Aristocracy IX to XIII centuries*, ed. M.J. Angold (BAR International Series 221) (Oxford, 1984), 58.

4 D. Jacoby, 'The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade'. *American Historical Review*, 18 (1973), 875 [= D. Jacoby, *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siècle* (London, 1979), no. II].

Byzantium not just as an abstract concept, but as a concrete fact. There was a properly constituted and generally recognized public authority. It provided for the welfare of the community at large through the provision of law courts and the application of a more or less uniform system of law. It offered protection in the shape of military and naval forces. In return, it was empowered to raise taxes.

The character of the state at Byzantium was complicated by being nearly identical with imperial authority (*basileia*). To quote David Jacoby once again, "The emperor, who personified the state and was the repository of political and judicial authority, was also the source of all grace and responsible for the implementation of the law"[5]. There was a relative, but not an absolute, identity of the state and imperial authority at Byzantium. It was recognized that the state as a fiscal agency (*demosion*) had a continuous existence that reached back before the creation of the Empire. The *Peira,* a law book of the mid-eleventh century, includes the following opinion: "Those things are *demosia,* which are called *demosia,* which the *demosia* had and enjoyed before there was an emperor and which passed to the Empire once it had been constituted"[6]. It concludes: *demosia ta tou demou onta.* Though more than a shade gnomic, it does indicate the meaning to be ascribed to *demosia*: public rights and property. This was the core of the state and lay at the basis of its right to tax. It was also a recognition that imperial authority at Byzantium went back to the Augustan settlement, through which it had been grafted on to the republican institutions, or democracy, as Greek would have it. Democracy only very occasionally raises its head in Byzantine history[7]. Relations between emperor and church were always a much more pressing constitutional issue. Never more so than in the mid-eleventh century, where events were for a time dominated by the figure of the Patriarch Michael Keroularios (1043-58). He was accused of

5 *Ibid.*

6 I. and P. Zepos, *Jus Graecoromanum* (Athens, 1931), IV, 143.

7 G.T. Bratianu, 'Empire et "Démocratie" à Byzance', *BZ,* 37 (1937), 86-111.

usurping imperial authority; he was also charged with being democratically inclined (*demokratikos*)[8]. This was an extraordinary accusation, but it indicates that democracy was an issue; that the relationship of public and imperial authority was the object of debate. It reflected the strains that existed in the mid-eleventh century within the structure of the state.

These strains can be seen as the product of a complicated process of adaptation and change, which, at its simplest, turned into a struggle for control of the machinery of state[9]. If, theoretically, the state its responsible for the requirements of the community at large, it is also the main source of power and rewards and therefore a prize to be fought for. Most emperors strove to preserve a balance within the state between the common and private interest, but in the course of the eleventh century this became more and more difficult to do, until the state became prey to faction. Michael Psellos explains what was happening: "Therefore two things preserve the supremacy of the Romans: they are the system of honours and wealth, and, in addition, a third factor: Their wise supervision and care in their distribution"[10]. He saw that these strengths were being sapped; there was no sense of proportion in the way honours, gifts, and pensions were being granted out. It was undermining the financial soundness of the state and loosening the cohesion of the elite, as the rules for entry into its ranks relaxed. Psellos displayed his usual perspicacity, when he singled out wealth and the system of honours as the twin pillars of the Byzantine state. A state does not function very effectively without a well-defined elite. The system of honours defines that elite and binds it to the ideal that it is supposed to serve. Until after the death of Basil II in 1025 the Byzantine elite had been fairly narrow. It consisted of two clearly defined groups: a bureaucracy and an officer class. Although it would be unrealistic to deny the importance of birth for entry into either, it was

8 Michael Psellos to Michael Keroularios: K.N. Sathas, *Mesaiônikê Bibliothêkê* (Venice / Paris, 1872-94), V, 512, l.6.

9 See M.J. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204* (London, 1984), 34-58.

10 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 29, ed. E. Renauld, I, 132, ll. 6-10 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers* (Penguin Classics), 170].

not an absolute criterion. Ability and education were rather more important.

Wealth is the lifeblood of any state. In the end, the health of a state depends on whether it is able to balance its budget. After the dispensing of justice, the collection and dispersal of money and goods is the hall-mark of a state. The importance of the fiscal system to the Byzantine state has recently been underlined by Michael Hendy. He shows that its coinage was exclusively geared to the needs of the state. "The perceived needs of the state dictated not only where and when coin was produced, but even what kind of coin was produced. The state issued its precious-metal coinage to serve as a medium of revenue and expenditure"[11].

It was the fiscal system more than anything that held the Byzantine Empire together during the seventh and eighth centuries. A devolved system of military government grew up in the provinces. The central government only retained direct control over the fiscal and financial organization. Otherwise, the state retreated into Constantinople. Here were housed the law courts and a series of administrative bureaux (*sekreta*), which dealt mainly, but not exclusively, with fiscal and financial matters. But even in the capital power might be delegated. Much of the organization of day-to-day life was in the hands of the gilds, which are described as self-governing bodies, after the manner of the *polis*[12]. It was a system of government that suited the requirements of the Byzantine Empire during the period when it was on the defensive. Problems began to appear once the Empire went on the offensive from the middle of the ninth century. It was then that the central government started to interfere increasingly in the life of the provinces. This was done in the first instance to control the growing power of the great families of Anatolia. The instrument that was developed to this end was the agrarian legislation of the tenth century[13]. This was initiated by Romanos Lekapenos (920-

11 M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 663.

12 *Basilicorum Libri LX*, ed. H.J. Scheltema and N. van der Wal, I (Groningen, 1955), VIII, 2, 101.

44) and was ostensibly designed to protect the property of the peasantry from the great landowners. The cynical would say that this was done not so much out of any interest in the well-being of the peasantry, more to further the control of the state over the land and the peasantry[14]. The legislation was nevertheless presented as an act of imperial philanthropy, protecting the poor against the strong, the interests of the commonwealth against private gain. This imperial rhetoric was echoed in the letters of the Logothete of the Drome Symeon, one of the ministers responsible for implementing this legislation. He talks about "our brothers the poor"[15]. He closes one letter with the appeal: "Save my poor ones from those who do not shrink from doing them harm and wrong"[16]. There seems to be no good reason to doubt the genuiness of these sentiments. There can be little doubt either that the defence of the poor against the powerful, the pursuit of the common good[17], provided the bureaucracy in Constantinople with a justification for the power they wielded as agents of the state. Nor was it just a question of the exercise of power. They had an interest in ensuring that the peasantry did not escape the clutches of the state, because their salaries and other perks came out of the taxation drawn into Constantinople. The bureaucracy identified the interests of the state with its own interests.

This did not go unchallenged by the armies of the themes. Their leaders reacted by seizing control of the state with the usurpation of Nicephorus Phokas in 963. They objected to the way that soldiers "who put loyal service to the holy emperors and the freedom and honour of christians above their own lives were beaten by nasty little tax-collectors, who bring no benefit to the commonwealth. Rather do they oppress the poor and accumulate

13 See A. Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his World* (London, 1973), 145-76; P. Lemerle, *The Agrarian History of Byzantium from the Origins to the Twelfth Century. The Sources and Problems* (Galway, 1979).

14 E.g. G. Ostrogorskij, *Quelques problèmes d'histoire de la paysannerie byzantine* (Brussels, 1956), 11-18.

15 J. Darrouzès, *Epistoliers byzantins du Xe siècle* (Paris, 1960), p.125 (= II, no.37).

16 *Ibid.*, p. 146, ll. 11-12 (=II, no.82).

17 *Ibid.*, p. 116 (= II, no.25).

for themselves from injustice and the blood of the poor many talents of gold"[18]. Nicephorus Phokas, whose sentiments these were, tried to take this further by getting the patriarch of the day to sanction the notion, no doubt current, that those soldiers dying in battle against the Muslims should be accorded the status of martyrs[19]. The intention was to underline that it was the military who were the true protectors of the commonwealth and of the poor. It provided some justification of the militarization of the Byzantine state that was carried through under Nicephorus Phokas. There were two main elements: Phokas raised the value of a military estate from four to twelve pounds of gold. This completed the evolution of the *stratiotes* from part time to professional soldier, with a social status which can be equated with that of the 'knight' in western Europe. Units of the *tagmata* — the regiments of the standing army — were stationed in the provinces under the command of a duke or a katepan. In addition, the peasantry were organized to support the much expanded military establishment. It all meant that the military element which had been on the fringes of the state was now brought firmly within it[20].

It intensified competition between the civil and military establishments for control of the state and strained the state's finances. It sets the scene for the reign of Basil II (976-1025). The early years of his reign saw two great rebellions in Asia Minor as the military families sought to recover control of the state. Basil II victorious. He was able to dominate both the military and the civilian establishments, but he made few changes to the basic structure of the state inherited from the soldier-emperors. His major innovation is instructive: he set up the bureau of the *epi ton oikeiakon*. Its purpose was to bring more land and peasants under the direct exploitation of the state[21]. He was interested in strengthening the

18 Nicephorus Phokas, *De Velitatione Bellica, apud* Leo Diaconus, *Historia* (Bonn, 1828), 239, l.20-240, l.5.

19 V. Grumel, *Les Regestes des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople*, II (Paris, 1936), no.790.

20 A.P. Kazhdan, *Derevnja i gorod v Vizantii IX-X vv* (Moscow, 1960), 153-62.

direct control exercised by the state over basic resources. He wanted to guard against the danger of the state being taken over from within. To this end, he imposed a peculiarly harsh regime. He must be credited with using his iron will to hold the state together. The strains apparent were contained, but coldly appraised Basil II's achievments were those of a salvager. He held on to Asia Minor in the face of aristocratic resentment, but most of the impetus for further expansion eastwards was lost. Only in Armenia did he negotiate further concessions of territory, but the Armenian lands were in a state of disintegration. In Europe he was able to recover the territories, which had been lost to the Bulgarians early in his reign, largely due to his own incompetence and inexperience. This took him thirty years' hard campaigning, which is scarcely impressive. It was almost a conspiracy. The Bulgarian war was useful to him: it provided an outlet for the energies and ambitions of the military aristocracy and a justification for his harsh policies. It helped preserve the cohesion of the state around the emperor. Basil II was fortunate in that conditions outside the Empire remained propitious. How would he have fared if he had to face a formidable foe, such as the Turks? It may be that it was the absence of such an enemy that lent to Byzantium under Basil II the impression of great strength.

His immediate successors' lack of success suggests that this was indeed the case. They tried to take up the momentum of expansion that had been lost under Basil II. Their efforts in Syria and Sicily brought next to nothing in the way of concrete gains. Even Basil II's main achievement, The recovery of the Bulgarian lands, was threatened by a rebellion which affected much of the Balkans in 1040-1041. One of the causes was the attempt made by the chief minister of the day to convert taxes paid in kind into a money payment, contrary to Basil II's undertaking to the Bulgarians. This suggests that the financial position of the Byzantine state was beginning to deteriorate. The origins of its financial difficulties can be traced back to the end of Basil II's reign, when he remitted two

21 N. Oikonomidès, 'L'évolution de l'organisation administrative de l'Empire byzantin au XIe siècle (1025-1118)', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 136-37.

years' taxation. The reason given for this measure was his pity for the poor, which would be in line with imperial rhetoric. It seems rather to have been an admission that his fiscal policies had been too harsh. The finances of the state proved too precarious to stand the burden thus imposed. Constantine VIII had to rescind his brother's measure and collected five years' taxation whithin the space of three years[22]. The discontent this produced exploded in a series of rebellions centred on continental Greece.

With financial difficulties, rebellions, and a general lack of military success came disillusionment with the system of government inherited from Basil II. It can be detected in the rather sour comments that Michael Psellos reserves in his *Chronographia* for Basil II's style of government[23]. A series of events between 1040 and 1043 underlined the malaise of the Byzantine state: there was the Bulgarian rebellion; the overthrow of Michael V by the Constantinopolitan mob; the rising of the Byzantine general George Maniakes. They each underlined different weaknesses. The Bulgarian rebellion, as we have seen, highlighted the financial difficulties of the Empire. The overthrow of Michael V indicated that the citizens of Constantinople were a political force with which Byzantine emperors would have to reckon, while Maniakes's rebellion emphasized the dangers of concentrating too much power in the hands of a general. Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-1055) was the emperor who had to face up to the implications of these events. He would preside over an attempt to give the Empire a new direction and purpose and to extricate it from Basil II's legacy. In many ways, he was trying to get back to the ideal that was expressed by a Byzantine spokesman at the court of Nicephorus Phokas, when he spoke disparagingly of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, as "a mild man who tried to win the friendship of the whole world by peaceful means"[24].

22 John Scylitzes, *Synopsis Historiarum* (ed. H. Thurn) (Berlin / New York, 1973) (= CFHB v), 373, ll.4-11.

23 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, I, 29-31, ed. E. Renauld, I, 18-19 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 43-45].

24 J. Becker, *Die Werke Liudprands von Cremona* (Hannover / Leipzig, 1915), 205-6.

He renounced the offensive foreign policy that had lingered on from Basil II's reign, the only exception being in Armenia, where he annexed Ani in 1045. In the frontier regions he tried to cut back on direct administration and to work through the local ascendancies. This is apparent from the way he made Argyros — the head of the most powerful Lombard family of Bari — viceroy of the Byzantine territories in southern Italy[25]. Even in the Armenian lands the old families clearly retained much of their power. Gregory Magistros from the great Armenian family of Pahlavi was made duke of Mesopotamia by Constantine Monomachos[26]. A more radical solution was attempted in the old Bulgarian lands, where the Petcheneks were brought in as military colonists[27].

This taken in conjunction with Monomachos's disbanding of the army of the Iberian theme[28] has always been seen as a deliberate disparagement of the military establishment and was so considered in many quarters at the time. The settlement of the Petcheneks was a major cause of the rebellion of the western armies in 1047 under Leo Tornikios[29]. Financial considerations were not likely to have been uppermost in Monomachos's mind. He was a by-word for his generosity and indulgence in the early part of his reign. It was more likely that Monomachos was trying to rationalize the cumbersome military organization that he had inherited. The assumption, at least for Anatolia, seems to have been that a small professional army stationed well back from the frontiers in bases such as Theodosioupolis and Melitene would be just as effective and far more economical than the old system, where the competence of thematic and tagmatic troops often overlapped. The peaceful con-

25 V. von Falkenhausen, *Untersuchungen über die byzantinische Herrschaft in Süditalien vom 9. bis ins 11. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1967), 58-59, 93-94, 187-90.

26 Khr. M. Bartikian, *To Byzantion eis tas armenikaspegas* (*Byzantina keimena kai meletai* 18) (Thessaloniki, 1981), 88-92.

27 P. Diaconu, *Les Pétchenèques au Bas-Danube* (Bucarest, 1971), 50-78.

28 Michael Attaleiates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1853), 44-45; Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, ed. B. Wassiliewsky and V. Jernstedt (St Petersbourg, 1896), 18, ll. 12-24.

29 J. Lefort, 'Rhétorique et politique: trois discours de Jean Mauropous en 1047', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 276-77.

ditions existing in the mid-1040s also suggested that the huge military establishment built up since the middle of the tenth century could safely be slimmed down. This comes out very clearly in the chrysobull Constantine Monomachos issued in 1047, establishing the post of *nomophylax*: "Thanks to the Lord of Heaven, Whose long arm and strong hand bring wars to an end, Who opposes the proud and exalts the meek, external wars and rebellions have been brought to an end; enemies are at peace and our subjects reconciled. The affairs of the Romans now enjoy the greatest tranquillity. There is nothing distracting our attention. So with the blessing of God we turn our whole purpose towards the reform of our polity"[30].

The chief measure was to be the setting up of a law school. The lack of a proper system of legal education was endangering the standard of justice. A law school would help to counter "those who do not hesitate to use blatant sophistry to pervert the course of justice"[31]. "Total casuistry" is how Dieter Simon characterizes the administration of the law in the court of the hippodrome in the early eleventh century[32]. In the Basilics the Byzantine state possessed a perfectly adequate law code, but no effective system of legal education to complement it, equivalent to the training that had been available under Justinian at the law school at Beirut[33]. The aim was to provide one. Thiş measure reflected the primacy of law in the proper functioning of the state. It also indicated that higher education was a responsibility of the state. Since the seventh century Byzantine emperors had taken but a fitful interest in education[34]. Constantine Monomachos, however, not only created the position of *nomophylax* for John Xiphilinos, who headed the law school. He also made Michael Psellos consul of the philosophers, a post which entailed supervision of the private schools

30 I. and P. Zepos, *Jus*, I, 621, para. 6.

31 *Ibid.*, 625, ll. 15-16.

32 D. Simon, *Rechtsfindung am byzantinischen Reichsgericht* (Frankfurt, 1973), 17.

33 I. and P. Zepos, *Jus*, I, 627, ll. 9-11. Cf. W. Wolska-Conus, 'L'école de droit et l'enseignement du droit à Byzance au XIe siècle', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 1 (1979), 1-107, esp. 1-11, 13-53.

34 See P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (Paris, 1971), 74ff.

of Constantinople[35]. The aim was to ensure a ready supply of trained administrators and judges.

They were, in other words, measures that pointed to the strengthening of the bureaucratic element within the state. The same was true of Monomachos's creation of the office of *epi ton kriseon*. According to Michael Attaleiates, who was then just at the start of his career in the Byzantine administration, its holder headed a new *sekreton*: that of the *idiotikai dikai*. He amplifies this by adding that "the judges of the provinces both drew up what they had done in writing and deposited there copies of their registers, in order to clear them of suspicion"[36]. The intention was clearly to make the provincial judges responsible to a ministry in Constantinople. It completed the haphazard development of provincial administration since the turn of the tenth century, which had seen the judge gradually replacing the *strategos* as the effective governor of the theme. It was the culmination of the demilitarisation of the theme system. The thematic troops were largely pensioned off; and the themes became units of an essentially civilian administration[37].

Monomachos's reforms only had a limited success. They left a legacy of bitterness and failed to provide the state with any new sense of purpose or direction. The emperor was soon forced to backtrack. The group of men most closely associated with his schemes found themselves out of favour. John Mavropous who was perhaps the architect and certainly the advocate of Monomachos's reforms was packed off to darkest Pontos as bishop of Euchaita. In the face of the hostility that the creation of the law school provoked Xiphilinos preferred to retire gracefully to Bithynian Olympos, whence he would later descend to become patriarch. Only Michael Psellos clung on, but his influence with

35 W. Wolska-Conus, 'Les écoles de Psellos et Xiphilin sous Constantin IX Monomaque', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 223-43, esp. 231-43. Cf. P. Lemerle, *Cinq études sur le XIe siècle byzantin* (Paris, 1977), 203-12.

36 Michael Attaleiates, 22, ll. 1-3.

37 H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 'Recherches sur l'administration de l'Empire byzantin aux IXe-XIe siècles', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 84 (1960), 21-24 [= H. Ahrweiler, *Études sur les structures administratives et sociales de Byzance* (London, 1971), no. VIII].

the emperor was in decline. The reforms had gone wrong for a number of reasons. They were predicated on a state of continuing peace both at home and beyond the frontiers of the Empire. The settlement of the Petcheneks was badly mismanaged and pressure from the Turks was mounting along the eastern frontier[38]. The financial position of the Empire deteriorated. Michael Attaleiates records that in the last two years of his reign Monomachos adopted a brutal fiscal policy. The one specific measure cited was directed against the church. The emperor set up a commission to investigate the *siteresia* — allowances from the state — enjoyed by churches and monasteries. He died before its work could be carried out. It was clearly designed to cut back on state expenditure[39]. His financial difficulties have also been revealed by numismatists, who have shown how he was forced to carry out a controlled debasement[40].

The bitterness generated by Monomachos's reforms is rather harder to explain than their relative lack of success. They were concentrated on the field of education. This looks, at first sight, innocuous enough. They may have affronted entrenched interests in the gild of notaries, but this should not have been too serious. It was much more that these reforms seemed to be a cover for the ambitions of a clique of bureaucrats. They and their plans seemed all the more dangerous for the meritocratic ideal, which they revived. The claim made by their spokesman John Mavropous that first place in the state belonged to the intellectual rather than the soldier[41] must have revived antagonisms that were beginning to fade. Michael Psellos tried to associate Constantine Monomachos in such pretensions. Looking back on his early career he said of the emperor: "He did not advance office holders and judges because of high birth nor did he fill the senate and various magistracies only from the first families, but also from other

38 M.J. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204*, 44-45.

39 Michael Attaleiates, 50-51.

40 P. Grierson, 'The debasement of the bezant in the eleventh century', *BZ*, 47 (1954), 379-84; C. Morrisson, 'La dévaluation de la monnaie byzantine au XIe siècle', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 3-30.

41 J. Lefort in *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 285.

sections of society, should they appear well-qualified and more suitable than others, for he believed it absurd that as far as the senate was concerned it should be an essential law and an unchangeable rule to observe succession by family and that only somebody revered for his lineage should have access to the palace, even if his mental faculties were marred and he could do no more than breathe, not able to belch forth anything except his family's great name"[42].

Whether Monomachos approved of the meritocratic sentiments that were wished upon him is another matter. He belonged to an old aristocratic family. He was connected in one way or another with the Argyros, Tornikios, and Skleros families[43]. He was part of that aristocratic ascendancy which emerged after the death of Basil II[44]. It transcended the old divisions between civil and military. Its members were as likely to hold high office in Constantinople as military command; they were as likely to have their main interests in the capital as in the provinces. Many came from old Anatolian families, such as the Argyros and Skleros, but others, such as the Comneni, owed their ascent to Basil II. These were the families which would compete for the imperial office after the death of Constantine VIII, brother of Basil II. The one prominent family which does not, at first sight, appear to fit is the Paphlagonian, which had no claims to an aristocratic origin[45]. They are usually treated as representatives of the commercial wealth of Constantinople[46]. The architect of their fortunes, however, was no business man, but one of Basil II's ablest ministers, John the Orphanotrophos. The Paphlagonians turn out to be one of Basil II's new families, but after the event. They were perhaps not so very different from the Comneni, who also came from Paphlagonia and owed their original promotion to their connection

42 Sathas, *Mesaiônikê Bibliothêkê*, IV, 430-31.

43 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 14-15, ed. E. Renauld, I, 124-25 [= Michael Psellos, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 161-63].

44 A.P. Kazhdan, *Sotsial'nyj sostav gospodstvujushchego klassa Vizantii XI-XII vv* (Moscow, 1974), 255-58.

45 Cf. Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 98-88.

46 E.g. M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, 570-73.

with the civil service family of Erotikos[47]. There is indeed a much more concrete connection between the two families. Isaac I Comnenus granted an annual sum of 24 *nomismata* to the monastery of Theotokos Dekapolitissa for a candle to burn in memory above the grave of John the Orphanotrophos[48].

The aristocracy remained high in Monomachos's favour. Psellos found it worthwhile cultivating their support. He soon dropped his meritocratic pretensions, found himself an aristocratic bride, and claimed for himself aristocratic descent from consuls and patricians[49]. But Monomachos did not rule simply in the aristocratic interest. He tried to preserve a balance between the most important elements within the state. These included the bureaucracy, but he also had to take account of a new force, the gilds of Constantinople[50]. Psellos accuses him of reducing the *cursus honorum* to confusion: "He associated in the senate nearly all the riff-raff of the market place, not just on one or two or possibly a few more, but at a stroke he promoted the whole lot of them to the proudest positions of state"[51].

It may be doubted whether this was done out of respect for Constantinople's growing economic power. It is more likely to have been a reward for the loyalty that the city of Constantinople had shown towards the Empress Zoe, as well as official recognition of the influence exercised within the capital by the gilds. Constantine X Doukas (1059-67) was to take this still further. Michael Psellos complained that he abolished any distinction

47 Kazhdan, *op. cit.*, 161.

48 I. and P. Zepos, *Jus*, I, 638 (= no.XV). Isaac also gave an annual sum of 24 *nomismata* to Nea Moni on the island of Chios for a candle to burn over the tomb of the monk Theodore, the former *nobelisimos*. It is tempting to identify him with another of Michael IV's brothers, the *nobelisimos* Constantine.

49 For Psellos's family background, see Ch. Diehl, *Byzantine Portraits* (New York, 1927), 278.

50 See Sp. Vryonis Jr., 'Byzantine *demokratia* and the guilds in the eleventh century', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 17 (1963), 287-314 [= Sp. Vryonis Jr., *Byzantium: its Internal History and Relations with the Muslim World* (London, 1971, no.III)].

51 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 29, ed. E. Renauld, I, 132, ll. 18-21 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 170-71].

between gildsman and senator[52]. The standing of the gilds was also emphasized in another way: emperors now felt that it was necessary to make an inaugural speech, setting out their aims and ideals, to the assembled gildsmen of the city[53]. A new element was being brought within the compass of the state. The commercial and professional class of Constantinople had always tried to use their wealth to buy status for themselves by the purchase of dignities. Such pressures had in the past been more or less contained. From the mid-eleventh century the relative weakness of the emperors was to mean a wholesale capitulation. It was not necessarily a bad thing. It was one of the ways the Byzantine state absorbed social, economic, and political changes. It was a process that of necessity imposed great strains on the fabric of the Byzantine state. These were apparent under Constantine Monomachos, but they did not erupt until after the death of Theodora, the last of the Macedonian line.

Her brief reign allowed a group of bureaucrats led by Leo Paraspondylos to seize the reins of power. When the old empress died in 1056, they had an ex-civil servant Michael Stratiotikos hurriedly made emperor. He came from the great Bringas family[54], but was otherwise a nonentity, one of those "only able to belch forth their family's great name". He had been forced to swear in advance that he would do nothing contrary to the wishes and advice of the ruling clique which was to bring him to power[55]. Such an undertaking was quite unprecedented. It came close to perverting imperial authority. The emperor was no more than a figure-head. Control of the state had passed into the hands of a bureaucratic clique. Michael Psellos who did not belong to it was indignant. It was quite unconstitutional. In his opinion it was not enough for an emperor only to have the support of the civilian element within the state. Imperial authority properly rested on

52 *Ibid.*, VII, 15, ed. E. Renauld, II, 145 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 338].

53 E.g. Michael Attaleiates, 70, ll. 15-16. See Sp. Vryonis, *art. cit.*, 309-14.

54 P. Grierson, 'The Tombs and Obits of the Byzantine Emperors (337-1042)', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 16 (1962), 60.

55 John Scylitzes, 480, ll. 37-40.

three factors: the people, the senate, and the army[56]. The people and the senate were won over by the distribution of imperial largesse, but the army was ignored. This was the cause of a rebellion by the eastern armies headed by Isaac Comnenus, which eventually brought down Michael Stratiotikos's government. Michael Psellos's analysis of this episode lies at the bottom of the usual interpretation of the period as one of a struggle for power between a military and a civilian party[57]. It was far more complicated than this. It does scant justice to the central role played in these events by the Patriarch Michael Keroularios. It plays down the aristocratic character of Isaac Comnenus's rebellion. The leaders came, with one exception, from great aristocratic houses. The exception was Kekavmenos Katakalon, a career soldier of no very distinguished family background. After Isaac Comnenus was safely in power, he was accused of plotting against the new emperor and forced to become a monk[58]. The armies which had brought Isaac the throne were disbanded, their hopes of adequate reward still unfulfilled[59]. The neglect of the legitimate rights of the army was in the end just a pretext for an aristocratic coup.

Michael Psellos's simplistic analysis of these events is easily explained. It has to do with his anachronistic constitutional ideas. The failure of the Macedonian line must have occasioned reflection upon the constitutional steps necessary for the making of an emperor in the absence of any hereditary claimant. Following the antiquarian fashion of the time Psellos applied to Byzantium prescriptions borrowed from the Augustan settlement. The attractions of such a solution are obvious. However distantly Byzantium was the heir to the Empire of Augustus. His constitutional settlement could be made to fit Byzantium without straining credibility. The army could be used as a vehicle for aristocratic

56 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 1, ed. E. Renauld, II, 83 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 275].

57 Most recently by M.P. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, 570-82.

58 *Michaelis Pselli scripta minora* (ed. E. Kurtz and F. Drexl), II (Milan, 1941), nos. 30, 59, 141.

59 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 45, ed. E. Renauld, II, 111 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 303].

ambitions. The people could be represented by the gilds; and Byzantium had its own senate[60]. It is true that it is not easy to establish its composition or function at any given time. Its importance varied, the eleventh century being a time when it was more than usually prominent. It might be described as the Byzantine state in its honorific capacity. In theory, most holders of rank had access to the senate; in practice, it seems to have been the preserve in the eleventh century of the bureaucratic element within the state. These divisions remain artificial, but they were an attractive way of explaining the stresses and strains within the Byzantine state. These had little to do with constitutional schemes; much more with the way the state was adapting to the claims of a hereditary aristocracy, while absorbing the new wealth of Constantinople.

Michael Attaleiates also tried to explain the political turmoil that followed the death of Theodora in constitutional terms, but the line he followed was rather different from that favoured by Psellos. "The division of power among various people and the pretensions of each minister (*paradynasteuontes*)[61] to imperial status (*basilei gauroumenou*) was the cause of much discontent and confusion among both the aristocrats and the populace (*demotikoi*) on account of democracy (*demokratia*), for the former thought only of the well-being of their own party and of those connected to the emperor, whether or not it was of value to the state (*politeia*), or dangerous and unrealistic, while the latter had no thought except to act as vessels (*parergon*) of senseless arrogance and empty conceit[62]". What does Attaleiates mean by democracy? Is it the division of power or is it the self-seeking of the aristocrats and the mindlessness of the populace? Democracy was a notion that was in normal circumstances anathema to the Byzantines. It was regarded as the antithesis of monarchy. Monarchy was equated

60 See A.A. Christophilopoulou, *He synkletos eis to Byzantinon Kratos* (Athens, 1949).

61 See H.-G. Beck, 'Der byzantinische "Ministerpräsident"', *BZ*, 48 (1955), 327-32 [= H.-G. Beck, *Ideen und Realitäten in Byzanz* (London, 1972), no.XIII].

62 Michael Attaleiates, 53, ll. 2-11.

with order and harmony; democracy with disorder and chaos. The likelihood is that Attaleiates was using democracy to mean the lack of order produced by the breakdown of effective imperial authority, leading to the unrestrained pursuit of power by the upper classes and mindless violence among the lower. But mindless violence might on occasion be justifiable. Were the people of Constantinople acting constitutionally, when in 1042 they overthrew the Emperor Michael V with their terrible cry of "Dig up the Bones of the Caulker"[63]? If the people could overthrow an emperor, could they not also transfer imperial authority to another? In 1078 a popular assembly met in St Sophia and, though Michael VII Doukas was still in power, it acclaimed the rebel Nicephorus Botaneiates emperor. Michael Attaleiates was a supporter of Botaneiates, but he is very cool in his appraisal of the actions of this assembly. Its members acted as they did because "they believed themselves to be living in a democracy (*demokratoumenoi*)"[64]. It was much the same charge that was made by Michael Psellos against the Patriarch Michael Psellos: that hating monarchy he was democratically inclined[65]. The occasion for this accusation was the assembly that the patriarch encouraged to meet in St Sophia to depose Michael Stratiotikos and acclaim Isaac Comnenus[66].

Both Michael Psellos and Michael Attaleiates use the word democracy pejoratively, but there is little doubt that its meaning was shifting to take account of the unprecedented role of popular assemblies. It was, however dimly, a recognition of the way that the structure of the state was changing. It demanded a reevaluation of the relationship of monarchy and democracy. Were they entirely opposed concepts? This was the object of, at least, the indirect interest of John Xiphilinos, nephew of the patriarch of the same

63 John Scylitzes, 418, ll. 28-29. Cf. H.-G. Beck, 'Senat und Volk von Konstantinopel. Probleme der byzantinischen Verfassungsgeschichte', *Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1966, 44-45 [= H.-G. Beck, *Ideen und Realitäten*, no. XII].

64 Michael Attaleiates, 256, ll. 15-16.

65 Sathas, *Mesaiônikê Bibliothêkê*, V, 512, l.6.

66 Michael Attaleiates, 56-58; John Scylitzes, 498-99.

name. During the reign of Michael VII Doukas (1071-78) he produced an epitome of Dio Cassius's *Roman History*. It may well have been Michael Psellos who encouraged him to undertake this task[67]. He showed a particular interest in the Augustan settlement, which was characterized as a mixture of monarchy and democracy. The ideal that was proclaimed was that of imperial authority which checked the worst excesses of democracy and where respect for democratic institutions checked the danger of imperial authority becoming tyrannical: "Being above democratic impudence and tyrannical outrages it will be possible to live in well-ordered freedom and in a secure monarchy, ruled over but without the taint of slavery and yet enjoying democratic rights but without dissensions"[68]. This represented an ideal far removed, it would seem, from the Byzantine reality, for Xiphilinos concluded his summary of the Augustan settlement with these words: "I shall include separately everything that it is necessary to remember today especially since those times are so far distant from our own way of life and polity"[69]. The message was that the Augustan settlement showed that ideally it was possible for monarchy and democracy to co-exist, the one strengthening the other. The *Epitome* of Dio Cassius should not be dismissed as mere nostalgia[70]. At least, one of its prescriptions appears to have been applied. It makes a plea that imperial legislation should be issued in the form of a *senatus consulta*[71]. That is exactly the form in which Nicephorus Botaneiates (1078-81) would issue some of his legislation[72].

But this was perhaps more a reflection of the desperate condition of the Byzantine Empire after Manzikert, when the most bizarre nostrums were tried in the hope of rescuing the Empire. It was the

67 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 73, ed. E. Renauld, I, 152-53 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 171].

68 Dio Cassius, *Historia Romana*, LVI, 43,4, ed. L. Dindorff / I. Melber, III (Leipzig, 1928), 255, ll. 8-13.

69 *Epitomê tês Dionos ... Rhomaikês Historias* (Geneva?, 1568), 72.

70 Cf. Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 82.

71 Dio Cassius, LII, 31, 1-2, ed. Dindorff / Melber, III, 64-65. Cf. F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford, 1964), 102-18.

72 Michael Attaleiates, 314, ll. 19-21.

natural consequence of the way the educated Byzantine only understood the present in terms of the past[73]. There was no vocabulary adequate to analyse Byzantium's social and political structure. Society, at least until the twelfth century, was seen as divided between the powerful and the poor, a division which had been elaborated in late antiquity[74]. As a result, it was only possible for Byzantine historians to hint at the changes which were taking place within the Byzantine state.

A better guide is provided by Isaac Comnenus's reform programme[75]. It was designed to restore financial soundness to the Empire by cutting out the private interests which had begun to infiltrate the structure of the state. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way that dignities were being privatized. Michael Psellos was able to make up his adopted daughter's dowry with the dignity of *protospatharios* and the pension that went with it, both of which were in his gift. Dignities were almost turning into stocks which could be disposed of privately. Psellos could also offer his prospective son-in-law another 60 nomismata on his pension as a *spatharios,* entry into the bureau of the Antiphonetos, and admission to the number of the judges of the hippodrome[76]. Isaac Comnenus unwisely allowed himself, like so many after him, to be mesmerized by Michael Psellos, whom he made his chief minister and put in charge of the reforms. Michael Psellos had the courtesy to applaud them in principle[77], but saw all too clearly that they threatened the interests of people like him. He masterminded the coup that would lead to the abdication of Isaac Comnenus and the accession of Constantine X Doukas. Isaac's empress would turn upon Psellos with these bitter words, "Pray

73 Cf. C. Mango, *Byzantine Literature as a distorting mirror* (Inaugural Lecture) (Oxford, 1975).

74 E. Patlagean, *Pauvrété économique et pauvrété sociale à Byzance 4-7e siècles* (Paris, 1977), 11-35.

75 Michael Attaleiates, 60-62; E. Stanescu, 'Les reformes d'Isaac Comnène', *Revue des études sud-est européennes,* 4 (1966), 35-69.

76 R. Guilland, *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines* (Berlin, 1967), I, 84.

77 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia,* VII, 62, ed. E. Renauld, II, 121 [= Michael Psellus, Fourteen Byzantine Rulers, 313].

heaven we benefit from your advice as much as you hope, philosopher"[78]!

Psellos put himself forward as the philosopher who was the arbiter of the affairs of state. He thought that the temptations and burdens of the imperial office were too considerable for any mortal. This might be alleviated if the emperor could be persuaded to follow the advice of a philosopher, whose intellect and moral fibre could provide the necessary solutions to the problems besetting an emperor[79]. This was a pose, even if temporarily a profitable one. His real power lay elsewhere. His claim to be the philosopher who guided emperors stemmed in part from his office — that of consul of the philosophers. As we have seen, it gave him rights of supervision over the private schools of Constantinople. He used these along with his undoubted abilities as a teacher to build up a network of contacts within the state apparatus which guaranteed him real power[80]. We know from Robert Browning's work on the dossier of a tenth-century Constantinopolitan schoolmaster what a vital place the schoolmaster had in Byzantine political life[81]. His power rested on his ability to place his pupils in the system. Normally, the schoolmaster remained outside or on the edge of the state apparatus, but Psellos brought the role of the schoolmaster into the heart of government. What his career reveals so well is that network of informal contacts and reciprocal obligations, which underpinned the machinery of state. But it went further than this. Psellos provided in the ideal of friendship a justification for the system[82]. Lip service might be

78 *Ibid.*, VII, 81, ed. E. Renauld, II, 132 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 325].

79 Cf. Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 100-101.

80 G. Weiss, *Oströmische Beamte im Spiegel der Schriften des Michael Psellos* (Misc. Byz. Monacensia, 16) (Munich, 1973), 48-64; J.N. Ljubarskij, *Mihail Psell. Lichnost' i tvorchestvo* (Moscow, 1978), 101-11.

81 R. Browning, 'The Correspondence of a 10th-century Byzantine scholar', *Byzantion*, 24 (1954), 397-452 [= R. Browning, *Studies in Byzantine History, Literature, and Education* (London, 1977), no. IX].

82 Ljubarskij, *op. cit.*,117-24; F. Tinnefeld, '"Freundschaft" in den Briefen des Michael Psellos', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 22 (1973), 151-68.

paid to the need for loyalty to the imperial office, but the main stress was on the ties binding individuals. The first responsibility was to friends, followed by obligations to patrons and clients. It would be unrealistic to suppose that to a degree this was not always the case. The difference was that in the eleventh century it was accentuated to the point where it was necessary to provide a justification for the way private interests permeated the state. Psellos made great play with the autonomy of the individual, but this was only another way of stressing the importance of the individual at the expense of the community. The rationale of the state was no longer so much the protection of a common interest, as the mutual self-interest of an elite. An emperor who threatened this had to go. That was the fate of Isaac Comnenus. In his place, Psellos helped to raise up Constantine Doukas, the heir to a great name, but apparently devoid of any dangerous reforming tendencies.

Constantine Doukas had the sense to get rid of Psellos. His reign was not unsuccessful. He managed to preserve a balance between the major elements within the state. He deferred to the gilds and the senate and restored to those deprived of them by Isaac Comnenus their *oikeiai timai*[83], by which I understand honours and pensions that could be disposed of privately. There were, of course, financial difficulties. He did not, however, find it necessary to accelerate the debasement initiated by Constantine Monomachos, and was able to keep the coinage at the same fineness[84]. This may be taken as a sign that his financial difficulties were note overwhelming. He did impose surcharges on the provinces[85]. This provoked a rebellion in Thessaly, but it was easily contained[86]. He was forced to economize still further on the armed forces[87]. In 1065 he could only get together a pathetically small force to oppose the Oğuz Turks who had broken through the Danube frontier. There was also increasing pressure from the

83 Michael Attaleiates, 71, ll. 12-15.
84 Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, 509.
85 Michael Attaleiates, 77, ll. 10-11.
86 Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 66-72.
87 Michael Attaleiates, 76-77.

Seljuq Turks along the eastern frontier. There was no disguising that there were some major set-backs. The stategy adopted was a static one, to hold the key points in the frontier zone. It was scarcely very glamorous, but the Byzantines were just managing to hold their own.

Though Constantine Doukas's style of government must be judged as largely negative, in one important respect it pointed the way to the future. He looked to his family to provide the strength necessary to control a system of government that had been getting out of hand. He made much of his aristocratic descent and connections[88]. Whereas in the past members of the imperial family had had, at best, a ceremonial role, he gave his brother the Caesar John Doukas real power. Constantine's dynastic concerns were apparent in the will that he drew up on his deathbed. He entrusted the reins of power to his brother to be exercised on behalf of the Doukas family. His Empress Eudocia Makremvolitissa was forced to take an oath to respect these arrangements. She was not to make any of her cousins or relatives ministers[89]. Imperial authority is conceived very much in terms of family interest.

It is no use pretending that the Byzantine state was particularly healthy when Constantine Doukas died in 1067. It was clearly very vulnerable. Military strength had been sacrificed, while the absorption of the gilds within the framework of the state brought no tangible advantages. The cohesion of the state was also weakened by the infiltration on an ever increasing scale of private interests. The financial condition of the Empire was precarious, though it was possible to balance the budget. The main thing is that the Byzantine state did not appear to be in any danger of imminent collapse. There was indeed every possibility that it would preserve its administrative strengths unimpaired and that it would be all the stronger for a wider base. Such hopes rested on

88 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 6, ed. E. Renauld, II, 140 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 333].

89 N. Oikonomidès, 'Le serment de l'impératrice Eudocie (1067). Un épisode de l'histoire dynastique de Byzance', *Revue des Études byzantines*, 21 (1963), 105-08 [= N. Oikonomidès, *Documents et études sur les institutions de Byzance (VIIe-XVe siècles)* (London, 1976), no. III].

firm direction from the centre, but Constantine Doukas died before he had properly founded his family's power in the apparatus of the state. The Caesar John Doukas was faced with agitation that an aggressive military policy and a military man as emperor were needed if the Turks were to be held at bay. Eudocia succumbed all too readily, ignored the inconvenient undertakings she had made to her dead husband, and chose Romanos Diogenes as her husband and emperor. His reign was a disaster. He attempted to put the Empire once again on a military footing by bringing the armies of the theme out of mothballs. The result was pathetic. His search and destroy tactics had even less success against the Turks than Constantine Doukas's masterly inactivity. The Turks were pressing ever further westwards. In 1070 they sacked the great shrine of the Archangel Michael at Chonai in the upper Maeander valley and even pressed on to the shores of the Aegean. Still, Romanos persisted. His reputation and his hold on power in Constantinople depended too much on achieving some spectacular military success. He no doubt calculated that he would be able to use war and success against the Turks as a way of uniting Byzantine society behind him. Manzikert was an unnecessary battle. It was a gamble, and it failed. It opened up all the divisions within the Byzantine state which previous emperors had more or less managed to contain.

It is absolutely clear that the near collapse of the Byzantine state did not precede, but followed the defeat of Manzikert. It was then that the debasement of the coinage got completely out of hand. The distribution of honours reached ludicrous proportions. They were doled out not merely to gildsmen, but to common tradesmen[90]. This was done on such a scale that under Nicephorus Botaneiates the state literally went bankrupt, because it could not pay what it owed in pensions and salaries[91]. It was the custom for newly-promoted dignitaries to make gifts to the poor. There was now such a profusion of them that the poor found it too much bother to

90 Constantine Manasses, *Breviarium Historiae* (Bonn, 1837), ll. 6701-10.

91 Nicephorus Bryennius, *Historiarum Libri IV*, ed. P. Gautier (Brussels, 1975) (= CFHB IX), 257-59.

collect their dues[92]. Imperial estates and rights of taxation were being granted out to individuals on a much more lavish scale. Even fortresses were passing into private hands[93]. Alexius Comnenus's coup in 1081 did not put an end to the disintegration of the Byzantine state. If anything, it became worse[94]. This may even have been deliberate. He came to power as the head of a powerful aristocratic network. His first concern was to establish his family in power. The most important positions of state, including the household offices were reserved for them. He granted them state revenues. He created a special order of titles for them, which placed them at the very top of the court hierarchy. It was ceremonial proof that an aristocratic network had been superimposed upon the Byzantine state. The senate and the gilds were disparaged[95]. Perhaps the historian Zonaras should be allowed the last word: "His chief concern was to alter the old usages of state and their transformation was his most important achievement. He did not administer affairs, as though they were of any common or public concern. He thought of himself, not as a steward, but as a landlord. He considered that the imperial palace was his private dwelling and so designated it. He did not pay due respect to the members of the senate, nor did he provide for them in a fitting manner; rather did he set out to humiliate them. Nor was he completely impartial, treating all as of equal worth. He provided his relatives and some of his attendants with cartloads of public moneys and distributed generous annual allowances to them, so that they abounded in wealth, had retinues that were fit for emperors rather than private citizens; possessed dwellings, in size comparable with cities, in luxury not dissimilar to an imperial palace"[96].

The Byzantine state had changed out of all recognition from that

92 Michael Attaleiates, 275-76.

93 N. Oikonomidès, 'The Donations of Castles in the last quarter of the 11th century (Dölger, *Regesten*, no.1012)', in *Polychronion* (Heidelberg, 1966), 413-17 [= N. Oikonomidès, *Documents et Études*, no. XIV].

94 J.C. Cheynet, 'Dévaluation des dignités et dévaluation monétaire dans la seconde moitié du XIe siècle', *Byzantion*, 53 (1983), 453-77.

95 M.J. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204*, 114-15.

96 J. Zonaras, *Epitome Historiarum* (Bonn, 1897), III, 766-67.

which had existed on the eve of Manzikert. The germs of future developments can perhaps already be detected, but germs need the right conditions to proliferate. These were provided by the near collapse of the Byzantine state that followed the battle of Manzikert.

THE FRAMEWORK: 2

TWELFTH-CENTURY BYZANTINE AND TURKISH STATES*

RALPH-JOHANNES LILIE / BERLIN

If one asks who were the most dangerous enemies the Byzantine empire had during the last four centuries of its existence, the answer appears to be straightforward: the Turks, who in 1071 defeated the Byzantines at Mantzikert, a defeat which brought worse consequences for the Byzantines than, for example, the loss of the French and Spanish fleets in the battle of Trafalgar was to bring for Napoleon; the Turks, who in 1176 at Myriokephalon put an end to all Byzantine attempts at a *reconquista* of Asia Minor, and during the subsequent centuries not only took over the remaining Byzantine territories in the coastal regions of Asia Minor but conquered the Balkans as well; the Turks, who eventually in 1453 sacked the impregnable Constantinople and were the terror of South-Eastern Europe until the 18th century.

The history of Greek-Turkish relations thus appears as an endless chain of Turkish attacks and Greek defences – defences that certainly were heroic at times but always unsuccessful, down to the subjection of 'Greece' and her resurrection in the 19th century after four hundred years of servitude: the ever-recurring story of the 'Foul Fiend from the East' and the people of civilization, heroic but doomed to perish[1].

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[1] The background to this paper is provided by the following works: C.Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history c. 1071-1330,* (trans. from the French by J.Jones-Williams (New York, 1968); *idem, Orient et Occident au temps des croisades,* (Paris, 1983); Sp. Vryonis jr., *The Decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century* (Berkeley, 1971); *idem,* "Nomadization and Islamization

This interpretation may seem justified from the point of view of the "Europeans" of the 19th, occasionally even the 20th, century. The Byzantines looked at events differently. The famous words of Lukas Notaras, who is reported to have said a little before the fall of Constantinople in 1453: "It is better to see in the city the turban of the Turk than the hood of the Latin monk"[2], are not the only testimony for this. The first conquerors of Constantinople had not been the Turks but the Venetians and the knights of the IVth crusade, who captured the Byzantine capital and divided up the Empire in 1203/04. And who knows, if without the IVth crusade the sack of 1453 would ever have taken place? During the 12th century at least the West was more dangerous for Byzantium than were the Seljuk Turks. The Byzantines themselves were well aware of this. I would just remind you of Nicetas Choniates, who wrote: "They (the Latins) have an evil desire for our goods, are always ready to do harm to our people, and constantly devise some evil plan... Thus between us and them lies a huge gulf of enmity, and in our views we have no contact but are diametrically opposed, even if physically we are close to each other and frequently share the same dwelling."[3] Of course he was writing this with the conquests of Salonica in 1185 and of Constantinople in 1204 on his mind, but the history of the 12th century confirms his opinion. And even after the defeats of Mantzikert and Myriokephalon no Byzantine ever spoke about the Turks with the hatred and the bitterness that is typical of statements about the Latins before and after 1204.

in Asia Minor," *DOP* 29 (1975), 41-71; R.-J.Lilie, *Byzanz und die Kreuzfahrerstaaten. Studien zur Politik des byzantinischen Reiches gegenüber den Staaten der Kreuzfahrer in Syrien und Palästina bis zum Vierten Kreuzzug (1096-1204),* (München, 1981); *idem, Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi* (Amsterdam, 1984); *idem,* "Des Kaisers Macht und Ohnmacht. Zum Zerfall der Zentralgewalt in Byzanz vor dem vierten Kreuzzug," in R.-J.Lilie - P.Speck, *Varia,* (ΠΟΙΚΙΛΑ BYZANTINA 4; Bonn, 1984) 9-120; and last but not least M.Angold, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204. A political history* (London-New York, 1984).

[2] *Ducae Historia Turco-Byzantina (1341-1462),* ed. V.Grecu, (Scriptores Byzantini 1) (Bucarest, 1958), 329.

[3] *Nicetae Choniatae Historia,* ed. J.-L. van Dieten (Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae. Series Berolinensis 11/1.2) (Berlin-New York, 1975), 301.

This does not mean that the Seljuks were enemies who were neither dangerous nor aggressive. But we have to distinguish different phases of the development. During the 11th century the Seljuks indeed attacked Byzantium again and again, and after the battle of Mantzikert quickly occupied all of Asia Minor. But the Byzantines themselves contributed to this conquest. The civil war that followed the battle of Mantzikert opened Asia Minor to the Seljuks, and almost drew them to the West in a conquest that was more accidental than planned. In the years that followed Byzantium seemed doomed to perish. So the Seljuks too tried to secure their share in the booty – still, the Norman and Petcheneg attacks in this period were more dangerous. This was a time of civil war and unrest, however, for the Seljuks as well as the Byzantines, and it is not representative of the relationship between the two powers. It was only after the knights of the first crusade had recaptured Nicaea for Byzantium and defeated the Seljuks at Dorylaion that Byzantium took advantage of the favourable situation and launched a counterattack. Within a short period Alexius Comnenus reconquered all of Western Asia Minor for Byzantium. The Seljuks remained in possession of central Anatolia, whereas the Byzantines took over the coastal regions from Pontus to Cilicia.

This was the configuration that was to be characteristic of the history of Asia Minor during the greater part of the 12th century: Byzantium held the fertile coastal regions, especially in Western Asia Minor and south of the Black Sea. The Danişmendids established their state in the northeast. To the west of this lay the sultanate of Iconium. In the east, in the Caucasus, the Georgians were able to maintain their state, as were the Armenians in the south, in the Taurus range. To these factors were added the crusader states in northern Syria: Antioch and – up to the middle of the 12th century – the county of Edessa. This constellation remained more or less stable during the 12th century, even if Edessa was lost in the 1140s and the Danişmendid state was absorbed by the Seljuks of Iconium in the 1170s.

But, most important: not only did this situation not change; but neither Byzantines nor Seljuks made any serious attempt to change it.

Some scholars, like Sp. Vryonis jr. and Claude Cahen, have interpreted the 12th century as the period of struggle for Asia Minor, with the Seljuks attacking, the Byzantines counterattacking, and the

Seljuks eventually winning a decision at Myriokephalon in 1176. Viewed from a higher stand this interpretation may be true, but still, I do not believe that things were like this. On the contrary, the 12th century seems to me to have been a period of peaceful coexistence between the Byzantines and the Seljuks. "Peaceful coexistence", that is, in the medieval, not in the modern sense of the word: a peace that excluded neither continuous border warfare nor even major expeditions. But – and this is the decisive point – both parties accepted the existence of the other side. Neither the Byzantines nor the Seljuks seriously attempted to extinguish the other during the 12th century.

The constant warfare does not argue against this. To a great extent this warfare was brought about by the structure of the Turkish principalities. The backbone of Turkish military power was constituted by the bodies of Türkmen nomads, over whom Seljuk rulers had only very limited control. These nomads did not care about the treaties between the Byzantine emperor and the sultan of Iconium, and the sultan could seldom force them to honour such treaties.

The Türkmens frequently acted quite contrary to the explicit intentions of the sultan, attacking armies that passed through or plundering the adjacent Byzantine territories. The sultans were unable to prevent this, and this inability was not a mere diplomatic disguise. That they were actually incapable of enforcing their intentions may be illustrated by the example of the third crusade. Kılıç Arslan had made a contract with the German emperor Frederick Barbarossa and guaranteed a peaceful passage for the crusader army. This was in accordance with the interests of the Seljuk state. The crusade was not directed against Iconium but against Saladin – who was an enemy of the Seljuqs as Nūr ad-Dîn had been before him. Still Kılıç Arslan did not have sufficient authority to make his subjects respect the treaty. The result was the conquest of Iconium by the Germans[4]. More examples like this could be cited.

The unreliability of the Türkmen nomads constituted an element of insecurity in Byzantine-Seljuk relations and overshadowed the determination of both states to live in peace with each other. This applies

[4] E.Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa im Orient. Kreuzzug und Tod Friedrichs I.*, (Istanbuler Mitteilungen 17) (Tübingen, 1977), 76f, 119ff.

especially to the continuous strife in the border regions, which consisted almost exclusively in Türkmen attacks and Byzantine defence or counterattacks. The sultans rarely took part in this and did not as a rule defend the Türkmens against Byzantine counterattacks. But neither Seljuk guile nor Muslim Holy War are involved in this – it is the old antagonism between nomads and a sedentary population.

That the Seljuks had no intention to expel the Byzantines from all of Asia Minor appears clearly after the battle of Myriokephalon. Although the Byzantine army had been defeated, Kılıç Arslan concluded peace and was content with the restitution of the two fortresses of Subleon and Dorylaion. The refusal by the Byzantine emperor to give back Dorylaion led to minor military action but not to a serious war. The sultan was content, if the *status quo* was maintained[5].

Indeed, there were repeated Türkmen attacks all through the 12th century, but large, general offensives by the sultans themselves were rare. In fact, it was rather the Byzantine emperors who conducted major campaigns. But they too aimed primarily at checking the recurring nomad raids. They did not question the existence of the sultanate or of the Danişmendid principality. Two examples illustrate this very clearly:

In 1158 Manuel Comnenus undertook a major campaign in Northern Syria. The Franks of Antioch accepted his supremacy. Nūr ad-Dîn of Aleppo also pledged to send the emperor auxiliary troops. In addition Manuel had allied himself with the Danişmendid Yaği-Basan and with Şahanşah, Kılıç Arslan's brother. Thus the sultan of Iconium was completely encircled. A final victory over him would have been possible, even likely, during these years. Nevertheless, Manuel refrained from taking the final step in this war. He was content not to eradicate the sultanate of Iconium, in order to re-establish Byzantine dominion over Central Anatolia and even consented to a peace treaty by which the Empire gained virtually nothing in terms of territories. The international situation cannot have been the cause for this. From 1159 the preponderance of the Empire in the crusader states was

[5] R.-J.Lilie, "Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176). Auswirkungen auf das byzantinische Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert," *REB*, 35 (1977) 257-275.

unquestionable. With the Normans of Sicily and Southern Italy peace had been concluded in 1158, and the antagonism between the Empire and the Germans did not yet dominate Byzantine political thinking. Likewise, in the Balkans there was no serious threat to the empire. Manuel, then, had the time and a situation prevailed that would have allowed a definite resolution of the Anatolian question in favour of the Byzantines and their settling with the Seljuks once and for all.

But he did not do this. He was content with a peace treaty instead. Kılıç Arslan pledged military assistance against the enemies of the Empire and the restitution of a number of cities, Sebasteia in the first place. Also, he was obliged to prevent raids by his subjects into Byzantine territory. This stipulation probably refers to the Türkmens. It is indicative, that this treaty was not only signed by the sultan but confirmed by his military leaders as well. This shows that the emperor was well aware of the sultan's weak position and therefore strove to oblige the Türkmen leaders directly. In a way Kılıç Arslan recognized the emperor's supremacy in 1162, and this was exactly what Manuel had aimed at. He accepted the existence of the sultanate of Iconium at the same time that he established a balance of power in Asia Minor that gave a dominant position to Byzantium without the need to employ any larger number of the Empire's forces.

The campaign that ended with the defeat of Myriokephalon had no different purpose. In addition, it was to a considerable extent caused by the empire's western policy. The Byzantine Empire was completely isolated politically in the West during the 1170s. Germans and Normans were the Empire's enemies, the alliance with Venice did not exist any more. The only means which Byzantium might still use in order to break through this isolation was its position as protecting power of the crusader states in Syria and Palestine, a position threatened already by the growing power of Saladin. In this situation Manuel proposed a crusade and declared publicly that he intended to come to the aid of the crusaders. This resulted in the dispatch of a fleet in 1177, but primarily in preparations for an expedition against Iconium, preparations which were under way since 1175. This campaign was intended to open up again the land route to Palestine. The situation of the Empire would have profited from this considerably. If we may believe Manuel's own words, then, his aim was not to destroy

the sultanate of Iconium, but to reestablish security in Asia Minor, and to open the pilgrim route to the Holy Land again.

The second motive was supplied by the development of the situation in Asia Minor. We have seen that one of the Empire's aims in the 12th century was to establish and maintain a balance of power that gave preponderance to Byzantium. This balance had changed during the 1170s in favour of the Seljuks of Iconium. The possessions of the Danişmendids had been gradually absorbed by Kılıç Arslan, the last Danişmendids had fled to Constantinople. Manuel demanded from Kılıç Arslan the reinstatement of the Danişmendids. The sultan refused, and his refusal led to war. Manuel divided the Byzantine army. With the main force he marched towards Iconium. Another detachment attacked Niksar, which had been held by the Danişmendids before. This shows clearly that the emperor hoped for an insurrection in favour of the Danişmendids in the east while he, by his own attack, kept the Seljuk force occupied and unable to relieve the garrison of Niksar. Obviously he intended to re-establish the previous *status quo* in Asia Minor, which had been so favourable for Byzantium. The defeat at Myriokephalon put an end to this policy and gave preponderance to Kılıç Arslan. This at the same time explains the sultan's restraint. His principal aim was to consolidate his position. If he continued this war, he might endanger all he had achieved so far. So the best option was to wait. Time would work in his favour. A few years later, however, destiny almost realised Manuel's plans all the same, when Kılıç Arslan divided his principality among his sons, thus causing extended civil war and a decline of Seljuk power, which was to recover only in the 13th century. But under the Angeli Byzantium itself had become too weak to take advantage of this opportunity.

On the whole, then, the 12th century was a period of coexistence of Byzantium and the Seljuks, even if there was fighting again and again. No party sought a final decision, neither the Seljuks, nor the Byzantines. The major campaigns served to strengthen one's own position, not to eliminate the adversary; minor expeditions were in many cases the result of the internal weaknesses of the Seljuk state, which was unable to prevent the Türkmens from their habitual raids against the Byzantines.

What was the reason for this coexistence? The answer to this

question lies, not least, in the changes that came about in the structure of the Byzantine Empire in the time of the Comneni and Angeli.

During the middle-Byzantine period Asia Minor had been the nucleus of the Empire, Constantinople its undisputed centre. The first themes had been formed in Asia Minor, the economically most important provinces were situated there. The Empire was inconceivable without Asia Minor. The few provinces in the Balkans practically played no role, plundered and devastated by enemies as they were. Italy and Africa did not count at all. The Empire was Asia Minor and Constantinople. The Byzantines could have abandoned anything without much consequence but not their capital and not Asia Minor. Therefore the struggle against the Arab attacks was indeed a struggle for life. Had the Arabs succeeded in establishing themselves permanently in Asia Minor north of the Taurus, Byzantium would have been done for, as would have been the case if they had been able to gain Constantinople[6].

During the 11th century, however, the importance of the Balkans increases. After Byzantium had been able to push its frontiers as far as the Danube again, the Byzantine provinces in the Balkans began to recover gradually, and after Mantzikert they take the place that had been held by Asia Minor before. This change was difficult and painful. The weakness of the Empire in the time of Alexius I Comnenus is largely accounted for by this shift from the eastern to the western part of the Empire. But by the beginning of the 12th century this transition had been completed. It was the Balkan provinces now which flourished, and on which the wealth of the Empire was now based. The development of long-distance trade is most indicative of this, in its almost complete lack of interest in Asia Minor and almost exclusive concentration on the Balkan provinces. The Empire's provinces in Asia Minor no longer played any role in this any more. And – apart from Trebizond – Byzantine Asia Minor seems to have been exhausted economically as well. This is no wonder. The Turkish conquest after Mantzikert had left agriculture and the economic structure of the

[6] R.-J.Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber. Studien zur Strukturwandlung des byzantinischen Staates im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert,* (Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia 22) (München, 1976), esp. chapter VII.

peninsula generally completely destroyed. The population had fled to the coastal regions, to the islands or even to Europe, partly it was resettled. But most important of all the Türkmen nomads had occupied the plateau of Central Anatolia, and it proved to be impossible for the Byzantines to drive them out again. This resulted in extremely long borders, which could hardly be controlled effectively. The raids of the nomads constituted an element of insecurity, which impaired, indeed made virtually impossible, any economic recovery. The second crusade highlights this situation, as do the fortifications constructed by Manuel in the Region of Chliara, Pergamon and Adramyttion in the 1160s. Only after this organization did the region recover. Nicetas Choniates praises it as "one of the best measures" of Manuel[7]. We are dealing in this case not with an area on the Byzantine-Turkish border, but on the north western shores of the peninsula, as far removed from enemy territory as possible. This shows dramatically how unsafe the situation in Byzantine Asia Minor actually was.

To put an end to the nomadic raids definitely would have been possible only if the emperors had been able to drive all nomads out of Anatolia completely and repopulate the area. In addition to this they would have had to destroy the sultanate of Iconium and the Danişmendids as well – and even then the outcome would have been doubtful. But I doubt that the Byzantine Empire would have been strong enough – both militarily and economically – to achieve such results, to begin with. In any case, it did not even feel sufficiently strong to venture it. There were more important things to do. For the reshaping of the Empire's structure entailed consequences that could not be ignored. If the Balkans had now become the nucleus of the Empire, this nucleus had accordingly to be secured – as Asia Minor had been before. From Asia Minor there was no threat to the Balkans during the 12th century. The Seljuks no longer had a fleet after Tzachas had been beaten at the end of the 11th century. The Balkan provinces were menaced from the north – by the Hungarians, the Serbs, the Petchenegs, and the Cumans; and from the West – by Normans, Germans,

[7] *Nicetas Choniates*, ed. van Dieten, 150.

Venetians, Pisans, Genoese; and last, but not least, by the crusades. The Comneni and Angeli, therefore, concentrated totally on warding off these enemies by isolating them, playing them off against each other or by attempting to bring them under the Empire's influence. This is the governing principle of all Byzantine policy in the Balkans, in Italy, and even in the Crusader States. The Seljuks were not an important factor in this and little was to be gained by a war with them. So the emperors were content to establish and maintain a balance of power here, and to defend and secure the borders against raids by the nomads. This was less costly and left a number of options available. The idea of a reconquest of Asia Minor was probably never totally abandoned in Constantinople. But such an enterprise lay in the far distant future; it was not a matter of immediate concern.

Another development within the Byzantine Empire, however, was of even greater importance: during the 12th century a new power structure had emerged, which was distinctly different from the system which had been characteristic of Middle-Byzantium. During the mid-Byzantine period, the Empire had been a centrally-organized state. The emperor, with the centre Constantinople behind him, had been the most powerful factor by far, and the provincial powers played only a subordinate role. The domestic as well as the foreign policy, therefore – aside from a few exceptions – had been shaped exclusively by the central government seated in the capital. The Empire's policy towards its neighbours, then, was homogeneous and consistent, provided that the emperors were so themselves.

This situation changed in the 12th century. It would take too long to analyze the causes which lie at the bottom of this change. It will suffice to point out the conditions which had changed: during the middle-Byzantine period the central government had been strong. One reason for this had been the relative homogeneity of Byzantine society. Another had been the administrative structure of the Empire, the theme system. And not the least important reason for this had been the successful parrying by the central government of all attempts on the part of the provinces to gain power at the centre's expense.

This changed in the 11th century. The theme system had declined, and one of the main reasons was that the structure of Byzantine society had changed. By now, great clans had emerged, which derived their

power from their influence and their wealth in the provinces, and tried to limit the government's control over what they considered "their" provinces. The Byzantine writer Cecaumenus writes about this in considerable detail.

At first, all this happened against the intentions of the central government. But under the Comneni a change is brought about: the Comneni not only stop fighting the provincial aristocracy, but, on the contrary, base their rule on this class, indeed, place themselves at its top. The Byzantine Empire in the 12th century contained strong feudal elements, all of which tended to weaken the central government as opposed to the provincial centres of power. This was the price the emperors had to pay for the suppos of the provincial aristocracy. The Comneni and Angeli payed this price and attempted to secure the emperor's interests in other ways. One of these was the establishing of personal ties between the emperor and the aristocracy, mainly by marriage. But the emperor also tried to bring his own family to the top and thus create a kind of dynastic power. This resulted in a change in the position of the emperor. The emperor ceases to be the absolute lord, except in theory. He is not any more in a position simply to command, he now has to convince the others as well. Most importantly, in order to secure the support of the aristocracy, he had to respect its position, which means that he loses his influence in the provinces, to the extent at least to which these belong to the aristocracy.

The Gabras clan of Trebizond, provides a good example of this. This family held great possessions in the province of Chaldia in the 11th century already[8]. In the confusion that followed the battle of Mantzikert Theodore Gabras with forces of his own was able to capture Trebizond and establish a principality of his own there. The emperor Alexius I Comnenus tried to bring about a peaceful arrangement with Gabras, and after extended negotiatons was able to achieve a marriage between Gregory Gabras, who was held hostage in Constantinople, and his own daughter Mary Comnena. An attempt to break the power of the Gabras family by appointing a governor of his

[8] A.A.M.Bryer, "A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades, c. 979 - c. 1653, *University of Birmingham Historical Journal, 12 (1970), 164-187* (reprinted in A.A.M.Bryer, *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos* [London, 1980], no. IIIa).

own after Theodore had died, failed after a short time. The Gabras clan remained masters in Trebizond and Chaldia at least until the middle of the 12th century. An attempt by the emperor John II Comnenus, who undertook a campaign to Chaldia and against the Danişmendids, to force Constantine Gabras to recognize the imperial authority seems likewise not to have been crowned with success.

The end of this campaign is indicative of the dilemma in which the emperors found themselves: John was unable to take Niksar, which was held by the Danişmendids, and had to come back because, apparently, the Byzantine aristocracy refused to give their allegiance. This highlights the problems very clearly. The emperors depended on the support of the provinces. The provinces, however, had become more independent, and they took an interest in the successes of the central government only if these successes worked in their own favour, or at least did no damage to them.

In other words: a success of John over the Danişmendids was not necessarily desirable to the Gabras clan of Trebizond, because it would strengthen the emperor's position and might therefore endanger their own independence. This was probably one of the reasons for the failure of John's campaign. The emperors, on the other hand, could hardly be interested in taking strong measures against the Seljuks, if their efforts would benefit others – the Gabras family, for instance, or some other provincial magnate – rather than themselves. In a way this dilemma blocked any Byzantine policy towards the Seljuks and the Danişmendids.

The Comneni were not only the victims of this development, however, but promoted it themselves. John's plan to form a prinicpality for his son Manuel, which was to encompass Antioch, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Attaleia, would have meant the creation of a more or less independent state, over which Constantinople would have had only limited control. To a considerable extent this scheme was motivated by diplomatic considerations. Still it shows that the emperors were willing to recognize and even promote the growing independence of the provinces, provided they themselves profited from this development[9].

[9] *Ioannis Cinnami Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum*, ed. A.Meineke, (Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae) (Bonn, 1836), 23.

The growth in long-distance trade during the 12th century likewise contributed to an increase in the significance of the provinces. For Contantinople was no longer the only centre for such trade. Increasingly it was looking for markets in the Byzantine provinces as well.

This had consequences for developments in Asia Minor. If the emperors throughout the 12th century took a personal part in the events on many occasions, their activities were limited in most cases to North-Western Asia Minor and rarely showed much vigour. For the rest the provinces were more or less left to themselves. But strong as they had become, they still were no match for the Seljuks. They remained on the defensive, even more: they were ready to cooperate with the Seljuks to a limited extent, especially when no help was to be expected from Constantinople.

The Gabrades again provide a good example of this: in the 12th century they almost occupy an intermediate position between Byzantium and the Seljuks, mainly in order to safeguard their independence, from Byzantium as well as from the Turks. But it is also a consequence of the internal development of Byzantium. This may be seen clearly in the events after Manuel's death in 1180, when the separatist tendencies in the provinces increase rapidly and the power of the emperor declines. Many local lords now attempt to come to terms with the Seljuks; they even try to use them in order to maintain or improve their position in relation to the central government. I need only to recall the revolts of Theodore Mankaphas or of Manuel Maurozomes. Local interests here more or less make impossible any consistent policy toward the Seljuks. However, this is but the natural consequence of a development which began at the end of the 11th century. The emperors, on the other hand, could take an interest in the survival of the Turkish powers. The provinces occasionally played off the Turks against the central government, to be sure, but this game could be played by the other side as well. The emperor too could ally himself with the Seljuks or the Danişmendids against his own provinces as the case of Theodore Mankaphas in Philadelphia illustrates again.

The Byzantine Empire appears to be content, then, with the *status quo* in Asia Minor in the 12th century, and attempts to preserve it rather than endanger it by a *reconquista* policy. The same holds true,

by the way, during Manuel's reign, for the Balkan provinces and the crusader states in Syria and Palestine. It is the Empire's policy during this period to force the neighbouring states to recognize the supremacy of Byzantium, and to play them off against each other in a way that is most likely to safeguard the Empire's superiority.

But the Seljuks of Iconium and the Danişmendids likewise had little interest in an aggressive policy and this was so, paradoxically, for almost identical reasons.

The military strength of the Seljuks was based on the Türkmen nomads, who, however, could be controlled to a limited extent only. This resulted in limited security at the borders but at the same time reduced the danger of any major campaign, because the sultans could not be interested in letting the various Türkmen chieftains become still more powerful. The existence of the Byzantine state may indeed have been welcome to the rulers, for to a certain extent it could serve to check the nomads. To put it briefly: control of powerful and unreliable subjects through a foreign enemy. Also Byzantium was not necessarily a threat to the existence of the Seljuk state. More dangerous were the other Muslim powers in the east and in the south. This led to a situation in which the sultans were unable – and probably not even willing – to suppress the raids by the nomads but tried to forestall major attacks, attacks that might lead to reprisals from the side of the emperor. Manuel's expedition against Iconium before the second crusade provides an example for these Byzantine counterattacks, which were caused by a Türkmen attack.

But, outside of this overall policy the local Türkmens and Byzantines in the borderlands were more or less left to themselves. This led to fights but also to coexistence as may be seen in the case of Attaleia. This city payed a tribute to the nomads in the neighbourhood and thus was relatively safe from attacks[10]. This arrangement was probably not unique.

To this should be added still another consideration: it may not have

[10] William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum a tempore successorum Mahumeth usque ad annum domini MCCXXXIV. edita a Venerabili Willermo Tyrensi Archiepiscopo,* Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Historiens occidentaux I. 1-2 (Paris, 1844), XVI. 26, p.750s.

been desirable for the Seljuks to take over the coastlands. The Seljuks and the Danişmendids ruled over nomadic tribes. Their territory was the plateau of Anatolia, which was well suited for nomads, and by now had been abandoned almost completely by the Byzantines. The Greeks, on the other hand, were concentrated in the fertile river valleys in the west and in the coastal regions north of the Pontus range, on the shores of the Black Sea. These were lands that were suited for intensive agriculture. The two parties, nomads and peasants, complemented each other and thus the Greeks were of considerable use to the Seljuks, in addition because they served as a link with the Mediterranean long distance trade. In the 14th century the situation had changed, but the situation in the 12th century must not be equated rashly with that in subsequent centuries.

The difference in religion does not provide an argument against this coexistence. The crusading movement of the 12th century and the Muslim counter-thrust, especially under Nūr ad-Dīn and Saladin, are frequently misinterpreted as symptoms of an increase in tension between Muslims and Christians. For Western Europe and Syria/ Palestine this may be true, for Asia Minor it is not. Neither the Byzantines nor the Seljuks were fanatics in religious matters. One of Kılıç Arslan's chancellors, for example, was a Christian; the Byzantines employed Seljuk mercenaries in their army and even allowed a mosque to be maintained in Constantinople. Many more examples could be quoted.

On the whole it is hard to detect any sharp contrast in spite of the many differences. This is true for all aspects: race, culture, and social structure alike. Byzantine aristocratic families could attain the most prominent positions in the Seljuk state, as was the case with the Gabras family. On the other hand the Turkish Axuchs were one of the Empire's most distinguished families in the 12th century. A list of the Byzantines who at some time sought refuge with the Seljuk or Danişmendid courts reads almost like a *Who's Who?* of the high aristocracy of Byzantium. Suffice it to mention the sebastokrator Isaac Comnenus, the emperor John's brother, and his sons John and Andronicus, who later became emperor. On the other hand many Seljuks and Danişmendids found asylum at the court of Constantinople. There is no noticeable difference, at least, in comparison with the

Christian neighbours of Byzantium. The toing and froing of local lords at the end of the 12th century likewise testifies against any sharp contrast. People like Manuel Maurozomes, Theodore Mankaphas, the Pseudoalexii, or the Gabrades[11] are conceivable only in an area and in a political climate in which the leading powers were relatively similar.

For the rural population this is valid anyway. Partly the Byzantines were downright relieved when their area was taken over by the Seljuks. The tax burden decreased and so did the danger of Türkmen raids. In addition the sultans tried to make easier the difficult period of transition for these new subjects.

In the realm of ideology, no coexistence was possible, to be sure. But the Byzantines were much too realistic to let ideology have much influence on their actual policy. The same can be said about the Seljuks.

This is not to say that in principle the emperors were no longer interested in retrieving all of Asia Minor, and that the Seljuks would not have thrown the Greeks into the sea, had they been able to do so. But as long as this was impossible, each had to come to terms with the other.

Was, then, Asia Minor in the 12th century the paradise of peaceful coexistence? Certainly not. The antagonism continued. But to a certain extent one had come to an arrangement. Neither party was sufficiently strong to eradicate the other. In addition each side had other, more urgent problems. This did not exclude minor and major conflicts. But things were rarely pushed to extremes, either in the 12th or in the 13th century. The state of affairs was altered only when the Mongol invasion and the establishment of the Il-Khans had brought the sultanate of Iconium to an end.

At the same time the Byzantine Empire had become weaker and weaker as a consequence of endless civil wars and recurring attacks from the Bulgars, the Serbs, and the Latins. But that is a different period, the 14th and 15th centuries. In comparison the 12th century was a time of balance of power, a period of coexistence. Not without

[11] J.Hoffmann, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten im byzantinischen Reich (1071-1210), (Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia 17) (München, 1974).*

problems and quarrels, but without questioning the right of existence of the other party. This is a considerable achievement in the history of the Byzantine Empire and it is perhaps no small achievement in the history of the Muslim Turks either. Certainly it does not provide proof for the belief that the evil always comes from the east. For 12th century Byzantium it came rather from the Christian west.

THE FRAMEWORK : 3

THE OTTOMAN STATE ON THE EVE OF LEPANTO, 1571

HANS GEORG MAJER / MÜNCHEN

On the eve of Lepanto[1] the Ottoman State stretched over huge territories, reaching from the borders of Galicia and Podolia in the north to the Yemen in the south, from Algeria in the west to Mesopotamia in the east. The shores of the eastern and southern Mediterranean were Ottoman; the Red Sea, the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, although including the disturbing Venetian islands of Cyprus and Crete, had become Ottoman inland seas[2]. Only Philip II's Spain, comprising the Spanish kingdoms, the Netherlands, Burgundy, Milan, the Kingdoms of Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, the American possessions and the Philippines, was a match for the Ottoman Empire[3]. But the geographical advantage of the Ottomans was that their possessions formed one territory, any place except of course the islands could in principle be reached by land without the necessity of ever leaving the Empire's frontiers. The political advantage of the Ottoman Empire when compared to Philip II's kingdom was the direct rule it exercised in the bulk of its territories, important exceptions being the Khanate of the Crimea, the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transsylvania, and the republic of Ragusa.

The living spaces offered by the Ottoman territories differed

1 In 1971 two important meetings of historians dealt with Lepanto; one was held in Venice, the other in Zadar. The papers of both have been printed. Venice: *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, a cura di G. Benzoni (Firenze, 1974). Zadar: *Lepantska Bitka. Udio hrvatskih pomoraca u Lepantskoj Bitki 1571. godine*, ed. G. Novak and V. Mastrović (Zadar, 1974).

2 See D.E. Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden, 1972), map XXIII.

3 The standard work on the period and the region is F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, I-II (London, 1972).

greatly. The heartlands of the Empire[4], southeastern Europe and Asia Minor, were part of the zone of fold mountains extending from Spain to India, characterized by enclosed plains and plateaux. Arabia and North Africa contributed deserts to the surface of the state. The basins of three great rivers, the Danube, Euphrates and Nile, were cut in deeply into this body of land, offering good conditions for settlement and agriculture. As the coastlines of the Empire were very extended, most of the important towns were situated on it or along the great rivers. Communication by sea and river therefore was of great importance. Danger arose from Cyprus, Crete and Malta. The main routes by land ran towards the capital. The old 'Heerstrasse' from Belgrade to Constantinople and its branches connected Hungary and the Balkans to the capital, the pilgrim-road coming from Mecca and Medina via Damascus, crossing Anatolia, and its branches coming in from eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia bound the eastern and Arab provinces to the well-protected and dominating metropolis between the Two Lands and the Two Seas[5].

It took much time to get people, informations and goods from the capital to the far parts of the Empire and vice versa: for example thirteen days from Istanbul to Alexandria by ship[6]. Communications by land and by sea became extremely difficult and dangerous in winter.

The inhabitants of this vast area were grouped vertically in four legal categories according to the Sharia[7], with full rights for the first group and diminishing rights for the following: male Mulims, female Muslims, *zimmis* (i.e. non-Muslims), and slaves.

4 K. Kreiser, "Über den Kernraum des Osmanischen Reiches", *Die Türkei in Europa*, ed. K.-D. Grothusen (Göttingen, 1979), 53-63.

5 On the road-network of the Ottoman Empire see C. Jireček, *Die Heerstraße von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe* (Prague, 1877); O. Zirojević, "Carigradski drum od Beograda do Sofije (1459-1683)", *Zbornik Istorijskog Muzeja Srbije*, 7 (1970), 3-196; F. Taeschner, *Das anatolische Wegenetz nach osmanischen Quellen*, I-II (Leipzig, 1924-26).

6 The ship in our example, originally a Venetian galleon, had been taken away by the Turks in 1571. It was used by a German traveller in 1579: *Orientalische Reiss des Edlen und Vesten Hanss Jacob Breunig von und zu Buochenbach* (Strassburg, 1612), 103-16.

7 J. Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964), 124-133.

Müstemins, non-Muslim foreigners, lived under special conditions[8]. Religion was thus dicisive for the standing of a person. Within the crude legal grouping into Muslims and non-Muslims, however, a great variety of religious communities were the real basis of social life. Most Muslims were orthodox and belonged to the *Hanafi* law-school dominating in the Ottoman Empire, but there were adherents of the *Şafii, Maliki* and *Hanbali* schools as well, especially in the Arab provinces of the Empire. There were Shiite Muslims, some openly Shiite, others more or less hidden. The Shiites again were separated into different groups as Imanites, Zaidites and others. Popular Islam even of the seemingly orthodox Muslim population, characterized by believers often heterodox and pre-Islamic in origin, centred on cults of saints, was the domain of dervish orders of whom a great number existed in the Empire between Anatolia and North Africa. These dervish orders were no forerunners of the orthodox faith but seekers of a direct mystical contact to God. Some of them even denied the importance of any worldly laws and rules, and had demonstrated their ability to assemble discontented elements and especially those with strong but secret Shiite inclinations[9].

There were religious groups living on the margin or beyond Islam, such as the Druzes in the mountain regions of Syria, and the *Yazidis* centering in the mountains north of Mosul[10].

8 See H. Inalcık, "Imtiyāzāt ii. The Ottoman Empire, *EI*[2] III, 1179-89.

9 For general information on the dervish orders see J.S. Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford, 1971). Information especially on the Ottoman dervish orders can be found in various articles written by H.J. Kissling: "Die islamischen Derwischorden", *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte,* 12 (1960), 1-16; "Die soziologische und pädagogische Rolle der Dersischorden im Osmanischen Reiche", *ZDMG,* 103 (1953), 18-28; "The sociological and educational role of the dervish orders in the Ottoman Empire", *Studies in Islamic Cultural History,* ed. by G.E.v. Grunebaum (Menasha, Wisconsin 1954), 23-35; "Die Wunder der Derwische", *ZDMG,* 107 (1957), 348-361; "Aus dem Derwischwesen Südosteuropas", *Grazer und Münchener Balkanologische Studien* (Munich, 1967) 56-70. On individual Ottoman orders see articles and books by J.K. Birge, A. Gölpınarlı, S. Faroqhi and again H.J. Kissling (for references see S. Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien* [Wien, 1981], Bibliography).

10 See M.G.S. Hodgson, S. Tekindağ and M.T. Gökbilgin, "Durūz", *EI*[2] II 634-37; Th. Menzel "Yazīdī, "*Handwörterbuch des Islam,* ed. A.J. Wensinck

The non-Muslims consisted of Christians and Jews. Among the Christians the majority was Orthodox, again split up in several church-organizations. There were Protestants in Hungary, Catholics in Bosnia, Croatia and Albania, Copts in Egypt, Syrian Christians and several others. The Jews were split up according to their regional origins, *Sephardim* and *Ashkenazi* being the most important groups, and, according to their understanding of the Bible, into Karaites and Rabbinites[11]. Things become even more complicated when we consider the ethnic and linguistic differentiation. The official language and the language necessary for social advancement was Turkish. Arabic was the language of the Holy Koran, the language also of religious learning, and the mother-tongue in the Arab provinces. Persian was learned and used widely in educated circles. Kurdish, Armenian and Syriac were found especially in the East. Greek was used in the Balkans and in many parts of Anatolia. Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, Rumanian, Hungarian in the Balkans, Spanish was still used by the Jewish immigrants from Spain. Even German and Italian were languages of Ottoman subjects; as the former was spoken in Transsylvania, the latter in Dalmatia and Ragusa.

Most of these people lived in the country; agriculture was the basis of their living[12]. Transhumance and nomadism were widespread in the Arab provinces, in Anatolia and even in parts of the Balkans. A minority lived in towns, most of which resembled more big villages than real towns. Nevertheless there were many towns and their importance as centres of administration, com-

and J.H. Kramers (Leiden, 1941), 806-11; K.E. Müller, *Kulturhistorische Studien zur Genese pseudo-islamischer Sektengebilde in Vorderasien* (Wiesbaden, 1967).

11 Two important new books on Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire have apeared lately: B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society* I, II (New York and London, 1982); M.. Epstein, *The Ottoman Jewish Communities and their Role in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Freiburg, 1980).

12 A vast amount of information on the economic and the rural population can be found in the Ottoman cadastral surveys (see Ö.L. Barkan, "Daftar-i Khākānī, "*EI*[2] II, 81-83). Some of which have already been published by H. Inalcık, G. Káldy-Nagy, B. McGowan, H. Šabanović, H. Hadžibegić, A. Handžić, E. Kovačević, A. Stojanovski, W. Hütteroth - K. Abdulfattah and S.S. Jikᶜia.

merce, manufature, was great.

The Ottoman Empire was direct heir to a great number of empires, kingdoms, and principalities: including the Byzantine Empire, the Mamluk Sultanate, the Anatolian Principalities, the Bulgarian, Serbian, Bosnian and Hungarian Kingdoms; they were indirect heirs to the Selcuks, the Abbasids, the Omayyads and even to the state of the Prophet Muḥammad himself, the capitals of all these states now being Ottoman towns of greater or smaller importance: Constantinople, Cairo, Sofia, Belgrade, Buda, Konya, Baghdad, Damascus, Medina and Mecca. But the Ottomans were not only heirs; they had founded new towns and, even more important, they had developed many of the old urban centres. Istanbul had become a metropolis of about 400,000 inhabitants[13]. Anatolian Bursa, Kayseri, Ankara, Tokat, Konya, Ruha (Urfa), Ayntab, Sivas and Kastamonu each had between 3,000 and almost 13,000 taxpayers[14]. Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo had also greatly developed under the Ottomans during the 16th century[15]. Even some Balkan towns had grown considerably in size and importance[16]. Estimates of the entire population of the Ottoman Empire range from Braudel's of about 22 million[17] to Barkan's 30-35 million[18]. Demographic research has developed greatly over the last decades and a number of regional studies has been undertaken. With our growing knowledge of documentary detail and awareness of the problems they pose, it may be generalized that most towns seem to have expanded in the 16th century.

13 For a discussion of this question see: H. Inalcık, "Istanbul. VII. The Inhabitants", *EI* ², IV 238-44.

14 S. Faroqhi, "Taxation and Urban Activities in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1 (1979-80), 41; see also the same author's article: "Urban Development in Ottoman Anatolia (16.-17. Centuries)", *Journal of the Faculty of Architecture*, Middle East Technical University, 7/1 (1981), 35-51.

15 A. Raymond, "The Ottoman Conquest and the Development of the Great Arab Towns", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 1 (1979-80), 84-101.

16 N. Todorov, *La ville balkanique, XVe-XIXe ss.* (Sofia, 1970); M. Hadžijahić, "Die privilegierten Städte zur Zeit des osmanischen Feudalismus", *SOforsch*, 20 (1961), 130-58.

17 Braudel, *Mediterranean*, I, 396f., 410.

18 Braudel, *Mediterranean*, I, 396f., 410.

But whether this was a consequence of immigration, of indigenous growth, or of both factors is still unclear. More regional studies are needed before an answer can be ventured. Behind them, the most tormenting problem, being the question of the multiplier to translate household (*hane*) numbers into population figures of individuals, is still unsolved, and I fear may remain so to all eternity.

Far from being homogeneous, the Ottoman state is characterized by sharply marked geographical, ethnic, linguistic, religious and legal differences. These were only compounded when during the 16th century it almost doubled its territory by engorging in swift succession the Mamluk Sultanate and the Kingdom of Hungary. How could such a state be held together? There must have been factors of cohesion strong enough to match all the opposing forces. The most important of these factors of cohesion were the religion of Islam, the Ottoman dynasty and the Ottoman administration.

The Religion of Islam

Gaza, the struggle for the faith, for Islam, had been a decisive element of the early Ottoman successes. To conquer new lands for Islam, to become a *gazi,*[19] was an aim cherished by the sultans ever since. In the 16th century the Ottoman state had by conquest become the guardian of the Holy Cities, an honourable function intensifying its religious obligations. Religion and state, *din ü devlet,* had become a kind of unit, both elements, however, not being completely fused.

Islam prescribed the duties of the individual and of the community towards God, towards co-religionists and infidels. Islam was the varnish giving to the conglomerate Ottoman Empire the outside appearance of uniformity. The most visible element of this varnish was architecture: mosques, *medreses, hamams* and other buildings serving the needs of religion. For many years Mimar Sinan[20], the greatest single Ottoman contributor to the history of

19 J. Mélikoff, "Ghāzī", *EI* ², II, 1043-45.
20 O. Aslanapa, "Sinan", *IA*, X, 655-61.

art, had been in charge of putting the architectural varnish over the state. Hundreds of buildings had been erected all over the empire; the visible "magnificence" of Süleyman's reign was based mainly on Sinan's genius; his masterpiece, however, the Selimiye in Edirne, was just under construction on the eve of Lepanto. The organization of religion in Islamic history undeniably had its apex in the Ottoman Empire. For what Islam never had had before, it seemed to have now: a 'pope', 'bishops', 'priests' and 'monks', arranged in a hierarchic system, at least in the eyes of western travellers from the middle of the 16th century onwards[21].

Although in reality this Islamic 'church' did not exist, the observation was not totally wrong. In fact the Ottoman state, as a result of a long development, had just completed the formation of the *ilmiye*[22], organizing Islamic law and learning in a complicated system. A career in the *ilmiye* had three phases: the student had to run through a vertically arranged sequence of *medreses,* before he became professor. The professor had to follow the same sequence of *medreses* before he became a judge. The judge rose from office to office until he became judge of the capital, *kadiasker* of Anatolia, of Rumelia and at last 'pope', that is *müfti or şeyhülislam.* The *ilmiye,* as can easily be seen, was far from being an independent organisation, it was part of the Ottoman administration; the *ulema* had to guarantee the orthodox Islamic character of the state, but they also had to serve the state in more worldly functions. Nevertheless the *ulema's* religious learning, their formalized career, their wealth and group-solidarity made them more independent than any other group of Ottoman officials. A certain tendency toward greater influence and independence automatically resulted from the formation of the *ilmiye.* A development in that direction, however, depended on favorable conditions and these were to come only later on.

The 'pope', the *şeyhülislam,* on the eve of Lepanto was still Ebussuud Efendi, the greatest scholar of Islamic law the Ottoman

21 H.G. Majer, *Vorstudien zur Geschichte der Ilmiye,* I (Munich, 1978).

22 U. Heyd and E. Kuran, " 'Ilmiyye", EI², III, 1152-54; I.H. Uzuncarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Ilmiye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1965); H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* I / II (London, 1957).

Empire has produced[23]. He had been in office for decades representing continuity and stressing the determined Islamic orthodoxy of the Ottoman state. Ebussuud Efendi worked out the *fetva* justifying the attack on Cyprus in 1570[24].

No doubt a Muslim could feel himself at home in the Ottoman state. Islam was a further factor in its coherence, for non-Muslims were beginning to have a clearly defined status in subordination to the Muslims of the Empire, but with the right of regulating the internal life of their communities on the lines prescribed by their religions.

The Ottoman Dynasty

Until five years before Lepanto the Ottoman dynasty had contributed in a unique way to the cohesion, stability, and continuity of the Ottoman state: it had produced ten generations of capable rulers. From the eponymous Osman to Süleyman the Magnificent adult sons had succeeded their fathers to the throne. Only two ruled for the comparatively short period of eight years; seven ruled more than twenty five years, and one, Süleyman himself, for forty six years.

On the other hand the dynasty itself endangered stability and integrity of the state, whenever a sultan died, as there existed no accepted rules for succession[25]. Nevertheless the struggle for power among the princes was apt to bring to light their capabilities: those who won had always turned out to be able rulers. Unfortunately by 1566 the old system no longer functioned; it had degenerated during the long reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. Süleyman had had three sons, two of whom were like their forefathers. Being so, they had begun activities, which their father had judged to be endangering his rule. In such cases he used to react

23 J. Schacht, "Abu'l-Su'ūd", *EI* ², I, 152.

24 M.E. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* (Istanbul, 1972), 108f., Ottoman text in: Kātib Çelebi, *Tuḥfet ül-Kibār fī esfār ül-bīḥār* (Istanbul, 1141/1729), 40a. For a German translation see J. von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, III (Pest, 1828), 566f.

25 See F. Giese, "Das Seniorat im osmanischen Herrscherhaus", *Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte*, 2 (1923-26), 248-56.

swiftly and mercilessly: Prince Mustafa was killed, on his order[26]; Prince Bayezid was defeated by Prince Selim with the Sultans's help and fled to the Shah of Iran, an act that did not save his life in the long run[27]. In this way patient Prince Selim, by showing himself to be a good and obedient son, became the only heir to the throne: From 1566 he was Sultan Selim II, 'the blond', 'the sot', the first Ottoman of lesser ability[28]. Selim's mother, Sultan Süleyman's beloved Roxelane and Selim's sister Mihrimah had played an important part in the first scene of the succession drama[29]. These ladies corresponded with the king of Poland, an act symbolic for the increasing importance of the *harem*. As Selim's mother had died before his accession there was no *valide sultan* at his time, so his *başkadın* Nur Banu Sultan, born as Cecilia Venier-Baffo from a Venetian noble family[31], concentrated the *harem's* influence in her hands. Her influence on Selim is shown not only by the fact that she became mother of several princes[32] and princesses, among them the future Murad III, under the government of whom her power as *valide sultan* did not fade away. With the help of her influential Jewish *kira* she kept in touch with the extramural world of the *harem* and exercised her influence within. The Venetian *Archivio di Stato* preserves letters written to the doge by her and her *kira*[33]. Like Queen Victoria she nurtured other lines of influence: through her daughters. By 1562

26 See M.Ç. Uluçay, "Mustafa Sultan", *IA*, VIII, 690 ff.

27 See Ş. Turan, Kanunî 'nin Oğlu Şehzâde Bayezid Vak' ası (Ankara, 1961).

28 Ş. Turan, "Selim II", *IA*, X, 434-41; Marino Cavalli's *relazione* of 1567 not mentioned in that article, was published by W. Andreas in 1914 and again with annotations in his book *Staatskunst und Diplomatie der Venezianer im Spiegel ihrer Gesandtenberichte* (Leipzig, 1943), 273-89.

26 M.Ç. Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları* (Ankara, 1980), 34f., 38f.

30 Z. Abrahamowicz, *Katalog Dokumentów Tureckich* (Warsaw, 1959), 103-104, 106-107.

31 E. Rossi, "La sultana Nur Banu (Cecilia Venier-Baffo) moglie di Selim II (1566-1574) e madre di Murad III (1574-1595)", *Oriente Moderno*, 33 (1953), 433-41; Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları*, 40.

32 See Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, Table XXXI.

33 S.A. Skilliter, "The Letters of the Venetian 'Sultana' Nūr Bānū and her Kira to Venice", *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata* (Napoli, 1982), 340a, 515-36. Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları*, 40 ff.; idem, *Harem II* (Ankara, 1971), 94.

three had been married by their grandfather Süleyman to men of importance.

The early Ottomans had entered the dynastic web of foreign policy of their neighbours. They took as legitimate wives Byzantine, Serbian and emiral princesses and gave their own daughters to Muslim rulers[34]. Now sultans had only slave girls as concubines, such as Nur Banu, who only happened to have begun life in the Venetian aristocracy. But Ottoman princesses were still used in internal politics: an equivocal reward to great servants of state, for it bound them to the dynasty without incorporating them into it. By 1571 two of Selim's six viziers were his sons-in-law (*damad*) and one was the husband of his sister's daughter; a third vizier became his *damad* later[35].

The dynasty's sovereignty was unquestioned, for it had only one root. Ottoman court ceremonial developed over the centuries[36], allowing less able sultans to play a role which became strongly formalized. Selim's two more visible duties were to ride to Friday prayer with his retinue on horse and to hunt with his viziers. His third was to receive foreign ambassadors, which he performed sitting immobile, contributing to the dialogue (as his father before him) no more than a murmured "güzel, güzel"[37]. Silent and invisible, the sultan was supposed to audit sessions of the *divan* from behind a grille above where his vizier sat. No one knows how often he attended, but Selim's grand vizier frequently referred to his master's own wishes when dealing with foreign ambassadors[38]. Was his argument tactical, or does it demonstrate

34 Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, 85-100. *Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları*, 3-24; idem, *Harem I.*, 89.

35 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 98f. and *Stephan Gerlachs des Aelteren Tage-Buch der... An die Ottomannische Pforte zu Constantinopel abgefertigten ... Gesandtschafft*. Ed. by Samuel Gerlach (Franckfurth am Mayn, 1674), 38-39; Pečüyī, *Ta'rīḫ*, I (Istanbul, 1283), 539-43; *Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları*, 40ff.

36 It was *not* a Byzantine inheritage taken over by Mehmed II after the conquest of Constantinople, see K. Dilger, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des osmanischen Hofzeremoniells im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1967).

37 Gerlach, *Tage-Buch*, 23; annother eye-witness says "la sua grandezza consiste in non parlar Marino Cavalli, "Relazione", 283.

38 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 98.

Selim's real participation in affairs of state? Little is known. But one constraint on the grand vizier was that he had to keep his sultan informed, if only to pre-empt others who might be informing against him: one contemporary reports how careful he was in getting his ruler's approval in writing for his most important acts[39].

The Ottoman Administration

The shortcomings of a sultan could always be made up by an able grand vizier. Selim II's inheritance included Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, the old sultan's son-in-law and grand vizier of two years' standing[40]. Whether through indolence or common sense, Selim kept Sokollu Mehmed in office for life. It was his first effortless but major contribution to the Empire: the second was to beget an heir apparent. Both acts safeguarded our third factor of imperial cohesion: the continuity of Ottoman administration.

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had acquired an unique position. He was the first grand vizier whose scope was not limited by a more powerful sultan. People thought him to be the real ruler of the Empire. A Venetian envoy wrote "governa tutto l'imperio ottomano"[41]. This was true to a certain degree only, for he had to tolerate lesser and rival viziers in the *divan*. His eagerness to amass riches and place members of his family and client friends in high office should be seen as a symptom of his own insecurity of tenure, rather than of effortless exercise of his sultan's power. Apart from Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, there were five viziers in the *divan* all *devşirmelis* of Bosnian, Albanian and Hungarian origin: Pertev Pasha[42], Piyale Pasha[43], Semiz Ahmed Pasha[44], Zal Mahmud Pasha[45] and Lala Mustafa Pasha[46]. Apart from them

39 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 98.

40 M.T. Gökbilgin, "Mehmed Paşa Sokollu", *IA*, VII, 595-605; see also: O. Zirojević, "Mehmed Pascha Sokolli im Lichte jugoslawischer Quellen und Überlieferungen", *Osmanlı Araştırmalar*, 4 (1984), 55-67.

41 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 81, a similar expression is found on p. 98.

42 Ş. Turan, "Pertev Paşa", *IA* IX, 552ff.

43 Ş. Turan, "Piyâle Paşa", *IA* IX, 566-569.

44 I.H. Danişmend, *Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı* (Istanbul, 1971), 19.

there were the two *kadiaskers* representing the *ilmiye* and the *defterdar*, head of the finance department, who became more and more important[47]. The *divan* discussed and dicided all matters of state. But some were brought to the sultan for approval. Unfortunately we still know too little about the exact procedure at the time of Selim II. But apart from state affairs, any subject Muslim or Christian, could apply to the sultan or *divan*; so, as *defters* show, the latter had to decide on hundreds of individual cases, because people often made use of this possibility whenever local authorities had been unable or unwilling to solve their problems[48]. In principle the inherently conservative Ottoman administration was inclined to prolong conditions, rights and privileges given to anyone at any time. The orders of the *divan* where exercized mainly through two administrative networks covering some way or the other the whole of the state:

- The administrative network of *beylerbeyliks* and *sancaks*. Being at the same time the framework for the military *timar*-organization, it had executive power.
- The network of *kazas*, part of the *ilmiye*; the *kadis* besides their original judicial and notarial duties were obliged to register all incoming orders in their *sicills*; an effective means of supervision of the provincial authorities and a valuable source of modern research.

Substructures of both networks reached into every village. *Beylerbeyis, sancakbeyis* and *kadis* were in principle nominated by the sultan, who never completely gave up the field of personal policy.

"Orderly finances are essential to the state"[49]. No doubt this is a

45 Pečūyī, *Tarih*, I, 441 f; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, II, 426 (Istanbul, 1311).

46 B. Kütükoğlu, "Mustafa Paşa, Lala", *IA*, VIII, 732-36.

47 See K. Röhrborn, "Die Emanzipation der Finanzbürokratie im Osmanischen Reich (Ende 16. Jahrhundert), *ZDMG*, 122 (1972), 118-39.

48 For the defters of the diwan-i hümayun see A. Çetin, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Kılavuzu* (Istanbul, 1979); for an even more detailed list of the most important type, the mühimme defterleri see G. Elezović, *Iz Carigradskih Turskih Arhiva Mühimme Defteri* (Beograd, 1950), 19-30.

49 R. Tschudi (ed.), *Das Aşafnâme des Lutfî Pascha*. Türkische Bibliothek ed. G. Jacob 12 (Berlin, 1910), Turkish text p. 35, German trans. p. 29.

commonplace, but a commonplace written down in the mid-sixteenth century by Lutfi Pasha, a former grand vizier of Süleyman the Magnificent. Did the Ottoman State follow this maxim; did it have orderly finances? What was its income and expenditure? When the Venetian envoy Jacopo Ragazzoni read his *relazione* in August 1571, one month before Lepanto, he had to admit his ignorance of Ottoman finances. He was sure, however, of one aspect: there was a surplus every year[50]. If this really was true, Lutfi Pasha's second financial maxim had been fulfilled, namely: "it is absolutely necessary that receipts surpass expenditure"[51].

Consequently for him a surplus of income is the proof of orderly finances. By balancing receipts and expenditure annually this proof according to him can be given and a basis for financial proceeding can be won[52].

In fact some balances of the Ottoman state have been preserved, the earliest dating from the time of Mehmed II[53]. Another one luckily dates almost from the eve of Lepanto: it is a budget, as scholarly convention calls them now, covering the period from March 11th 1567 to March 10th 1568[54]. At first glance Ragazzoni's remark on the surplus can be verified: the income was 348,544,150 *akçe,* being equivalent to 5,809,069 gold pieces; the expenditure 221,532,423 (= 3,692,190 gold pieces), so there was a surplus of 127,011,728 *akçe* (= 2,116,862 gold pieces). Even if we subtract the amount of 119,509,235 *akçe* (= 1,991,820 gold pieces), which was not a regular income of that year, there remains a small surplus of 125,042 ducats (7,502,493 *akçe*)[55].

Spain's revenues in 1566 totalled 10,943,000 ducats, and 13,048,000 in 1577[56]. Compared with these figures the Ottoman

50 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 99.

51 Tschudi, "Aşafnâme", loc. cit.

52 Tschudi, "Aşafnâme", Turkish text p. 40, German trans. p. 32.

53 H.G. Majer, "Ein osmanisches Budget aus der Zeit Mehmeds des Eroberers", *Der Islam,* 59 (1982), 40-63; 387.

54 Ö.L. Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-68) Malî Yılına âit bir Osmanlı Bütçesi", *Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası,* 19 (1957-58), 277-332.

55 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 237, 251.

56 Braudel, *Mediterranean,* I, 533; on the financial consequences of Spains'

sum seems to have been quite small. But there is a great difference: Spain had debts which in 1571-73 amounted to about 50 million ducats, so it must have had to pay between 2½ and 5 million in interest annually[57]. The Ottomans had almost no debts and paid no interest. The surplus was available in cash in the Imperial Treasury and in Yedikule[58].

Unfortunately the interpretation of the Ottoman budgets presents great difficulties. They are not arranged systematically but according to more or less unclear and often changing bureaucratic usages and traditions. One thing, however, is sure: the budgets list only those parts of the Ottoman state's receipts and expenditure which went through the central treasury. A considerable part of the state income was balanced already on a local or provincial level. In these cases only a surplus might be represented in the treasury's budgets.

13.9% of the receipts were irregular and 86.1% regular, made up of 47% from the Rumelian *defterdarlıks,* 16% from the Anatolian *defterdarlıks,* 0.5% from the *haremeyn evkafı,* 22.6% were the *hazine* (surplus) of Egypt, Aleppo and Damascus[59].

The irregular receipts consisted of items like honorary gifts of provincial governors and *kadis* on the occasion of Selim II's accession to the throne; extraordinary taxes, taken especially in wartime; sums resulting from the sale of church property and of textiles by the treasury; sums from the *vilayets* of Diyarbakır, Yemen and Beç, the last of which denoted the Emperor's tribute for his Hungarian possessions; money found hidden in the house of a former finance official in Egypt, amounting to about three times the Hungarian tribute[60]; and the fortune of a killed Gouvernor of Yemen[61].

participation in the war, see F.R. Martin, "Las Finanzas de la Monarquía Hispanica y la Liga Santa", *Il Mediterraneo,* 325-70.

57 Braudel, loc. cit.

58 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 311.

59 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 285.

60 Compare Gerlach, *Tage-Buch,* 31: "Das Begler-Begat zu Kairo solle sonderlich der beste Reichmacher seyn, und seinen selbsten eigenen Schnitt dabey treflich haben, darumb wann sie einen bald reich machen wollen, schicken sie ihn dahin".

Unfortunately the regular receipts are not given with many details. The most important single item is *mukataa,* tax farming comprising income of almost every kind: agriculture, mining, fishing, the mint. Among some others there are mentioned the sheep-tax (*adet-i agnam*), the poll-tax (*cizye*) the farm-tax (*ispence*), fees for documents, honorary gifts (*pişkeş*) of metropolitans and others; and not least income from the sultanic estates (*hass*) and the poll-tax of Cyprus[62], amounting to 8000 ducats (*altun*) which sum had been payed to the Mamluk sultan first by the kings of Cyprus then by the Venetians from 1426-1517 and to the Ottomans ever since, year by year[63].

Unfortunately the problems involved make it impossible to compare this budget to others earlier and later. In general, however, the Ottoman finances on the eve of Lepanto seem to have been still in rather good order. This is confirmed by the fact that the value of money had also been stable for a long time. Economic and financial problems began to characterize the Ottoman state some years after Lepanto and hardly in any connection with it[63a].

The Ottoman state was the result of conquests; it had been created by the army, not vice-versa. Consequently the state was there for the army; one of its main tasks was to safeguard the existence of its military power. This can be seen from the fact that by far the greatest part of the state revenue was spent on the army. The Ottoman army was paid for in peace as well as in war, in winter and in summer. So in principle the Ottoman state could wage war without enlarging its financial burden; an astonishing fact noticed by many observers from the West. In 1573 one observer, even estimated, that by waging war the sultan became

61 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 303.

62 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 299-302.

63 For details of the Venetian payment see T. Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyatında Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri", *Belgeler,* 1/2 (1964) 119-220, especially 127, 134f., 192f., 194-200, 202, 216. See also A.H. de Groot, "Ḳubrus", *EI²*, V, 301-309, 304f.

63a See Ö.L. Barkan, "L'Empire ottoman face au monde chrétien au lendemain de Lépante", *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del' 500 alla luce di Lepanto,* ed. G. Benzoni (Firenze, 1974), 95-108 especially 95-96; also Röhrborn, "Emanzipation der Finanzbürokratie", 119-22.

richer[64] and when writing so, did not even think of conquests. Reading his *relazione* to the senate in August 1571, Jacopo Ragazzoni presented some figures for Ottoman military power: 160,000 *sipahis,* 12-14,000 janissaries and additional irregular soldiers (*venturieri*)[65]. The number given for the janissaries can be controlled quite easily. According to the budget of 1567-68 they numbered 12,798 in the capital, but there was a number of janissaries also in the *vilayets* of Buda and Tesmeshvar[66]. The number of 160,000 *sipahis,* owners of *timars,* seems to be quite exaggerated. Their numbers and income unfortunately are not represented in the budget of 1567-68. On the other hand Ömer Lütfi Barkan calculated that the *sipahis* together with their armoured men (*cebeli*) must have numbered about 200,000 at the end of the century[67]. Again we must admit that Ragazzoni was informed quite well. The irregular troops Ragazzoni mentions might live from booty as the *akıncıs*[68], or they might be paid retainers of *sancakbeyis* or *beylerbeyis* like the *delis* and other units. Ragazzoni was unable to give numbers and even today the information at hand is scanty[69].

Ragazzoni did not mention the paid élite cavalry of the sultan, about 11,000 men; he did not mention the technical units of about 2,500 men (*topçu, cebeci, top arabacı*), nor the paid troops guarding the border fortresses in Hungary (*vilayets* of Budin and Temeshvar)[70]. Besides assembling his own troops the sultan of course could order his vassals, especially the Khans of the Crimea[71], to send troops. Thus the Ottoman state disposed of a numerically impressive army. But there were important limitations

64 Gerlach, *Tage-Buch,* 31.

65 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 99.

66 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 305, 309.

67 Ö.L. Barkan, "Timar", *IA,* XII/1, 290-93.

68 A. Decei, "Akındjı", *EI*², I, 340.

69 I.H. Uzunçarşılı, "Deli", *EI*², II, 201f. M. Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul, 1965).

70 Barkan, "Osmanlı Bütçesi", 305-306, 309.

71 L.J.D. Collins, "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars, 16th-17th centuries", *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East,* ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London, 1975) 257-76.

in respect to the availability of these forces.

As the bulk of the army, the *timarlı sipahis* and their *cebelis,* were cavalry, forage was required, which was only available in certain seasons. As their income also derived mainly from agriculture, they were eager to be at home before winter. Consequently the traditional season of campaigning became limited to between 5th of May (*ruz-i Hızır*) and November 8th (*ruz-i Kasım*). Whenever a longer season was necessary, some resistance had to be expected.

The long borderline and powerful neighbours did not allow the Ottoman state to withdraw all troops and concentrate them on one point. Border-fortresses and border-provinces had to be protected. Even in other provinces some military were necessary for keeping up law and order. Nevertheless the military power of the Ottoman state was undeniable. For some time during Süleyman's early Hungarian campaigns, however, the Ottoman soldiery had suffered great losses by the efficient gun and musket fire of the German infantry. The consequence had been the introduction of *tüfeng* (i.e. *rifle*) into the Ottoman army. By 1566, according to Selaniki "all the soldiers at the sultan's Porte as well as the retinues of the pashas used the *tüfeng* against the enemy"[72]. The same can be attested for certain garrison troops. The men in the pashas' retinues as well as those in the garrisons carrying muskets were originally *reaya*. "Despite the government's prohibition and confiscation of arms, by 1570", according to Inalcık, "the use of the tüfeng had become widespread among various groups of re'āyā"[73]. Peasant youths equipped with fire-arms became an important reservoir for the Ottoman army, and were to play an important part in the transformation of the Ottoman army, beginning at the end of the century. The timariot calvalry still forming the majority of the troops, however, was more conservative and did not give up its traditional equipment so easily. Lazarus von Schwendi, who had commanded the forces of Emperor

72 H. Inalcık, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East", *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East,* ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London, 1975), 199.

73 Inalcık, "Diffusion of Fire-arms", 197.

Maximilian II on the Hungarian front during the years 1564-68 compared the German and Turkish soldiers. He "believed the Germans ('natio Germanica') to be less disciplined, less mobile, and of less endurance than the Turks and also inferior to them in the practice of war. He underlines how numerous were the horsemen available to the sultan and how difficult it was to meet their tactics of assault, withdrawal, and renewed attack"[74].

The Ottoman navy had two main bases, the arsenals at Galata and Gallipoli[75]. These were at the same time the most important shipbuilding-yards in the Empire. Smaller arsenals were at Sinop and Izmir. The arsenal at Galata had 123 docks in 1557 "where ships could be built, pulled up on land for repair, or housed during the winter months and each dock could hold two vessels. This allowed a fleet of 250 galleys to winter at Galata"[76]. The shipbuilding capacity of the empire was centred in these arsenals, but as galley building did not require special dockyards, facilities for shipbuilding could also be found at a number of places along the shores and rivers of the Empire.

Ragazzoni's judgment regarding the existance of sufficient resourses for ship-building can be confirmed on the basis of modern research. In his thorough study of *The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent,* Colin Imber characterizes the situation: "The continued maintenance of a fleet of wooden vessels required vast and regular supplies of timber for construction, pitch, oakum and tallow for caulking and viling, iron for nails, anchor chains, and other metal parts, fibrous plants for rope and sailcloth, and numerous other materials. Sixteenth-century records show that in all of these the Ottoman Empire was self-sufficient, however scattered its resources may have been and however formidable the problem of transport"[77]. These resourses, their exploitation

74 V.J. Parry, "La Manière de Combattre", *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East,* ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London, 1975), 223.

75 On the Ottoman Navy see I.H. Uzunçarşılı, "Baḥriyya, iii. The Ottoman navy", *EI*², I, 947ff.; idem, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1948), 389-546; and the important article of C.H. Imber cited in the next footnote.

76 C.H. Imber, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent", *Archivum Ottomanicum,* 6 (1980), 239.

fashioning, transport, and use was strictly under the control of the central government.

The Ottoman navy had become the greatest single naval power in the Mediterranean after 1538[78]. Its dangerousness had been demonstrated several times during the years preceding Lepanto: Malta had been attacked by a large fleet in 1565 although in vain; Chios had been incorporated into the Empire in 1566, by the Don-Volga project the Ottoman Black Sea fleet would be enabled to reach the Caspian Sea in 1569, and in 1570 the fleet started the conquest of Cyprus.

Examined with critical Venetian eyes the Ottoman navy nevertheless had its weaknesses. But, as Ragazzoni remarked in August 1571 before the senate, if the Ottomans put as much care and diligence in the affairs of the sea as they did in those of the land, it would have to be feared that their power would also grow greatly in this field, as there was no lack of anything to build and furnish a greater quantity of galleys. In case of problems they easily could get the necessary supplies with the help of money[79].

Lepanto

At Manzikert in 1071 Turks had won a land-battle; at Lepanto, exactly 500 years later, they lost a sea-battle. Manzikert without doubt is the symbol for a beginning. Lepanto, however, marks no end, not even the beginning of an end.

On October 7th, at sunrise, two fleets met at the entrance of the gulf of Lepanto. The Ottoman fleet numbered 230 warships, the Christian fleet 208. At the end 30 Ottoman galleys escaped, the rest was captured by the victors. The Ottomans suffered over 30,000 dead and wounded and 3,000 prisoners. The Christians lost 10 galleys, suffered 8,000 men killed and 21,000 wounded[80]. No doubt a glorious victory for the allied navy under the command

77 Imber, "Navy", 228.

78 Imber, "Navy", 235; see also: V. Maštrović, "Turska kao pomorska sila prije Lepantske Bitke", *Lepantska Bitka*, 11-28 with English summary.

79 Ragazzoni, "Relazione", 100f.

80 Braudel, *Mediterranean*, II, 1102 (with bibliography); differing numbers are given by: J. Sisević, "Tok Lepantske Bitke 1571. Godine", *Lepantska*

of Don John of Austria, the Ottoman fleet seemed totally destroyed. Wildest hopes filled the air.

Christian Europe was full of overwhelming joy; the invincible enemy had been beaten, the Virgin had worked a miracle. Trophies were solemnly hung up in churches. Poems, sermons and accounts celebrating the event were written and distributed widely in print. Woodcuts, copper engravings and medals[82] illustrated the event. In Venice Paolo Veronese, Jacopo Tintoretto and Andrea Vicentino dealt with the subject[83]. Churches and palaces all over Europe were embellished with paintings or frescoes of Lepanto, even in Japan a painting was found representing the battle of Lepanto[84].

Thanks to the Rosary Feast introduced by the pope in commemoration of the contribution of the prayers of the Fraternities of the Rosary on the 7th October, and thanks to the fraternities themselves, Lepanto did not cease to be remembered as an essential miracle of the Virgin and a topic for artists: even as late as the early 18th century we find Lepanto on the walls of Bavarian baroque churches[85], and Sta. Maria Victoria in Ingolstadt owns a unique monstrance, manufactured in Augsburg in 1708, showing an allegorical representation of Lepanto[86].

The contrast to the immediate military and political consequences is great. Although we unfortunately know little about the imme-

Bitka, 39-49, including a summary in English.

81 C. Göllner, *Turcica. Die europäischen Türkendrucke des XVI. Jahrhunderts.* II: MDLI-MDC (Bucharest, Baden-Baden, 1968) 220-38. See also C. Dionisotti, "Lepanto nella cultura italiana del tempo", *Il Mediterraneo nella secconda metà del' 500 alla luce di Lepanto* (Firenze, 1974), 127-151.

82 G. Gorini, "Lepanto nelle medaglie", *Il Mediterraneo,* 153-62 (with illustrations).

83 A. Pallucchini, "Echi della battaglia di Lepanto nella pintura Veneziana del 500", *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del' 500 alla luce di Lepanto* (Firenze, 1974), 279-87, the article includes reproductions of the paintings.

84 Akiyama, "Lepanto auf einem japanischen Wandschirm des 16. Jahrhundert", *Du* 22.255 (May 1962), 47.

85 The most impressive example is Mariae Himmelfahrt in Prien near the Chiemsee.

86 The monstrance (1.23 m. in height) is made of gold and silver. It is reproducted and described in *Du* 22.255 (May 1962), 34-37.

diate reactions in the Ottoman Empire, we can say the Muslim people reacted with prayers, and that Selim II was left without sleep for three days and nights. Then he returned from Edirne to the capital and with the grand vezier's aid began to react without delay[87]. By using all the capacity of their state, the Ottomans were able to rebuild a powerful fleet within a year[88]. The original aim of the war, the conquest of Cyprus, was realized in spite of Lepanto[89]. Ottoman naval activities did not cease for some time after Lepanto. But when they did it was in another context. Braudel's theory that neglect of the fleets in consequence of the lack of a powerful and agressive enemy caused the decline of both the Spanish and Ottoman naval powers[90] seems reasonable to me. Lepanto for the Ottomans was just a lost battle, for Europe — according to Braudel — it was "the end of a genuine inferiority complex"[91]. The Ottoman State on the eve of Lepanto was still well-ordered and powerful, although it was already developing structures which diminished its capacity of coping successfully with the crises coming at the end of the century.

87 R. Mantran "L'écho de la bataille de Lépante à Constantinople", *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del 500 alla luce di Lepanto* (Florence, 1974), 243-56.

88 Unfortunately C.H. Imber's article "The Reconstruction of the Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Lepanto 1571-72", has not appeared in print so far. Some materials and conclusions from that article, however, can be found in his "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6 (1980), 211-82.

89 See H. Inalcık, "Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest", *Milletlerarası Birinci Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi (14-19 Nisan 1969). Türk Heyeti Tebliğleri* (Ankara, 1971), 59-77, reprinted in H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy*. Collected Studies (London, 1978); N. Göyünç, "Türk hizmetine giren bâzi Kıbrıs müdafileri", *Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi*, 105-107 (in Turkish), 109-12 (in German); C. Orhonlu "Osmanlı Türklerinin Kıbrıs Adasına yerleşmesi (1570-1580)", *Kıbrıs Tetkikleri Kongresi*, 91-97 (in Turkish), 99-103 (in English). The first budget of Ottoman Cyprus, dated 979-980 / 1571-72, was published by H. Sahillioğlu, "Osmanlı idâresinde Kıbrıs' in ilk Yılı Bütçesi", *Belgeler* 4.718 (1967), 1-33.

90 F. Braudel, *Mediterranean*, 1141f, idem "Bilan d'une bataille", *Il Mediterraneo*, 117-20.

91 F. Braudel, *Mediterranean*, 1103.

I. SECURITY AND WARFARE : 1

THE COST OF LATE BYZANTINE WARFARE AND DEFENSE

MARK C. BARTUSIS / ABERDEEN, S. DAKOTA

A consideration of the costs of warfare and defense during the late Byzantine period (1204-1453) begins with a definition of the word *cost*. From the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between the "costs" of warfare and the "effects" of warfare. Costs, generally speaking, are a type of negative effect. But since negative effects themselves are relative (e.g., what was negative for the Byzantine state was often a positive benefit to the Ottoman state), it is appropriate to limit the discussion to the negative effects of defense and warfare upon the Byzantine state and population. And while it is understood that what was bad for the state may not have been bad for the population, and vice versa, this approach is sufficient to include within the word *cost* the major impact of defense and warfare in the late period, as well as to exclude the vague "effects" of warfare which had no clear positive or negative impact. An example of the latter is the ascendancy of the military class in Byzantine society.

Yet all negative effects of warfare are not "costs". Here it is necessary to distinguish further between the negative effects of warfare and those negative effects which would have resulted whether or not Byzantium was successful in its defensive efforts. So, by "cost of warfare and defense" I shall mean the price Byzantium had to pay for defense even if that defense had been successful; that is, negative effects inherent in Byzantium's military policies regardless of the success at implementing those policies. Thus, the long-distance flight of people from areas conquered by the Turks is not a cost of warfare, though the short-distance flight to cities of peasants whose lands were devastated

by the Turks invited to Europe by Byzantine rulers was.

Most of the negative effects of warfare can be categorized under the rubric of either social costs or economic costs, i.e., the price paid for war and defense by Byzantine society at large and the price paid by the Byzantine economy. This paper will deal with each of these in turn.

The social costs of late Byzantine warfare and defense took two forms. On one hand there was the direct human cost paid by any society which goes to war or must defend itself. Whether victorious or defeated, there will be the dead, the maimed, the wounded, the prisoners and, in the pre-modern era, the enslaved. Soldiers fighting for Byzantium or for a faction in one of the Byzantine civil wars, faced danger not only from the enemy, whoever that may have been, but from the elements[1], from disease[2], and from hunger[3], as well as from the Byzantine population itself. At times civilians were enslaved as a result of imperial policy decisions — one might think of John Kantakouzenos' employment of Omur's Turks[4]— and occasionally civilians died at the hands of the enemy, a tragedy usually resulting from their refusal to stand clear of conflict[5]. But the direct cost of warfare in terms of human lives was relatively low. Casualities of more than 100 for any single battle are rare. Even a major Byzantine defeat, such as the battle of Pelekanon in 1329, for which Kantakouzenos seems to provide accurate figures, involved no more than perhaps 150 casualties[6].

Much more significant are those social costs which contribute to the erosion or disintegration of the social bonds which hold society together. These social bonds are the interpersonal ties of

1 E.g., *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Eximperatoris Historiarum* (Bonn, 1828-32), II, 347-48 [henceforth, Kant.].

2 E.g., Kant. II 293.

3 E.g., M. Bartusis, "Brigandage in the Late Byzantine Empire", *Byzantion*, 51 (1981), 400-02.

4 Kant. II 384, 391, 404. But cf. Kant. I 171.

5 E.g., Kant. II 303-05; *Georgii Pachymeris de Michaele et Andronikо Palaeologis* (Bonn, 1835), II, 629-30 [henceforth, Pachy.].

6 Kant. I 347-62 (a total of 129 Byzantine soldiers killed). Cf. the numbers of killed or wounded in other battles or sieges: Kant. I 140, 175, 467; III 126, 129; *Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina Historia* (Bonn, 1829-55), I, 415 [henceforth, Greg.].

dependence between men and the social ties between men and institutions. Without them, civilization is impossible, and as they are eroded — as in late Byzantium — civilization itself disintegrates. Warfare was not the only factor which played a role in the transformations of late Byzantine society, but it did have a very decisive role. Warfare, in this respect, had several characteristics which undermined a variety of societal bonds. All of these proceeded from two fundamental facts about late Byzantine warfare: First, the scene of warfare was always Byzantine territory, or territory which had recently been Byzantine territory, and second, it was impossible for the state to acquire an adequate number of professional soldiers from the native population of the empire. All else proceeds from these two facts.

From the fact that all late Byzantine military activities occurred within Byzantium or within territory that had recently been Byzantine come all the social costs of warfare which arose when armies — both Byzantine and those of enemies — roamed the countryside of Byzantium. With the single exception of certain parts of Anatolia during the first half of the thirteenth century, not a single piece of late Byzantine territory escaped the march of warring troops. And since the number of trained, professional troops was small, it was necessary to supplement the size of the army or alter tactics or both. Throughout the late period the state relied heavily on foreign mercenary troops — usually Latins — or auxiliary troops — notably Turks — as well as untrained civilians — peasants and the urban poor. The insufficient number of trained troops raised the value of each professional soldier to the point where pitched battles were avoided, military commanders preferring less hazardous tactics such as skirmishing, pillaging and treachery to accomplish what could not be done through overt force or through attrition[7].

The presence of the military in Byzantine territory and the nature of their military activities while in Byzantine territory had numerous detrimental effects. Since their pay was frequently late or

7 See Pachy. II 271-72, 624; Greg. I 538; Bartusis, "Brigandage", 398.

simply unpaid[8], or in those cases when their primary source of pay was plunder, soldiers were often engaged in pillage, both officially sanctioned and at the soldier's own initiative. The act of laying waste hostile territory was the most effective, time-honored means of punishing towns that refused to surrender. Yet, it is during attempts to recover lost territory that the propriety of military plundering becomes questionable, and indeed, becomes a cost of warfare. For example, in 1355 troops under the command of John Kantakouzenos' son Matthew plundered the environs of Philippi, an area which had been held by the Serbs only since 1345. In this instance, as in many others, it is not known whether the commander (here Matthew Kantakouzenos) actually ordered his troops to plunder or whether his troops, probably being no more disciplined than other late Byzantine forces, decided to pillage on their own[9]. Yet either scenario makes the plundering a "cost" of warfare; in the first, the commander, wishing to harm the economic base of the occupied territory or wishing to improve the morale of his troops or seeking a way to pay his troops, orders pillage[10]. In the other, the cost of employing ill-disciplined troops manifests itself in unauthorized plunder[11]. In the end, the cost was borne by those Byzantine peasants living in the land occupied by the Serbs.

The pillage of unpaid or poorly-disciplined soldiers was often duplicated by the irregular bands of peasant or urban troops which often supplemented the regular campaign armies. At times the state actively recruited such supplemental forces, while at other times, such "peasant armies" appeared unbidden, but were nevertheless employed reluctantly to make up for a shortage of trained manpower. In one notable case, that of the peasant army led by the

8 E.g., see Pachy. I 54; II 208; Greg. I 138; Kant. I 238; Bartusis, "Brigandage", 396; *Chronicle of the Morea*, ed. J. Schmitt (London, 1904), v. 5100.

9 Greg. III 564.

10 Plundering as a standard procedure: *Chronicle of the Morea*, vv. 3670, 6652; Kant. I 190; II 292, 484; Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des offices*, ed. J. Verpeaux (Paris, 1966), 173, 251.

11 Indiscipline within the army: Kant. I 96, 97, 149; II 84-87; III 66; Greg. II 586; Bartusis, "Brigandage", 399. On unsanctioned plunder: Kant. I 134, 140-41, 498; II 381; D. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium* (London, 1972), 134.

pigherd Choirovoskos, the irregular force of farmers quickly degenerated into a pillaging expedition in the vicinity of Thessaloniki[12]. It is quite likely that the example of soldiers and quasi-soldiers, acting quite literally like brigands, fostered an atmosphere of lawlessness within the empire, contributing to the endemic brigandage of the late Byzantine era and to a general disregard of the basic rules upon which civilized life is founded[13]. In addition to this, it would seem that the actions of soldiers created an antipathy toward the military most clearly seen in the enmity between garrison and urban population[14] and between natives and foreigners[15], but extending as well to an antipathy toward the state itself, a belief that the state no longer existed.

The pillaging of soldiers and those who followed their example served to uproot a substantial fraction of the population, creating a refugee population which sought shelter in the fortified towns of the empire[16]. As the populations of towns were increased by this influx of peasants, new enmities arose which exacerbated the tensions between rich and poor, garrison and people, and the authorities and the populace.

The geographical structure of the late Byzantine empire, lacking defined and defensible borders, brought warfare to all areas and required the provincial urban centers to deal with crises on their own. This, along with the state's inability to respond adequately to crises, furthered the process of political fragmentation, dramatically manifesting itself in the appearance of independent borderlords on the fringes of the empire[17].

12 A. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 191-92, and cf. 79-80.

13 See Bartusis, "Brigandage".

14 E.g., Kant. I 272; II 188, 277; Greg. III 178. Cf. Kant. II 578 and Greg. II 634-35.

15 E.g., from the documents, F. Miklosich-J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi* (Vienna, 1860-90), V, 80, lines 6-7, and 261, lines 2-4.

16 Kant. I 179; II 79; III 251-52. A. Laiou-Thomadakis, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire* (Princeton, 1977), 261. Lj. Maksimović, "Charakter der sozial-wirtschaftlichen Struktur der spätbyzantinischen Stadt", *JöB*, 31/1 (1981), 187 and note 216-17.

17 See M. Bartusis, "Chrelja and Momčilo: Occasional servants of Byzantium

In this way the cost of warfare involved a continuing erosion of the bonds between man and man, man and state, man and the local community, and between the local community and the state.

The economic costs of warfare are somewhat clearer, and, by their very nature, allow more precise estimate of their effects. They naturally divide themselves into two categories: 1) decreased production due to the ravages of war, and 2) decreased production due to the diversion of resources — that is, men, animals and land — to military ends. The first kind of cost is illustrated by a passage from Kantakouzenos' memoirs dealing with the effects of the civil war between the Andronikoi in 1322. We are told that Andronikos III was

> . . . at a loss for the money by which [he] could provide for the mercenaries. For the *demosia* had not been exacted because of the disorder from the war and because the farmers from whom especially the taxes are exacted left their own villages because the soldiers of the older emperor plundered, and because those of the young [emperor] who were sent out as garrisons led away and carried off the property [of the peasants] because of military greed and behaved no better than the enemy[18].

Thus, because of war, 1) taxes are not collected, 2) peasants flee, and 3) soldiers plunder, all with result that overall production decreased.

All of the destruction of the empire's economic base is not a "cost" of defense as I have defined it. The ravages of enemy troops is merely the effect of unsuccessful defense. In any event it is impossible to estimate even approximately the decline in production due to the destruction which was the unfortunate result of the defensive policies implemented by the rulers of Byzantium.

The situation is a bit different in regard to the formal diversion of resources to finance defense and warfare. Here it is almost possible to make quantitative estimates of the cost of warfare and

in Fourteenth Century Macedonia", *BS*, 41 (1980), 201-21.

18 Kant. I 136-37.

defense because we enter the realm of the Byzantine fiscal system. I say that it is *almost* possible to make estimates bacause the data needed to make a truly valid estimate still are not quite there. But on the other hand, it certainly is possible to establish an order of magnitude, which has a value in its own right. Here I should like to formulate the questions we might ask, suggest how we might go about answering them, and finally — since it would be anti-climactic to go that far without suggesting answers — to estimate in a general way the economic costs of warfare and defense.

I have settled on three questions which are worth asking, two deal with the cost of war on what could be called the macro-economic level, and one with the micro-economic level. The first asks the traditional question: How much money did the imperial government spend on defense? The second is closely related, but addresses a broader issue: What percentage of the empire's economic resources were consumed by the military? And finally, the third asks a very specific question: What quantity of resources was required to field a single soldier?

Though data are extremely meager, it is possible to calculate roughly the state revenues which first passsed through the treasury before being directed toward military ends, that is, toward mercenaries and the fleet. The treaty of Epivatei in 1322, which concluded one phase of the civil war between Andronikos II and Andronikos III, stipulated that Andronikos III was to receive a personal pension of 36,000 *hyperpyra* yearly[19]. Four years and four months later Kantakouzenos reports that this money had not been delivered to Andronikos and that by Kantakouzenos' own calculation the money Andronikos II owed his grandson for the pension and for mercenary pay amounted to 350,000 *hyperpyra*[20]. Dividing 350,000 by 4 1/3, we get an annual income for

19 Kant. I 167.

20 Kant. I 237. F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches* (Munich, 1924-65), no. 2672, points out that at the end of 1326 (the period about which Kantakouzenos was writing) *five* years and four months had passed since the treaty of Epivatai. But since Kantakouzenos writes that the figure 350,000 was produced "by my calculation", it was probably based on the four-year / four-month period, and possibly was only calculated as he wrote his memoirs. Therefore, this is the time-span I utilize here.

Andronikos III of around 81,000 *hyperpyra*. Subtracting the pension of 36,000 *hyperpyra,* we are left with about 45,000 *hyperpyra* for the expense of the mercenaries. Since Andronikos II would have spent at least this amount on mercenaries, and probably a bit more for the small fleet, the total military outlays from the treasury in the 1320's was something on the order of 100,000 to 150,000 *hyperpyra*.

The magnitude of this figure is reasonable when we compare it to the sum of 50,000 *hyperpyra* which Kantakouzenos states was the sum necessary to pay the mercenaries of the army and the garrisons of Thessaly in 1321, and to the sum of 100,000 *hyperpyra* which Apokavkos was given in 1340 with which he was to refurbish the fleet and to hire mercenaries[21]. Both of these sums represented extraordinary expenses resulting from special circumstances[22].

As for the empire's total annual revenues, there is only one figure given in the sources. Gregoras states that around 1320, Andronikos II, through tax increases and great diligence, raised state revenues to the level of one million *hyperpyra*[23]. Given that ordinary state income was probably considerably less than this, my figure of 100,000 to 150,000 *hyperpyra* represents something like a quarter or perhaps as much as a half of the money normally available to the treasury. The figure of one million *hyperpyra* also illustrates the difficulties the treasury faced in financing the Catalans who received, according to A. Laiou's calculations, nearly one million *hyperpyra* over a two-year period, far exceeding the normal revenues directed toward the military and necessitating the extraordinary measures Andronikos II undertook to pay them[24].

However, this figure of 100.000 to 150,000 *hyperpyra* yearly does not represent total military expenditures, because it only con-

21 Kant. I 87, 540.

22 Cf. the figures and analysis of V. Smetanin, "Rashody Vizantii na armiju i flot (1282-1453 gg.)", *Antičnaja drevnost' i srednie veka* (Sverdlovsk), 12 (1975), 117-25.

23 Greg. I 317.

24 Laiou, *Constantinople,* 186, note 108.

siders the expense of mercenaries and, to some extent, the fleet, and it neglects to include the incomes of soldiers which never passed through the imperial treasury. Any attempt to evaluate levels of military expenditures must also consider the cost of financing those soldiers and paramilitary personnel who received most or all of their incomes directly from the land.

From an economic point of view, it is convenient to categorize professional soldiers in late Byzantium into three basic groups: *pronoiars,* settled soldiers and mercenaries. These categories are distinguished by the type of pay the soldiers received, and while numerous cases can be cited in which certain soldiers blurred the distinctions implied by these categories, such a typology is useful for our purposes here. Thus, a *pronoiar*-soldier received remuneration from the central government in the form of a *pronoia,* that is, an imperial grant of fiscal rights and/or rights of usufruct over a defined set of economic instruments which were normally owned or enjoyed by the state. The settled soldier derived his livelihood from a grant of arable land bestowed by the imperial government. It is my view that individual settled soldiers, if they existed at all, were very rare, and that, typically, settled soldiers existed in colonies based either on ethnicity (such as the Cumans settled in Anatolia by John Vatatzes in the 1240s[25]) or on military function (such as the rowers called *prosalentai* settled near the coasts by Michael VIII in various regions of the empire[26]). And finally, the mercenary's pay usually was in the form of gold. Only in the case of the mercenaries did military expenses pass through the imperial treasury. And therefore, to get a more realistic view of the economic costs of warfare, one must consider the expense of providing for those soldiers whose incomes were not fiscalized on a yearly basis.

25 Greg. I 37. M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile* (London, 1975), 105.

26 Pachy, I 164, 209, 309; II 237-38, 240. P. Lemerle *et al.*, *Actes de Lavra,* II (Paris, 1977), no. 73, lines 9-10; no. 105, lines 18-20; III (Paris, 1979), no. 136, line 29. L. Petit, *Actes de Xenophon, VizVrem,* 10 (1903), suppl. 1 (rpt. Hakkert: Amsterdam, 1964), no. 11, lines 298-302.

Now, in order to estimate the resources tied up in the military, one should multiply the number of each kind of soldier by the average monetized agricultural return from the corresponding land-holding of each kind of soldier. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide such figures, so they must either be approximated through calculation or estimated. The probability of error is great at the start and will necessarily increase through computation, and so I should emphasize that no one need *accept* the resulting figures. They are only a best estimate, based on my study of the late Byzantine military, and I offer them only to illustrate a method for analyzing such worthwhile questions.

We first consider *pronoiar*-soldiers. From three lay *praktika* from the 1320s issued for *pronoiar*-soldiers in the *theme* of Thessaloniki, we see that the average quantity of arable land within each *praktikon* (held either by the soldier or his *paroikoi*) was 3004 modioi, and the average quantity of vineyards was 13 *modioi*[27]. After these figures are corrected to account for original measuring error, we multiply them by standard coefficients, and see that such a quantity of arable land and vineyards generally yielded an agricultural income of about 320 *hyperpyra* per year[28]. If there were 500 *pronoiar*-soldiers (a reasonable estimate), this

[27] For Manuel Berilas, 4630 *modioi* of *gê* (including 2500 *modioi* of second- and third-rate land, which is treated here as 1850 *mod.* of mixed quality) and 1.5 *mod.* of vines: P. Schreiner, "Zwei unedierte Praktika aus der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jh.", *JöB*, 19 (1970), 37-39, with revisions by N. Oikonomidès, "Notes sur un *praktikon* de pronoiaire", *TM*, 5 (1973), 335-46. For Michael Saventzes, 2287 *mod. gê* and 13.33 *mod.* vines, and for Nikolaos Maroules, 2745 *mod. gê* and 23.5 *mod.* vines: unpub. 1321 *praktika* from Xenophon's archives. I thank Denise Papachryssanthou for her kindness in providing me with transcripts of these documents.

[28] Here I follow the procedure offered by N. Svoronos in P. Lemerle *et al.*, *Actes de Lavra*, IV (Paris, 1982), 168-71. For cereal cultivation, the official area is reduced by 30%, and then the resulting land area is divided by 2 (for biennial production), and multiplied by 0.28 (= rate of production [3.5 *mod.* of grain/*mod.* of land] x price of grain [0.08 *hyperpyron/mod.* of land]). For vines, the area is also reduced by 30%, and then multiplied by 2.8 *hyp./mod.* of vineyards. It must be emphasized that the figure of 320 *hyp.* does not represent the *pronoiar's* personal income from his *pronoia* (which must be calculated on an entirely different basis), but the agricultural productivity of all the land comprising the economic unit of the *pronoia*. From this land, both *pronoiar* and *paroikoi* derived a livelihood.

would mean *pronoiar*-soldiers tied up 160,000 *hyperpyra* of the empire's agricultural production yearly.

As for settled soldiers, their holdings were much smaller and very similar, and at times identical, to those of *paroikoi*. Using typical figures for above-average *paroikos* landholdings, I estimate the typical holding of a settled soldier produced 16 *hyperpyra* of agricultural income per year[29]. If there were 1000 settled soldiers, this would amount to 16,000 *hyperpyra* per year.

To this we should add an appropriate figure to account for the expense of the paramilitary, professional guards who served in the cities, towns and fortified towers across the entire empire. These guards generally had the status of peasants and received, from both public and private sources, either small quantities of land (like settled soldiers) or tax-exemption on the small landholdings they already held for the service they did. Thus, if there were perhaps 3000 of these guards in the empire, they would tie up about 48,000 *hyperpyra* of yearly economic production.

So, adding 150,000 *hyperpyra* for the mercenary and fleet budget, 160,000 for the resources devoted to *pronoiars,* and 64,000 for settled soldiers and guards, gives a total of 374,000 *hyperpyra* for the total quantity of the empire's resources diverted yearly to the military[30].

If 374,000 was devoted to the military, how much was produced yearly in all? In the 1320s the empire contained about 30,000,000 *modioi* of arable land in areas where there was at least a fair chance that it could be safely cultivated and taxed[31]. Assuming about 1% of this land was planted with vines and

29 I.e., 50 *mod. gê* (50/2 x 0.28 = 7 *hyp.*) and 3 *mod.* of vines (3 x 2.8 = 8.4 *hyp.*).

30 This figure does not include the cost of building and maintaining fortifications. Since fortifications were built or repaired as necessity demanded and resources permitted, it does not appear that this was a regular expenditure of imperial and local authorities. This alone would not prevent us from calculating an average yearly expense for fortifications, but other factors make this impossible: While, at times, we are given a good idea of how many projects a particular emperor undertook (see., e.g., Kant. I 541-42), it is difficult to determine 1) the extent of building or repair on any particular fortification, given the hyperbole of the sources, and 2) the extent of local and private fortification-building during any period.

vegetable gardens, the total yearly return on this quantity of land was about 5,000,000 *hyperpyra*[32]. Therefore, the figure of 374,000 *hyperpyra* for total military expenditures represents about 7% of the empire's total agricultural production[33], and if we take into consideration a relatively small factor for urban non-agricultural production, we can estimate that the military in the first half of the fourteenth century consumed something like 5% of the total resources of the empire.

Now 5% does not seem like a very great percentage, certainly not for a modern industrialized state. Yet, in late Byzantine society, where nearly all of the inhabitants of the empire lived at or only marginally above the level of subsistence, 5% of total production was a very high percentage of disposable production (production beyond the minimum nutritional requirements of the population). While it would be desirable to determine this fraction of production, further travel along this line is not possible without appealing to totally imaginary figures.

The last economic topic for consideration is the cost of warfare in terms of the number of people who, through their labor, were needed to support a single soldier. For the settled soldier and professional guard, the answer is simple. To employ the services of a settled soldier or guard, only the labor resources of the soldier's household were needed, perhaps 5 or 6 people, including the soldier, his wife, a few children and perhaps a servant or hired man. For the *pronoiar*-soldier, the situation is more interesting. From our three lay *praktika* for *pronoiar*-soldiers, we see that,

31 I include the areas of modern Greek Macedonia (35,000 km^2), Greek and Turkish Thrace (8600 and 25,000 km^2) and Lemnos (460 km^2), and add a few thousand km^2 to account for the less-securely held regions located in present-day southern Bulgaria, Yugoslav Macedonia and southern Albania. About 40% (30,000 km^2) of this land was arable.

32 I.e., 300,000 *mod.* of vines and gardens yield (300,000 x 2.8 =) 840,000 *hyp.*, and 29,700,000 *mod. gê* yield (29,700,000/2 x 0.28 =) 4,158,000 *hyp.* The return on vineyards and gardens was not identical, but similar.

33 Naturally, my calculations do not consider the return from non-draft animals or immovable agricultural capital (mills, fisheries, etc.). I have assumed that there was proportionality between crop production and total production on lands devoted to the military, and between crop production and total rural production in the empire as a whole.

on the average, each of these *pronoiar*-soldiers held 42 *paroikoi*[34]. To this we add five people for the soldier's own family, a few servants (military and domestic) plus their families, plus a few households of *eleftheroi,* totalling perhaps 65 persons, 65 persons who comprised the economic unit of the military *pronoia*. Thus, as a very concrete cost of warfare, we can say with a fair degree of accuracy, that for every *pronoiar*-soldier put in the field, there were about 65 members of the population who either devoted nearly all their efforts to supporting the soldier, or, on the other hand, were supported by the soldier.

Throughout history warfare has often been a unifying force in society. During the period of Ottoman expansion, during the reign of Justinian, no less than during the Napoleonic era, offensive war improved morale and assuaged social discontent through the redirection of latent hostilities outward toward a foreign foe. Defensive war as well, with its inherent legitimization as defense of the homeland, can unite a people and partially offset the misery of war, so long as an end to the conflict is in sight and the defenders, through their actions, can maintain the moral high-ground. But in late Byzantium neither of these scenarios was realized. The social and economic costs of warfare in late Byzantium were determined by the nature of that warfare, by the twin facts that warfare was localized within the empire or in areas which had recently been part of the empire, and that the state's inability to acquire enough trained soldiers from the empire's native population led to the employment of troops who had no affinity with or responsibility toward the empire's indigenous residents. The defensive aspect of late Byzantine warfare, the circumstances which tended to keep warfare inside the shrinking borders of the empire, was the more decisive of the two. If warfare could have been taken beyond the empire's borders, if most of the empire's territory could have been kept free from the devastation of warring troops, the social and economic costs of war could have been reduced dramatically. But this was, of

34 Berilas: 37, Saventzes: 29, and Maroules: 60.

course, impossible. The rulers of late Byzantium had inherited an international situation which left them with hostile neighbors on all sides, neighbors who were fully aware of the internal weaknesses of Byzantium, and who were, due to the social dynamics within their own societies, driven to foreign conquest[35]. Byzantium had to accept, as a fact of life, that any attempt to revitalize the empire's security would have to begin with successful warfare within its borders.

Perhaps the social costs of such warfare could have been lessened if the entire population had taken a more active, communal role in their society's defense. The Byzantines themselves were not unaware that there were simply too many foreigners in their armies. Well-known is Theodore II Laskaris' dream of an all-Greek army[36]. Intellectuals, as well, recognized the virtue of a native defense of the empire, and I would like to conclude with a look at the advice offered by Gemistos Plethon and Thomas Magistros.

Gemistos Plethon complained that the military weakness of the Morean army resulted from the bulk of the population being both tax-paying farmers and part-time soldiers[37]. Such soldiers could not be properly equipped and invariably wished to return to the fields. Gemistos correctly understood that Morean campaign armies were composed in large measure, as in Byzantium proper, of peasants recruited on a campaign by campaign basis. His solution was to divide the population into two groups, regular permanent soldiers and taxpayers. The soldiers would neither farm nor pay taxes, and the taxpaying farmers (or "helots") would not fight. Every infantryman would have one helot assigned to him, and every cavalryman, two. Gemistos' debt to Plato and ancient Sparta has long been noted, but this should not obscure the fact that he is suggesting, probably quite unconsciously, a system of

35 See, e.g., G. Ostrogorsky, "Etienne Dušan et la noblesse serbe dans la lutte contre Byzance", *Byzantion*, 22 (1952), 157.

36 *Theodori Ducae Lascari Epistulae*, ed. N. Festa (Florence, 1898), 58, no. 44.

37 Sp. Lampros, Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά (Athens, 1912-30), III, 251-57.

petty *pronoiars* as the solution to the Morea's military ills.

Now Thomas Magistros offers opposite counsel[38]. He writes that every citizen should be trained in arms, regardless of his occupation, and the resulting citizen's militia should always be ready to supplement the state's army. Conversely, professional soldiers of lower status should be well-versed in some trade or craft. Perhaps we can attribute this divergence of approach to the century and a half separating the two men, to Thomas' observation of the rampaging Catalan Company, and to Gemistos' knowledge of the disorganization of ill-trained peasant armies.

While both plans could have reduced the social and economic costs of warfare by decreasing the empire's reliance on foreign soldiers and by assigning to the population at large a morale-building role in the empire's defense, neither plan had a future. Gemistos' required a complete re-ordering of society on a scale which has only been attempted in the present century. Thomas' proposal, however, raises an important question: Why didn't the imperial government foster the development of peasant militias? After all, in western Europe during the fourteenth century peasant armies armed with pikes and an occasional bow were proving an effective fighting force, if in sheer numbers alone. Was such an idea simply too costly, time-consuming and impractical? Did the rulers of Byzantium think peasants were incapable of becoming real soldiers? Or did the late Byzantine military aristocracy distrust or fear the idea of trained peasant militias? Such questions are fundamental to an understanding of late Byzantine society and deserve further study.

38 A. Mai, *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio* (Rome, 1825-38), III, 180.

I. SECURITY AND WARFARE : 2

THE COSTS OF OTTOMAN WARFARE AND DEFENCE

CAROLINE FINKEL / LONDON

What are we to understand by the concept of the costs of war in a pre-modern society? Any consideration on the part of an aggressor that hostilities, once begun, could prove excessively costly, has never lent itself to the rational appraisal of the balance sheet, even in the era of capitalist accounting: states do not refrain from going to war because they calculate that the costs would outweigh the benefits. Looking back at the Ottoman Empire then, our analysis of cost must necessarily employ anachronistic terminology. In the introductory part of this paper I suggest a periodisation for early Ottoman history which is based on the magnitude of the financial costs of war, as they relate to the character of warfare in each of the periods distinguished[1]. In the second section I will look at financial cost with the eye of an accountant, albeit a rather unsophisticated one, and the remaining two sections will be treated according to the mocern concepts of economic cost and social cost.

We have litte information about the financial organisation of the earliest Ottoman times. The equipping of the nomadic mounted archers who constituted the fighting force in the days of the sultans Osman and Orhan was not a drain on whatever centrally-held resources there may have been in the embryo state. Rather, the equipping of such a light cavalryman was an external cost, borne by the individual himself, fighting in anticipation of booty.

1 The period 1560-1660 has been dubbed one of "military revolution" in Europe by Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660* (Belfast, 1956), whose discussion of a qualitative shift in the nature of warfare at this period was subsequently modified by Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660: a Myth?", *Journal of Modern History*, 48 (1976). Debate along similar lines has not yet arisen in the Ottoman context, and I here offer an analysis based on one important indicator of qualitative military change.

The subsequent organisation of nomads into *ocaks,* groups of men who took it in turns to campaign, with their expenses being furnished by those whose turn it was to stay at home, perpetuated the system of self-financing troops. So too did the alienation of lands to march lords whose rights of revenue collection enabled them to put numbers of troops into the field. The vassal status imposed on some of the early Balkan allies of the Ottomans was another means of keeping to a minimum those outlays on warfare which the central power was obliged to make. In addition to the payment of tribute, vassals were required to provide troops for the Ottoman army, the costs of equipping them being borne by the vassal state.

On the scale of the financial costs of war, then, warfare in the earliest period of Ottoman history was cheap. A significant change comes with the bureaucratisation of the state in the second half of the fourteenth century. The harbinger of change was the creation of the *yaya* infantry, a measure taken in recognition that the expansion of the state could not rely solely on mounted archers. The gradual creation of a centrally-paid standing army, which, in the fifteenth century, began to use field guns and firearms, was to be a new and permanent burden for the treasury. The production and use of such equipment called for a style of organisation and a specialisation in skills which only the central power was able to underwrite.

This second period of warfare, characterised by a growing standing army in an expanding state, prevailed into the sixteenth century. Internal dynastic troubles apart, there had of course been earlier reverses in the expansion of Ottoman power, and the change in status of annaxed territory from vassalage to direct administration cannot be overlooked as indicative of the uncertain control which the central government could exercise. Given a strong and united opposition, one may speculate that the borders could have been contained earlier. Such a time was that which culminated in the failure of the Christian armies at Varna in 1444.

However, it was not until the sixteenth century that the Ottoman Empire was forced to adopt a defensive posture, and we come

here to our third period of warfare. The option to limit expenditure on military activity, to call a halt to hostilities, is only available to a power that is in a clearly dominant position. A state on the defensive has not the chance to set such a limit, but must search for new ways of stretching the resources at its disposal in order to meet the threat which it faces. In the Hapsburgs, the Ottomans encountered an adversary with whom a more or less stable border was gradually established. This alteration in the power relations between the Empire and the *dar ül-harb* should not be read as confirmation that the Ottoman army was unequal to the task of sustaining inexorable expansion. The fact that the garrisoning of the fortresses in Hungary cost more than could be extracted from the country in taxation should not be seen as an indicator of overextension, since a marginalist approach to the costs of war is irrelevant to a situation where the maximisation of financial returns was not a consideration. Rather, politics dictated that Hungary should become a buffer zone between the two Empires, that the Ottomans should fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the indigenous kingdom. The stable border between the two Empires was symptomatic of the military reality that a new age of warfare had arrived.

In the sixteenth century, the deployment of large numbers of troops on permanent duty in the garrisons of the border, and a fundamental change in the techniques of combat, from open battles to siege warfare, resulted in escalating costs. Ever greater strain was placed on those resources which had formerly been sufficient to meet military demand.

* * * * *

The late Byzantine Empire was a defensive not an offensive body: it is therefore to the defensive Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century that we will look, and particularly to the land warfare on its western edges.

1. *The financial costs of warfare*

We have considered the costs of warfare and defence in general terms, as relating to the nature of combat in different periods. Now, I will look at the administration of war finance in the sixteenth century. Accounts for various aspects of military activity do exist, but the organisation of the Ottoman accounting system, the impossibility of being certain that like is being compared with like, and the relative paucity of relevant material for the sixteenth century preclude any reliable totalling of the resources devoted to war. The existence of numerical data does not guarantee quantitative results.

The first point to stress is that in the Ottoman Empire, fighting should not be regarded as an aberration from an otherwise peaceful existence. It was an activity so frequently engaged in that it is unrealistic to expect to be able to isolate those outlays which did and did not contribute to its pursuit. Therefore we should not expect to gain any insights into the proportion of the Empire's resources devoted to warfare and defence by the simple comparison of a treasury account from a war year with that from a peace year. With a standing army, whose salaries consumed a high proportion of the annual cash income of the Empire, there was no relief from the burden of paying the troops when peace prevailed for a year or two. Money was permanently tied up in the production of equipment, and its manufacture did not cease on the conclusion of a peace treaty. Fortresses had to be kept in a constant state of readiness. The extra expenditure incurred in the course of military action was thus proportionately small, and was connected with the transport of food and equipment, increased production of military equipment, and money to pay the extra troops recruited in the course of the campaign.

It is fortunate that the difference between a situation of war and one of peace was of rather little financial importance, for the available accounts do not allow any reliable comparisons along these lines. The financial organisation of the sixteenth century

Ottoman Empire may be summarised thus: the tax revenues of the 'core' provinces of Rumeli and Anatolia were collected directly by the central treasury. Income generated in the many other provinces was spent locally, on defence for instance, and the balance on the account was remitted to Istanbul. Where this balance was negative, as in the province of Buda in the second half of the sixteenth century, the cental treasury subsidised the costs of border defence. So, in these two basic elements of financial administration, the central treasury and the provincial treasury, we have two types of account recording military expenditures. The major burden of both was salaries.

But the salaries of many military personnel were 'hidden', in that they were never recorded as being paid from the central or provincial treasuries. For instance, much tax-farm income was never paid into the central treasury, but allocated either permanently, or on a one-off basis, to specific local uses. These included troops salaries again, but also the rebuilding of fortifications, or the purchase of certain items of military equipment. Similarly, another 'hidden' source of military expenditure was the assignment of *timar* revenues to the support of garrison troops.

A different sort of problem arises in trying to quantify the military or quasi-military services performed by certain groups of *reaya* (primarily, agricultural producers) in return for tax exemptions. Are the taxes from which they are exempted equivalent in value to their service?

The aforementioned outlays are mostly outlays on manpower. In addition, separate accounts record the costs of military equipment made in the imperial gun-foundry, the shipyards, and the armoury. For formally-declared campaigns, there are special registers which record the details of the amounts of equipment sent from Istanbul to the front. The day-by-day running costs of campaign are recorded in yet another type of register, that of the campaign treasury. These running costs, which included expenditure on the smaller items of equipment for which need arose during the course of a campaign, as well as on transport and salaries of course, were

funded by a subvention from the central treasury and by tax revenues which were paid directly into the campaign treasury rather than into the central treasury. A minimum figure for the extra financial burden of fighting a war may perhaps be arrived at by adding the total of the heavy equipment costs to the running costs given in the campaign treasury accounts. But in reality, other than strictly campaign-related expenditures are included in the campaign treasury accounts: a contemporary distinction between war and peace was not made, and the accounting system does not lend itself to such analysis.

The value of lands alienated under the *timar* system should not be excluded from any calculation of the total of resources directed to war. The greatest number of troops, the provincial *sipahi* cavalrymen, were funded from taxes levied on the agricultural produce of the land. These troops were given the rights of collection of state taxes on the *timar* estates alienated to them, in return for which they had an obligation to serve on campaign. However, we are very ignorant of the dynamic processes which took place within the *timar* system, and therefore unable to determine the financial value of this vital element of military expenditure.

A provincial *sipahi* did not necessarily cost less to maintain than a soldier of the standing army, and indeed, a gun was cheaper than a horse, but there was a critical difference between their costs in practical terms. In their nostalgia for a return to an ideal, imagined past, the bureaucrats of the end of the sixteenth century pointed to the greater costs incurred by the growing numbers of standing troops in porportion to *sipahi* troops as the crucial factor in the apparent deterioration in the health of the Empire. Although their prescriptions for reform were impractical and prompted by vested interest, so that they failed to admit that a standing army with muskets was militarily more efficient than a cavalry one in the sixteenth century, they hinted at an important truth. The essential crisis of the second half of the sixteenth century was a shortage of cash, in large part aggravated by the permanent garrisoning of the numerous border fortresses.

2. *The economic costs of war*

The accountant's notion of cost, then, is the total of the outlays on war and defence. 'Economic cost', by contrast, implies a calculation of the opportunity cost of diverting to military purposes resources which would otherwise have been put to non-military ends. In the Ottoman Empire, structured for the pursuit of war, with the officially designated military classes being supported by the primarily agricultural activity of the peasants, there was no room in the administrative system for rational choice between competing ends, and the concept is thus meaningless.

Instead, an alternative approach will be adopted, in which economic cost is treated as economic effect, and the present brief discussion of the economic effects of war will take as its starting point the Sombart-Nef controversy. The title of Nef's book *War and Human Progress* seems rather outdated thirty-five years later[2]. Instead, we ask simply whether it can be said that the activity of war acted as a stimulus to the economy in the two sectors into which military demand penetrated so deeply, agriculture and the production of military equipment.

In the Ottoman Empire there was a system of close governmental control over production and marketing to ensure that internal demand, especially that for military provisions and equipment, was met. The *kanunnames,* regulations stipulating the conditions of taxation of each group of *reaya* in the Empire, show wide regional variations owing to past customary practice and to current production potential. The periodic surveys which provided the basis for any changes in the *kanunnames* illustrate the intimate knowledge of local conditions which were available to those

2 The substance of the debate concerning the contribution of warfare to industrial development, as exemplified in the different opinions of Werner Sombart, *Krieg und Kapitalismus* (Munich, 1913) and J.U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), is summarised in ed. J.M. Winter, *War and Economic Development* (CUP, 1975) 1-7. An important essay concerning the Europe contemporary with the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire discussed in this paper is that of Ingomar Bog, "Krieg und Wirtschaft im 16. Jahrhundert" in *Krieg, Militärausgaben und wirtschaftlicher Wandel,* ed. O. Pickl (Graz, 1980).

running the military enterprise. Commodities with a military value, from grain to cotton yarn, to lead, copper and sulphur, were subject to export bans at times in the sixteenth century. Grain was freely traded westward until the mid-sixties of the century, but a subsequent squeeze on supplies, perhaps for reasons of population pressure, prompted controls whose intention it was to ensure sufficient supply for the domestic population. In that the rural areas and small towns were able to supply themselves from their environs, it was the demands of the miltary, and the competing demands of the large towns which were of major concern.

At the time of campaign, orders were sent to the cadis on the military road that they arrange the preparation of grain and other supplies sufficient for the numbers of soldiers passing along the route. For most of the sixteenth century this could be effected by means of an in-kind levy on peasant producers, for which no compensation was made. Alternatively, specified amounts of food were purchased at the current price, but at a current price which was kept deliberately low, so that the supplies required by the army should not be subject to inflationary pressures brought about by shortages caused by profiteering. In the border area itself, much of the grain needed was purchased on the free market.

The provision of that other dietary staple of the Balkans, mutton, was the responsibility of individuals designated as *celepkeşan* (sheep drovers), who were chosen from among the wealthier members of the rural and small town population to provide sheep to the army. They performed a similar function in the supplying of meat to Istanbul. The government determined the price at which it would purchase the sheep from the drovers. Thus, the government used the capital accumulated by these individuals to ease its own cashflow difficulties. Problems in the provisioning of the troops, seem to have arisen surprisingly rarely, except in particularly awkward weather or transport conditions, and so it can be said that, despite the contraband trade in grain which is so frequently referred to at the end of the century, the policy of government control achieved its aim.

Priority was similarly given to the manufacture of military

equipment in this command economy. The sector which was of greatest strategic importance was the mining of the raw ores needed for the production of cannon, hand guns, gunpowder and gun carriages, as well as a mass of less sophisticated tools, axes, shovels, nails, and the like. Production took place on site during campaigns, and in the mines themselves, such as that at Samakov in Bulgaria, as well as in the imperial foundries already referred to. As in the case of the provision of mutton to feed the troops, the financing of the extraction of the raw material to make the weapons used by them was another opportunity for the government to mobilise the wealth of individuals. Where the government was not itself in direct control of the mining operations, they could be farmed out on a contract basis.

While *kanunnames* ordering the activities of the agricultural community are naturally most numerous, mining operations had their own sets of regulation. The special status of labourer was passed from father to son, and shown in his exemption from extraordinary burdens of the kind which we have seen agricultural producers being obliged to perform in time of war. Within the wide borders of the Ottoman Empire could be found most of the mineral resources needed for the predominantly military uses to which they were put. The restrictive practices adopted in the case of grain export were only necessary for the raw material of military hardware in time of real or anticipated shortage.

The protectionist mentality which guided Ottoman trade policy in this period can be seen to have ensured that military demands were satisfactorily met. But the enforcement of the measures taken to meet this military demand did not create conditions in which there was any tangible economic spin-off in non-military directions. Nor indeed is it apparent that there were any palpable advances within the agricultural or industrial sectors themselves, which can be said to have resulted from the opportunities offered by the huge amount of resources invested in production for military use. Whatever population pressure there may have been, it was apparently not so great as to bring under cultivation marginal land

in an Empire which had never been an importer of grain. In the pre-capitalist sixteenth century, the effects of military demand as a stimulus to economic development were seen only at the simplest level, such as in the operation of mines which would otherwise have been uneconomic.

Outside the aegis of government, institutions did not exist at this time for the mobilisation of the capital which had been accumulated by individuals. Some profit could certainly be made as a *celebkeşan* or as an investor in a mining operation, but there was no mechanism by which it could be translated into anything deserving the description 'economic development'. It was the Ottoman state which took up idle funds and channelled them back into military production, but as cash resources, rather than with the intention of using them for investment to stimulate future technical advance. In the same spirit was use made of the personal fortunes amassed by those in the upper reaches of the military hierarchy: such borrowings constituted up to 10% of the running costs of the campaigns at the end of the sixteenth century. It was the raw materials which the Ottoman Empire had to offer which attacted the merchants of Europe in a later period, not its manufactured goods, and there is no sense in which the activity of war brought advantages of the kind which it is thought by some to have engendered at other times and in other places.

3. *The social costs of war*

The separation of the social from the economic and political is necessarily arbitrary, and the rationale adopted here owes nothing to an economist's definition of social cost, but sees the impact of war on society as the obverse of the increasing financial costs which the state had to meet. Two of the pressures of sixteenth-century warfare which had a substantial effect on society are first, the consequences of the widening of the bases of military recruitment, and secondly, the heavier tax burden at the individual level which resulted from the state's growing need for cash.

In the area which some military historians would term the theatre

of war, there was loss and casualty to those who found themselves involuntarily caught up in its currents. Displacement of populations, and the destruction of their means of livelihood were its inevitable concomitants. As an aside, we may note that the profitable export of Hungarian cattle to the west, shows no signs of having declined in volume in the sixteenth century. The fact that such a primitive form of agricultural activity thrived is, however, seen by Hungarian historians as a negative consequence of the Turkish presence in a country whose chances to emerge from medieval feudalism were thereby arrested.

Unconnected with conditions on the ground, that is, the ravages in the border area, and the relative tranquility away from the combat zone, the increasing impact of war on society led to certain structural changes in the society as a whole. It is in this more defensive period of the sixteenth century that the strains imposed by the constantly high level of military spending brought a governmental response in which may perhaps be seen the seeds of later social change.

The non-*askeri* (non-military) classes had always had a role to play in the success of military undertakings. As we have seen in the case of the miners such participation could be formally regulated. The universal military needs for the transport of provisions and equipment and the repair of fortresses, roads and bridges, also relied to a very great extent on the informal hiring of the services of the *reaya* as a vital supplement to the official corps performing such tasks. Despite the fact that the functional dichotomy between *askeri* and *reaya* was more fluid in practice than is often supposed, and that the notion of the exclusivity of the *askeri* class was largely a propoganda exercise on the part of a foundering bureaucratic élite, chronicle and archival sources of the late sixteenth century attest to a situation in which the demand for manpower to garrison the borders, and simply to fight on many fronts, was of unprecedented proportions. It has recently been cited as a major cause of the internal social unrest of the early seventeenth century, the *Celali* revolts, and of the subsequent

fragmentation of the centralised society which had existed until the sixteenth century. In essence, this hypothesis of Inalcık's proposes that the numbers of armed men demobilised after campaign turned to brigandage, and sold their services to the highest bidder, thus creating local power bases which could act in opposition to the established power[3]. This seems plausible in general outline, but awaits more detailed research to clarify the connection between cause and effect.

Coming to the second point, of all the measures taken to produce the ever greater amounts of cash needed in warfare, one of the easiest options as far as the central authorities were concerned was to increase the rural tax burden. The Ottoman Empire had ample agricultural capacity, and the strengthened application of the irregular wartime taxes in kind, to feed the increasing number of military mouths, could have been achieved with rather little upset. During the course of the sixteenth century, two trends became apparent, however. On the one hand extraordinary wartime taxes were increasingly demanded in cash, and on the other, they were gradually regularised.

The importance of in-cash rather than in-kind contributions in this defensive period of the stable border is a further symptom that a new age had arrived. The taxation arrangements which had been satisfactory in earlier days, when the Balkan Empire was smaller in area, were unsuited to an Empire with a western border so far from the areas of greatest agricultural productivity. The distance to be covered in transporting grain from Thrace to Belgrade would have meant intolerably high costs, and in military terms any delay could by fatal. Apart from the problems of ensuring security from bandit attack, a food convoy which had to travel several hundred miles was out of the question. A far more realistic option was that extraordinary taxes should be transferred toward the border in the form of cash, and would then be spent on supplies nearer to the area of operation of the army. The *reaya* had the greatest difficulty in meeting their obligations, since the local market was not big

3 Halil Inalcık "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700" *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980) 283-337.

enough to absorb the extra agricultural produce they were obliged to sell in order to raise the cash needed. Efficient military administration in a time of money shortage was achieved at the expense of the very producers whom the government had formerly been at pains to protect.

II CONTACTS AND INHERITANCE : 1

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY TURKISH APOLOGY FOR ISLAM: THE *GURBETNAME-I SULTAN CEM**

BARBARA FLEMMING / LEIDEN

Background

Turkish perceptions of Western Christianity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have been studied in a general way. It has long been held that as a rule Muslims did not see Christianity as a religious threat to Islam and that they showed little interest in and curiosity about what went on in Christian Europe, taking little trouble to inform themselves even about the languages spoken there[1]. It is true that the Ottoman government, the Porte, did have access to first-hand material; it made use of the knowledge of seamen, and employed secret agents, some of whose depositions have been preserved[2]. But as far as the Turkish public was concerned, its potential sources of information on the "House of War", *darülharb* were chronicles and heroic poems on military exploits, the *gazavatnames*[3]. Their writers combined direct and

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1 B. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, London 1982), 82, 142, 182. For European indifference on matters Islamic see C. Göllner, *Turcica III. Die Türkenfrage in der öffentlichen Meinung Europas im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bucarest, Baden-Baden, 1978), 201, 214.

2 One example is the report of the famous seaman Barak (died in 1499), subject of a magistral study by V.L. Ménage, "The mission of an Ottoman secret agent in France in 1486", *JRAS* (1965), 112-132. Further material about Turkish Map-making and geographical knowledge in Lewis, *Discovery*, 152f.

3 See for example I. Mélikoff, *Le Destàn d'Umūr Pacha* (Paris, 1954): A.S. Levend, *Ġazavāt-nāmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey' in Ġazavāt-nāmesi* (Ankara, 1956); I. Mélikoff, *La Geste de Melik Dānişmend* (Paris, 1960); H. Inalcık and M. Oğuz, *Gazavât-i Sultân Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân* (Ankara, 1978).

hearsay evidence with older authorities, and for special subjects such as the history of Constantinople and the Hagia Sophia they derived their knowledge from Greek chronicles and legends which had been translated, with inevitable distortions[4]. One of the few detailed accounts of Western lands is the remarkable itinerary of Prince Cem (1459-1495) who was dragged through France and Italy as a hostage of Christian powers. It is included in the biography of the Prince, the *Vakıât-i Sultan Cem,* written by one of his close companions[5].

Within the Ottoman Empire large numbers of Christians, alongside Jews, continued to practise their religion as *zimmis,* protected taxpayers or "scriptural infidels". The Turks knew of the old division of Near Eastern Christianity into Greek Orthodox, Jacobite (Monophysite) and Nestorian Christians. Their Christian subjects were organized in three religious communities, *millet:* the Greek Orthodox, by far the great majority; the Armenian, Monophysite, *millet* which included besides Armenians all subjects of the Sultan not otherwise classified[6], and the Jews[7]. Catholicism was the most foreign of them all; in the 15th century it was the religion of all the Franks, the enemies of Islam. When the *millets* were formed, almost its only adherents within the Empire were

4 K. Süssheim (F. Taeschner), "Aya Sofya", *EI*², I (1960), 776-77; B. Lewis, "The Use by Muslim Historians of non-Muslim Sources", in B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, *Historians of the Middle East* (London 1962), 184-85. For the attitudes of neighbouring peoples see S. Franklin, "Byzantine and Kievan Russia", *Byzantion,* 53 (1983), and E.M. Jeffreys, "The Attitude of Byzantine Chroniclers toward Ancient History", *Byzantion,* 49 (1979), 199-238.

5 Published by Mehmed Arif as a supplement to *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası,* parts 22-25 (Istanbul, 1330 / 1911-1912). The work was used by the historian Sa'deddin, so that its contents were indirectly available to European historians; cf. Ménage, "Ottoman agent", 119. For a perceptive critique of the *Vakıât,* cf, N. Vatin, "A propos de l'exotisme dans les Vâḳı'at-i Sulṭân Cem: le regard porté sur l'Europe occidentale à la fin du XVe siècle par un Turc Ottoman", *JA,* 272 (1984), 237-248.

6 H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West. A study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East,* I, II (London, New York, Toronto, 1957), 221. For historiography on the Orthodox church in the early Ottoman Empire see M. Philippides, "Patriarchal Chronicles of the Sixteenth Century", *GRBS,* 25 (1984), 87-94.

7 B. Braude and B. Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a plural society* (New York, London, 1982).

foreigners such as the Genoese citizens of Galata[8].

In the early period of the Empire, when Islam had been preached in a rather broadminded way and in a familiar guise, absorption of christians by conversion had been rapid. But as Ottoman orthodoxy strengthened its grip on its flock and the *millets* were more tightly organized, conversions were actively prevented by the *millet* leaders and soon all but ceased[9]. In the villages of the early Empire, Muslims and Christians, sharing the status of "taxpaying subjects", *reaya*, were often on good terms with each other. In the towns, however, there were marked divisions between the communities. Intercourse between Muslims and infidels had more to do with practical matters, such as the payment of the "poll tax", *cizye*, than with religious differences.

If a religious debate did take place, the protagonists operated on familiar ground. Islam had from the start been engaged in debate with Jewish and Christian critics, and in the Koran itself Muḥammad is enjoined to "argue" or "dispute" with the unbelievers (Sūra 3:61)[10]. The Turks, too, had their share of religious debates, going back to the times of the Seldjuks, the Anatolian emirates, and the early Ottomans. Well-known examples are the discussions between an elderly *müderris* and Manuel II in Ankara, and between Mehmed II, the Conqueror (d.1481), and Gennadius II Scholarius whom he had installed as patriarch[11]. Polemic literature was, it is true, aimed at the religious adversary,

8 Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 245.

9 Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 256-258.

10 J. Brugman, *Godsdienstgesprekken tussen Christenen en Moslims in de vroege Islam* (Leiden, 1970), 45; for the oldest disputes see ibid., 46-51, and S. Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), 422f.

11 E. Trapp (ed.), *Manuel II. Palaiologos. Dialoge mit einem "Perser"* (Vienna, 1966); A. Papadakis, "Gennadius II and Mehmet the Conqueror", *Byzantion*, 42 (1972), 88-106; A. Decei, "Patrik II. Gennadios Skolarius' un Fatih Sultan Mehmet için yazdığı ortodoks i'tikad-namesinin Türkçe metni", *Fatih ve Istanbul*, I (İstanbul, 1953), 98-116; Vryonis, *Decline*, 423-436; Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, 199-215; B. Flemming, "Turkse discussies omtrent het christendom", in *Historische betrekkingen tussen Moslims en Christenen*, ed. Sj. van Koningsveld (Nijmegen, 1982), 116, 118, 123.

but in practice it was meant to strengthen one's own flock[12]. The average Muslim Turk knew no more about intricate theological concepts of his own religion than did the average *zimmi* about the subtle distinctions of Christian theology.

In the sixteenth century centres of Christianity in South-Eastern Europe were overrun by the Turks. Ranging far beyound the limits of Greek Orthodoxy, the victorious Muslims encountered, alongside Jews, a Christian population which was composed of Catholics, the foreign religion par excellence, and Protestants belonging to various denominations, Calvinist, Lutheran, or Unitarian. The spread of Islam northwards into Hungary during the high tide of Turkish conquests[13] caused anxiety to the churches, who tried to hold in and contain this current. The readiness of Christians to participate in public debates arranged by the Ottomans can be seen in this light[14]. One of the best known was the debate held on Whitsunday May 1547 in the church of the Franciscans in Nagyvárad (Grosswardein, Oradea Mare); the protagonists being a Turkish scholar named Dervişş Çelebi, as organizer of the debate, and a Turkish-speaking Catholic humanist, Bartholomeus Georgievič, who later had his account of the debate printed in Cracow[15].

This renewed energy in Ottoman-Christian religious polemic may be correlated with the situation of heightened tension in the

12 Brugman, *Godsdienstgesprekken*, 61. Cf. the Turkish sermon reported by a Christian prisoner in the 1450's; the preacher pointed out the errors of the Unbelievers concerning the death of Jesus: "the *kaury* say that Jesus was... crucified. You must not believe that". B. Stolz (transl.), S. Soucek (commentary), *Konstantin Mihailović, Memoirs of a Janissary* (Ann Arbor, 1975), 18-19, 202.

13 P.F. Sugar, *Sutheastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (Seattle, London, 1977), 50, with earlier literature.

14 Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, is the best comprehensive study. See M.E.H.N. Mout, "Calvinoturcisme in de zeventiende eeuw", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 91 (1978), 593-595; idem, "Turken in het nieuws. Beeldvorming en publieke opinie in de zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanden", *TvG*, 97 (1984), 362-381.

15 Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, 208, with reference to his own *Turcica. Die europäischen Türkendrucke des XVI. Jahrhunderts* (Bucharest, Leipzig, Baden-Baden, 1961-1968), Nr. 879. On Georgievič's contribution to turkology see G. Hazai, "Zum balkanischen Hintergrund der osmanisch-türkischen Transkriptionstexte von Bartholomaeus Georgievits", *Studia Slavica Hung.*, 20 (1974), 71-106.

two camps. Strictly Sunni *ulema,* their numbers vastly strengthened through the recent Ottoman conquests in the Near East, closed ranks against heterodoxy in general and the threat of the heterodox Shī'a of the *Kızılbaş* in particular[16], while a sense of crisis pervaded the "Frankish" camp in the wake of the Reformation[17].

The Gurbetname

Proclaiming their faith against the adherents of what they considered an earlier and incomplete form of God's revelation, Turkish debaters found it useful to refer to Christian beliefs, and needed information which indeed existed in an ancient body of literature, mostly Arabic[18]. But not everyone had access to such books and could read Arabic. Especially in their new provinces in Europe, in strongholds in an alien land with a fluid frontier zone[19], many a Muslim Turk must have felt the need for some exegetical equipment ready for use in his own language. It is surely no accident that such an equipment was provided by an unnamed sixteenth-century Turk within the framework of his "Book of Exile of Prince Cem" *Gurbetname-i Sultan Cem.* This book begins with a biography of the well-known Ottoman prince who lived for twelve years in Europe, becoming, during the last years of his life, an instrument of Christian rulers for their political plans. Their diplomatic activity around his person and the Ottoman counter-measures as revealed by the Turkish archives have been the object of profound historical research up to the present day[20].

16 H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600* (London, 1973), 182-185, with earlier literature. For demographic developments Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society,* 232.

17 Göllner, *Türkenfrage,* 173-186; Mout, "Calvinoturcisme", 582-585.

18 Lewis, *Muslim Discovery,* 136, 175, 182, 184.

19 Cf. Gy. Káldy-Nagy, "Mādjār. The Ottoman Period", *EI*², V (1984), 1023.

20 The classical study is L. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan. Fils de Mohammed II, frère de Bayezid II (1459-1495). Etude sur la question d'Orient à la fin du XVe siècle* (Paris, 1892). Recent treatments are by K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), II, The Fifteenth Century,* (Philadelphia, 1978), especially the chapter entitled "Innocent VIII, Jem Sultan, and the Crusade (1484-1490)"; and H. Inalcık, "A Case Study in Renaissance diplomacy. The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan", *Journal of Turkish*

The *Gurbetname* has been known since 1911 when Mehmed Arif mentioned it in the introduction to his edition of the *Vakıât-i Sultan Cem* cited above. In 1927 F. Babinger suggested that its author might be Cem's trusted follower Haydar Çelebi[21]. In 1954 I.H. Danişmend printed the text from a manuscript, now in Paris, in a modern Turkish transcription[22]. H. Inalcık in 1979 again drew attention to it; within the scope of his enquiry, the *Gurbetname* was a "modified version" and in many ways "simply a copy" of the *Vakıât-i Sultan Cem* into which the author inserted, "quite awkwardly" a long controversy on Islam and Christianity[23]. This controversy will be dealt with here, and it will be shown that the unnamed author of the *Gurbetname* had a purpose of his own. Using the travels of the Prince as an introduction to a long debate between Prince Cem and Pope Innocent VIII, he wrote in fact a Turkish apology for Islam which deserves to be studied as such. "It was may wish", the author said, "to write a brief and clear record[24] of the adventures of Prince Cem whom God has taken into his mercy and whose sins are forgiven —may his grave be pleasant and may he make Paradise his dwelling — and of the words[25] which he exchanged with the Pope of Rome[26] on the subject of religion, in order that the reader be overcome by compassion and remember him with blessings and delight his soul. If eloquence is absent here this is not for want of rhetorical figures; rather, it is due to the fear that (an embellished text) might not be

Studies, 3 (1979), 209-230; Vatin, "Exotisme" (cf. note 5).

21 See note 5; F. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927), 32, mentions a manuscript in the Halis Efendi library, which is now in the Library of the University of Istanbul; cf. H. Inalcık, "Ḏjem", *EI*², II (1965), 535.

22 I.H. Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme-i Sultan Cem", *Fâtih ve Istanbul*, II, 3/6, (Istanbul, 1954), 211-270. The call number of the Paris manuscript is Suppl. Turc 1434. For information about this manuscript I am grateful to J. Schmidt, Den Haag. My special thanks are due to Professor Adnan Erzi, Ankara, who gave me his own handwritten copy of the Paris manuscript in 1980.

23 Inalcık, "Case Study", 209.

24 *müsvedde* "rough copy, draft".

25 *kelimat*.

26 *Rim-Papa*. The title of the Pope is not followed by any formula such as "God speed his soul to Hell" etc., cf. Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*, 148.

useful because, being illiterate, the greater part of the folks of the Ottoman dominions might not understand our purpose. And its brevity is occasioned by the fear that, should I transgress the boundaries of actual fact, there might be a lack of acceptance...[27]".

These *kelimat* or "words" — we might also use the term *meclis-i kelam* "discussion"[28], being consciously aimed at ordinary people, are written in the straightforward Turkish which we know from other popular works from the early sixteenth century. The writer adapts his theme to the understanding of his readers or listeners, embroidering it with stories to keep alive their interest. The popular appeal is also served by the approving and admiring remarks with which the Pope invites the Prince to speak and comments on his utterances.

"The Pope saw that the late Prince was a commander of the word and a profoundly learned man. He began to question him on his knowledge and said, 'We hear that you confirm our religion; is that so?' Watch now how the late Prince answered and refuted him. He said, 'Yes, we affirm the religion of Jesus — peace be upon him — but not your religion which was invented by those 318 monks gathered in Nicea[29]. If you will listen and not be offended, shall I make an explicit declaration?' The Pope said, 'God forbid that I should be offended by you! You are my son, say what you wish'"[30]. "When (the late Prince) had said this, the Pope showed himself very much inclined and obliged and said, 'It is certainly my wish. Could there be a more beautiful and praiseworthy discussion? I wish that our whole life would pass in scholarly discussions!'[31].

The Prince, too, treated the Pope with politeness; Christians in the *Gurbetname* are not referred to as "infidels", but the Koranic term "Nazarenes", *Naṣārā,* is used. The author quotes from a number of Muslim and Christian sources, named (for example,

27 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 213.

28 Used by the author here and there; "argumentation" in Islamic theology is *ḥudjdja.*

29 Council of Nicaea 325 A.D.

30 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 228.

31 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 231.

Abū Yazīd al-Balkhī) and unnamed. It is certain that the *Gurbetname* was from the beginning a composite work. In addition, the text seems to have suffered from some revision, especially at the junction between the historical biography of Cem and the religious debate[32].

The Prince had entered Rome on 13 March, 1489, huge crowds gathering to see him ride through the city[33]. The *Gurbetname* follows the *Vakıât* in describing how Cem was received by Innocent VIII — named *Visenso* as in the *Vakıât* but not identified by name in the debate[34], and how the Pope gave him honours. It relates, still from the same source, Cem's proud refusal to genuflect before the Pope and his scornful rejection of the belief that the Pope could remit sins[35]. Cem did have a series of encounters with the Pope, but the disputation which now follows in the *Gurbetname* does not resemble them. There is no indication of the surroundings in which the debate took place. While this may cast doubts on the author's claim to autopsy, it is not inconceivable that he did belong to Cem's retainers — he alludes to his remaining in Rome to settle some important matters for the Prince when he left for Naples, where he died on 22 February 1495[36] — and that he set out, in his old age, to picture the son of the Conqueror emerging, from his dealings with the Christian enemy, as an impressive spokesman of Islam. A prophecy that Sultan Süleyman (1520-1566) would conquer Rome[37] allows us to date the work before 1566, perhaps in the

32 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 212 and 249.

33 Setton, *Papacy* II, 407.

34 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 222.

35 Cf. Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*. 178, with reference to the *Vakıât*; Vatin, "Exotisme", 243.

36 Setton, *Papacy* II, 481-482. The Sultan's purpose had always been the elimination of his brother; cf. Inalcık, "Case Study", 213. See also B. Flemming, "Zwei türkische Herren von Avlona", *Der Islam*, 45 (1969), 310-316; H. Reindl, *Männer um Bayezid. Eine prosopographische Studie über die Epoche Sultan Bāyezīds II. (1481-1512)* (Berlin, 1983), 303-308.

37 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 227-228; Inalcık, "Case Study", 218. For actual Turkish plans to invade Italy in about 1480 see Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*, 32. According to the *Gurbetname*, a Venetian scholar had written in a history book that after 920/beg. 26 February 1514 an Ottoman called Süleyman would become

thirties or forties of the sixteenth century[38].

The dialogue between Cem and the Pope

The Islamic apology of the *Gurbetname* unfolds gradually over the course of an unspecified number of encounters with the Pope, and it is often really a monologue delivered by Cem. The Pope opened the debate with the words quoted above; "do you confirm our religion?".

Five gospels

Cem, going far back in his answer, acknowledges five gospels, of which only one, the genuine *Incil* was authentic revelation[39]; the other four gospels by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John being the work of those four men. He conceded that there were blessed sayings of the prophet Jesus in them, but he deplored the process of *tahrif,* corrupting and falsifying the sacred text, especially through the confusion of tongues caused by translating it into countless languages. By contrast, nobody in the whole world was capable of translating the book of Islam, the Koran, and of altering or corrupting a single line of it[40].

Cem proceeded to tell a story about Salmān the Persian, a companion of the Prophet, from the time when he was still a Zoroastrian and fireworshipper. While hunting on a mountain, Salmān met an old ascetic monk who converted him to Christianity and told him about the Authentic Gospel which foretold the coming of the Prophet Muḥammed. In line with a tendency in the *Gurbet-*

Sultan, that he would make great conquests in Hungary as elsewhere, and that he would finally fit out a great fleet and would conquer Rome. For signs and portents read by the Venetians, this time in relation to the fall of Rome to the French on 31 December 1494, see Setton, *Papacy* II, 473.

38 After the siege of Vienna; for a Turkish prophecy connected with that event see B. Flemming, "Der Ḫāmi' ül-meknūnāt. Eine Quelle aus der Zeit Sultan Süleymans", in *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients,* eds. H.R. Roemer and A. Noth (Festschrift für Bertold Spuler) (Leiden, 1981), 79-92.

39 Cf. Koran, 5 : 46.

40 This is an extension of the meaning of the technical term *i'djāz,* which originally referred to the inimitability of the Koran in content and form, applied to "competition" with the Koran, not to altering or translating it; cf. G.E. von Grünebaum, "I'ǰāz", *EI*², III (1971), 1018-1020.

name to avoid a direct mentioning of names, the monk's name is not given; his appearance is an obvious allusion to the monk Baḥıra, an early witness for Islam in Muslim tradition[41]. The monk implored Salmān the Persian not to follow the actual corrupted religion of the Christians, because they no longer kept the Mosaic law and the law of the Authentic Gospel, eating pork, rejecting circumcision, changing their orientation in prayer, and deifying Jesus and Mary. All this they did under the influence of a wicked Jewish scholar, whose story Cem had in prospect. But he first changed the subject by suggesting a discussion about the textual promise concerning the prophet of Islam.

The Paraclete

The old monk had read in the Authentic Gospel that Aḥmad, the seal of prophets, would come, and he had found the same announcement in the gospels of John and Mark: The Paraclete, the spirit of God, my father shall send him in my name, and the Paraclete shall teach you everything... And "father" here meant not father but lord, master[42].

Cem now turned his full attention to the intricate questions raised by the concept of the *faraḳlīṭā,* Paraclete. He offered four interpretations. At first he borrowed from *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr,* the great commentary of the Koran by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149-1209)[43]. After translating this Arabic classic, Cem displayed the range of his knowledge by offering a supplement, heard from a former monk converted to Islam, which he reproduced in "Greek" with a

41 He is a heretical monk in Christian polemics; cf. A. Abel, "Baḥīra", *EI*², I (1960), 922-923; E. van Donzel, *'Enbāqom. Anqaṣa amin (La porte de la foi). Apologie éthiopienne du christianisme contre l'Islam à partir du Coran* (Leiden, 1969). For Salmān al-Fārisī see G. Levi della Vida, s.v., *EI*.

42 The *locus classicus* is Sura 61 : 6, where Muḥammad is announced; cf. R. Paret, *Der Koran. Kommentar und Konkordanz* (Stuttgart, 1979), 476-477. For this *topos* in Muslim polemics, cf. F. Sepmeijer, *Een weerlegging van het Christendom uit de 10e eeuw* (Kampen, 1985), 94, 121, with earlier literature. For "lord, master" cf. J.-M. Gaudeul, "The Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar. 'Umar's Letter re-discovered?", *Islamochristiana,* 10 (1984), 139-140.

43 C.G. Anawati, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *EI*², II (1965), 754. Cf. J.-M. Gaudeul and R. Caspar, "Textes de la Tradition musulmane concernant le *taḥrîf* (falsifacation des Ecritures)", *Islamochristiana,* 6 (1980), 61-104.

Persian translation, which he in turn translated into Turkish. It said: "From the people of Āzer, that is from the sons of the Prophet Abraham, there shall come one worthy of the prophethood... he shall be the son of one 'Abdallāh, and his blessed name shall be Muḥammad... Whosoever shall have faith in him shall be the master of the world and of the hereafter"[44]).

Corruption of religious practice and belief

"The Pope now reminded him, 'We should like to hear that tale from you about the man who did damage to the Christian religion. You were kind enough to promise us this, so if you do not think me over-persistent, please explain it'. Wishing to gain the goodwill of the Pope, the late Prince at once began with his story". It ran as follows.

The Christian community had been persecuted by a learned, but wicked Jew. When he was too old to harrass them, he decided to mislead the Christians and began by pretending that he had been temporarily blinded by Jesus. Again the *Gurbetname* expressly avoids mentioning a name, although there are many indirect references to Paul[45]. This Jew, then, taught the Christians to abandon the Sabbath and to worship on Sunday, and he also encouraged them to drink wine. Moreover, he perverted their belief in the Authentic Gospel, confusing the three leaders of early Christianity. This archdeceiver was completely grounded in philosophy, *ilm-i hikmet*. Interestingly, the author puts the following words into Cem's mouth: "In those times philosophy was different. Nowadays Muslim scholars have intervened in this[46]; our sheykhs have thoroughly investigated those passages[47]

44 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 231-232.

45 For traditional accusations against Paul, which may reflect hostile criticism of Paul by Christian theologians favourable to Peter, cf. R.A. Nicholson, *The Mathnawí of Jalálu'ddin Rúmî. Commentary* (London, 1936), 36-39), cf. W.M. Watt, "Ash-Shahrastani over de triniteitsleer", *Historische betrekkingen* (cf. note 11), (1982), 9-10; idem, "ash-Shahrastānī's Account of Christian Doctrine", *Islamochristiana*, 9 (1983) 247-259, esp. 251 f. For later developments cf. M. Ayoub, "Muslim Views of Christianity: Some modern Examples", *Islamochristiana*, 10 (1984), 57, 66-67.

46 *karışdı*.

which might be harmful to the faith (*itikad*). Everyone who studies those passages knows this"[48].

And thus the Jewish scholar misrepresented Jesus to the three Christian leaders, Melkā, Nastūr, and Mar Ya'ḳūb. They had started out believing that Jesus was the slave of God, his messenger and his word, but this false teacher gave each of them a different creed to follow, and they submitted to him, though grudgingly. When the deceiver vanished — there was conflicting evidence about his death and its whereabouts, one source being the *Mathnawī* by Mevlānā Djalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d.1273)[49] — the Christian leaders met and were startled to see that their creeds differed; they began to repudiate and abhor one another, the point at issue being the figure of Jesus.

Melkā, the leader of the Greek Orthodox, believed in Jesus the son of God, his word, brought by Gabriel, conceived miraculously by Mary[50], born, lived among men, then returned to his father and sat at his right hand. Nestorius spoke of three hypostases; he argued, as the deceiver had told him, that Jesus was the Light of Light, Son of God, had entered Mary as a ray of light, became flesh, was born, lived and returned to his origin. Mar Ya'ḳūb, as the Jew had told him, believed that God had no son and did not use light as his son; he came himself into Mary, took the form of man and drove away Satan.

With this meagre "Christology" the author of the *Gurbetname* would seem to confirm the saying that Ottomans felt that "Christians of all colours were much alike"[51]. The author did display some familiarity with the Nicene Creed, but did not puzzle his

47 *yerler*; Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 235-236.

48 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 235-236.

49 In the *Mathnawī* the deceiver was the vizier of a Jewish king; after contriving his plot against the Christians, he "killed himself in seclusion"; cf. R.A. Nicholson (ed.), *The Mathnawí of Jelálu'ddín Rúmí* (London, 1925), 41 verse 662; R.A. Nicholson (transl.), *The Mathnawí of Jalálu'ddín Rúmí*, I-II (London, 1926), 38; idem, vol. VII, *Commentary* (London, 1936), 36-39. For the explanation given by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (cf. above) of how the Christians came to err, cf. J. Jomier, "Unité de Dieu, Chrétiens et Coran selon Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *Islamochristiana*, 6 (1980), 170-171.

50 For Muslim doctrines regarding Mary, cf. Koran 3 : 33 f.; 3 : 47, 66 : 12.

51 Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 233.

readers with the Orthodox tenet that Jesus had two natures, one divine and one human, but only one person. As for the Nestorians and Jacobites, regarded as heretical by the Orthodox and thrown together, despite their disparity, in one *millet,* the author took little notice of them. Their distinguishing tenets[52] were reduced to the level of vague stereotypes and reminiscences[53]. It was enough to explain the seeds of disagreement between the Christians.

Early Christian history

After this survey of early Christianity Cem proposed to set forth the life-story of Jesus and the history of the early Christian empires. This body of information, taken from Muslim and (so it seems) Byzantine sources, would require a different scale of treatment than can be given here.

A dialogue within the dialogue

After another lacuna in the manuscript we find Cem taking up an old story as testimony to the truth of Islam:
"Our purpose in recording this story is to prove the weakness of the Christian religion; neither by reason nor by tradition[54] can its sayings be accepted as even resembling the divine word"[55].

Cem reproduced a polemic in which a learned Muslim, an Arab sheykh, refuted first a Christian called Beshīr, then a monk called in to help Beshīr, and finally the greatest monk at the emperor's court in Constantinople. The learned Muslim was a prisoner of the emperor; the Christians hoped to convert him; surrounded by great crowds he addressed the monks; they plotted to put him to death; finally, he recited the call to prayer in their great church and was set free by the emperor, a just man, who let him go back to his own country. It is easy to find features of Cem's life in this story; one is tempted to suspect that the author was inspired by this older debate.

52 Cf. Sepmeijer, *Weerlegging,* 37-42, 109-111.
53 E.g., "light of light", taking up a conventional theme from Platonism.
54 *ne aklen ve ne naklen.*
55 Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 247.

When we consider the civility and even amiability of Cem's encounters with the Pope, it is surprising to observe the acrimony with which this Muslim sheykh attacked his enemies. Jesus was a prophet, not the son of God, and he could list weak points in the Christian doctrines to prove it. Either Jesus endured bodily suffering as a helpless man: then how could they call him God? Or his sufferings happened with his divine consent: then why did they curse the Jews? They said that Jesus was God or the son of God because he performed miracles: they should look in the Torah and the Histories of the Prophets, *Ḳıṣaṣ ül-Enbiyā'*, at the other prophets who had the power to work miracles — some also went up to heaven — and they should draw the conclusion that Jesus was a prophet like the others[56]. Jesus was created by God, without an earthly father: so was Adam who had no father and no mother, either. They had better worship Adam! Jesus was in need of cleansing: John the Baptist[57] cleansed and baptized him. How could they say that Jesus was holy, and John the Baptist was not! The monks were liars: they claimed powers to purify the water of baptism, knowing that, being sinners, they did not have these powers. Their divine redeemer had humiliated himself to a sojourn of nine months in a woman's womb[58]: and here their greatest monk disdained intercourse with women. As for prostrating one self in front of the greatest monk: this was blasphemy, man ought to prostrate himself only before God.

After this, the Pope was mortified; the following question represented his last stand: "'My son, did not the Messiah say: there will not come a prophet after me?' The late Prince replied, 'Yes, this saying is true; but it refers to the prophets of the children of Israel[59]; there is no doubt about this, just as the pride of the two worlds, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā — may God commend and salute him — is the seal of the prophets'". Here ends the disputation,

56 For the theme "Other prophets performed miracles" cf. Gaudeul, "Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar", 146-147.

57 Yaḥyā. For the creation of Adam cf. Gaudeul, "Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar", 146.

58 Cf. Gaudeul, "Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar", 144-145.

59 Koran, Sūra 3 : 49.

meclis-i kelam, in which, just as in later debates, the Prince had not yielded on a single point. The *Gurbetname* now proceeds to tell its own story of the death of the Prince[60].

This study, too, has almost reached its end. It has set out to trace the polemical equipment to which a sixteenth-century Turk might have had recourse in order to refute a Christian who took up the challenge, suggesting that the *Gurbetname* was indeed written for such a purpose. To be sure, it does seem a curious shortcoming that his author had so little to say about the contemporary Latin Church. Events in Rome, ostensibly witnessed by him, did not stimulate him to report more about Catholic beliefs and practices than the outrageous claim, copied from the *Vakıât,* of the Pope to forgive sins. The *Gurbetname's* mental world was Islamic, Turkish-speaking, with a knowledge of Persian and some Arabic, and, as far as Christianity was concerned, it was reasonable familiar with a Greek Orthodox Church whose theology was rooted in a remote age before the schism which split the "Melkites" into West and East[61]. This tradition had tended to shield the Turkish-speaking Muslims from information about, for example, the dispute about images, the filioque-clause, or the primacy of Rome[62]. Seen from this vantage-point, the Latin Christians in the West were dissenters from the Great Church, not to speak of the emerging Protestants.

Further questions, such as the relationship between the *Gurbetname* and later Ottoman Turkish writings on this theme[62a] go beyond this short survey. For example, the memoirs of Turkish

60 Inalcık, "Case Study", 217.

61 Lewis, *Muslim Discovery,* 176. For the attitude of the Latins towards the Byzantines cf. R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth, 1970), 82.

62 B. Lewis noted that even Katib Çelebi's list of Popes stopped in 1535; *Muslim Discovery,* 179.

62a When the Ottoman scholar Talikizade (died c. 1599) composed his *Şemailname,* examples of the qualities distinguishing individual Ottomans, he became fascinated by Cem in Rome, embroidering its description and introducing additional dialogues. These are discussed in J. Buri-Gütermann, "Ein Türke in Italien. Aus einer unbekannten Handschrift der Nationalbibliothek Wien", *ZDMG,* 124 (1974), 59-72. The Vienna manuscript has since been described in C. Woodhead, *Ta'līḳizāde's Şehnāme-i hümāyūn* (Berlin, 1983), 12.

prisoners returning from Christian lands in the seventeenth century might help us to understand their thoughts over Christianity such as they witnessed it[63]. The learned Katib Çelebi (died 1657), who used Western books, gave his sholarly description of Christian doctrines a less polemical edge than is to be expected from his defiant Koranic opening[64]. The great traveller Evliya Çelebi (died 1682) was much clcoser to the popular approach of the *Gurbetname*. When he was in Antioch he visited Mount Nakūra, where stood the sanctuary of Shem'ūn Ṣafā, who in Muslim lore represents the apostle Peter. According to him, Shem'ūn lived and died there, together with Ḥabīb en-Nedjdjār, "the Carpenter", an unnamed believer referred to in the Koran. In their sanctuary the Authentic Gospel, *ṣaḥīḥ Indjīl,* was preserved, written by Shem'ūn on a gazelle skin. Evliya pored over it and took from it the verse, *ayet,* which was also recorded in Salmān the Persian's story: that Muḥammad was the man about whom the Authentic Gospel says: "He shall be a prophet from the house of Āzer, he shall be without falsehood, he shall be born in Mecca... his name shall be Aḥmed... and his followers shall own the earth"[65].

This old prophecy runs through Muslim religious polemics of the nineteenth and twentieth century[66]. Quite recently the confident, combative spirit of the *Gurbetname* reappeared in a "Handbook for the (Muslim in) Exile", *Gurbetçinin El Kitabı*[67]. This book, and similar publications, provide an indication of the

63 Autobiographical accounts of former prisoners-of-war are I. Parmaksızoğlu, "Bir Türk kadısının esaret hatıraları", *Tarih Dergisi,* 5 (1953), 77 ff., and F. Kreutel, *Die Autobiographie des Dolmetschers 'Osmān Aġa aus Temeschwar. Der Text des Londoner Autographen in normalisierter Rechtschreibung* (Cambridge-Hertford, 1980).

64 Flemming, "Turkse discussies", 120.

65 Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname* III (Istanbul, 1928), 103; cf. the modernized version by Z. Danışman (Istanbul, 1972), 4, 298-300. On Ḥabīb an-Nadjdjār see *EI*[2] s.v.

66 Cf. the survey by Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* I (Istanbul 1333 / 1914-15), 247-48.

67 E. Sanay, *Gurbetçinin El Kitabı* (Ankara 1984), 74-80, quoting the prophecy concerning Muḥammad from the *Seyahatname*. The Handbook is publication nr. 238 of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Turkish Republic. For a recent international debate, the Dialogue arranged by Mu'ammar al-Kadhdhāfī in Tripolis, Libya, in February 1976, see *Islamochristiana,* II

extent to which these polemics will take on the colour of the age in which they are written. Any history of Turkish Islam must take into account this development of religious apology.

(Rome, 1976) and V (Rome, 1979) 291 f. on the book by A.A. Aydın, *Islam-Hıristiyan Diyalogu ve Islamın Zaferi* ("The dialogue between Islam and Christianity and the victory of Islam") (Ankara, 1977).

II. CONTENTS AND INHERITANCE : 2

REMNANTS OF PRE-OTTOMAN INSTITUTIONS IN EARLY OTTOMAN CYPRUS:

THE KANAKARIA DOCUMENTS AND OTHER TESTIMONIES (A SUMMARY)

COSTAS P. KYRRIS / NICOSIA

1. This series of fourteen Greek documents from the Archive of the Greek Archbishopric of Cyprus comes from a mutilated collection of twenty-nine, as their original numbering shows, most of them relating to the Greek Monastery of Kanakaria near Lythrangomi, a village in the peninsula of Karpass, E.Cyprus, or to people connected with it.
2. The document No.1 (=No.1 of the original numbering) is a deed of sale of land near a river, apparently at Lythrangomi, by *Pervana Pelupakhis* and *Hassan Pelupakhis to Phlouris* in 1666.
3. The document No.2 (originally No.3) is a deed of sale of olive-trees near the garden of Koutoutzis by *Hassan Pelupakhis Tapaza* (=of Apaza) and his sons *Seleyman* and *Osman,* to the abbot of Kanakaria, 1696, with *Tirjanbeǵ* as witness. The other side of the same document contains a deed of sale of land by *Osman Peluk-pakhi* and *Seleyman Pelukpachi* to *Papagavriel* abbot of *Kanakaria* with *Nassanis Phrangos* and *Meemetagha Tapaza bumazos* as witnesses.
4. The document No.3 (=orig. No.4) is also a deed of sale of land with water and with "*anephotidhes*" (=Key water passages) called "*Vryssi tou Braima*", by *Hadji Hassanis* brother of *Hadji Memetis* from Varossin (=Famagusta), who lived at the village *Vassilin near Lythrangomi* and who had brought it from *Mustafa begis Pakhis* (= *baş?* =chief? or *sipahi?*), – to the same abbot, who

turned it into a "*Makkoufin*" [=*vakf*] of the monastery, 1694; Witnesses: *Mehemetis of Karnifatza,* and his brother-in-law *Chitiris,* and *Osmanis* of *Mehemetis Karamanlis,* and *Ali* the son of Omeris, and *Loïzos the son of Pitofas,* and *Iosifis* the *son of Hannas.*

5. The document No.4 (=orig. No.6) is a deed of sale of land with water by *Mehemmetaghas* and *Hassanis* sons of *Apaza Pelukpakhis* to the same abbot as "*makkoufin*" [=*vakf*] of Kanakaria, 1700; witnesses: *Ibrahim Çelebis* the *Hodja,* and *Falis the Miroudhin,* and *Nicholas* of [the village] *Melanarga,* and *Tzenios.*
6. The document No.5 (=orig. No.7) is a deed of donation of water by *Kyriakos of Leonarisson* to the same monastery for the salvation of his soul; it ends thus: "*And as a true confirmation the same Zaimaghas has issued this temessük* [=title-deed], *With his seal, 1702,* – still visible.
7. The document No.6 (=orig. No.8) of 1703 is a deed of sale of land, olive-trees and water by *Alis Makarounis* to *Papaleontios* of *Vathylakas* and to *Kyriakos* of *Leonarisson,* for which *Meemet peğis* and *Mustafa Çelebi* collected the relevant *resmi* (=tax). The same property was bought – apparently in partnership with Papaleontios and Kyriakos – by the Monastery of Kanakaria too, the following signing as witnesses: *Hadji Hassanis* of *Kilanemon, Ahametis* and *Isufis* the two brothers, the *Old Omerbegis,* and his son *Ali Celebi.*
8. The document No.7 (=orig. No.10) is a deed of sale of land – next to that of *Alis Macarounis* etc. – by *Mehemetis begis* and *Hassan begis spahis* of *Lythrangomon* to *Papa Anthimos* son *of Symeon* the *abbot of Kanakaria* to turn it into (λαδαργόν) oil-factory of the monastery and build premises in it; Witnesses: *Chiaspagis* and *Ahametis* and *Omeris* the three sons of *Mehemmetipegis.* The same document contains another deed of sale of land near the λαδαργόν by *Alis Makarounis* to the same *Papa Anthimos* who bought it on account of the monastery; witnesses: *Mehemmetis,* and *Kousseïs,* and *Ahametis* of the monastery of *Chilas* [?] the *sons of Alis.* Date: 1713.
9. The document No.8 (=orig. No.12). of 1716, is a deed of sale of land by two Turks to *Papa Anthimos* with Turks as witnesses; it

was issued by *Hassanbeği* the *sipahi* of *Lythrangomon.*

10. The other six documents contain similar deeds of sale of land or other property by Turks of Lythrangomon to Greeks of that area or to Kanakaria dated 1755 (no.9 =orig. No.15), 1763 (No.10 =orig. No.16), 1768 (No.11 =orig. No.17). 1780 (No.12 =orig. No.17, i), 1787 (No.13 =orig. No.18), 1806 (No.14 =orig. No.29). I just mention the sale of land by *Mehemetagha* the *Zaïmis* of *Leonarisson* to *Chryssanthos the abbot of Kanakaria* (1755, No.9), and the sale of land belonging to the monk *Papasophronis* in 1763 by *Mustafapegis Makarounis, Ali begis Karamanatis (sic,* Karamanitis?) the *spahis of Lythrangomon,* to *Vassilis* and *Lovis on account of the monastery of Kanakaria. "This land",* the deed goes, "*we* [=Mustafas and Alis], *bought to turn it into a Makkoufin* [=*vakf*]" (doc. No.10, 1763). (Here the relations among the persons involved are not quite clear).
11. In the document No.13 (=orig. No.18), 1787, the sale was made by a Greek, *Yerovassilis* of *Lythrangomi,* to *Hadji-Christofis* Daniel of *Trikomon,* the deed is signed and sealed by the local *sipahis* "According to the *kanun* of our long-lived King", and among the witnesses is included the "*Konomos' of Kanakaria* and *Mustafa Zapitis.* Similarly in the deed No.12 (=orig. No.17, i, 1780), the seller *Kusseyis* son of Kerim agha states that he *did the sale* before the *sipahi Imaïlagha* and the witnesses.
12. All these documents except the last one (=No.14) bear the print of the seals of many of the Turkish witnesses in the Arabic script and the signatures of many of the Greeks in Greek; they seem to have been drawn up and written by some Greek Cypriot notary, possibly the abbot of Kanakaria, in a form of popular Greek that proves much illiteracy. While in the documents Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 (1666-1700), 11 (1768), 14 (1806), no *sipahis* are mentioned, and the deeds bear no official confirmation in the documents Nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 (1702-1787), the *sipahis* (or zaïms) play an important part in the deed as the authorities that either confirm it or execute it by sometimes serving as lieutenants of the owner, who strikingly enough, is, in one case, the monastery itself (No.10, 1763); or, in three cases (Nos.7, 8, 9), they are the sellers. In these last three cases the documents become official apparently as a

result of the fact that the sellers are the authorities. In the deed No.6 the *sipahis* appear to collect the tax "*resmin*", "*according to the Kanun of our King*", and this may have been equally done in the other deeds too.

13. So, of these sale documents at least Nos.1-4 appear to be non-official documents involving Greeks and Turks without any official confirmation unless the seal-prints of the Turks who acted as witnesses may be considered to serve as official confirmation of the respective deeds; while the deeds Nos.5,6,7,8,10,12,13 are obviously official cadastral documents.
14. It is of the utmost significance that the Turks of Lythrangomi sold their property to Greeks, chiefly to a monastery during so long a time. These sales, especially those concerning *sipahis*, may belong to the general process of decay of the *timars* of the Ottoman Empire from the XVIth century onwards[1], and to a process of recovery of the Greeks of Cyprus. This is also indicated by the use of Greek in these deeds and by the fact that the Turks involved in them did not impose the use of their language, apparently because they, at least in Karpass, ad already before 1666 adopted Greek as their everyday language and as the language of their legal deeds involving Greeks, with whom they had close relations of cordiality. In fact their whole attitude and mentality as reflected in the deeds examined, appear similar to those of their Greek fellow-villagers who had succeeded in assimilating them to a considerable extent, as it had happened all over Cyprus and as it was still happening up to 1974 especially in Karpass: the Turks of several villages there used Greek as their mother-language.
15. This was contrary to what happened in Asia Minor, especially in its central areas, and to some extent in Crete, Macedonia etc., – where many of the Greek population gradually came to use Turkish as their everyday and legal language from the XIVth (or, in Crete, from the XVIIth) century onwards because the flood of the Turkish invaders had compelled them to do so; but this was compatible with similar practices in most other Greek provinces under Ottoman rule, where either Greek or Greek and Turkish

[1] B.Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 1962, pp.89, 91, 30, 33, etc.

were used (e.g. in Andros, etc.[2]), and with the use of Greek as the official language of the Sultans for a long time from the XIVth-XVth centuries onwards[3].

16. The above and other phenomena such as the use of the *Anno Domini* dating and the complete absence of the *Hijra* dating are mainly due to the fact that, like the majority of the Muslims of Cyprus after 1571, many of the Turks of our documents were in fact Christians, i.e. Venetians, or Catalans, or French, who adopted Islam in 1570-1571f., a means of preserving their property and offices or a great part of them as attested in many sources. *Hassanis Phrangos, Mehemet Agas Tapaza Toumazos,* and several other personages appearing in them are obviously descendants of mixed marriages or converted families preserving their traditional Christian names together with the Turkish ones. One of the Frankish institutions preserved in the documents is the *effiton=affictum* occurring in the *Assizes* of Mediaeval Cyprus, here equivalent to *resm(in),* etc. This and other pre-Ottoman legal terms were perpetuated by the notaries who drew up the deeds, all of them Greeks or Greco-Latins originating in the varied class of church and civil administrators of the island before 1570. Their "phonetic" "notarial" script and writing habits belong to the same context too and point to the survival of the mass of their class and their traditions in the new régime.
17. Of the three types of Mediaeval Cypriot script, Square, Notarial and "Karahissar" or "Chicago 2400" it is the second one, the *Notarial Script,* that has been used by the scribes of the Kanakaria documents. Darrouzes' description of it applies precisely to their own writing habits[4]. It was especially in the "mécoupures" and in

[2] D.P.Paschalis, in Θεολογία, 5, 1927, p.205: a bilingual deed of 1805; L.Ch.Zois in *Παντογνώστης,* 5, 1929, No.2, pp.28-29, etc.

[3] Sp.Lambros, in *Νέος Ελληνομνήμων,* 5, 1908, pp.40-78, 155-189.

[4] Jean Darrouzès, 'Les manuscripts originaires de chypre à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris', *REB,* VIII, 1950 (1951), pp.164-165; cf. the examples nos: 80, 81 (1460, 1479) apud *Sir* Edward Maunde Thompson, *An Introduction to Greek and Latin Palaeography,* [Oxford, 1912], New York, Burt Franklin, n.d., pp.267-271: for various types of byzantine script see also Franz Dölger-Johannes Karayannopulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre,* Erster Abschnitt, Die Kaiserurkunden, München, 1968, *passim* espec. pp.6,31,32,33,110,112,127,142,144,149,136; cf. p.47 for *"einige Besonderheiten*

the "tendance à supprimer l'iota et à le remplacer par η, οι, ει" that the scribes of Kanakaria excelled, whereas occasionally but not as a rule they used the "liaison des lettres" for certain groups of letters such as σκ, κρ, σε, παχι, σθεν, μαρ, καρ, πασι, σι, χι, πρ, χα, με, τι, μι, κο, σκαλ, δαρ, σεν, etc. Other groups are frequently written separately: ρον, με, λις, ουνιασ, εποὺλι, θιμ, εδο, να, στι, ρι, etc. The most striking trait of our scribes is their tendency to divide the words into syllables in a completely arbitrary way; this produced recurrent patterns suiting the scribes' writing movement and/or their conception of the phrases' or words' sound rather than their meaning. E.g. in doc. 4 we read: βρι σην τουμ πρα ὕμα, 3.κ'αλες [= τρεις σκάλες]/χορ αφην με τον ερ όν τους με ἄνεφο τηδεσ, ἔ/νε κα λα που λιμενο. κ. κα λα αγορας μενον, etc.

18. These patterns, like the abbreviations occuring in our documents – e.g. ατ=αντ, συπ=συμπ – are the products of hand-writing needs and adaptations and do in no way correspond to actual pronunciation. No strict rules may be deduced from or concerning them, since they seem to have originated in instinctive hand drives rather than in conscious pondering[5]. As C.N.Sathas has put with regard to the *Assizes*, "*ἡ ἐν τούτῳ [=τῷ ἰδιώματι τῶν 'Ασσιζῶν] διαφθορα τοῦ συλλαβισμοῦ καί του τονισμοῦ ειναι μᾶλλον φαινομένη ἤ πραγματική, διότι ἐν ᾧ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ οὕτω διαφθείρει τας λέξεις ἡ παχυλὴ τῶν χρόνων ἐκείνων ἀμάθεις ἐν τῇ*

in der Schreibung bestimmter Wörter". See especially: Paul Canart, 'Les écritures livresques chypriotes du milieu, du XIe siècle au milieu du XIIIe et le style Palestino Chypriote "Epsilon"', pp.17-76; *idem*, 'Un style d'écriture livresque dans les manuscrits chypriotes du XIVe siècle: la chypriote "bouclée"', *La Paléographie grecque et Byzantine, Paris 21-25 Octobre 1974, Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*, No: 559, Paris, 1977, pp.303-307; Annemarie Weyl Carr, 'A group of Provincial manuscripts from the Twelfth Century', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, XXXVI, 1982, pp.39-81+plates 1-60 passim; A.Cutler-Annemarie Weyl Carr, 'The Psaltr, Benaki 343. An unpublished illuminated manuscript from the family 2440', *Revue des Études Byzantines*, XXXIV, 1976, pp.281-323.

[5] In no language or script do morphemes or phonemes appear as a result of such pondering, but they are born from living realities: Charles F.Hockett, *A Course in Modern Linguistics*, New York, 1958, pp.54-61, cf. pp.15-32, 102-144, 279-300; *Leonard Bloomfield, Language*, New York etc., 1933, ed. Holt, Reinhart and Winston, reprinted June 1963, pp.74-157; Daniel Jones, *The Phoneme: Its Nature and Use*, Cambridge, 1962.

προφορᾷ μένουσιν αἱ λέξεις αὗται ἀναλλοίωτοι"[6].

19. Still under such arbitrary irregularities we can detect an inner system of script and meanings, a strange rhythm expressing a *sui generis,* pragmatic and linguistic feeling. The morphemes and phonemes and other word patterns formulated by our scribes appear, in their queer immutability, like part of their professional wisdom bequeathed from generation to generation. The ideals of our scribes, who perpetuated the *notarial script traditions,* do not include calligraphy or orthography, and this is in full agreement with the negative conception incorporated in the article no. ϱζϭ of the *Assizes*: "ἀμε μόνον νὰ φαίνωνται τὰ γράμματα νὰ διαϭαστοῦν" "the basic requirement of all documents was just that they ought to be legible"[7].

The application, conscious or not, of this rule of the pre-Ottoman period in our documents is connected with the continuation of the notarial script traditions into the Ottoman period and the resulting continuity of writing patterns and rhythms. This would have been impossible without the survival under Ottoman rule of a number of scribes (and notaries?) of the previous period. Who these scribes were, to which social class they belonged and other related matters will be examined below.

20. The Cypriot-born scribes and notaries of the pre-Ottoman era had undergone strong Latin influences in their writing-habits and in their turn they exercised their influence upon the Latin Cypriot script. Perhaps their major contribution was their having developed a more original handwriting type in texts written by them in Latin, French, Italian or other Western languages than their Western colleagues sent to work in Cyprus. The same originality appears in the Greek texts written by them, and the two main types of Greek script, the square and the notarial one, correspond to two Western scripts that were currently used by them when they were writing in a Western language.

[6] Constantinos N.Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικῆς Βιϭλιοθήκης Τόμος Ἕκτος, [Vol. VI]; Ασσίζαι τοῦ Βασιλείου τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων καὶ τῆς Κύπρου,* Venice-Paris, 1877, p.κε; cf. Emile Legrand, *Bibliographie Hellénique... dix-septième siècle,* V, Paris, 1903, p.349 ftn.1.

[7] Sathas, *op.cit.,* p.143.

The *Square Greek Cypriote Script* corresponds to an equally *Square Western Script* which is frequently fragmented and of a very regular appearance but difficult to decipher. It originates in Western models but it has been deeply influenced by the *Greek Cypriote Square Script*[8].

To the *Notarial Greek Cypriote Script* corresponds a *Notarial Latin Script* which was currently used in the diplomas of the Latin Kings of Cyprus, particularly after 1370: "*plus allongée, plus penchée, plus franchement minuscule que la précédente, elle est beaucoup plus proche des écritures de chancellerie occidentale. Les scribes* [of this type of Latin Script], *cependant, souvent Syriens d'origine* [or Greeks or Latins[9]], *qui écrivaient les actes émanant de la chancellerie royale, paraissent avoir eu soin d'écrire leurs diplômes dans le même type d'écriture que ceux qui étaient utilisés par les souverains d'Occident*"[10].

21. It is from the latter "Script Cycle", including both the Greek and the Latin Notarial Scripts, that at least some of the peculiarities of the script of our documents are derived, whereas others are apparently survivals of the Byzantine tradition. Such abbreviations as ἄσπρα, τιρ τιρον, τ τῆς, κ και, μ μεν, τ της, καί, τ την, ατ αντ, συπ συμπ, and others occurring in them have such counterparts in the "Notarial Cycle" as the "*lettres barrées ou surmontées d'un tilde (par, per, pour sont représentés par un p...)*" the "*lettres suscrites*" (*aull* for *avrill*), "*l'usage du tilde placé horizontalement au dessus d'une lettre pour tenir lieu d'une nasale suivante (Simõ pour Simon) ...l'emploi d'un tilde vertical pour tenir lieu de -er ou de - re*"[11]. However, similar traits were frequent in the Byzantine script, particulary in that used in documents and books[12], and at least a

[8] Jean Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans, Documents Chypriotes des Archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)*, Paris, 1962, p.61, cf. plate II,2.

[9] *Op.cit.*, p.15 ftn.2, p.24.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp.11-12, cf. p.61.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp.12-13, cf. pp.17B,Bz, 18-19; cf. the equation gni-νι in Cretan documents of 1651, 1652, *apud* Legrand, *Bibliographie Hellénique... dix septième siècle*, III, Paris, 1895, p.363; cf. Thémis Siapkaras-Pitsillidès, *Poèmes d'Amour en dialecte chypriot d'après un manuscrit du XIVe siècle*, Athènes, 1952, pp.67-68.

[12] Antonias Sigalas, *Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Γραφῆς*, Thessalonica, 1934, pp.296-299, cf. pp.273-271, 275, 277, 278, 279, and *passim*.

part of the peculiarities of our documents would be traced back to the Byzantine tradition. Since the scribes of these documents after 1570 were obviously churchmen, they would have preserved their old traditions, a basic constituent of which went back to the Byzantine heritage of Cypriote Culture.

22. None of the documents of Kanakaria seems to have been drawn up in a lay or church notarial office or chancery by a notary proper or chancellor or other official of that order as it was the custom in many Greek islands both in the Aegaean and the Ionian Sea as well as in Athens and other parts of Greece under Ottoman rule and before. Not even the scribe's name is mentioned in our documents: in this they follow a practice occurring with most published transaction documents from Cyprus and they differ from the practice pre-dominant in the above-said provinces of Hellenism. However the issuing authority is indicated in most of our documents: that was some Ottoman local official, a *sipahi* or *zaim* or *bölükbaşı* or a number of them who are also usually the sellers. Since such officials could not probably write in Greek, they could not have been the scribes of these documents, and the latter must of necessity be searched among the few literate people of the peninsula of Karpass, who should be identified with the monks and other clergymen of that area. And since our documents are relating to the monastery of Kanakaria, it is reasonable to suggest that they were drawn up by monks of the monastery, particularly by the abbot. Being the most educated and most influential personality of the area, the abbot was asked by local *sipahi*s or *zaim*s or *bölükbaşı*s or even *kadi*s to serve as their secretary or scribe, not to say notary proper. This conformed with the prevalent pattern of collaboration between the Greek Church of Cyprus and the Ottoman authorities of the island in administrative, financial and other affairs of public concern during Ottoman rule (1570-1878), and it was as a result of this collaboration that the mixed Secretarial System of Cyprus did gradually emerge at that time[13].

[13] E.g. see Villamont, 1589, *apud* Claude Delaval Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria,* Cambridge, 1908, p.182; cf. Costas P.Kyrris, '*L'*importance sociale de la conversion à l'Islam (volontaire ou non) d'une section des classes dirigeantes de Chypre pendant les premiers siècles de l'occupation turque (1570 – fin du XVIIe siècle)', *Actes du Ies*

23. THE 'DISPOSITIO': Ll.3-6: /[3] Ενεαλιθιά και επουλίσαμεν του Φλουρη/[4] αποτικαλαμιά-στιζεταδες το χοραφιπουΗνεπο/[5] κηθετουποταμου [5α και ποδωδε του πο] ταμουκοτατου-πελου/[6] παχή: This clause is the selling statement or 'dispositio' including a description of the object of sale, and has a completely different meaning from the confirmatory statement included in 11. 6-9. Both are of basic importance for the structure of a sale or lease or donation deed and occur in various formulae throughout Greek legal history[14]. The formula beginning with Ενεαλιθιά = είναι αλήθεια = *it is true, truly...*, occurs frequently in sale and analogous legal deeds of the Ottoman era from all over Cyprus: e.g. in the majority of the Kanakaria documents and in such transaction deeds as the sale deed of 1602 from St.Mamas Kouremenos[15], the 'bond' of the same year from St.Nicholaos tes Steyes[16], the sale deeds of 1692 and 1716 from Kiti[17], etc. It does equally occur in late Ottoman period deeds such as a sale deed of 20.1.1848 from Agros[18]. In fact the scribes of legal documents drew freely both from tradition and inspiration. It should, in this respect, be underlined the verb ομολογῶ, which in a Kiti document of 1779 corresponds to δηλοποιω or εἶναι ἡ αλήθεια, was used in the confirmatory statement of transaction deeds of Justinian's time[19]. Although in the Kanakaria documents the prevalent

Congrès International d'Etudes Sud-Est Européenes, III, Histoire, Sofia, 1969, pp.437,462, passim; idem, 'Symbiotic Elements in the History of the Two Communities of Cyprus [1570-1878], *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Political Geography,* Nicosia, 1976, pp.127-166 *passim* =*Κυπριακός Λόγος,* VIII, 46-47, July-October, 1976, pp.243-282 *passim.*

[14] Cf. Franz Dölger-Johannes Karayannopulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre, I, Die Kaiserurkunden,* München, 1968, *passim.*

[15] J.Darrouzès, 'Notes pour servir à l'histoire de Chypre, IV', *Κυπριακαὶ Σπουδαί,* XXIII, 1959, p.28.

[16] *Ibid.,* ftn.1.

[17] P.D.Metropoulos, ''*Ανέκδοτα Κυπριακὰ 'Εγγραφα', Κυπριακὰ Χρονικά* [=KX], I, 1923, pp.325-326.

[18] *Κυπριακὰ Χρονικά,* XII, Larnaca, 1936, p.307, No:4.

[19] Hubert Metzger, 'Eine byzantinische Notariatsurkunde aus der Papyrussammlung Ehrherzog Rainer, Pap. Graec. Vindob. 25.870, 6. Jahrh. n. Chr.', *JöbG,* XIV, 1965, pp.2,3.

expression is εἶναι ἡ ἀλήθεια, they do closely resemble the Kiti documents in language and in several other respects[20].

24. *THE DEFINITION AND FIXATION OF THE OBJECT OF SALE IN DOC.1*

Ll.4-6, 9-13/4 αποτικαλαμιάστιζεταδεςτοχοραφιπου Ν νεπο/5 κηθε του ποταμου Λ5α και ποδωδε του πο ταμουκοτατουπελου/ 6 παχή.../9 άνάμισι σκάλα χοράφΗ/10 αποπανοστο κε φαλοβρι/ 11 σο κι να παγιοστισικιες έσπου/12 ινε του πελουπαχι αποαπλα/ 13 γινοσαπλαγιαν... In these two clauses, which, though separate from each other, are part of the 'dispositio', the description and definition of the object of sale is included in accordance with the requirements of both the Graeco-roman and the Islamic Contract Law[21]. According to Islamic Law, "the object of contract, in particular, must be determined (*ma'lūm* = 'known', opposite *madjhūl* = 'unknown'). This requirement is particularly strict as regards objects that can be measured or weighed"[22]. Further, "when there is a question as to land sold as being of a definite number of donums or pics the figure alone is taken into consideration. But in the case of land sold with boundaries definitely fixed and indicated, the number of donums or pics contained within them are not taken into account whether mentioned or not, [then] the boundaries alone are taken into account"[23]. Similar stipulations obtain with regard to the sale of unknown objects[24], the sale of estates[25], and the estates mentioned in giving evidence[26].

[20] Cf. Costas P.Kyrris, 'Πωλητήριον ἔγγραφον τοῦ 1881 ἐκ Λαπήθου,' *Χρονικὰ τῆς Λαπήθου*, I, i, 1970, pp.34-35.

[21] Georgios A.Petropoulos, *Ἱστορία καὶ Εἰσηγήσεις τοῦ Ρωμαϊκοῦ Δικαίου*, Athens, 1944, pp.223, 225; F.Pringsheim, *The Greek Law of Sale*, Weimar, 1950, *passim;* Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford, 1964, pp.146-147 cf. Demetrius Nikolaïdes (ed.), *Ὀθωμανικοὶ Κώδικες, ἤτοι Συλλογὴ ἁπάντ τῶν Νόμων τῆς Ὀθωμανικῆς Αὐτοκρατορίας, Διαταγμάτων, Κανονισμῶν, Ὁδηγιῶν, Ἐγκυκλίων*. I, Constantinople, 1889, p.501, art. 858 concerning donation, and II, 1890, p.1020, art.47 = Stanley Fisher, *The Statute Laws of Cyprus 1878-1923*, London, 1923, p.16, art.47.

[22] Schacht, *loc.cit.*

[23] Nikolaïdes, *op.cit.*, II, Constantinople, 1890, p.1020 art.47 = Fisher, *loc.cit.*

[24] Nikolaïdes, *op.cit.*, I, p.158Γ, art.213.

[25] *Ibid.*, p.162, art.221.

[26] *Ibid.*

25. In conclusion, the precise fixation of the extent of the land sold was superfluous once the boundaries were given. Still such fixation frequently occurs in contracts, obviously for greater accuracy. On the other hand the omission of such fixation is not unusual, e.g. see Archiepiscopal Reg. XLVI, p.50, 1773: "ἐσσωπέρβολον εἰς τὸ μοναστῆριν οσον ἐστὶ μέ νερόν..."; cf. ibid., "ὡς καθως εἰρίσκεται μέ ολα του τα δικαιώματα", etc.; cf. several Registers of the Archbishopric, passim. But the precise description of an immovable sold and the definition of its boundaries are principles prevailing in Greek contracts of the Ottoman period, and as such are normally applied in the present Kanakaria deed[27]. Concerning Cyprus, the importance of definition and fixation has been noted by Constantinos Spyridakis, 'Σταχυολογήματα..., Β΄, Δύο Κυπριακὰ πωλητήρια', *Κυπριακαὶ Σπουδαί,* XII, 1953 [1954], pp.50-51, commenting on a sale deed of 2.X.1789 from Pharmakas, cf. pp.52-53, commenting on a sale deed of 20.X.1854 from Nicosia.

26. THE 'SANCTIO' OR AFFIRMATORY STATEMENT IN DOC.1

Ll.6-8: Ηνε καλαπουλιμενα κα/7 λα-αγοραςμενο ναμενιβρεθικα/8 νις νατοπεραξι τιποτες: This clause is the affirmatory statement or *risanctio,* separate though it is from the dispositio. A sanctio was normally required in most official documents and legal deeds, both

[27] For more examples see Ant. Fl. Katsouros, 'Ναξιακὰ δικαιοπρακτικὰ ἔγγραφα τοῦ 16ου αἰωνος', *ΕπΜεσΑρχΑκΑθ,* V, 1955, pp.49-83, docs. of 1515-1599; Dem. G.Seremetis, 'Δικαιοπρακτικὰ ἔγγραφα ἐκ τοῦ 'Αρχείου τοῦ 'Ελληνικοῦ 'Ινστιτούτου Βενετίας', *Θησαυρίσματα,* I, 1962, p.122 No 1 (Cerigo): *"In the contract [of sale] the locality of the immovable sold is clearly defined, and the boundaries are described in detail";* Katsouros, 'Νομικὰ ἔγγραφα Τηνου. Δικαοπραξίαι 'Ιωάννου Γᾶ', *ΕπΜεσΑρχΑκΑθ,* VIII-IX, 1958-1959 (1961), pp.176-177 doc.29,26. V. 1660 ll.20-25, 41-44 and *passim;* cf. Petropoulos, *ΝΕΣ,* passim; Petropoulos, *Αἱ Νοταριακαὶ Πράξεις τῆς Χίου τῶν ἐτῶν 1724-1780. Ἔγγραφα Β.Ρόδου καὶ Καστελλορίζου τῶν ἐτῶν 1847-1874,* Athens, 1963, *passim,* etc. Concerning Cyprus the importance of definition and fixation has been noted by Constantinos Spyridakis, *'Σταχυολογήματα..., Β΄, Δύο Κυπριακὰ πωλητήρια', ΚΣ,* XII, 1953 [1954], pp.50-51, commenting on a sale deed of 2.X.1789 from Pharmakas, cf. pp.52-53, comment on a sale deed of 20.XI.1854 from Nicosia.

in Byzantine and in Turkish diplomatics[28]. It was also required in monastic typika and κτητορικαὶ επιγραφαὶ of the Byzantine and post-Byzantine period, actually consisting of poenae spirituales and followed by the corroboratio and the date[29], and also in various other deeds[30]. Especially with regard to the sanctio in transaction deeds, it should be noted that it already occurs in the συγγραφαὶ ἀποστασίου of Graeco-roman Egypt[31] and later on in legal deeds of the Byzantine period[32]. The usual phrasing of the sanctio in late Byzantine legal deeds, which are nearer to our documents, included such expressions as "ἀνενοχλήτως καὶ ἀδιασείστως κατέχειν" and the like[33]. A similar phrasing of the sanctio occurs frequently in Aegaean deeds of the Ottoman period[34].

[28] See Franz-Dölger-Johannes Karayannopulos, *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre, I, Die Kaiserurkunden,* München, 1968, pp.48, 125, and *passim;* Arthur Leon Horniker, 'Ottoman-Turkish Diplomatics, A guide to the literature', *BSt,* VII, 1, 1966, p.139; Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615. A Study of the Firman according to the Mühimme Defteri,* Oxford, 1960, pp.10-11: *te'kid.*

[29] E.Herman, 'Ricerche sulle istituzioni monastiche bizantine, Typika, Ktetorika,caristicari e monasteri "liberi"', *OCP,* VI, 1940, pp.298-299f.; Dion.A.Zakythinos, 'Κάστρον Λακεδαίμονος', *Ἑλληνικά,* XV, 1957, p.101.

[30] Zakythinos, *ibid.,* citing further literature; Jean Richard, *Documents Chypriotes des Archives du Vatican (XIVe-XVe siècles),* Paris, 1962, pp.132-135, 139-154.

[31] Georgios A.Petropoulos, *Νομικὰ Ἔγγραφα Σίφνου τῆς Συλλογῆς Γ.Μαριδάκη (1684-1835) μετὰ συμβολῶν εἰς τὴν ἔρευναν τοῦ μεταβυζαντινοῦ Δικαίου, Fasc.I,* Athens, 1956, *Μνημεῖα Ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας,* III, Fasc. I, *Νομικα Ἔγγραφα τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῆς περιόδου τῆς Τουρκοκρατίας,* p.39.

[32] E.g. see a lease deed of Justinian's time, *apud* Hubert Metzger, 'Eine byzantinische Notariatsurkunde aus der Papyrussammlung Ehrherzog Rainer Pap. Graec. Vindob. 25.870, 6. Jahrh. n. Chr.', *Jahrbuch der österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft,* XIV, 1965, p.3.

[33] E.g. see Franciscus Miklosich - Josephus Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana,* II, Vienne, *1862, Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani MCCCXV-MCCCCII, passim,* e.g. p.384, doc. no: DLXIX, 1400; cf. *ibid.,* I, 1860, p.57 no: XXX, IV, 1316: *οὐδεὶς τοίνυν'εμποδὼν τούτῳ γενήσεται νομίμως ταῦτα πιποάσκοντι, ἀλλ' ἐάσουσιν αὐτον πάντες ἀνεμποδίστως τὴν τούτων πρᾶσιν ποιήσασθαι*; cf. *ibid.,* pp.67-68, no: XXXVI, 1316, pp.66, 101, 102, 118, 170, 391, etc.

[34] E.g. see Petropoulos, *ΝΕΣ,* p.3, doc.1, 1684, ll.27-28, a will: "*καὶ κανεὶς νὰ μὴν ἠμπορὴ νὰ τήνε διασείση καὶ νὰ τὴν ἐνοχλήση*"; pp.19-21, doc.4, 1761, espec. p.21 ll.15-16: "*νὰ μὴν ἠμπορεί νὰ τὸν διασείσῃ ὡς πρᾶμα ἐδικόν του καὶ/καλα ἀγορασμέ-*

27. In the rest of the Kanakaria documents there is a variety of formulations of the affirmatory statement or sanction, which, as in the case of the scribes of Aegaean legal deeds, points to the wide range of freedom in style enjoyed by the Kanakaria scribes, who use such expressions as: doc. no.8, 1703, 11. 10-11: "καὶ δὲν ἔχει κανεις ἀπο τους δικούς του ἤ ἀπο συμπλαστάδες να διασείση τίποτες· διότις με τὴν βουλήν τους/επουλήθην" (cf. ibid., 11.8-9); doc.4, 1694, 11.9-10: "να μην ἔχη/κανέναν νὰ πατζαριστῆ"; doc.9, 1704, 11.18-19: "νὰ μην ἔχη κανήν(ν)α πειράξη ἤ ἀπο τους συπλαστάδες η ἀπο τους/γονεῖς αὐτοῦ διότι ἐκ θελήσεως αὐτῶν ἐπουλήθη"; doc.25, 1850, 11.7-8: "*να μην/ἔχη κανένας να ἐνοχλήσην τίποτες*"; cf. C.Metropoulos, "*Ἀνεκδοτα Κυπριακά ἔγγραφα,*' *Κυπριακα Χρονικά,* I, 1923, pp.325-326, doc.I 1692: "δίδο του το αὐτὸν μοραφέττιν με τες βουλλες τους ανοθεν πελούκ παχίδες πος ηνε καλα πουλιμένον κε καλα αγορασμενον κε κανεναν κερον να μην τον πιράξι κανένας"; cf. ibid., II, 1716: και ἔλαβαμεν το χακκιν μας, και ίδου που του εδοσαμεν το μουραφατην να μην εχι κανεναν να ρισι τιποτα", etc.; cf. C.P. Kyrris, 'Πωλητήριον...', *Χρονικά της Λαπήθου,* I, i, 1970, pp.37-40.

28. The unity behind variety in the formulation of the sanctio, as of other parts of post-Byzantine legal deeds points to a continuity of tradition, both stylistic and legal, whose bearers would have obviously been the scribes, chancellors, notaries or other clerical

νο"; cf. *ibid.,* p.24, doc.5, 1769, ll.8-9; p.27, doc.6, 1773, ll.11-15; p.43, doc.7, 1815, ll.7-8; cf. Petropoulos' commentary in pp.25f., 39-40, 52, 228, 229, 234; cf. Katsouros, 'Ναξιακά δικαιοπρακτικά έγγραφα τοῦ 16ου αἰῶνος', *'Επετηρὶς Μεσαιωνικοῦ Αρχείου 'Ακαδημίας 'Αθηνῶν,* V, 1955, p.80, doc.22, 1598, ll.21-22: "*εἰς ὅλην του την ζωὴ νὰ μὴν ἡμπορῆ κανεὶς νὰ τὸν ἐδιασείση*"; *ibid.,* pp.65-66, doc.12, 156θ, ll.12-14; ibid., p.83, doc.24, 1599, ll.37-39; cf. Katsouros, 'Νομικὰ ἔγγραφα Τήνου. Δικαιοπραξίαι 'Ιωάννου Γᾶ, *'ΕπΜεσΑρχΑκΑθ,* VIII-IX, 1958-1959 (1961), pp.125-190, passim; Lykouris, John, '*Η διοίκησις καὶ δικαιοσύνη τῶν Τουρκοκρατουμένων νήσων Αἴγινα-Σπέτσαι-Ὕδρα κ.λπ. ἐπι τῆ βάσει 'Εγγράφων τοῦ 'Ιστορικοῦ 'Αρχείου 'Υδρας καὶ ἄλλων,* Athens, 1954, pp.327-343 passim, e.g. p.343, no: 21, 1824: "*καὶ καλὴ καὶ νόμιμος αὐτοῦ ἀγορασία*"; Dem. G.Seremetis, 'Δικαιοπρακτικὰ ἔγγραφα ἐκ τοῦ 'Αρχείου τοῦ 'Ελληνικοῦ 'Ινστιτούτου Βενετίας', *Θησαυρίσματα,* I, 1, 1962, p.131, doc.1, Cerigo 1624, ll.3-4: "*νὰ ἔχη, νὰ κρατῆ καὶ νὰ ἐξουσιάζη ὡς ἴδιος καὶ καθολικὸς νοικοκύρης εἰς τὸ πουλήσει/χαρίσει, προικίσει, ἀνταλλάξει... μη παρά τινος ὁμποδισμένος*"; cf. *ibid.,* pp.132-135, etc.

employees of the secretarial system, even improvising local literate notables[35]. The great similarity of structure, style and legal ideas, such as the sanctio, between the Kanakaria and other Cypriote legal deeds and those from the Aegaean and other Greek provinces points to the continuity among them in the above respects, a continuity due to the secretarial staff responsible for their redaction. This staff in Cyprus were maintaining pre-Ottoman legal traditions going back to the Latin and Byzantine periods, and this despite the fact that they were working for the Ottoman authorities by issuing documents in their name. With regard to the legal meaning of the sanctio, according to Prof.G.Petropoulos, it purports to secure the stability of sale and does not constitute a declaration of transfer of the object of sale by the seller to the purchaser: the sanctio is clearly distinct from both the transfer and the sale, the latter being effected by virtue of a specific statement such as "πουλω καὶ παραδίδω", "πωλεῖ καὶ ἀπὸ τον ἑαυτον της ἀλλοτριώνει", which, in the present documents may be compared with the phrase "καί εἶναι καλα πουλημένο και καλα ἀγορασμένο". As for the transfer, it is carried out by drawing up and handing over the sale document itself to the purchaser[36]. The contract through such phrases becomes definitive, a direct transfer of ownership to the purchaser being thus effected[37]. Sometimes a guarantee accompanies the sanctio in Ceriyo, but its practical value is not known because it did not include a pledge on an immovable[38]. Such a guarantee is non-existent in the Kanakaria documents, with the possible exception of no.19.

29. *THE TERMS ΕΦΦΙΤΟΝ, ΕΦΦΙΤΙΑΖΩ, RESM, TAPOU, HOJET ETC., in doc.1.*

Ll.8-9: εφφιτια ψαμε το >-60. The verb *αφφιτιάζω α'φφιτιάζω,*

[35] Petropoulos, *NES,* pp.9,11,12,21 [ll.21-22: *καντζιλερικά,* doc.4, 1761], 67; Lykouris, *op.cit.,* pp.104,106,109, 313-325, espec. pp.323-325; I.Vizvizis, 'Οι κοινοι καγκελλάριοι τῆς Νάξου ἐπὶ Τουρκοκρατίας', *'Αρχεῖον 'Ιδιωτικοῦ Δικαίου,* XII, 1945, p.68.

[36] Petropoulos, *ΝΕΣ,* p.40.

[37] Seremetis, op.cit., *Θησαυρίσματα,* I, 1, pp.122-123: Cerigo, XVIIth century.

[38] Cf. *ibid.,* p.131, doc.1, 1624, ll.3-4.

ἐφφιτίασα has no relation with the Latin *fides, affidare* or the Greek dialectic verb *ἀφφιδεύ(γ)ομα*[40], whose natural form in Cypriote would be *ἀφφιδεύκουμαι* or *ἀφφιδεύγουμαι,* with *δ,* not *d,* like *φέδε*[41]. *'Αφφιτιάζω,* spelled with *τ,* is obviously derived from the legal term *ἔφφιτον* or *ἔφιτον* occurring in Medieval Cypriote texts: e.g. see Leontios Makhairas[42]: *πάκτη και ἔφφιτα καὶ σενιάσματα* assessments, rents and assignments, according to Dawkins' translation; cf. Dawkins, *ibid.*, II, p.246, where ἔφφιτον is etymologized from the Mediaeval Latin *affictum;* cf. numerous occurrences of *ἄφφιτον,* usually in the form *ἔφητον,* in the *Assizes* of Mediaeval Cyprus and Jerusalem[43]. This article points to the distinction between state-owned (royal) and private land in Latin Cyprus, a distinction corresponding to the Byzantine pronoiatic and patrimonial land and to the Ottoman *miri* and *mülk.* The *ἔφητον* here was a fixed amount of money (*ἕνα μάρκον ἀσήμιν*) which was discharged by the seller to the State Treasury prior to a sale of royal land possessed (not owned) by him, and this in addition to the 3 1/2 (hy)perpyra(=gold coins) paid by the purchas-

[39] *Ibid.*, p.125.

[40] *'Ιστορικόν Λεξικόν τῆς 'Ελληνικῆς Γλώσσης, Α΄, 'Ιστορικόν Λεξικόν τῆς Νέας Ελληνικῆς,* III, Athens, 1942, p.356.

[41] Certificate, cf. I.A.G.Sykoutres, *Ἔκθεσις τῆς Κριτικῆς 'Επιτροπείας τοῦ Α΄ φιλολογικοῦ Διαγωνισμοῦ τῆς Α.Μ. 'Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου κ.κ. Κυρίλλου Βασιλείου,* Nicosia, 1924, p.138: a *φέδε* issued in 1695 by the Bishop of Kition.

[42] *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus Entitled 'Chronicle',* ed. R.M.Dawkins, I.Oxford, 1932, p.606 ll.31-34, p.608, ll.1-3, §618.

[43] Apud Constantinos N.Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικῆς Βιβλιοθήκης Τόμος 'Εκτος* [VI], *'Ασσίζαι τοῦ Βασιλείου 'Ιεροσολύμων καὶ τῆς Κύπρου,* Paris, 1877, pp.5-6, art. no. κθ΄: "*τῆντα ἐντέχεται νὰ πλερώση ἐκεῖνος ὁποὺ πουλεῖ τὸ ἀπλήκιν του ὁποῦ πλερόνει ἔφητον τοῦ ρηγὸς*" cf. *ibid.*, pp.39-40, where the whole question is analytically explained: "*...εἴ τις πουλήσει ἀπλήκιν, ἀνίσως ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸν ἀπλήκιν ἔνι εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τοῦ ρηγὸς καὶ πλερόνει ἔκητον, πρέπει νὰ πλερώση εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν διὰ ἐκείνην τὴν πούλησιν ἕναν μάρκον ἀσήμιν, καὶ ὁ ἀγοραστὴς νὰ πλερώση πέρπυρα τριάμισυ, ἤγουν γσ΄ διὰ τήν σαζὴναν ᵃμὲ ἄν ἔνη, ἡ γῆ ὁπού ἔνι τὸ σπὶτιν ἔνι ἐλεύθερον, τουτέστιν οὐδέν πλερόνει ἔφητον τοῦ ρηγός, ἀμὲ ἄλλου ἑτέρου τινός, τὸ δίκαιον ὁρίζει ὅτι οὐδέν ἐντέχεται νὰ πλερώση διὰ τὴν πούλησιν τῆς κληρονομιᾶς παροῦ πέρπυρα τρία ἥμισυ μόνον ὁ ἀγοραστής, χωρὶς πλεῖον τίποτες, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα νὰ ἔνη κῆτος* [=quitted, free, cf. modern Cypriote *κῆττος] κατὰ τὴν 'Ασίζαν.*"

er. From the clause "*ἀμε ἄν ἔνη ἡ γῆ ὁποῦ ἔνι... ἑτέρου τινός*", it is deduced that the *ἔφητον* was also normally paid to the private owner of land on which a house was built, obviously by an individual who had this plot with the house in a status of leasehold from the said owner (=a baron?). For the sale of such land only the sum of 3 1/2 (hy)perpyra was discharged by the purchaser, and this only once, whereas the ἔφητον for the royal land was paid by the seller only prior to a transaction, as it was the case in the Ottoman period (see below), and the *ἔφητον* for private land was discharged at regular intervals by the individuals possessing it to its master, the baron, i.e. it was a sort of *rent.*

30. It is precisely this latter meaning of *rent* that is borne out for *ἔφητον* in the rest of the articles of the Cypriote and Jerusalem *Assizes* in which it occurs; e.g. see Sathas, *op.cit.*, pp.77-78 art. ξζ': "Περὶ ἐκεινους ὁποῦ δίδουν τας οἰκίας τους, ἤ τους ἀγρούς τους, ἤ τους κήπους τους, εἰς ἔφητον... ἐκεῖνος ὁποῦ πλερόνει τὸ ἔφητον ἠμπορεῖ να ἀφήση το πάκτος πᾶσαν ὥραν ὁποῦ να θέλει..."; cf. *ibid.*, p.78 art. ξη', where we come across such phrases as: "*ὁ κύριος ἤ ἡ κυρα τοῦ ἐφήτου*"=*the rent, or the estate rented or leased out,* or "*ὁ κύριος η ἡ κυρα τοῦ ἐφήτου ζητᾶ τοῦ πακτονάρη η τῆς πακτοναρίας το πάκτος, καὶ ἐκεῖνος οὐδέν θέλει να το δώση τὸ ἔφητον καὶ λέγει ὅτι ἐπλέρωσέν το*"; cf. pp.78-79 art. ξθ', pp.202-203 art. σμε'=pp.453-454 art. σμγ'. In art. ξα', pp.74-75 *ἐνοίκιον* is used as a substitute for ἔφητον with regard to a house. From this article and from art. ρκϐ', *ibid.*, p.93, it is to be inferred that *ἔφητον* was mostly used in respect of land and *ἐνοίκιον* in respect of houses. This is corroborated by a donation deed of 5.VIII.1464[44] entered in Cod.Paris. 280, fos 194vo- 195ro, whose 11.4-6 run thus: "*ἔδοκαι ἕναν χοραφι... καὶ τὰ ὑστάμενα δένδρα... 15... νὰ μηδὲν πληρόνη οὐ κανέναν ἔφυτον οὐ τρίτον οὐδὲν τρόπακτον. παροῦ/σἔδοκέν το ης τω(ν) ναών...*" In his commentary the editor rightly proposes the correction of *οὐδεν τρόπακτον* into *οὐδ' ἔτερον πάκτον* [cf. the *Assizes'* articles quoted above]; but he is definitely wrong when

[44] Apud J.Darrouzès, 'Notes pour servir à l'histoire de Chypre; III ', *Κυπριακαὶ Σπουδαί,* XXII, 1958, pp.234-235.

suggesting that "*ἔφυτον doit être, semblet-il, un terme se rattachant à l'ἐμφύτευσις*"[45], the relation between the two terms being an intriguing phonetic resemblance: *ἔφυτον* was the *rent,* whereas *τρίτον* was a *fiscal charge* and *πάκτον* the *contract.* This is confirmed by the use of these terms in another donation deed of 1484[46].

With regard to the resemblance mentioned, it is due to the change of the initial *αφφ-* into *εφφ-*, a change partly caused by the dominant sense of the proposition *ἐν,* – which, like *συν,* is misconceived by the people to occur in words where it is in fact non-existent – and partly by a process of phonetic weakening, e.g. cf. *ὀφφίκιον > ἐφφίκιον, οφφικάτορος > ἐφφικάτορος*[47], *ἀβιτζιάλιδες > οφιτξιάλιδες*[48], *ὄφκαιρος > εὔκαιρος,* etc. *Ἔμφυτος/ ἔμφυτον* does always mean "instinct, instinctive, inborn, full of plants (or trees)", but never does it have any connotation relating to *ἐμφύτευσις/emphuteusis!*

31. So *ἄφφιτον > ἔφφιτον (> ἐφφιτιάζω)* is one of a number of Latin terms which survived in the Ottoman period in Cyprus, obviously having been retained by the surviving members of the Latin Administrative Machinery who joined the Secretarial System of the Ottoman period. For further information about *affictus-affictum* see Carolus DuFresne DuCange, *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis,* I, Parisiis, 1840, pp.128b-131b; cf. *ibid.,* III, Parisiis, 1844, p.280: *fictus affictus.* According to DuCange, I, *affictus locatio fundi ad modicum tempus* (p.128); *Affictus dicitur census, qui datur ratione praediorum... Affitto... pigliar a fitto, conducere, dare a fitto, locare* (p.128b); *Affictum, ut Affictus, census, reditus... Affictare: locare praedia sub pensione certa. Affictare: conducere, locare, dare vel capere ad Affictum. Ital. Affitare...* (pp.128c-129a); *Affictatio constitutiones Archiepisc. Nicosiensis 1322, cap.8. Emptionem, seu Venditionem, Affictationem, seu alium quemcumque contractum etc. (ibid.)... Affi-*

[45] *Ibid.,* p.235.
[46] *Ibid.,* pp.232-233.
[47] Makhairas, *op.cit.,* II, p.246, s.v.
[48] *Ibid.,* p.259 s.v.

taiuolus, conductor, locator, qui ad affictum tenet Affictarius... Affitus, Census, reditus, idem quod affictus... 1336 (p.131b); *Fictus census locatio, pensio, reditus, rectigal fixum et certum: nam et fictum pro fixum... Italis Fitto et Affitto... Fictalicia res, datae ad censum. Fictalicius, inquilinus, fundi ad fictum conductor Ital. Fittiuolo* (*ibid.*, III, p.280). From these and other uses of *affictus affictum affitto,* etc., it would appear that our *ἄφφιτον* has rather derived from the Italian form of the term *affitto,* which does also occur in Cypriote Venetian documents written in Italian[49]. Now, what is the exact meaning of *ἄφφιτον-ἐφφιτιάζω* in the present document and in the rest of the Kanakaria deeds?

32. In view of the substitution of *ρεσμί* for *ἄφφιτον* is a number of other deeds of our collection, it is to be concluded that the two terms were equivalent. In Muslim Law the *rasm al-tapū,* title-deed fee, pl. *rusûm,* was the fee paid as compensation to the State by the transferee in a transaction for the grant to him of the usufruct of *amīrīyah* [=*mirieh,* state] land[50]. According to Gibb-Bowen, "The landowners' consent to peasants' transactions in connection with their *ṭaṣarruFs* [=*mirieh* land holdings].. could only be secured on payment of a fee (called *marifet akçesi* acknowledgement money)[51]. In this statement the landowner is assumed to be holding land in lieu of and as delegate to the state and therefore to, like our *bölükbaşıs* here, collect the *rasm al-tapū* or *marifet akçesi,* on behalf of the state, to which his land ultimately belonged[52], and to perform all administrative functions relating to it[53].

33. In this connection we have first to note the drawing up and issuing

[49] XVIth century, see Costas P.Kyrris, 'Further documents relating to Cypriote immigrants in Venice (XVI-XVII centuries)', *Ἐπετηρὶς Κέντρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἐρευνῶν*, III, 1969-1970, p.150 doc.II, 1600, Commentary to l.58, *L'affito della casa.*

[50] *Subhi Mahmasani, apud Majid Khadduri-Herbert Liebesny, Law in the Middle East,* I, *Origin and Development of Islamic Law,* Washington, 1955, p.181, ftn.4.

[51] Hamilton Gibb-Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* I, i, Oxford, 1960, p.241.

[52] Cf. *ibid.*, I,i, pp.240, 242, 247, 52.

[53] Bistra A.Cvetkova, 'L'évolution du régime féodal turc de la fin du XVIIe jusqu'au milieu du XVIIIe siècle', *Études Historiques,* I, 1960, pp.172-173; Vangelis Skouvaras, *Τὸ χρονικὸ τῆς Συκῆς,* Volos, 1959, pp.24, 42-44.

of many of the Kanakaria deeds by *bölükbaşıs* and/or *sipahis*, who collect the *resm*, and their appellation as *murafets* or *temessüks* (e.g. see no:4, 1694, No:5, 1700, No:7, 1702 No:8, 1703, No:9, 1704, No:10, 1713, No:11, 1714, No:12, 1716, No:15, 1755, No:16, 1763, No:17b, 1780 No:18, 1787, No:21, 1802, No:22, 1802, No:24, 1829, No:27, 1704-1716, No:28, 1702-1704, No:30, 1787-1802[?]). This is the case with several other sale and contract deeds issued in Cyprus under Ottoman rule, e.g. see a sale deed of 1754 issued by a *zaim* of Kritou Marottou: the priest Τζουβάνης sells land to the monastery of Chrysoroyiatissa represented by its οἰκονόμος, a deacon and two other *rayâhs*: *και εγωρασαμεντα, δὶαραζουν τοῦ μακουφιου του μονάστηριου/της χρησσορογιατησας, καὶ δια το κανόνι τοὺ πολληχρο/νιμενοὺ βασιλέος, έπιρα εγῶ. ζαοίμαγας χακηβελα/γάς: καὶ ἐβολοσα τὸ πάρον μοραφεττη. εὶς κᾶιρον/ χρύας. τὸ δικεον μου και δι'α πρα 800 ἰγιουν οκτῶ/σια*[54]. The *δίκεον* paid to the *zaim* here was the *resm* or *ἔφφιτον* due to him for drawing up and ratifying the sale deed; cf. P.D.Metropoulos, ''Ανέκδοτα Κυπριακὰ ἔγγραφα,' *Κυπριακὰ Χρονικά*, I, 1923, p.325, doc.I, 12.X.1692, a sale deed ending thus: "*κε εμις η ανωθεν πελούκπαχίδες επιραμεν το ρεσμίν μας*"; cf. *ibid.*, pp.325-326, doc. II, 2.X.1716, a sale deed (*μουραφάτην*, like the previous one), issued and ratified by the *bölükbaşıs* and *νιφεριδες* military officers of Tersefanou, who "*ἔλαβαμεν το χακκιν μας, και ίδου που τοὺ ἐδοσαμεν του μουραφάτην να μην εχι κανεναν ναρισι τιποτα*"; *χάκκιν* here *ρεσμίν ἔφφιτον*.

34. What is particularly interesting in doc.9, 1704, is the co-existence of the terms *affiton* and *resm* (ll.20-22) in such a way that the former appears to be secured only on payment of the latter: *ε πιρα/21 μεν τορέσιμον. καιεδι σαμέν τω εἴς τω εύφιτον ναδίδι/22 @ 180 καὶ ἐθέσαμεν τὲς βούλλες μας*". The *ρέσιμον* is here distinguished from the *ἄφφιτον* or *εὔφιτον* and it is defined as the due discharged for securing the registration of the sale in the *εὔφιτον*, which seems to denote here the Land Registry Book lending official validity to the act of sale. A similar notion is conveyed by

[54] Ioannes P.Tsiknopoullos, *Παναγιὰ ἡ Χρυσορρωγιάτισσα ἱστορικὴ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἱερὰ μονή*, Nicosia, 1964-1965, p.22, cf. p.21.

doc.3 (1694-1704), ll.10-12: "*καὶ ἐδώσαμεν το παρὸν μοραφεττην μετες/11 βούλλες μας εις ἔνδιξιν κερου δαιδῖσαμεν το εις το έφφι/12 τον δια @ εξιντα.*" However it was to be expected that the Italian term *ἄφφιτον would be replaced by the Turkish one, resm,* the distinction in docs. 3 and 9 in fact pointing to the gradual "fossilization" and change of *ἔφφιτον's* original meaning before its falling into disuse. Still it occasionally occurs in later documents, e.g. see Register XLVI, p.176: "*1773, Τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Μοναστηρίου Τοχνιοῦ: ἄφυτον* 4, *στὴν μελίαν ἔμφυτον* 1"; cf. a sale deed of 30.IX. 83 from Lapithos, *KX,* X, 1934, pp.6-7: "*τὰ ὁποῖα χοράφια με τὸ νερόν τους ἀπον δεκα ἀγνάρια τοῦ σαβατιου ἕως δέκα τῆς Κυριακῆς και περιβολόφιτον μαῖδια* 13"; cf. Costas P.Kyrris, "*Ἡ μονὴ Ἁγίας Νάπας ἰδίως ἐπι Τουρκοκρατίας", Κυπριακαὶ[ὰ] Σπουδαί,* XXXII, 1968, p.244: "[1758]...*Το περιβολόφυτον τούτων [τῶν περιβολιῶν ἁγίου Νικάνδρου, με τὸ δουλαπιάτικον @ [=ἄσπρα]* 13. *μετὰ ἔφυτα τούτων ὡς ἄνωθ(εν). Το τοῦ μοναστηριοῦ ὀγγιαῖς* 4. *καὶ περιβολόφυτον με δουλαπιά: τικον, και της βαθιας γονιᾶς, οσα φαίνον(ται) δηλαδή ἄνωθεν ἔφυτ(ον)* @ 12"; cf. *ibid.,* p.245 §19: "*τὸ περιβολόφυτον τούτου, με δουλαπιάτικον, καὶ τὰ χωράφ(ια) τα κάτωθεν ὅσα εἰσιν ἔφυτα @ 13. [στήλη α =] Τὰ χωράφια τούτου κατα μέρος/τρυτερὰ τῶν λιβαδιῶν λεγόμενα, ἀπὸ κοντὰ τοῦ / περιβολιοῦ ἕως τοῦ γιαλου ὅσα εἰσι/δεμμένα ὅλα εἰς τὸ περιβολοφυτον*" cf. doc.3; cf. Kyrris, *op.cit., p.248, §28; p.250a, §32: "περιβολόφυτον τούτων ὅλων περβολ(ιῶν) καὶ ἐμφύτων μέ το δουλαπιάτικον @* 12.1/2: *ibid.,* 2 §35: "*περιβολότυπ(ος) εἰς περιβολοφ(υτον)* 6"; cf. C.P.Kyrris, "*Τοῦ 'Ἐνθύμιον' τοῦ Κωστῆ Χ Παρασκευᾶ [Παρασκευαῖδη]", Χρονικὰ τῆς Λαπήθου,* I, ii, July-Dec. 1970 [March 1971], pp.212-214, 139 §22.

As for the reasons of the gradual falling of the Italian term *ἔφφιτον* into disuse, they may be connected with the extinction of all hope of liberation by the West after 1670 and the consequent weakening of Western influence in Cyprus ever since[55] and the growing

[55] George Hill, *History of Cyprus,* IV, Oxford, 1952, p.59, Costas P.Kyrris, 'Armées locales et luttes de libération en Chypre 1570-1670', *Actes du IIe Congrés International des Études du Sud-Est Européen,* VI, Athènes, 1981, pp.175-189.

adaptation of local prelates and notables to the Ottoman régime. This was the case with other Italian terms relating to administration and law, like *viscontado, φέδε* etc., which occur in Cypriote documents of the late XVIIth century for the last time.

35. THE SURNAMES OF CYPRIOTE MOSLEMS

Even more than names proper, the Cypriote Moslems' surnames are strikingly hellenized not only in Greek but also frequently in the Cypriote Turkish dialectic usage. This points to the growing assimilation of the immigrants of 1572-1573 by the dominant Greek linguistic and cultural environment of the island. The crucial fact in the case of the nucleus of the "Ottoman" ruling class of Cyprus after 1571 is their Graeco-Latin or Latin or Greek origin multilaterally attested: this was the main source of their Greek linguistic and cultural identity as illustrated in our documents[56]. In most cases the Ottoman officials are surnamed by the people after their titles or other notable characteristics, which, as in the case of Greek office-holders and other citizens, tend to attain the grammatical status of real, official and permanent surnames or family names (e.g. *πελουπάχης, γισούφ(μ)πεης,* etc. This is still more important as it occurs almost three centuries before the compulsory adoption, by all Turks, of surnames in 1935 in the course of radical reforms imposed in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal[57]. Previous to that, the Turks of Turkey had no family name or were distinguished from one another simply through the "additional indication of a physical characteristic, the district of origin, the craft, etc."[58], a procedure otherwise not unusual among the Greeks, especially of the lower strata during and before the Greek Revolution of 1821[59], and also the Greek Cypriotes in the same

[56] C.P.Kyrris, 'Symbiotic Elements...', *cit.*, passim; idem, *History of Cyprus, With an Introduction to the Geography of Cyprus,* Nicosia, Cyprus, 1985, pp.253-264.

[57] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* Oxford University Press. 1963, p.283.

[58] Paul Wittek, *Turkish,* London, 1956, ed. Percy Lund, Humphries and Co., p.53.

[59] Nicholaos P.Andriotes, 'Συμβολή στη μορφολογία τῶν Νεοελληνικῶν ἐπωνύμων' extract from '*Επιστημονική Επετηρίς Φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης,* VI, 1947, pp.21-22 f.,14.

period and later[60].

36. The Greeks, however, were drawing on the rich Byzantine and Frankish tradition, which included numerous surnames, national names and nicknames, that tended to become and in most cases became established family names inherited from generation to generation[61], especially among eminent noble or ennobled families of the later centuries[62]. But Turkish family names and surnames before 1934, due to lack of such a tradition, were not permanent and had not developed into a system, exception made of eminent ex-Christian muslimised families such as the *Mihaloglus,* the *Sokollu* or *Sokolovitch,* the *Evrenos, the Zaganos,* etc., and a number of other relatively rare cases. The prevalent usage was that of a personal name given at birth supplemented by a second name given in childhood or by the father's name. This usage being insufficient for the more complex relationships of modern society and law, was abolished by a law of 28.VI.1934, which obliged all citizens of Turkey to adopt a surname as from 1.I.1935 and suppressed all non-military ranks and titles for the past, substituting for them the terms Bay and Bayan Mr. = and Mrs.[63].

[60] Constantine P.Kyrris, *Κυπριακά καὶ 'Αμμοχώστεια μελετήματα καὶ δοκίμια,* I, Famagusta, 1957, pp.144-146.

[61] Phaidon Koukoules, *Βυζαντινῶν Βίος καὶ Πολιτισμός,* VI, Athens, 1955, pp.452-504; *idem, 'Βυζαντινα τινα παρωνύμια', 'Επιστημονικὴ Επετηρὶς Φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς Πανεπιστημίου 'Αθηνῶν,* Period II, Vol.IV, 1953-1954, pp.60-98; Kolitses, pp.82-90, cf. 40-41; Chr. G.Pantelides, 'Τοπωνυμικὰ καὶ ἐπώνυμα', *KX,* II, 1924, pp.183-184.

[62] See C.Toumanoff, 'The Background to Mantzikert', *Thirteenth International Congress of Byzantine Studies, Main Papers,* XIII, Oxford, 1966, pp.8-9; *idem,* 'Armenia and Georgia', ch.XIV in *The Cambridge Mediaeval History, IV, The Byzantine Empire, part* I, *Byzantium and its Neighbours,* Edited by J.M.Hussey etc., Cambridge, 1966, pp.593-637 passim, espec. pp.595-597, 603, 609, 613-614, 617, 621, 623, 625-626, 628, 632-633; H.Grégoire, 'The Amorians and the Macedonians', *ibid.,* pp.142-143; J.M.Hussey, 'The Later Macedonians, the Comneni, and the Angeli 1025-1204', *ibid.,* pp.241, 243, 244; D.M.Nicol, 'The Fourth Crusade and the Greek and Latin Empires, 1204-61', *ibid.,* p.280, G.Ostrogovsky, 'The Palaiologi', *ibid.,* pp.341-342.

[63] G.Jäschke, in *Handbuch der Orientalistik,* I, VI, *Geschichte der Islamischen Länder,* III, Neuzeit, Leiden-Köln, 1959, p.84; B.Lewis, *op.cit., loc.cit.*

37. This measure of advance implied the surpassing, by individuals, of the status of numbers in a tribal social structure, and their becoming distinct personalities capable of self-assertion and self-identification; through their now established family names a revolution was accomplished in their linguistic and behavioural concept-system[64]. Well, it is of the utmost significance that the Cypriote Turks of the XVIIth century onwards had adopted such a system under the influence of their Greek compatriots and their Graeco-Roman-European culture to which many were intrinsically related; by this they created a precedent unique for the Moslem world, which only recently followed suit hesitatingly and slowly[65]. Let us now quote the Moslem family names, surnames and nicknames occurring in our docuements and some other relevant sources.
38. Doc.1, 1666 and Doc.2, 1696, 1.1: *ἐγώ ω χασάνης του πελούπαχη ταπαζά:* cf. above. Note that two names, one denoting office (*πελούπαχης*) and the other ethnic origin, are here used to form a family name. This is not impossible, even for proper names as such[66]. Note also that the distance between the initial meaning of both these surnames and their function as family names is very short[67], the latter (function) not at all being vitiated by the fact that the persons identified as such were in 1696 holding the office of *bölükbaşı* and that their Abkhazian extraction would have still been remembered[68]. – Doc.2, 1696 1.9: *γισουφπεεις Καρπασίτης: beğ,* a title, and *Καρπασίτης,* a surname indicating *γιουσουφ΄ς* place of origin, Karpassi, are here functioning as a distinctive family name, cf. *Πελούπαχης ταπαζά* above and below.
Doc.3, 1694-1704, 1.1: *ός μαν πελουκπαχις σελεημαν πελούκπα-*

[64] Cf. Sir Alan Gardiner, *The Theory of Proper Names,* Oxford, 1954², pp.17-19, 43, 73, 75; Wolfgang Fleischer, *Die deutschen Personennamen, Geschichte, Bildung und Bedeutung,* Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1964, pp.5-16ff. and *passim.*
[65] Fleischer, *ibid.,* pp.75-76: Egypt 1950, and other Arab countries afterwards; cf. the use of Ottoman titles as proper names: Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *Recherches sur les actes des règnes des Sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad,* I, Monachii, 1967, p.89, no: 28.
[66] Gardiner, *op.cit.,* pp.43, 71; Fleischner, *op.cit.,* pp.116-158 *passim.*
[67] Cf. Gardiner, *op.cit.,* p.41.
[68] Cf. *ibid.*; cf. Fleischer, *op.cit.,* pp.128-136f., 138-147.

σις; 11.12-13: *χασανις φράγγος*/13 *μεεμεταγας ταπαζά τοῦ μάζος*. Similar Turkish family names or surnames denoting office or place of origin or both etc., do already occur in Byzantine texts, sometimes in their original form or hellenized or, sometimes, in a hybrid, transitory state: *Γιαμγουρτζέ, Γιαξῆς, Κλιτζασθλάνης, κιζιλμπάσις, Κιζιλ 'Αχμέτης, Κούρτης, Μπάρκου [=Barqūq], μπεηλέρμπεης, πέκης, πεκλάρπακις, Σαρχάνης, 'Αλφαροῦς, 'Αμάρμπεης [=Οὐμούρμπεης,* or *'Αμούρμπεης,* or *'Αμούρπεκης],* etc.[69]. Of particular interest in the examples of doc.3 is the preservation of the Christian family name of *μεεμέταγας ταπαζὰ τοῦ μάζος [=Τουμάζος, Tom(m)maso],* which points to his Greek or rather Graeco-latin Christian extraction, probably from the maternal side.

39. Doc.4, 1694, 1.2: *'Ο χατζηχασάνης ὁ ἀδελφος τοῦ χακὴ μεμέτη από βαρόσιν...* Note the combination of title (the quality of *haji*, for whose social importance cf. *Χρονικά της Λαπήθου*, I, i, 1970, pp.45-46), kinship and place of origin to form a distinctive surname, ibid., 11.14-17: *μέχεμ μέτης*/15 *τοὺ καρνιφάτζα και ο γαπρος του ὁ Χιτιρις, και οσμάνης του μεχεμμέ*/16 *τι του Καραμανίτι. Καὶ ὁ ἤ ως τούμερι αλης και οηως τού πιτοφά*/17 ο Αοηζος: Καρνιφάτζα(ς) seems to be an Italian nickname, probably restricted in Karpass and it reminds of the innumerable nicknames attached to individuals or entire villages all over Cyprus[70]. *Χιτίρης,* especially in the form *Χιτιραῖοι,* is a well-known family name in Karpass. *Καραμανίτης,* showing the place of origin, adds to the genitive of the father's name. Note *Πιτοφάς [=Πιττοφά(γ)ος],* a Greek's nickname that tends to become a family name.

Doc.5, 1700, 11.1-2, *ὁ μεχεμμέταγας και ο χασανης*/2 *ἡεῖ τοὺ ἀπαζὰ πελουκπαχη:* cf. above, ibid., 1.10-13: *ἤμπραὴμ*/11

[69] See Gyula Moravscik, *Byzantinoturcica,* II, *Sprachreste der Türkvölker in den byzantinischen Quellen,* Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1958,[2] *passim, s.vv.*

[70] See Georgios Papakharalambous, 'Πειράγματα χωρίων τῆς Κύπρου', *Στασινος,* II, 1964, pp.149-159; Costas P.Kyrris, ''Επαγγέλματα, χαρακτηρισμοὶ καὶ χαρακτῆρες τοῦ λαϊκοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ κοινωνικοῦ βίου τῶν Κυπρίων', *Κυπριακος Λόγος,* I, 1969, pp.92, 99, 171-174, 235-238, 288-291, 328-331, II, 1970, pp.41-43, 80-84, 138-140.

γκελεπής. ο χοκας και οφασλὴς τομιρουδην/13 καὶ ο Νικόλας ἀποτην μελαναργαν καί ο τζένιος: Note the substantial transmutation of the grammatical function of *μιρούδιν (<ἐμιρούδην,* little emir; or the son of a little emir?) from a title into a nickname or surname, and of *γκελεπὴς* from an adjective into a proper name hardly distinguishable from a surname. Note also the parallel lack of surnames or family anmes among apparently low-class Greeks like *ὁ Νικόλας απο την μελάναργαν* and *ὁ Τζένιος:* sine the document had not been drawn up in Melanarga, the village of Nicholas, its mere addition to Nicholas' name was sufficient to recognise him: Tzenios would have been a well known person in the area.

Doc.7, 170, 1.10: *ο αὐτὸς ζα ημα ος zaïma(g)a; ibid., ο κυργακὸς απολιο/ναρισον.*

Doc.7, 1703, 1.1: *με έμετ πεεις, μουσταφὰ τζελεπῆ σπαχίδες λι θραν γκόμου:* note the mention of rank, title, office, place of residence as the two Turks' attributes, cf. *ibid.,* 1.2: *ὁ αλιc ο μακαρούνιας:* this is a hellenized Italian nickname that became family name, as we see in subsequent documents (e.g. doc.9; 1704, 1.1); ibid., 11.13-14: *χατζιχασάωιc αποκιλάνεμον με τον υιόν του τον αλιτζελεπὶν μάρτιρεσ:* place and rank or title; *ibid.*: *αχαμέτις καὶ ισοῦφις ιδίο αδελφοί μάρτυρες:* this pair of brothers would have been well known in the area; *ibid.: ὁ γερωμερπεεις*: age, title.

Doc.9, 1704, 1.1: *ὁ αλησ ο μακαρούνιας* (cf. doc.8); *ibid.,* 1.24: *αχαμ ετης οσερδαρης:* office; *ibid.,* 1.26: *μουσαφακελεπης οκκατίπογλους:* title, office and *oğlu* "son of", all three form a family name; *ibid.,* ll.26-27: *χακιμουσταφας καὶ γουσούφης* 2 *αδελφή,* cf. doc.8; *ibid.,* ll.26-27, *αλιτζελεπης τοῦ χατζηχασάνη χανσα τζελεπης του χατζηχασάνη:* combination of a title, the father's name and the quality of haji: *ibid.,* ll.28-29: *τζου φρὲς καὶ γεωργης του χατζηνικολὸ καὶ γεωργεις του πγέρου. Ο Γερομερπεεις... Παπαγαβριηλ;* etc.

40. No doubt a number of these family names appear here in a process of formation. Another interesting point is the fact that similar rules obtain for the formation of both Greek and Turkish Cypriote family names or surnames: similar grammar, similar or same

constituent elements, similar combinations and elaboration, similar morphology. This similarity has been maintained until today and, but for the proper names, in many cases one would hardly distinguish between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes from their surnames or nicknames or family names alone. From a rich collection of such names I am citing just a few as illustration of my assertion: Archiepiscopal Reg.XLVI, p.161, 1797, Goufa: *χάρις γεωργῆ στρατουρᾶ τταράφιν μεχμέτη Καλλικᾶ και Χασάνη Καλλικᾶ 4;* cf. *Χασάνης Καλλικας, Eleftheria,* no: 10942, Year LIX, 7.VIII, 1964, p.3: *Μουσταφᾶ Μεμετ Τσαγκάρις* of Potamia, *Agon,* 5.III.1965, p.6; *Χιλμῆ 'Ιμβραχὶμ "Γρίβας"* of Xerovouno, *Eleftheria,* 5.III.1960, Year LX, No: 11414; *Κληρονόμοι Καττάσι Αλη Σίταρου ἐκ Γαλάτειας,* Koma tou Yalou, (Local) Register, 8/34, no: 350/1, *Μεχμὲτ Κοντζὲ Σίταρος, ἐκ Γαλάτειας, ibid.,* 8/34, 404; *Ρουστεμ 'Αχμετ Σοφοῦ ἐκ Γαλάτειας, ibid.,* 8/27, 440; *'Οσμαν Χασαν Τρούλλου, Register of Lythrangomi,* Form 108, no: 77,1/4; *Κληρονόμοι Χουσειν Λίγκερου* [Alingien?] *ibid.,* 79; *Κληρονόμοι Χάββα Ιμπραχήμ, Μουστάκλο μεχμετ Βοκολή, ibid.,* 42, 509; *Χασὰν Χασὰν Σανίδα ἐξ 'Αγίου Συμεών, ibid.,* 8/4, 496, 5/50; ... *σύνορα Χαββα Αλῆ Κούρα, ibid.,* 505; *σύνορα Χαββα Αλη Κούρρα, ιδιοκτησία Χαββα 'Αλη Κούρα, ibid., 506; but, cf. 'Αγιος Τζίρκος, Κληρονόμοι Γιαννῆ Γιωργῆ 'Αληκούρη,* a Greek, *ibid., 3/62, 88; 'Εμὶρ Αλῆ Καρακούλλη Τσιτσίρκα ἐκ Γαλάτειας,* (local) Register of Tannou, 7/48, no: 194; *ὁ Χ Οσμάνης, ὁ Χασάνης Μουστάφης, ὁ Μουσταφᾶς Γιαλλούρη, ὁ σαλήχης πτοψίς,* etc., 185[71]; *Χουσεῖν Μεχμέτ Μακρῆ* [Uzun], *Eleftheria,* 12 and 13, XI, 1965; *ἀγορασθέν ἀπό τον χασαναγα βοργά ὀνομαζόμενον,* Reg.XLVI, p.211 1773, Asha; *ibid.,* p.26, 1773, *Μελάναργα, ὁσπήτια του Χατζῆ Μεχεμετὴ Κάττου,* etc.; *Κιαμὴλ 'Οσμὰν Μαῦρος,* Kaïmakli, *Eleftheria,* 15.X.1966, year LXI, no: 11611, p.1 otherwise *Μπλάκκης,* see *Patris,* Year II, no: 554, 15.X.1966, p.6; *Μουσταφὰ Οσμὰν Καλλή, Πολεμίδια, Κεμάλ Σαλήχ Τσούκκας, Πολεμίδια* apud Spyr. Papageorghiou, *'Αρ-*

[71] Apud Ioannes P.Tsiknopoullos, *Παναγία ἡ Χρυσορρωγιάτισσα, ἱστορικὴ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἱερὰ μονή,* Nicosia, 1964, 1965, p.61.

χεῖον τῶν παρανόμων ἐγγράφων τοῦ Κυπριακοῦ Ἀγῶνος 1955-1959, Athens, 1961, p.401; *Ραμανταν Ἐμιν Πέρδικος* of Tremithousa, Chrysochous, *Eleftheria,* 25.II.1966, p.6; *Αχμέτ Μεχμέτ Βαλεττῆ* of *Γαλάτεια* Koma tou Yialou, Land Register 8/27, no: 371,2 [Valentino(o), cf. *Παλεττοῦ* Valentine, *Βαλιαντοῦ,* etc.] Add. many other family names of Turkish Cypriots of Frankish extraction: *Πιτζένης* < *Picquigny, Ἀγκολέμης* < *Angouleme, Τζεμάλ Ἐφέντης* from Lapethos[72].

[72] C.P.Kyrris in *Χρονικὰ τῆς Λαπήθου,* I, Jan.1970, pp.73-74; C.P.Kyrris, 'Κυπριακὰ τοπωνύμια καὶ ἐπωνύμια', *'Ονόματα, Revue Onomastique,* Athens, IX, 1984, pp.247-257, espec. p.253.

II. CONTACTS AND INHERITANCE : 3

PRIVACY IN BYZANTINE AND OTTOMAN HOUSES

SIMON ELLIS / OXFORD

This note is a preliminary result of research on later Byzantine and Turkish housing supported by the British Institute at Ankara, the University of Oxford, and the University of Edinburgh.

Previous studies in this area have relied on traditional historical arguments that do not base themselves firmly on the material remains. Some scholars have looked for the appearance of later Byzantine houses in the *palazzi* of Venice whilst others have compared the few remains of later Byzantine palaces with 17th or 19th century houses in Istanbul[1]. One should point out that palaces generally have a completely different architecture and function to domestic houses. Scholars of Turkish architecture have sometimes been content to talk of the origins of housing derived from the nomad tent, whilst admitting that the earliest preserved Turkish houses that can be dated with certainty are of the 17th century[2]. Von Gabain[3] based her fascinating study of the early Turkic kingdom of Qoco (AD 850-1250) on illustrations and texts. Her descriptions of pavilions have been compared with kiosks built in the palace of Topkapi in the 15th century. As we have just said palaces and pavilions are a long remove from normal domestic

1 The first monograph on Byzantine housing was L. de Beylie, *L'Habitation Byzantine* (Grenoble / Paris, 1902), since when there has been little progress in studies, see for example R. Krautheimer, *Early Christian and Byzantine Architecture* (Harmondsworth, 1979). (For many recent studies of the subject, see Ch. Bouras in *JöB*, 31-32 (1981), 611-53 - ED.).

2 For classic accounts of the Turkish house see E. Kömürcüoğlu *Das alttürkische Wohnhaus* (Wiesbaden, 1966), and G. Goodwin, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (London, 1971).

3 A. von Gabain, *Das Leben im uigurischen Königreich von Qoćo (850-1250)* (Wiesbaden, 1973), 87-8 on pavilions. For the way Uigur symbolisim has been applied to an 18th century house see E. Esin, *Sa'dullah Paşa Yalısı* (Istanbul, 1984).

architecture. Moreover it is dangerous to use texts and illustrations, as for Qoco, to give an idea of everyday life. Classicists and Byzantinists are well aware of the use of fantastic architecture in illustrations, which functioned rather like stage settings in a theatre. Many more mediaeval monuments need to be discovered and recorded before architectural development between Asia and the Orient can be established.

If one takes a rigorous view of the material evidence for housing in the Ottoman dominions between AD 200 and 1900 it is immediately clear that there is a complete absence of well dated houses from AD 550 to 1700. No architectural developments can possibly be carried across such a gulf with any confidence. The only feasible approach to the subject is to treat houses pre 550 and post 1700 as completely separate traditions. To some extent the material remains can be supplemented by narrative texts and the accounts of travellers[4], but these only give us a glimpse of a particular place at a particular time and are not so useful in building up a general picture of housing.

It is impossible to present an idealised version of any one house as representative of Turkish Vernacular Architecture. Naturally vernacular architecture is dependent on the availability of building materials, climate and pre-existing local traditions. Several major recent studies have looked at Ottoman buildings in the Arab lands, in the advance of modern urban development[5]. In the land of modern Turkey studies have recently been concerned to publish a few representative houses from a particular town or district[6]. However many of these studies have neglected the social function of the house in favour of considerations of architectural develop-

4 See Goodwin *op. cit.* 430 discussion of Busbecq in the 17th century, and F. Burnaby *On Horseback through Asia Minor* (1898, reissued Gloucester 1985) 78.

5 Of great importance are J. Revault, *Palais et maisons du Caire d'époque ottomane* (Paris, 1983) and *Palais et demeures de Tunis,* I-II (Paris, 1967-71). Also H. Gaube and E. Wirth, *Aleppo,* Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients B58 (Wiesbaden, 1984).

6 For example R. Günay *Geleneksel Safranbolu evleri ve oluşumu* (Ankara 1981), H. Karpuz, "Trabzon köy evlerinin bölmeleri", *TFAr* 1981/2 (1982), 37-48, and E. Esin, *op. cit.* (note 3). A recent general work on the Ottoman house is A. Arel, *Osmanlı konut geleneğinde tarihsel sorunlar* (Izmir, 1982).

ment. My purpose in presenting this paper is to suggest a social function of one element in Turkish domestic architecture, and to open up a new line of enquiry to a comparison of Byzantine and Ottoman houses.

The houses that I wish to consider lie in the western coastal region of Asia Minor centred on Izmir[7], though similar houses are to be found widely in eastern regions. The traditional town-house in this area is of two general kinds. One has a front facade of the kind we associate with schoolchildren's drawings of houses in this country. That is, it has now four windows (two on the upper storey and two on the lower storey) with a door between the lower windows. The second kind of house seems more deeply rooted in what is normally considered to be the central tradition of Ottoman domestic architecture. On the ground floor there is a central door but no flanking windows. The upper storey projects over the street. It is often built entirely of wood whereas the lower floor is in stone. The upper floor has large windows or shutters, in more recent houses a bay window may be built. These two kinds of house are quite distinct and examples may be found in virtually every Turkish town dating from the 18th through to the 20th century.

I will now concentrate on the second kind of house with the projecting upper floor. Two main arguments have been put forward for the origin of this style of architecture. I take first that of Burton Berry[8]. He believed that the origin of the projecting upper storey was in the difficulties encountered by early Turkish builders in incorporating the ruins of earlier Byzantine buildings. Thus when the Turks had to build on top of a ruined wall (presumably he envisages a thick blank outer wall of a public building) they escaped from the restricting plan of the previous structure by allowing the upper floor of the new house to project over the outer

7 The limits of the area can be conveniently defined by M. Kazmaoğlu and U. Tanyeli, "Anadolu konut mimarisinde bölgesel farklılıklar", *Yapi*, 33 (1979), 29-41, on the basis of constructional material and architectural style; their Group 1.

8 Burton Berry, "The development of the bracket support in Turkish domestic architecture in Istanbul", *Ars Islamica*, 5 (1938), 272 ff.

wall of the ruin below. We should of course reject this view *a priori* as it is based on assumptions of fifteenth century architecture and we have no material evidence for this period. However we can also dismiss the assumption on other grounds. There seems no reason why the early Turks would have been unwilling to demolish early ruins, or at least re-use the masonry piecemeal. Can we also believe that such an *ad hoc* architectural solution as Berry suggests would have become so central to the tradition of vernacular architecture in Turkey that it should survive until the present day? Berry's interpretation is also inadequate to explain the lack of windows in the lower storey, unless one assumes that the early Turks always chose windowless ruins on which to build their houses.

The second explanation put forward for the projecting upper storey is of a different order. It is claimed that the function of the blank lower floor was for defense. Once again there is a tendency to push this explanation back into mediaeval times and to say that the style of architecture arose when clans or families were at each others throats in feuds or vendettas. This of course falls as did the previous explanation because we have no remains of mediaeval Turkish houses. Of course feuds did continue until at least the later 19th century, but against the assertion of later feuds we can pose the material evidence. There are as we have seen two kinds of house in the cities at this period. The other type has no projecting upper storey and has windows on the ground floor. The two types seem to be inextricably mixed in every quarter of the cities. If such feuds were so common there does not seem to have been much pressure to build houses with projecting upper storeys as better strongholds. In fact we may question whether such houses were so strongly detensible. It would be quite easy to lob missiles in through large upper-storey windows. Wooden upper storeys would be liable to attack by fire, and could probably be destroyed from the outside with rope and tackle. If we consider mediaeval Italy another society where feuds were common we do not find such houses there. The feuding did affect architecture as it led to the erection of the great towers known as *campanile* but these

towers were probably not used so much as active military architecture. The aim soon became to build the tallest tower simply as a demonstration of the households superior influence.

In one respect I would suggest that the interpretation of the Turkish houses as fortifications may be on the right lines. I believe that the blank wall of the lower storey was in some way a form of protection for the household. I consider that the design of this type of Turkish house was dictated by a desire for privacy. The Ottoman houses that we are considering were probably owned by what we may term the middle class or the bourgeoisie. The lower storey of the house was commonly used to accomodate animals and/or servants. The upper storey was the private apartments, including the salon which lay in the bay window or projection over the street. Entry to the house was thus controlled at the door in the blank face of the lower exterior wall. This part of the house was a reception area where visitors of a less personal nature could be dealt with without impinging on the privacy of family life up above. The austerity of the reception area at the door served to emphasise the warmth of the reception that greeted family guests upstairs. When the visitor entered the house he often saw opposite him the wide stair giving access to this privileged area. Such a wide stair was certainly not a defensive measure. Passing up the stair the visitor came to the heart of the house in fact the heart of the family and its life — the salon. An accentuated threshold reminded him that it was customary not to wear shoes in this room[9]. The threshold of the salon is thus in its own way another barrier for guests. The high threshold and the act of removing the shoes serve to emphasise that this room really is the *sanctum* of the host's family.

The Ottoman house was thus designed with a series of restrictions upon entry in mind. The progression into the centre of the family was in a vertical plane. As with most Mediterranean houses, one first passed through a blank exterior wall, and *then* went upstairs. Instead of the most private reception room being

9 Goodwin *op. cit.* pp. 434-5.

located at the centre of the house — the heart of the physical house and the heart of family life — the Ottoman house was rather turned inside out as the salon was uplifted onto the upper storey and projected out over the exterior walls. This movement provided a great advantage in 'ambience'. The Ottoman house could still remain closed, in accord with general modesty, privacy, and Islamic principle, but the salon up in the air could still look outwards towards the rest of the world[10]. Instead of having to be lit by glancing light from clerestory windows like rooms in the centre of other houses the Ottoman salon could be flooded with direct lighting through wide casements. The ambiguity of a closed dark lower storey and a bright airy upper salon accords well with Turkish principles — moral but not such a restrictive form of Islam as that practised in many Arab countries, for example in the Gulf[11].

Whereas in the Gulf the harem was often a separate, isolated, part of the house, in the Ottoman house, where a harem existed, it does not seem to have been architecturally separated from the main apartments. The architecture of the salon can be said to have been a response to climate. It was customary to have an open summer, and a closed winter salon. On the other hand this would not explain the reason for this particular architectural response for the climate. Other alternatives that might have been adopted are the *liwan,* or the ventilation shafts used in the Gulf[12].

If we view the architecture as governed by a choice in life-style rather than a choice of defence it is much easier to explain the presence, side by side of the two kinds of houses mentioned at the start of this discussion. Some chose privacy with a blank lower-floor external wall, whereas others were less concerned with this

10 S. Ögel 'Die Beziehung zwischen Innenraum und Außenraum in der osmanischen Architektur' *Anatolica* 9 (1982) pp. 123-32 notes this ambiguity, but applies it to architectural development rather than social functions. A. Arel, *op. cit.* (note 6), 47-54, sees a development from the 'open' pavilion to a more solidly built 'closed' house.

11 R. Lewcock and Z. Freeth *Traditional Architecture in Kuweit and the Northern Gulf* (London 1978).

12 Both theses features were used in 13th century Cairo — S. Goitein *A Mediterranean Society* IV (Berkeley 1983) pp. 62 and 67.

requirement and felt that their privacy could still be ensured even with windows on the lower floor and less restriction upon entry. The two architectural traditions can then quite easily live and develop together. Though a house with a vertical arrangement of rooms was well-suited to cramped urban space it is also found in the countryside. Cramped urban space would not account for the choice of a projecting upper floor rather than building higher. The chief advantage of the projecting room was the incoming light and air, or the view onto the garden and street; contrasted with the blank lower wall to restrict entry.

We can now compare the Early Christian and the Ottoman house from two different perspectives, architectural and social. In terms of architecture the Early Christian house, following its Roman predecessors, was generally organised on a single floor[13]. The Ottoman house was orientated vertically, the rooms were arranged in a vertical design in which the most prominent upper part of the house was reserved for the salon. The Roman house was designed to be seen in a horizontal vista with extensive spaces, light falling between columns, onto wide mosaic floors. The Ottoman house was designed to impress with its high facade, and its view out from the salon, above the neighbourhood. However in a sense both houses were built with the same social conception. The principal room used for entertainment, the salon or the *triclinium,* was located in the depths of the house far away from the entrance. Both houses presented blank walls to the street. The Early Christian house was inturned onto the peristyle, off which all the rooms opened. The Ottoman house improved on this design in placing the salon at the top of the house. It was able to keep its blank wall to the street, while at the same time allowing the salon to look out to the world.

Finally we may use this study to suggest two changes in housing that we must look for in the intervening mediaeval period. There is an architectural change from a horizontal to a vertical orientation. There is a social change as the poorly lit, mosaic

[13] S. Ellis "The Palace of the Dux at Apollonia and related houses" in G. Barker, J. Lloyd, and J. Reynolds, ed., *Cyrenaica in Antiquity* (Oxford, 1985), 15-25.

covered *triclinium,* has been replaced by the light, airy, wood-panelled salon. The salon seems to have much more of a relaxed ambience closer to the modern living room than to the cold formal atmosphere of an Early Christian *triclinium*. Continued research is needed to determine by what process, and when these changes took place.

II. CONTACTS AND INHERITANCE : 4

PHRYGIA BETWEEN BYZANTINES AND SELJUKS

KLAUS BELKE / WIEN

Phrygia in its Byzantine geographical extension is approximately the area between the cities of Dorylaion in the north, Amorion and Polybotos in the east and the valleys of the Meander and Lykos rivers with Laodikeia, Chonai, Apameia at the sources of the Meander and Sozopolis in the south. Most of this area belongs to the Anatolian plateau, but from its western and north-western edge several valleys and low passes with important ancient and medieval roads lead to the lower regions of the Marmara and Aegean coasts. The two most important of these road-systems led from the inner Anatolian Tembris and Bathys valleys, that is from the region of Dorylaion and Kotyaeion, to the lower Sangarios valley, to Nikaia and Prusa[1], and from southern Phrygia down the valleys of Lykos and Maeander to Caria, Lydia and the towns of the Aegean coast[2]. Since all Byzantium's enemies, who strove after the fertile coasts and rich towns of the Aegean region, had nearly inevitably to pass one of these Phrygian roads — because of the Pontic mountains to the north and the Pamphylian and Lycian mountains to the south — Phrygia had a military key-position in the defence — or reconquest — of western Asia Minor. But these valleys and plains also attracted the real enemy of Byzantium : Turkish groups of nomadic character, because they offered excellent pasture land[3].

It is well known that in less than ten years after the battle of

1 See e.g. map in V. Laurent, *La vita retractata et les miracles posthumes de Saint Pierre d'Atroa* (Bruxelles, 1958), 10, on the roads from northwestern Phrygia to Bithynia.

2 For a clear general map of the Roman road-system of Phrygia see M. Waelkens, *Dokimion* (Berlin, 1982), plate 31.

3 In this communication I cannot deal with the complex of nomadization; see the respective articles of this volume.

Manzikert almost all Asia Minor, including, of course, Phrygia, was lost to the Turks[4], who swamped the land mostly in groups under local leaders with no, or only loose connection, with the ruling dynasty of the Great Seljuks. From 1077, however, Süleyman, who was, indeed, a descendant of the Seljuk family, organized the first Turkish state in western Asia Minor with its centre at Nikaia[5]; other Turkish principalities followed on the Aegean coast[6].

It was only after the reoccupation of Nikaia by the joint armies of the First Crusade and the Byzantians, and after the Crusaders' victory near Dorylaion in 1097, that Byzantium could attempt a reconquest of Asia Minor. The Byzantines soon proved successful in the coastal areas from the Pontus to Cilicia; Phrygia remained for about 100 years a zone contested by both sides, and some aspects of this struggle for Phrygia, especially under the first three Comnenian emperors, are the subject of my contribution.

Our question is: What were the measures by which Byzantium tried to regain and to protect Phrygia, and were they effective?

To sum up: The Byzantines frequently sent armies to expel the Turks from the main inhabited areas, and they built or rebuilt castles and fortified or refortified towns. This may be illustrated by some examples.

In 1098, only one year after the success of the First Crusade the general John Dukas succeeded in destroying the coastal emirates and then marched through Lycia and southern Phrygia unto Polybotos, expelling the Turks from all these regions[7], and in the same

4 Phrygia is mentioned expressively amongst the provinces whose cities were opened to the Turks during the revolt of Nikephoros Melissenos, cf. Nikephoros Bryennios (ed. P. Gautier), 301. At the beginning of the reign of Alexios I only Choma (near the sources of the Meander) seems still to have been controlled by a (virtually independent) Byzantine commander (τὸν Βούρτζην τοπάρχην ὄντα Καππαδοκίας καὶ Χώματος); but he too was called to fight the Normans under Robert Guiscard in 1081 (Anna, ed. B. Leib, I 131).

5 Cf. C. Cahen, "La première pénétration Turque en Asie mineure," *Byzantion*, 18 (1948), 5-67, especially 31-34, 42-44; idem, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* (London, 1968), 72-77.

6 The most threatening was the emirat of Tzachas (Çaka); on whom cf. Cahen, "Première pénetration," 52; *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 81; I. Mélikoff, *La geste de Melik Danişmend I* (Paris, 1960), 85-88.

year the emperor himself reached Philomelion obviously without difficulty, planning to help the Crusaders at Antioch; but when he was (falsely) informed that the Crusaders were going to be defeated completely before Antioch and heard of a great Turkish army approaching, he returned to Constantinople, taking with him parts of the Christian population of eastern Phrygia, and thus abandoning it to the Turks[8].

In 1109 we find the Turks in the district of Lampe in southern Phrygia; they were defeated by the troops of Eumathios Philokales, but their defeat and above all the cruel treatment by the Byzantines caused new reprisal raids, which brought the Turks again to the Aegean coast[9]; this was only the beginning of a new series of Turkish raids. During the last years of Alexios' reign they invaded the coasts of Bithynia and the Hellespont, and, for example, besieged Nikaia[10].

In his last expedition in 1116, Alexios wanted to curb the menacing Turkish state by marching against the developing new capital of the Seljuks, Ikonion. This time he came from the north, by way of Dorylaion; the Turks retreated to central Asia Minor, but at Philomelion, Alexios stopped his march again, chiefly because of difficulty of provision. He returned to Constantinople again with a considerable part of the Christian population[11].

In spite of Alexios' partial success in eastern Phrygia the Turks had reoccupied all southern Phrygia probably already before the emperor's death. It was one of the first deeds of John II in 1119 to reconquer Laodikeia which he refortified, and Sozopolis. The occupation of Sozopolis, whose location on an isolated rock with

7 Anna III 23-27; cf. F. Chalandon, *Les Comnènes I.* (Paris, 1900), 196-7.

8 Anna III 27-29; cf. S. Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1971), 186.

9 Anna III 143-146; cf. Chalandon, *Les Comnènes I*, 254-256.

10 Anna III 154-55, 157-58, 164-72; cf. *Chalandon I*, 264-66.

11 Anna III 187-213; cf. *Chalandon I*, 268-272; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 91-2; Vryonis, *Decline*, 186-7. That this campaign was not just a step in the daily frontier warfare, but intended to be a greater enterprise against the Sultanate is stated by Anna at the beginning of her report (p. 187) and is the consequence of the extant of the preparations, too.

only one difficult approach is described vividly by John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, was only possible by a ruse[12].

While Sozopolis from then on could withstand at least two Turkish sieges (1132 and 1142), thanks to its position and walls or to relief by Byzantine armies[13], until its definite occupation in 1180 after the death of the emperor Manuel[14], Laodikeia at the other end of Southern Phrygia was conquered at least once (about 1160) and its population enslaved[15]. The people of Laodikeia were at this time dispersed over villages nearby, perhaps already (as certainly later) closer to the mountains of the Baba Dağı. Some unknown time later they were again united in a fortified town in a not yet identified position, obviously in the outskirts of the Baba Dağı[16].

Further incursions of Turks into Bithynia as well as to the valley of the Maeander and Lydia caused the emperor Manuel's first campaign against Ikonion in 1146. It was not at all successful, the siege of the Seljuk capital was raised, before it had properly begun, and the retreat was accomplished only with difficulty[17]. It is interesting to note that Manuel came upon a Turkish tribe, laden with booty, near the sources of the Meander, where he thought he

12 John Kinnamos (ed. Bonn) 5-7; Niketas Choniates (ed. J.A. van Dieten) 12-13.

13 According to Michael Syrus (trad. B. Chabot) III 232-3, there was a fruitless attack on Sozopolis before 1133; the Turks only sacked the surrounding countryside. At the beginning of the emperor John Komnenos' last campaign to Syria in 1142 the news of the arrival of the Byzantine army was sufficient to induce the Turks to retreat from Sozopolis (Kinnamos 22; cf. Chalandon, *Les Comnènes II* (Paris, 1912), 181).

14 Nik. Chon. 262.

15 The assault on Laodikeia (and Phileta) was probably chiefly a reaction on attempts of the emperor Manuel Komnenos to expel groups of Turkish nomads under an emir Süleyman from the upper valley of the Meander and the adjoining regions (Kinnamos 194-198; cf. *Chalandon II*, 460-1 and Vryonis, *Decline*, 122). The report of Nik. Chon. 124-5 can posibly be referred to the same event and does not necessarily mean a second capture of Laodikeia (but cf. *Chalandon II*, 499; Vryonis, *Decline*, 122, 189).

16 For the history of the settlements of Laodikeia and Denizli in the later middle ages see X. de Planhol in: J. de Gagniers-P. Devambez-Lilly Kahil-R. Ginouves (eds.), *Laodicée du Lycos, le Nymphée* (Québec-Paris, 1969), 391-431.

17 Kinnamos 38-63; Nik. Chon. 52-3; cf. Chalandon, *Comnène II*, 248-257; Vryonis, *Decline*, 120-1.

had reached already safe Byzantine territory[18].

In 1159, on the way back to Constantinople from the famous Cilician campaign some units separated from the main body of the Byzantine army were attacked by Turkish troops near Kotyaeion in the middle Tembris valley. The emperor answered with a winter campaign to the region of Dorylaion (about 60 km. northeast of Kotyaeion) in order to punish the same Turkish tribes; he expelled a great number of nomads with their animals. It seems that this is the first concrete report that groups of nomads had established themselves in the plains and valleys of northern Phrygia[19].

I could continue the list of Turkish raids and nomadic infiltration on the one hand and of Byzantine counter-expeditions on the other. But I would rather mention two further works of fortification, the famous rebuilding of the city of Dorylaion as a frontier fortress and the refortification of the old decayed castle of Sublaion near the sources of the Maeander[20]. When the Sultan Kılıç Arslan II heard of the enterprise at Dorylaion, it became clear that not some Turkish nomads but the Seljuk empire was concerned. The sultan wrote a letter to the emperor demanding that he leave the area[21], thus showing that he had laid claim to it. It even seems that the area had gained economic importance for the maintenance of the sultan's armies[22]. By the way, this attitude fits well into the frame of the more expansive Seljuk policy of these years, when the sultan was dealing with his last serious Turkish adversaries at his eastern frontiers. And only a short time before he had by a strategem brought a certain number of unfortunately unnamed (and still at least in part Byzantine?) towns under his authority[23].

18 Kinnamos 59-63.

19 Kinnamos 191-4; cf. *Chalandon II*, 456-459; Vryonis, *Decline*, 121-2.

20 Besides Kinnamos 294-298 and Nik. Chon. 176-7 there are three rhetorical texts mentioning the event (see P. Wirth, "Kaiser Manuel I. Komnenos und die Ostgrenze. Rückeroberung und Wiederaufbau der Festung Dorylaion," *BZ*, 55 (1962), 21-29).

21 Nik. Chon. 176; cf. also Kinnamos, 299.

22 This is hinted at by Nik. Chon., 176 and said more clearly by Euthymios Malakes in his speech to the emperor Manuel Komnenos, ed. K. Mpones, Theologia (1941-1948), 525-550, especially 541.

After Manuel's defeat in the defiles of Tzybritze near Myriokephalon (in 1176) or more exactly immediately after his death in 1180 Byzantium lost the remnants of its weak control over most parts of Phrygia rapidly. In 1180 Kotyaeion (and probably Dorylaion) in the north as well as Sozopolis and other places in the south fell to the Seljuk state[24], and in 1190, when the German army of Frederik Barbarossa passed through Asia Minor, Laodikeia, in itself almost an island surrounded by Turkish nomads and robbers, was the last city under Greek control[25]. It is time therefore to draw conclusions from the examples presented.

There were three serious attempts to hit the enemy at the heart of his power, Ikonion (1116, 1146, 1176), which all failed. But the vast majority of the campaigns had only restricted aims. They usually succeeded in cleaning a certain limited area of Turkish bands or nomads. But since these were only expelled — often not very far — and not destroyed, they always returned very soon, often raiding the adjoining districts, too, for revenge. The situation worsened especially towards the end of the period under consideration, when the Byzantines not only had to deal with more or less independent bands of nomads, but with the expanding Seljuk state. The fortifications were as limited in their effects. As Rudi Lindner has recently shown, they could not stop nomadic infiltration[26]; but they certainly could give shelter to the surrounding

23 Kinnamos, 292; cf. Vryonis, *Decline*, 123.

24 Nik. Chon., 262. It does obviously not make an essential difference that according to the wording of Choniates Sozopolis and its surroundings were "captured", and Kotyaeion only "sacked" (cf. P. Wittek, "Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie," *Byzantion*, 10 (1935), 11-64, esp. 33-35). Dorylaion is not mentioned in this passage, but we find the town (although not very well attested in the manuscript tradition) ten years later, after the division of the Seljuk state, together with Amaseia and Ankyra in the possession of Masut (Muhyiüddin Masud Şah): Nik. Chon., 520, cf. Wittek, *Toponymie*, 12-16, 35-39. On the site of Myriokephalon, see now M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine monetary economy c. 300-1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 146-54.

25 Ansbert, *Historia de Expeditione Friderici*, ed. A. Chroust (Berlin, 1928), 75; Cf. E. Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa im Orient. Kreuzzug und Tod Friedrichs I.* (Tübingen, 1977), 103-107.

26 R. Lindner, "An Impact of the West on Comnenian Anatolia," Akten XVI. Internat. Byzantinistenkongreß, II / 2 (= *JöB* 32/2). Wien 1982, 207-213, esp. 209. It seems, however, to need further discussion, to which extent Comnenian

population and sustain administrative stuctures in case of raids.

As we learn from various episodes, but above all from the reports of the Second and Third Crusades, there was no security of communication for small groups between the few inhabited and heavily fortified towns, as Laodikeia, Chonai, Sozopolis, Choma in the south and perhaps Kotyaeion in the north. Great armies had considerable difficulties in provision[27]. Agriculture was only possible in a very limited scale around fortified places[28]. Most of the countryside was abandonded[29], and the remaining Greeks of western Phrygia had often turned into robbers themselves, sometimes in alliance with Turkish bands[30]. To summarize I am inclined to say that as regards Phrygia it is not even correct to speak of a reconquest, in the strict sense of the word, by the Comnenian Emperors.

fortification really "mirrors the policy of Capetian France or communal Italy" (Lindner l.c.), considerng that fortifications in various kinds go back to the very beginning of the Byzantine state and flourished in the time of the Arab wars.

27 Shortage of provision was one of the reasons which helped the Turks in their victory over the German army of the Second Crusade near Dorylaion (cf. Odo of Deuil, ed. Virginia Berry, 90-94, and above all the famous letter of king Conrad III to the abbot Wibald of Korvey and Stablo (latest edition in F. Hausmann, *Die Urkunden der deutschen Könige und Kaiser IX. Die Urkunden Konrads III. und seines Sohnes Heinrich* (Wien-Köln-Graz, 1969), Nr. 195. The French army of the Second Crusade found itself confronted with this difficulty already by far west of Phrygia in the district of Esseron (Byzantine Achyraus, south of Balıkesir, see Odo 102-106); where they preferred to follow the longer road along the Aegean coast instead the direct route to Philadelpheia, which seemed to offer even less food stuffs. About 50 years later also the army of the Third Crusade had to face the lack of provision in this region for the first time (Ansbert, 72-3; cf. Eickhoff, *Barbarossa*, 90).

28 It is interesting to note that Niketas Choniates (p. 150) saw a relation between the increase of the agricultural production in a part of western Asia Minor (the theme of Neokastra) and the security of the rural population, which Manuel settled in fortified hamlets, since the open villages before did not give shelter against the Turkish raids. — Destroying of the crop in Phrygia (esp. towns in the Maeander valley and Chonai) is mentioned on the occasion of the revolts of Theodor Mangaphas (1189) and Pseudalexios (1192), see Nik. Chon., 400, 421. Turkish raids, of course, had the same effect.

29 Odo of Deuil, 106, for the time of the Second and Eickhoff, *Barbarossa*, 91-94, 99-100, 103-4 with the sources for the time of the Third Crusade.

30 Odo of Deuil, 108, 112-116, 126; Eickhoff, *Barbarossa*, 91-2, 103.

II. CONTACTS AND INHERITANCE : 5

CUISINE GRECQUE ET CUISINE TURQUE SELON L'EXPERIENCE DES VOYAGEURS (XVe-XVIe SIECLES)

JACQUES PAVIOT / PARIS

Parmi les voyageurs français qui ont voyagé dans les empires byzantin et ottoman, assez peu ont parlé de la nourriture qu'ils ont mangée, encore moins des us culinaires des peuples visités: Bertrandon de La Broquière, qui traversa l'Anatolie et les Balkans en 1432[1], Guillaume Postel, qui séjourna en Turquie en 1535-1536 et 1549-1550[2], et surtout Pierre Belon, qui se livra à la recherche des singularités du Levant entre 1547 et 1549[3]; le témoignage de ce dernier se distinguant par la richesse de ses informations, nous le suivrons plus particulièrement.

Que mangeaient les Grecs? La nourriture habituelle du peuple ne devait pas être bien différente de celle des caloyers du mont Athos, dont voici un menu du temps de carême servi à Belon: "(le caloiere) apporta de la Roquette, des racines d'Ache, des testes de Porreaux, des Concombres, Oignons & de beaux petits Aillets

1 Bertrandon de La Broquière est originaire du duché de Guyenne, mais au service du duc de Bourgogne. C'est pour ce dernier qu'il entreprit le voyage d'outre-mer en 1432, en fait mission de renseignements. Il meurt à Lille en 1459. L'édition à laquelle nous nous référons est celle de Ch. Schefer, *Le Voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière* (Paris, 1892).

2 Né en 1510, Guillaume Postel "Cosmopolite" a une vie assez agitée (voir W.J. Bouwsma, *Concordia Mundi: The Career and Thought of Guillaume Postel (1510-1581)* [Cambridge, Mass., 1957] et Marion L. Kuntz, *Guillaume Postel, Prophet of the Restitution of All Things. His Life and Thought* (The Hague, 1981]). Il publie à partir de ses expériences turques "*De la Republique des Turcs*" à Poitiers en 1560; nous nous servons de cette édition; il y a une édition augmentée à Paris en 1575: *Des Histoires orientales*. Il décède en 1581.

3 Pierre Belon, né vers 1517, a une formation d'apothicaire mais, au service du cardinal de Tournon, il accomplit aussi des missions diplomatiques. Après son voyage il publie *"Les Obseruations de plusieurs singularitez & choses memorables...* (Paris, 1553); nous suivons l'édition augmentée de 1554. Il meurt assassiné en 1565. (Voir P. Delaunay, *L'aventureuse existence de Pierre Belon du Mans* (Paris, 1926).

verds... & mangeasmes les herbes susdictes sans huille ne vinaigre... Il nous apporta aussi des Oliues noires confictes, qu'ilz appellent Demarties: du biscuit bien noir, & du vin... deux de ses compagnons... apporterent quelques poissons salez & desseichez, Seiches, Pourpres & Casserons... Ces Caloieres commencent tousiours leur repas par oignons cruds auec des Aux: & le principal de leur disner sont Oliues salées, & febues trempées en l'eau, & finissent par Roquette & Cresson alenois &... n'ont l'vsage de mettre de l'eau dedens le vin" (f^0 43r^0-v^0). Ce menu pouvait être complété par "toutes especes de Cancres, de Limax de mer, & autres qui ont coquilles, comme sont Moules & Oistres, parce qu'ilz n'ont sang[4]" (f^0 43v^0). Parmi les poisssons séchés se trouvait la vandoise, qu'il a vu pêcher et préparer au village de Bouron, en Thrace: "Ilz y peschent moult grande quantité de petitz poissons semblables aux Ables, que les Grecz de Bouron nomment Lilinga, & à Constantinople Licorini... Ilz les accoustrent comme nous faisons les harengs. Car apres qu'ilz les ont vn peu salez, puis faict fumer, ilz les deseichent, & enuoient à chartées & batelées en plusieurs lieux de Grece, & iusques en Italie mesme" (f^0 61r^0). Pour les jours non jeûnés, le choix des poissons était très large, comme nous le verrons pour Constantinople; régionalement, Belon a noté à Lemnos la pêche d' "vne sorte de poisson, qu'ilz nomment Cano, & anciennement Cana, & à Marseille vn Serran... Vn autre aussi vulgairement nommé Ropho, & anciennement Orphus (poisson de couleur rouge). Les poissons... Blenni (blendii?), Glini (?), Atherinae (?), Sargi (sargues), Gobij (boulereaux), Merulae (merle de mer), Turdi (tourds), &... ceulx que les Grecs appelloient anciennement Iulides, maintenant Sgourdelles (?)" (f^0 30v^0). En Crète il a goûté le scare "cuit & embroché, à leur mode, vei qu'ilz leur fichent vne brochette par la gueule au trauers du corps pour les rostir sur les charbons... Ce qui est le meilleur de ce poisson est l'herbe qu'il

4 "Telle opinion de viure ainsi (de ne pas manger de chair avec sang), n'est pas seulement es Caloieres, ne es prestres & autres gents d'église de Grece, mais aussi au commun populaire, qui pour mourir ne vouldroient (pendant leur caresme) manger du poisson qui a sang, n'autre chose grasse, tant ils sont austeres à obseruer telles superstitions" (Belon, f° 43v°).

mange (Scaruotano, herbe des Phaseoles), de laquelle on trouue tousiours grand'quantité en son estomac. Il a aussi le foie moult grand, qui sert à luy faire sa saulce. Car estant batu auec ses tripes, sel & vinaigre, donne bon goust à tout le poisson" (f⁰ 9v⁰). Comme l'indiquent les cultures relevées par Belon, différents fruits et légumes complétaient cette alimentation: les habitants de Lemnos sont "cultiueurs de legumages, & toutes autres choses, comme sont Pois, Febues, Ciches, Serres, Lentilles, Bled" (f⁰ 26r⁰); on trouvait aussi des "arbres Fructiers, comme Figuiers, Noiers, Amandiers, & quelques oliuiers" (f⁰ 26v⁰). En Crète "Les vergers sont pour la plus part plantez d'Amandriers (*sic*), Oliuiers, Grenadiers, Iuiubiers, Figuiers, & autres telz arbres fruictiers, & entre autres de moult grands Oranguiers, Citroniers, Pommiers d'Adam, & Poncieres" (f⁰ 7v⁰). On peut citer encore le "Chardon du Macreau", sorte de réglisse: connu sous le nom d'Ascolimbros en Crète, "Lon en mange les racines & fueilles (*sic*) auant qu'il ait faict la tige" (f⁰ 19r⁰), tandis qu'à Lemnos où il est nommé Scombrouolo, l'on préfère "sa fleur iaulne, qui est fort doulx à manger" (f⁰ 26v⁰). Pour la Crète, le fromage était fourni par le lait des brebis et des chèvres que l'on fait paître dans les montagnes (f⁰ 6v⁰). Notons l'habitude féminine de mâcher: la gomme de carline en Crète, de chondrille à Lemnos, de lentisque (le mastic) à Chio (f⁰ 20v⁰)[5].

5 Plus tardivement Julien Bordier, passant à Trébizonde en 1609, a donné quelques renseignements sur les cultures dans les alentours de cette ville: "Tout le reste du terrin dautour de la ville et faubours, sont jardinages rustiques, sans artifices, ou se voit quantité de grands oliviers, dans lesquels montent les ceps de vignes, dont les resins sont dextreme grosseur, et les grins de celle de prunes de Damas violet, et presque de la coulleur desquels se faict le vin, qui est un peu rude, et toutefois est treuvé bon de ceux du pays, pour ny en avoir de meilleur; y ly a aussy force noyers et pommiers, mais que dune espèces ou deux, qui sont de moyenne grosseur, longuettes comme en forme d'ovalle, rouges d'un costé et jaulnes de lautre, la peau fort lissée et luisante, la cher dure et de peu de goust, neanmoins sen porte quantité de barques chargées a Constantinople, comme aussy font-ils des noisettes et avelines, dont y a merveilleuse quantité de noisetiers sur les costaux des montagnes et semblés de bois taillis; de poires et prunes ny en a aussy que de trois ou quatre espèces; de guignes et cerises y a aussy, non grandement, ...; pour ce qui est des herbages, y ly a force choux cabus, lettues mais surtout force ails, ougnions et paureaux, quils mangent crus tout lesté, la ville ayant a foison tout ce qui necessaire" (*Relation d'un voyage en Orient*, in *Archeion Pontou*, vol. VI (1936), p. 134; voir aussi Anthony

Enfin, la Grèce etait célèbre pour ses vins avec, en premier lieu, le malvoisie, produit en Crète: à la différence de celui qui était exporté dans les pays tels que la France, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne, le malvoisie que consommaient les Grecs n'était pas cuit. Cependant Belon remarque que "rafraischissants leurs vins par chascun an, amendent les vieux auec le nouueau, & renforssent le nouueau auec le vieil. Les vins de Crete anciennement, comme encor maintenant estoient doulx" (f^0 21r^0). Il y avait un autre cru: "L'isle de Crete donne aussi d'excellente Muscatel, duquel y en a de hatif auant la saison, & d'autre qu'on faict en vendenges.... Et est à noter qu'il y a aussi de Muscatel & de la Maluaisie de deux sortes, sçauoir est de doulce, & d'autre qui n'est point doulce, que les Italiens appellent garbe, c'est a dire ce que les François nomment verd ou rude en vin" (Ib.). Belon cite encore un troisième cru notable, celui de Lesbos, apprécié à Constantinople et consideré supérieur à ceux de Chio et des Cyclades: "Le vin de Metelin.... est quasi tout clairet. Et à fin de le rendre plus coloré, ils sçauent mettre de la semence des hiebles selon la doctrine que le Iuifs leur ont aprins" (f^0 82v^0), ce qui était donc une préparation assez nouvelle. Dans les îles Ioniennes, le vin de Zante était aussi renommé: Torkington, voyageant en 1517, a noté: "There is (in Zante) the greatest wines and strongest that ever I drank in my life"[6], tandis que soixante ans plus tard, en 1579, Carlier de Pinon indiquait que "(l'isle de Zante) produict sur tout du vin fort estimé et en grande quantité, le clairet estant nommé *Romania,* et le blanc, *Ribola,* touts deux eguaux en bonté"[7]. Remarquons finalement que contrairement à l'usage occidental "Tous (les Grecs) estiment chose odieuse mettre de l'eau dedans leur vin" (Belon, f^0 5v^0).

Bryer, *The Estates of the Empire of Trebizond,* in *Archeion Pontou,* 35 (1979), 370-477.

6 Sir Richard Torkington, *Ye Oldest Diarie of Englysshe Travell,* ed. W.J. Loftie (1884), p. 18, cité in Terence Spencer, *Fair Greece Sad Relic* (Bath, 1974), 129.

7 Carlier de Pinon, *Voyage en Orient,* publié par E. Blochet (Paris, 1920), 48. (A white wine called 'Robola' is still made by the Kalligas family of Zante, where it is locally believed to be named after a variety of Venetian grape. Editors' note).

Mais de boire de l'eau, sans vin, comme le font les Turcs (et les autres musulmans) a toujours surpris les voyageurs. Certes le vin était prohibé par la religion mais certaines personnes en buvaient dès qu'elles le pouvaient[8]. A défaut de vin les Turcs buvaient une sorte de bière, dont Belon a observé la fabrication en Turquie d'Asie: "Ilz le nomment vulgairement Chousset (var. Choussent, Posset)... C'est vn breuuage blanc comme laict, espois, & bien nourrissant, & enteste beaucoup ceulx qui en boiuent par trop, iusques à les (en)yurer... (Il) est faict de farine mise en paste, qu'il faict cuire dedens vne grande chauldiere, puis on iette vne boule de la dicte paste dedens l'eau, qui incontinent boult d'elle mesme & s'eschauffe sans feu, tellement qu'il en est faicte vne beuuette espoisse" (f^0 155v^0 - 156r^0). Postel, lui, signale (à l'occasion d'un banquet de noces) que "Le boire est communement eau succrée, meslée souuent auec eau rose damasquine" (p. 16). En été, pour se rafraîchir, les Turcs préfèraient "du serobet, qui est la decoction de pruneaus, raisins, figues, poires, dacnettes & pesches & tels fruicts, laquelle boisson vsent fort en esté, auec de la glace, ou de la nege qu'ils gardent tout au long de l'année en des magazins en terre, & est vn fort bon boire" (Id., p. 16-17)[9]. Un siècle plus tôt, La Broquière a bu aussi du lait (cf. p. 71, 91 et 124). Les laitages

8 Voir par exemple La Broquière, p. 79. Carlier de Pinon a fait état d'un ersatz de vin, "un breuvaige, qu'ils appellent *Arab sorbet,* quy veut dire autant que boisson d'Arabie, laquelle ils font avecq des raisins de Corinthe ou de Damas, rompus dans le moulin, lesquels estants mis dans un vaisseau de boix, ils y versent certaine quantité d'eau chaude, ce qu'après avoir bien meslé, ils bouchent bien ledict vaisseau, laissans le tout bouillir de soy mesme par deux ou troix jours, y adjoustants de la lye de vin, s'il ne boult assez. Au bout dudict temps ledict breuvaige est fort bon a boire, representant tellement le vin, que plusieurs y sont trompés, et moy mesme quelquefoix. Il monte aussy a la teste a la façon du vin, mais ne se garde longtemps, par ce qu'aisement il s'aigrit" (op. cit., p. 112).

9 Cf. aussi Belon, qui est le premier à donner le mot en français: "ilz ont coustume de garder la neige & la glace qu'ilz vendent en esté pour refraischir les breuuages nommez sorbets... il y a quelques Turcs qui ne viuent d'austre mestier en esté, que de faire vne sorte de breuuage doulx appellé cherbet... Aussi y a diuerses manieres de Sorbet. Les vns sont faicts de figues, les autres de prunes, & de poires, les autres d'abricos & de raisins, les autres de miel... le sorbetier y mesle de la neige pour le refroidir, ou de la glace: aussi n'estoit cela, il n'y auroit aucun plaisir à en boire" (f^0 189r^0-v^0).

étaient d'ailleurs un mets favori des Turcs.[10] La Broquière a été le premier à faire mention du yoghourt en Occident; il en a mangé alors qu'il se trouvait à l'Ayas parmi des Turcomans: "(ils) nous baillerent une grande telle de lait quaillié qu'ilz appellent yogourt" (p. 89). Il a goûté aussi de "la crayme de buffle qui est tresbonne et doulce qu'ilz appelent Kaymac" dans les environs de Brousse. Belon a signalé ces produits, mais en leur donnant des noms classiques: "Il y a tout vn bourg en Constantinoble... qui ne faict autre chose que du Melca (lait aigri avec des épices?), du Caimac, & d'Oxygala (yoghourt). Le Caimac est faict de cremme: & en faict on en diuerses manieres. C'est ce que les Grecs ont nommé anciennement Aphrogala. Aussi ont (les Turcs) grand vsage de la recuicte, que les Grecs nomment vulgairement Misitra" (f° 192r°). La nourriture de La Broquière lors de sa traversée de l'Anatolie se composait principalement de pain et de fromage (cf. p. 71, 78 et 124). Voici la façon de faire le pain, ainsi qu'il a pu l'observer à l'Ayas: "Ilz ont une petite table ronde, bien ounye et prendent ung pou de farine ainsy comme s'ilz vouloient faire ung gasteau et de l'eaue; et là, le destrempent et font une paste assez mole, plus que pour faire pain, et de cela font plusieurs loppiens (petits morceaux) ronds et l'aplatissent le plus deslyé qu'ilz pevent; et ont ung baston rond moindre que le rondeur d'un oef et a un pié de long ou environ; et mettent ladite paste ainsy aplatie autour dudit baston et le roullent aux mains sur ladit table jusques ad ce qu'il soyt ainsy deslyé, comme j'ay dit; et le font habilement et tost et plus que ung oublieur ne fait une oublie. Et après, ilz ont là une piece de fer eslevée par dehors et la mettent sur un trepié et ung petit feu legier dessoubz et mettent celluy pain dessus, tout estendu et ne font que le mettre sus et retorner et sont plustost cuis deux que une oublye" (p. 91-92). Belon, empruntant à peu près le même itinéraire, a eu un menu semblable: "des oignons auec du pain & quelques raisins & autres fruicts secs. C'est vne chose commune aux Turcs tant grands seigneurs que petits compagnons de manger des oignons cruds[11]" (f° 196r°), il est aussi plus disert sur le fromage des

10 Cf. Belon: "Tout ainsi que les Turcs sont issus de vachiers & bergiers... ils ayment plus à manger des choses de laictage qui coustent peu" (f° 192r°).

11 Il nous paraît surprenant que La Broquière n'en ait pas parlé.

pasteurs anatoliens: "Et entant que tel fourmage (gardé dans des outres) est distribué par le pays de Grece... les Grecs le nomment de nom vulgaire Dermitisihilatismeno, & ne disent pas tyri, qui est à dire fourmage, mais simplement salé en peau... le fourmage de ces Turcs ainsi sallé en peaux, est communement plain du poil des bestes, pour ce qu'il (*sic*) ne coulent (filtrent) point le laict" (f⁰ 163v⁰). S'ajoutait quelquefois à cela de la viande: pour La Broquière, à Afyon-karahisar "des piés de mouton... les milleurs que je mengasse jamais" (p. 125) et peu avant Brousse, un méchoui, de la "char rostie... qui n'estoit point cuitte à moittié à beaucop, et la trenchions en rostissant en la broche" (p. 130); Belon y a goûté en Thrace: "Nous trouuasmes des pasteurs au bout du pont (sur le Netsos), qui faisoient rostir des moutons entiers, excepté la teste, pour vendre aux passants: lesquelz ilz auoient embrochez dedens des perches de Saule: mais ilz en auoient vuydé les tripes, & auoient recousu le ventre. Nul ne pourrait croire qu'vne si grosse masse de chair se peust cuyre en rostissant, qu'il ne l'auroit veu" (f⁰ 60v⁰). Comme fruits, La Broquière indique avoir mangé dans un village avant Brousse "du raisin qu'ilz gardent freiz tout au long de l'année, comme ilz sont à vendenges" (p. 130) et, juste après cette ville, "un fruit plus gros que grosses cerises et de la fachon et goust des freses, excepté qu'il est ung pou aigret et est tres-plaisant mengier" (p. 138), c'est-à-dire l'arbouse; Belon note en Cappadoce la culture de "Peschers, Cornaillers, Pruniers, Pommiers, Poiriers, Amandiers, Grenadiers, Orangiers" (f⁰ 166v⁰). Pour en finir avec cette nourriture de voyageurs[12], qui devait constituer l'ordinaire de la majorité des Turcs, voici la recette d'un potage populaire, distribué au caravansérail de Cavalla où Belon est passé: "Surtout (les Turcs) baillent liberalement du potage faict de Trachana, ou de Bohourt, ou de Afcos (aphace, espèce de pissenlit), ou de riz. Les habitants de l'isle de Metelin sçauent accoustrer du fourment, & le composer auec du lait aigre.

[12] Pour être complet, voici une spécialité anatolienne appréciée par La Broquière: "trouvay une viande... de noix nouvelle pelleez et parties par millieu et enfilleez en une corde, et jettent du vin cuit par dessus qui se prent et congelle comme cole. Et est tresbonne viande à mengier quant on a faim" (p. 125-126).

Premierement ilz boullent ledict fourment: en apres ilz le reseichent au soleil, & en font vne composition, qui de nom propre est appellée Bohourt. Ce Bohourt est transporté de Metelin, & enuoyé par toute Turquie: dont ilz se servent grandement en potages. Ilz font encore vne autre sorte de drogue de fourment audit Metelin qu'ilz nomment Trachana, laquelle n'est moins requise que la premiere, c'est à mon aduis celle qu'on appelloit anciennement en Grece & Italie, Maza. L'vsage de ces deux dictes drogues Bohourt & Trachana est si grand par toute Turquie, qu'il ne se peult dire plus: Car ilz ne font bon repas qu'ilz n'en facent cuire en leurs potages. Ilz ont le Riz en... grand vsage... Ilz ont aussi vne espece de legume, en moult grande vsage... que les Grecs appellent Afcos, du nom corrompu de Aphace... La façon de faire leur cuisine est moult differente à la nostre: car quand la chair est cuite, ilz la tirent hors du pot: & puis mettent dedens ce dequoy ilz veulent pour espoissir le bouillon. Et pource qu'ilz en font quantité, aussi ilz le meslent auec vne longue pale de bois" (f^0 59v^0)[13]. Une autre spécialité turque est de confire des aliments: "Les Turcs ont de moult bonnes inuentions de confitures en saulmeres, qui sont de petite valeur... ils confisent les racines des bettes... des gros choux cabus, & des grosses racines de raues, & des racines de Enula campana... C'est vne viande qui ne fault point cuire, car elle est toute preste estant ainsi sallée. Ils ont aussi des raisins de veriust confit, qui est grand soulagement aux Turcs: lequel trempant dedens du vinaigre & de la semence de moustarde, est vn moult plaisant manger cru auec du pain" (f^0 92r^0). Avant d'entrer chez des particuliers, voici un dernier mets que l'on pouvait trouver à acheter: "Ils (les Turcs) ont aussi des boutiques qui ne font autre chose qu'apprester des testes de mouton auec les pieds pour vendre: & quand ils les baillent, sçauent les ouurir habillement, & tout-chauldement les mettent en vn plat auec vn peu de gresse & de vinaigre saulpoudrées de sel composé auec des aulx, & meslé auec des escorces de la semence de Sumac,

13 Le problème du *trachanas* est en fait plus complexe; voir Anthony Bryer, "Byzantine Porridge", in *Studies in Medieval History presented to R.H.C. Davis*, ed. H. Mayr-Harting and R.I. Moore (London and Ronceverte, 1985), 1-6.

anciennement appellé Rhus obsoniorum" (Ib.). Lors de son séjour à Lemnos, Belon a été invité par le représentant de l'autorité turque: "Le premier mez fut de Concombres cruds sans vinaigre ne huille, qu'ilz mangent ainsi sans aultre saulse sinon auec du sel. En apres nous eumes des oignons cruds, & de Mouronne crue, & au domourant de la souppe de fourment boullu, du miel et du pain. Et pourautant qu'en la campagnie y auoit des Grecs Chrestiens, nous beusmes du vin" (f⁰ 28r⁰). Postel, de son côté, nous fait pénétrer dans un banquet de noces: "sont apportés grans plats... auquel plat (*sic*) y aura d'autres plats garnis de diuerses sortes de ris, de chapons rostis & bouillis, de mouton, d'oiseaus de riuiere, du poisson, des amandes confites, des dattes, du pain tout coupé, comme aussi les viandes se presentent toutes en pieces" (p. 16). Une certaine frugalité se retrouvait à la cour: à un repas où devait assister le sultan, La Broquière indique que l'on n'a apporté que de "grandes escuelles d'estain et en chascune avoit une piece de mouton et du ris" (p. 190). Postel était présent lors du banquet de congé de l'ambassadeur en 1536: "fut appor(t)é vn grand plat d'argent quadruple aux communs bassins a lauer de deça, auquel y auoit six plats de pourcelaine remplis de diuerses sortes & painctures, de ris auec du mouton, & des pieces de chapon, & quelques pluuiers, ou autres oyseaus incongneus, le tout à ung seruice, entrée, second mes & issue, & baillé à boire de l'eau succrée confite auec aue (*sic*) rose damasquine" (p. 21); on eut aussi des "rissoles ou bignets" (p. 24)[14].

Ainsi selon le témoignage de ces voyageurs, l'alimentation des

[14] Carlier de Pinon, qui a eu une expérience moins étendue, ayant seulement séjourné à Constantinople, l'a ainsi résumée: "(les Turcs) sont fort sobres, quant au manger et boire... Le vulgaire se contente de pain, sel et aux, lesquels ils ayment sur tout, et quelquefoix du laict caillé. Le ris leur est aussy viande fort ordinaire, et la chair plus commune, celle de mouton, et poulles, s'abstenants de chair de porc, laquelle leur est defendue par leur loy. Et ne faut esperer d'y trouver aucun chappon, faisant, tourterelles, et autres viandes delicates. L'eau simple leur sert de boisson ordinaire, l'estimants estre comme un nectar, quand il y a un petit de succre ou miel meslé parmy... Quand ils vont par pays, ils ne mangent guere de viandes chaudes, mais trouvans a achapter partout du fromaige, ou bien des pruneaux, poires, pesches, coings, figues et raisins de Damasc, qu'on a cuits avecques de l'eau pure, et sont guardez dans des pots de terre, ils en acheptent, se servants aussy de ladicte eau, qu'ils boivent apres qu'ils ont mangé lessusdicts fruicts" (op. cit., p. 111-113).

Grecs se composait d'une plus grande variété de légumes, de poisson et fruits de mer, et de vin; celle des Turcs de laitages, de riz et de mouton. Les deux peuples ont en commun la consommation d'oignons, ainque d'aulx et de concombres crus; les fruits sont aussi semblables. Mais il y a des interpénétrations. Peuple continental venu s'installer sur les rivages de la Méditerranée, les Turcs ont adopté le poisson dans leur cuisine, notamment à Constantinople, selon Belon: "Encores diray dauantage que le grand Turc mesmes, ses predecesseurs, & tous ceulx de sa court, mettent plus leur desir à manger du poisson que de la chair: & ne voit lon guere de gibbier au marché de Constantinoble" (f^0 69r^0). Le marché est approvisionné par les pêcheurs de la mer de Marmara; voici les différents poissons selon les observations de Belon: Sphyrenes (sorte de brochet), Oblades (?), Lampugnes (?), Pelamides (thons), Cholios (?), Dorades, Dentaulx (scies), Salpes (merluches), Sargs (muges), Mulets, Rougets, Perches, Surs (lat. sorus?), Menes (petits poissons), Giroles (girelles), Bars, Maigres (?), Pageaux (lat. pagurus?), Anges, Chats, Rayes, Chiens, Maquereaux, Pourpres (poulpes), Murenes, Pastinaces (sorte de raie), Atherines (?), Cabassons (?), Congres, Totenes (?), Casserons (petites seiches) (cf. f^0 69v^0-71v^0). Les Turcs adoptent aussi le garum, oublié en Occident vers le Xe siècle: "Il y eut vne liqueur nommée Garum... comme nous est le vinaigre pour l'heure présente. Ie l'ay trouuée en Turquie en aussi grand cours qu'elle fut iamais... (les poissonniers)... apprestent iournellement des poissons fraiz, & les exposent en vente desia frits, desquels ostans les tripes & ouyes, & les mettans tremper en la saulmure, la font conuertir en Garum[15]" (f^0 72r^0). Dans les deux peuples est répandue la consommation d'un mets aujourd'hui de luxe, que ne semble avoir guère prisé La Broquière: "fu en ceste ville de Bourse où je mengay premierement du cavyaire avec l'uyle d'olive,

15 Les Turcs usaient aussi d'un autre condiment produit en Crète: "des fruictz d'iceux (arbres fruictiers... Oranguiers, Citroniers, Pommiers d'Adam, & Poncieres) les Grecz expriment le ius, & en remplissent des tonneaux... qu'ilz enuoyent vendre en Turquie... dont les Turcz se seruent grandement en leurs potages au lieu de verd ius" (Belon, f^0 7v^0).

lequel, quant on n'a aultre chose que mengier, ne vault gueires que pour les Grecz" (p. 135)[16]. Enfin, une autre préparation qui a eu aussi un bel avenir, le yoghourt, a fait son apparition dans la cuisine grecque; Belon, qui nous a si bien guidé, est l'auteur de cette dernière citation: "Tous les voicturiers & muletiers de la Carauanne (en Thrace) se fournirent d'vne sorte de lait aigre, nommé Oxygala (le yoghourt)... Les Grecs & Turcs ont coustumes de prendre des aulx egoussez & les batre en quelque vaisseau de bois: puis les mesler auec de l'Oxygala. C'est vne viande de grand seigneur, tant elle est plaisante à manger" (f° 65r°). C'est, concombres en moins, le dzadziki actuel. Pour mesurer jusqu'où est allée cette interpénétration, il n'est que de juger de la cuisine actuelle de ces deux peuples.

16 Il s'agit de la première occurrence en français; cf. Belon: "vne sorte de drogue faicte d'oeufs d'Esturgeon que tous nomment Cauiar, qui est si commune es repas des Grecs & Turcs, par tout le leuant, qu'il n'y a celuy qui n'en mange excepté les Iuifs" (f° 72r°).

III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 1

NOMADS OR BANDITS? THE PASTORALIST / SEDENTARIST INTERFACE IN ANATOLIA

KEITH HOPWOOD / LAMPETER

Doukas gives us the pretext for the outbreak of war in 1453 which led to the fall of Constantinople:

> "As the Turks approached the fortress of Epivetai, the horses and pack-animals were set loose to graze on the crops of the Romans and they proceeded to ravage the grain and all other kinds of green vegetables"[1].

This led to a skirmish and Turkish retaliation:

> "This was the beginning of the conflict which led to the destruction of the Romans"[2].

Such destructive pasturing is used by semi-momadic and nomadic societies to precipitate a feud[3] either among themselves or with sedentarist groups. Another form of provocation is the razzia, or rustling raid. Indeed, the title 'Ghazi', adopted by many of the Turkish emirs, is derived from '*ghazw*' which describes an expedition of such a nature which, in nomadic societies was "a means of redistributing economic resources in a region where the balance could easily be upset by natural calamities"[4] and provide the leaders of such enterprises with charisma and booty. Such actions were recognised as legitimate, if provocative, by pastoral societies.

1 Doukas XXXIV. 10. Translation by H.J. Magoulias, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks by Doukas* (Detroit, 1975), 197-98.

2 ibid.

3 J.K. Campbell, *Honour, Family and Patronage* (Oxford 1964), 209-10 on the Sarakatsani of Northern Greece in the 1950s; J. Black-Michaud, *Cohesive Force : Feud in the Mediterranean and Middle East* (Oxford, 1975), 62.

4 L.E. Sweet, "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: a Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation", *American Anthropologist*, 67 no. 5, pt. 1 (1965), 1132-50.

Sedentarists saw these activities in a very different light. In Roman Asia Minor, destructive pasturing of livestock was classed as 'banditry' (λῃστεία)[5] and in a predominantly sedentarist society was to be severely punished. The Later Roman Empire and the Byzantine state found themselves surrounded by bandit societies whose mode of production was essentially pastoralist and who obtained the non-animal products they needed by means of raiding[6]. The society which was seen as the bandit-society *par excellence* by our period was that of the *Türkmen* groups. Their razzias are frequently described not as plundering expeditions or as acts of war, but as 'banditry'[7].

Banditry, not warfare. The traditions of Mediterranean agrarian communities were completely opposed to the nomadic economies. As Theodore Metochites points out, the nomads "did not draw themselves up against him (s.c. Alexander the Great) as he pursued, nor did they attack, but easily ran away as was their custom"[8] unlike "the rest of Asia's blessed and happy races who lived in cities and ploughlands and who usually drew themselves up and fought battles against those who attacked them"[9]. John Cinnamus extends the description into an insulting reply of a Byzantine leader to a Seljuk Sultan:

> "You fled continuously, like runaway slaves, shifting from one place to another and heretofore not remaining to oppose us face to face"[10].

Such fighting was not according to the rules laid down by the agrarian civilizations of the Mediterranean Basin which were im-

5 *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua,* IV, 297.

6 For a cursory analysis of this evidence, I refer you to my own paper, 'Turkmens, bandits and Nomads: Problems and Perceptions', *Papers of the VIth Symposium of the Comité International des Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes, Cambridge, July 1984* (To be published by *Isis* Press, Istanbul, 1986).

7 E.g. Cinnamus, 1. 60; Nicetas Choniates, 162; 550; Pachymeres, I. 26; II. 402; IV. 16.

8 *Peri Scython* 728-29 in T. Kiessling's edition (Leipzig 1821). All translations from Metochites are my own.

9 Ibid.

10 II. 58-59. Translation by C.M. Brand, *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by John Kinnamos* (New York, 1976), 52.

posed on the peoples they came into contact with. Livy, for example, could describe guerilla or irregular warfare only in terms of banditry (*latrocinium*)[11]. An incident from one campaign is pertinent to our study. A military tribune was condemned by the consul for disobeying orders even though by doing so he won the battle for the Romans. The consul defended his actions by saying that if such activity goes unpunished "*latrocinii modo caeca et fortuita pro sollemni et sacrata militia sit*"[12]. This distinction between legitimate warfare and irregular (and therefore illegitimate) warfare was further promulgated by Ulpian and Pomponius and adopted in Justinian's Digest "*Hostes sunt, quibus bellum publice Populus Romanus decrevit, vel ipsi Populo Romano, ceteri latrunculi vel praedones appellantur*"[13].

Metochites' attempts to analyse the economic basis of nomadism should neither be dismissed nor overestimated[14]. Metochites has used (and even plagiarized) classical sources from Herodotus to Priscus in his description[15] which seems to represent the consensus of Byzantine opinion on nomads[16]. Yet his assessment of their mode of production based on this pre-processed data is worth quoting. For him, nomads "live a communal way of life according to nature, but, as I said, it appears a bestial one and they themselves appear to lack experience of all kinds of human activity and literature, nor do they live in cities, as nearly all other men do, nor do they make their lives more secure by fortifying fortresses of any kind whatsoever, nor do they have houses to contain them, nor do they know the skill of crafts, nor of commerce, nor do they take pains over agriculture or gardening ... but they live by chance, casually, and they do not obtain their means of life by settling down and hard preparation"[17]. 'Feckless', 'idle' and 'without forethought' are terms employed of nomads throughout

11 E.g. II. 48.5; VI. 31.6.
12 VIII. 34. 11.
13 *Digest*, 49. 15. 24; cf. 50. 16. 118.
14 For dismissal cf. Sp. Vryonis Jr., "Byzantine attitudes to Islam during the Late Middle Ages", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 12 (1971), 284.
15 For an examination of this question, I refer to my essay cited in note 6.
16 Cf. Pachymeres V. 4 on the Mongols.
17 730.

the Peri Scython. Such a picture of nomadic *inertia* is typical of agrarian societies looking at opposed systems of existence: the skills needed for the nomadic way of life are not of interest and so are not observed. In fact, nomadism can be seen as a deviant mode of life: "nomads regularly make a defiant parade of all those attributes which they know are most calculated to annoy their sedentarist neighbours". My source for that last quotation is neither Herodotus nor Theodore Metochites, but I.M. Lewis, whose *Nomadism: an Anthropological View* was published by the F.A.O. in 1971[18]. He goes on to claim that "the nomad's capricious movements severely curtail his commitment to the state, which is, by definition, sedentary and of fixed geographic location".

According to this well-established train of thought, nomads are perverse, flaunting their difference from the normative sedentarist populations, moving about at their whim to baffle state officials who are trying their best to make sense out of nomadic chaos.

Perhaps this view needs no further burying[19], but I trust I may labour the point for a moment. The sedentarist orientation of Lewis' first statement is compounded by his unawareness of the constraints on a nomad's life revealed by his second point. Again this epitomizes the sedentarist stereotype of nomadic communities. Much recent anthropological work with nomadic societies has elucidated to a certain extent the socio-economic basis of nomadic life: the need to move to locate and exploit (but not over-exploit)

[18] Quoted by Abbas Mohammed, "The Nomadic and the Sedentary: Polar Complimentaries — not Polar Opposites" in Cynthia Nelson (ed.) *The Desert and the Sown* (Berkeley, 1978).

[19] For an extreme rebuttal, perhaps too extreme in its stress on the complementary nature of nomad and sedentarist modes of production, see the article by Abbas Mohammed referred to in note 18. While Mohammed is right to show the possibilities for a complementary relationship between nomadic and pastoralist societies, I am unconvinced that it is a universal feature of such contacts and that "mutual hostility between nomads and their sedentary neighbours becomes a myth" (op. cit., 111). The nomad / sedentarist collaboration at Sufi Village in the Sudan was fostered by the cultivation of the cotton crop, and the use of nomads as seasonal labour at harvest time. The extra labour intensity of this process fosters closer links than, say, harvest of cereal crops may have done.

pasture, the need to balance age- and sex-composition of herds, the need to prepare for and prevent natural disasters from decimating the herd; all these and many other factors make the nomad's life as difficult as that of the sedentarist[20].

We must not despise nomads as idle, but they may still be fundamentally opposed to the sedentarist in terms of mode of production. Such a view sees nomads and sedentarists as polar opposites: sedentarists have wealth in land, nomads in cattle, sedentarists by definition remain sedentary, nomads derive their means of life from movement. All this is true, yet it is an over-simplification.

Firstly, there is the 'non-autarky' of nomads[21]. Despite much early ethnography to the contrary, it now seems as though no society has ever been nourished by animal products alone. Nomadic societies must either have a portion that spends at least part of its time in farming, or enter into some relationship with neighbouring sedentarists. Naturally the latter aspect will figure prominently in this paper.

Secondly, there is the factor that nomad / sedentary is not an opposition, but a spectrum, along which lie many intervening categories[22] of which, for our purposes, the most important is that of the semi-nomad, or transhumant[23]. This category is in itself divisible into many sub-categories[24], but it is perhaps best to define it as comprising pastoralists who migrate between fixed summer and/or winter pastures. In Anatolia this usually implies mountain summer pasture (*yayla*) and lowland winter pasture (*kişla*). Segments of such communities may indulge in arable farming[25]. Semi-nomadism has been seen as a step towards

20 Cf. for example, G. Dahl and A. Hjort, *Having Herds* (Stockholm 1976); A.M. Khazanov *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge 1984).

21 For this term see A.M. Khazanov, op. cit., 3ff.

22 Ibid, ch. 1.

23 X. de Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne aux lacs pisidiens* (Paris, 1958), 207-21, for an explanation of this term.

24 Unlike R.P. Lindner *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington 1983), I do not believe that this invalidates the use of this term.

25 For a detailed analysis of such activities in Southern Turkey, I refer to X. de Planhol op. cit., n. 23.

sedentarization. This need not be the case; semi-nomadism is a stable lifestyle of its own and one which could even be a transitional stage from sedentarism to nomadism. The possibilities of semi-nomadism will also appear in this analysis of nomad-sedentarist relations in Anatolia.

It is well known that after the battle of Mantzikert in 1071 Asia Minor was opened up to the incursions of Türkmen nomads and that the impact of the Mongols on the Seljuk state in the late 13th and early 14th centuries led to a further influx of nomads into Asia Minor[26]. It is impossible to obtain accurate figures for the numbers of the Türkmen, yet it is clear from numbers quoted in the sources that contemporaries were astonished at the magnitude of the numbers involved: 100,000 in the regions of the Upper Maeander at the time of Barbarossa's March, 200,000 in the thirteenth century near Laodiceia[27].

Influxes of this kind of order of magnitude had an instant destructive and disorganizing effect. To deal with the latter first, the Byzantine peasantry dispersed to caves, mountain tops or cities, leaving the land to the incursing nomads[28]. In terms of the geography of Hellenic Asia Minor, this meant the abandonment of areas beyond the immediate *chōra* of the cities. This land would have been 'marginal' land: 'marginal' in the sense that it would support equally well either a pastoral or agrarian economy. As Lattimore points out, the mode of utilization of such marginal land depends upon the nature of the dominant regional power[29]: here in Asia Minor the power-balance by sheer weight of numbers shifted significantly in favour of the pastoralist.

26 For a survey of these events see C. Cahen *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* (London 1968).

27 For the figures, I am indebted to Sp. Vryonis Jr. "Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 29 (1975), 50. One must stress, however, that these are perceptions of number held by a threatened society, not accurate statistical records. I am very grateful to Klaus Belke for pointing out to me the unreliability of these figures.

28 Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, III. 229; Nicetas Choniates, 194-95; Theodore Scutariotes, 268.

29 O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (London, New York 1940), 162.

The destructive effects of the nomadic incursions are most obvious in the records of the sacking of cities. This evidence has been conveniently tabulated by Sp. Vryonis[30]. This destruction of administrative centres was in many cases only temporary, as many of these cities revived under the Seljuks of Rum and their successor emirates. These states, basing themselves on Persian administrative practice, set up agrarian based economies centred upon the cities. The Great Seljuks had distanced themselves from the Türkmen: "The Saldjūqs announced 'we are Türkmen, we are your brothers, but they were of no benefit either to the *il* or the people"[31] claimed the nomads, while an Arab outsider, Al-Idrisi, wrote: "Their princes are bellicose, far-sighted, firm and just, and are distinguished by superb qualities: the people are wild, coarse and ignorant"[32].

The Türkmen were gradually moved to the border country, the *uc*. In this area they moved among the Byzantine inhabitants they had displaced earlier. It is to the dislocated Byzantine population that I now wish to turn.

'Dislocation' is a blanket term. Even in a period of such upheavals, a sizeable proportion of peasants, benefitting from inaccessibility, proximity to cities, or sheer good luck, would remain relatively undisturbed for considerable periods. Others, as has been seen, took to the mountains. Here they would be forced by environmental conditions to become semi-nomads.

Lattimore's observation that "a complex of techniques, like that necessary to pastoral nomadism, cannot either be evolved locally or acquired by borrowing until the society supposed to be affected has already arrived at a level that permits it to take advantage of the new techniques and 'convert' itself"[33]. It is vital to our understanding of the complex of processes involved under the umbrella term 'nomadization' to examine briefly the traditions of

30 Sp. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor* (Berkeley, 1971), 166-67.

31 Abu-l-Gazi, *The Pedigree of the Turkmen*, quoted in A.M. Khazanov, op. cit., 267.

32 Quoted in Khazanov, op. cit., 266.

33 O. Lattimore, op. cit. 162.

pastoralism in the Byzantine economy.

There had always been transhumant pastoralism in Anatolia. Herodotus[34] records that when the Persians reached Xanthos in the sixth century B.C. many of the men were away: presumably in the mountains with the sheep[35]. We have already seen how in Roman times the slave-shepherds, separated from the polis-based communities, made their presence felt by the illegal pasturing of animals. The sheer amount of sheep and goats we hear of on the Anatolian plateau in the Roman period[36] suggests the continuing importance of stock-raising. Despite this, the Geoponica would seem to suggest that Byzantine farming was almost entirely agrarian. Of the two books devoted to stock-raising, Book 17 deals with cattle (a form of livestock with which it is almost impossible to migrate) and only Book 18 deals with sheep and goats[37]. The writer (Florentinus) assumes that even these animals were kept indoors in winter. Perhaps Florentinus is describing an ideal situation, certainly he is expressing a sedentarist ideology, for it seems highly unlikely that such a practice was at all widespread in Anatolia. Environmental constraints such as the rainfall pattern and the scarceness of winter fodder would preclude such a practice, which would have been extremely wasteful of labour if attempted[38]. Given the large number of references to sheep and goat products[39], and the continuity of the tradition in areas like the Upper Meander Valley, it seems likely that such large quantities of livestock were kept throughout our period and would have to be raised by a system of transhumance.

Byzantine herd-husbandmen and transhumants would have increased in number within the borderland as more and more land

34 I. 176. 3.

35 A situation which still prevails in Anatolia: often only the headman and some women remain in residence.

36 E.g. Strabo XII. 6. 1 (= 568 C).

37 It is interesting to note how the Byzantine sources' neglect of stock-raising has coloured modern approaches, P. Lemerle's *Agrarian History of Byzantium* (Galway, 1979) has no reference whatsoever to any form of animal husbandry.

38 A.M. Khazanov op. cit., ch. 1.

39 E.g. Pliny NH XXIX. 33; VIII. 190; 201; Columella Praef. 26; Martial XIV. 140.

was made available for pastoralism. In the early disruptive phases of this movement even city territories could have been turned over to pasture. Cinnamus' description of the site of Dorylaeum (well on the way to becoming Eskişehir) occupied by 2,000 Türkmen nomads is indicative of this phase[40].

We must now consider the relationship between nomads, semi-nomads and sedentarists within the zone of the *uc*: in fact the interface between nomads and sedentarists. To the west lay the lands of Romania, to the east those of the Seljuk sultanate of Rum, both agrarian economies.

First of all, the fragility of the nomadic economy must be stressed. Nomadic groups in time of war can be ruined by the destruction or seizure of their flocks. Time and again we hear of Byzantine armies 'driving off ' their loot, implying that the loot consists almost entirely of animals[41] and Cinnamus proclaims as a rule that it is through this form of plunder that the Turks can be most damaged[42].

All this implies that the Turks were entirely dependent upon animal products. This seems not to have been the case. There is reference in the Book of Dede Korkut to the consumption of *yufka* and bread among the Oğuz[43] and Professor Faruk Sümer has even suggested that the Turks who entered Anatolia were partly farmers "onların önemli bir bölüğü tam *göçebe,* bir bölüğü *yari göçebe,* bir bölüğü de şehir ve köylerde oturak hayatı yaşıyordu"[44]. Although we need not go so far as that, we can admit that a certain amount of vegetable and crop production in *yaylas* must have taken place.

Such production could have been supplemented by further agricultural produce obtained from the Byzantines. Nomadic societies can obtain goods by raiding or by some form of peaceable relationship, such as trade or as payment for services

40 VII. 2 (295); cf. Nicetas Choniates, 228.

41 E.g. Cinnamus 1. 9; IV. 22.

42 IV. 23.

43 X. de Planhol "La signification géographique du Livre de Dede Korkut" *Journal Asiatique* 254 (1966), 229.

44 F. Sümer, "Anadolu'ya yalnız göçebe Türkler mi geldi?", *Belleten* 24 (1960), 374.

rendered[45]. During the period of initial contact, it seems likely that raiding was the major means of obtaining supplementary items, but as the peoples remained together in the same area such practices must have decreased in frequency: sedentarists could rustle nomadic flocks. A system of collaboration must ultimately have developed. Pachymeres characterises this frontier zone as one of people "ready to defect"[46]. Indeed the inhabitants of the Lake Beyşehir area in the twelfth century would not allow a Byzantine army access "for by long time and usage they were united in their views with the Turks"[47]. Nicetas Choniates' account is rather more explicit "τοῖς Ἰκονιεῦσι Τούρκοις ἐπιμιγνύμενοι, οὐ μόνον τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν ἐντεῦθεν ἐκράτυναν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτῶν ἐν πλείοσι προσεσχήκασιν"[48]. He goes on to suggest that it was the Romans whom they looked upon as enemies. John Comnenus was forced to treat them as enemies and captured their settlements, albeit with heavy losses.

The *uc* zone gained a character of its own, separate from that of the settled states between which it formed a marginal zone. Within this zone we can see Byzantines and Turks sharing common interests: they had to do so if they wished to have a better standard of life than one of mere subsistence.

We must now consider the role of the élites: on the Byzantine side, the large landowners; on the Turkish side, the leaders of the nomadic groups. Professor Bryer has elucidated some connections between the Byzantine and Turkish élites over the period covered by our symposium. He has shown how families such as the Gabrades[49] and the family of Axouch[50] work together. Such links

45 For a model of such relationships I refer to A.M. Khazanov op. cit.,36. For a detailed analysis of one payment for labour relationship cf. Abbas Mohammed, art. cit., n. 18.

46 I. 4.

47 Cinnamus I. 10. Translated by C.M. Brand op. cit. n. 10, 26.

48 P. 50, ed. Bekker.

49 A.A.M. Bryer: "The Gabrades" *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* XII. (1970), 164-87; A.A.M. Bryer "A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades" *Byzantinoslavica,* 36 (1975), 38-45.

50 Cinnamus I. 2.

are of fundamental importance, not only as evidence for the increasing intermixture of populations and the creation of a new, Anatolian, élite, but also for the nomad/sedentarist relationship.

When two different groups come into contact, the conditions for social and commercial intercourse are lacking: how to communicate, how to bargain, how to settle differences. It is in such a situation that the function of élite becomes important. "In many societies, the moment transactions cross ethnic boundaries, the élite's role as middlemen becomes indispensable"[51]. This role benefits not only the two groups involved, but also the élite middlemen: "the élites of the different groups in such an interaction are playing a game, one of the rules of which is to keep some information from the masses"[52], their own status is enhanced by their role as middlemen between the two communities, and the 'mystery' of their communication with their peers in the other society is to be kept to themselves, not lost by divulging the techniques involved.

In nomadic groups, such élites are often either sedentary or semi-nomadic, rarely are they themselves committed to a pastoral economy. Consequently they participate to some extent within the sedentarist system and must have some relations with it. As Khazanov points out[53] Barth's formulation: "States have a nomad policy, whereas nomads, since the days of the Mongols, can hardly be said to have an 'agrarian policy'" cannot be true. Let us examine the role of one nomad élite for which we do have relatively full sources concerning its relations with its own group and neighbouring sedentarists.

My example will be the relations between Osman and the peoples of Bithynia. Osman is quickly distanced by Neşri from the nomadic Turks (*göçer evli etrak*), yet their mutual dependence is shown in the following incidents. On the death of Ertuğrul it is clearly the nomadic Turks who have the say in the choice of

51 Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed in Cynthia Nelson (ed.), *The Desert and the Sown* (Berkeley, 1973), 76.
52 Ibid.
53 Op. cit., 261.

Ertuğrul's successor: "Some of the nomads wanted to make Ertuğrul's brother (and Osman's uncle) Tundar *beğ*, others Osman"[54]. Osman was clearly the *beğ* of an essentially nomadic people and under Ertuğrul he and his brothers became *hakim* over the nomadic Turks[55].

His ability to 'arrange things' for his nomadic followers is shown by the anecdote of how he enables his people to pass to summer pastures despite the opposition of the Master of Ine-Göl. It is in his capacity as top-man of the group that he negotiates with the Master of Bilecik for the safe custody of the Turks' *impedimenta* which enabled them to fight off an ambush led by the Master of Ine-Göl.

Neşri gives an explanation of Osman's relations with the Master of Bilecik: "there had been a constant friendship between Osman himself and his (Osman's) father Ertuğrul and the Master of Bilecik"[56]. The élite of the countryside and of the nomads had a mutually beneficial relationship of long-standing. All sides benefited: Osman's people kept their belongings safe, Osman gained in power and the Master of Bilecik was rewarded with a supply of animal products.

Clearly Osman had a 'nomad policy'. That he also had an 'agrarian policy' is demonstrated by his patronage of his own 'infidels" and his creation of a Sunday market in Bilecik for them. The story of the chastisement of a Germiyan Turk for stealing from an infidel is instructive here, as the produce of which the infidel was robbed, a pot, is essentially the product of someone engaged in sedentary activities[57].

By infiltrating and adapting local power-structures Osman managed to create a niche for himself and his followers within Bithynian society. To the state in Constantinople, Osman's actions were those of 'bandit gangs' (λῃστρικῶν συμμορῶν)[58]. The

54 Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 31 (ed. Taeschner, Leipzig 1955) (= Cod. Menzel, 25).

55 Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 28 (ed. Taeschner) (= Cod. Menzel, 24).

56 Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 31 (ed. Taeschner) (= Cod. Menzel, 25).

57 Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 34-35 (ed. Taeschner) (= Cod Menzel, 27).

58 Pachymeres, *Andronikos* I. 26: cf. IV. 16.

Byzantine infrastructures were being eroded within the *uc* where similarity of lifestyle made strange bedfellows. Köse Mihal, an 'outstanding infidel' was persuaded to join Osman and take part in his activities and advise his actions. The Byzantine masters and Turkish *uc-beğleri* found common cause.

Osman, then, was a patron of the racially mixed, sedentarist and nomad population of the *uc*. Also, as a local man of power, he entered into relationships with the Germiyan Oğulları and possibly the Seljuks of Rum. Perhaps we can see him as a power-broker, who mediates between different societies or levels of societies. In the words of Adams: "his actual control over either sphere depends upon his success in dealing with the other; his controls in one level of articulation provide a basis for his controls in another ... he controls one domain only by virtue of having access to derivative power from a larger domain"[59].

It is typical of nomad/sedentarist relations that such power is derived not merely from patronage but also from protection or intimidation. Osman's successes must have derived from his employment both of force and of a rough and ready justice applicable to *uc* conditions but understood poorly in Constantinople or Konya[60] and his relations with outside forces. Professor Lilie in his article within this volume has shown how the Artukhids arose from a similar cultural milieu in Trebizond. Perhaps the concepts outlined in this paper cast more light on the rise of the Turkish *beğliks,* such as that of Karaman who seems to have risen to prominence by leaving his migratory profession of charcoal-burner in the Taurus Mountains and, according to Ibn Bibi "played the bandit on the highway"[61]. The Northern Taurus around

59 R. Adams, "Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in the Structure of Complex Societies", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,* 26 (1970), 320-21.

60 Cf. K. Wrightson "Two concepts of order: justices, constables and jurymen in seventeenth century England" in J. Brewer and J. Styles (ed.) *An Ungovernable People: the English and their law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (London 1980), for an introduction to this concept.

61 Cf. C. Cahen "Quelques textes négligés concernant les Turcomans de Rum au moment de l'invasion mongole" *Byzantion,* 14 (1939), 133-36; C. Cahen "Notes pour l'histoire des Turcomans d'Asie Mineure au XIIIème siecle" *Journal Asiatique,* (1951) 335-54; H.I. Uzunçarşılı *Anadolu Beylikleri* (1984).

Laranda (Karaman) was in 1256 the *uc* between the Seljuks of Rum and the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia. The local man of power was put in a strong position vis-a-vis the Seljuk Sultan in his campaigns in Armenia.

We have come a long way from Mehmed II before Constantinople, but I hope that as we have wandered through the sheep-tracks of Anatolia we have been the elasticity inherent in the nomad/ sedentarist interface, and laid bare some of the threads that created the complex braid of the *uc,* where, in Paul Wittek's words "La Turquie se turquise"[62].

62 P. Wittek "Le rôle des tribus turques dans l'Empire ottoman", *Mélanges Georges Smets,* (Bruxelles 1952), 676.

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III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 2

THE FRANKISH ARCHIPELAGO

BEN SLOT / DEN HAAG

The history of the Frankish Archipelago, the set of small principalities established on the Cyclades after the Fourth Crusade, is most complicated. To try telling it as a simple short account is courting failure. Not one modern historian has tried to give something of a general account of it. There exist a few studies on some details. Jacoby's book on the laws of Frankish Greece treats the problem of their application in the real situation on the islands[1]. My own book on the period of establishment of Ottoman power contains as an introduction some kind of snapshot of the islands under Frankish rule just before the Ottoman conquest[2]. It would not be wise to write a general history of Frankish rule in the Archipelago supported by the scanty sources available just now: as long as the notarial archives of Venetian Crete have not been sifted for incidental documents on the islands, any short excursion by a researcher to Venice may make such a general study hopelessly obsolete. Still, a contribution could be made by introducing a new kind of source and to try to use it in treating the demographic and social aspect of the history of Frankish rule over the islands.

In Istanbul there is in the Başbakanlık Arşivi a tax register, a *tapu defteri*, which may be considered as a kind of domesday book for the six islands which made up the territory of the Duchy of Naxos and the Signorie of Paros and Andros. It gives the full name of each inhabitant of each village with the number of vine-

1 D. Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale: les Assises de Romanie, sources, application et diffusion* (Paris, 1971) = *Documents et Récherches sur l'économie des pays Byzantins, Islamiques et Slaves et leurs relations historiques au Moyen Age*, X, 271-94.

2 B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus, les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane c. 1500-1718*, (Leiden-Istanbul, 1982) = *Uitgaven van het Nederlands Historisch Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul*, LI, 35-72.

yards, fields and trees owned by him in his own place and in other places[3]. This *defter* dates from 1670, 91 years after the imposition of the Ottoman administrative system on these islands. It will be used to look for remnants of demographic and social structures of Frankish time. Use of a source of a much later date would be a dangerous game but there is other supporting material available in archives in Rome and on the islands, which may help to avoid anachronism[4].

It is impossible to enter here the complicated history of the insular dynasties. Nothing can be given but a few short remarks. During the latter half of the Frankish period there were five principal units[5]. The largest, the duchy of Naxos, consisting of Naxos, Milos, Santorini and Syros, claimed some kind of suzerainty over most of the other islands. Three large islands formed independent *signorie*: Andros, Paros and Tinos — of which the last belonged since the end of the 14th century to Venice. A number of smaller islands in the South-West belonged in late period of Frankish rule to the Bolognese family of Gozzadini. The larger islands were ruled by Latin dynasties until 1566 (Tinos by a Venetian rector till 1715). The Gozzadini maintained their rule over most of their islands until 1617. Between 1566 and 1617 the six islands of Naxos, Paros, Syros, Santorini, Milos and Andros were subject to a gradual process of integration within the Ottoman Empire. In 1617 also came the end of the rule of the Gozzadini.

Frankish rule over the Archipelago has not been a simple consequence of a conquest in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. In reality it was the follow-up of a series of waves of immigration through three centuries. These waves may not only have been related to contractions of Christian rule in the Balkans and Greece but also to immigration as a consequence of internal disturbances in Italy. The explanation of the relatively humble place Venetians take in the Frankish population of the islands except in their direct possession of Tinos might possibly be the fact that Venice with its

3 Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, T.T. 800.

4 A number of documents is cited in notes in *Archipelagus turbatus*, 339-51.

5 *Archipelagus turbatus*, 38-39.

stable history had less mass-exiles than other towns. Latin migrations were not the only demographical changes ocurring in the islands. Numerically as important were enterprises of bringing into exploitation deserted whole islands or portions of islands with migration of Greek and other elements.

It would be very interesting to seek out the spread of Frankish immigration simply by looking for Frankish elements in the Ottoman *defter* of 1670. But matters are not as simple as that: Frankish immigration continued till long after the Ottoman conquest. Luckily, documents from early Turkish and late Frankish times are sufficient in number to compensate for part of this deficiency.

The view of traditional historiography is that Marco I Sanudo, the Frankish conqueror of the chief principality of the Archipelago, Naxos, left local landowners in possession, but that he expropriated lands belonging to absentee landlords and monasteries outside the Archipelago. On the whole this might be correct. It seems that this was also the way the conquerors of other islands proceeded, expropriating only some special categories of landowners and taking for themselves the fiscal income. Marco Sanudo is said to have constructed 56 fiefs out of the expropriated land of Naxos which he distributed among his companions[6]. This tradition is of rather dubious value. In the form it has come to us, it was recorded by a Jesuit father, Robert Saulger, who wrote his story for political purposes at the end of the 17th century[7]. The 56 fiefs are a typical example of an anachronism: in Saulger's times there were indeed 56 territories with special fiscal status on Naxos, but these territories, called '*topoi*' in contemporary sources, are not directly related to Marco Sanudo or to the Frankish conquest.

Thanks to publications by Loenertz and Borsari we are now able

6 The traditional sources of the history of Marco Sanudo's conquest of the Archipelago have been treated in J.K. Fotheringham, *Marco Sanudo, conqueror of the Archipelago* (Oxford, 1915), 80-103. Some corrections have been applied in S. Borsari, *Studi sulle colonie veneziane in Romania nel XIII secolo* (Napoli, 1966), 36-43.

7 B.J. Slot, "O ierapostolos Robert Saulger, istoriografos tes Fragkokratias ton Kykladon," *Mnemosyne*, 6 (1976/77), 117-44.

to have better knowledge of how Frankish conquest went[8]. This conquest was not one concerted move but a series of separate and unconnected events between 1206 and the early 15th century. Documents have been published concerning the economic setup of the conquest of Kea and Santorini[9]. The conquest was a matter of commercial enterprise in war, something like a freebooter's action, where also shareholders in the expedition receive a proportional share of the booty. Afterwards, in the larger principalities, feudal terminologies may pop up in three kinds of circumstances. The first is the distribution of part of the conquered land among companions of the conqueror in the shape of feudal tenures with the clear purpose of keeping a defence-force together. Of this we have no positive proof, given the dubious character of the Naxos tradition, but the case of Tinos in late Frankish period seems to indicate that feudal tenures were situated in one block surrounding the town[10]. The second kind of feudal tenures are later grants of pieces of land in reward to servants or former military men. The third case is the occurrence of feudal terminology in the relations between the lords of the islands or very large portions of islands, this with the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the ducal family's possessions.

There are no very clear indications that the military or dynastic use of Western feudal concepts was closely connected to the social system in the sense that the landowning class in the Frankish Archipelago as a whole was a feudal nobility. The existence of fiefs does not mean that all large possessions are integrated in a feudal hierarchy. Neither is there entire congruence between the land-owning class and the group of Latin emigrants.

There is another aspect to Frankish rule which has not attracted the attention of earlier historians so much. This is the question in how far Frankish rule had economic consequences in the forming

8 R.J. Loenertz, *Les Ghisi, dynastes vénitiens dans l'Archipel 1207-1390* (Firenze, 1975); Borsari, l.c.

9 *Archipelagus turbatus*, 350 n. 172; Loenertz, *Ghisi*, 298-300.

10 C.N. Sathas, *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1880-90), IV, 272.

of a colonial economy. The establishment of colonial economies is not uncommon in the Latin Levant. The fact that the Frankish lords of the islands got large parts of their revenues in products which were negotiable on the international market (silk, cotton, cereals, wool) is a strong argument for the colonial character of the economy[11]. Cases of importation of foreign capital for bringing into exploitation the resources of islands are known in the duchy of Naxos in the 15th century. Marriage-policy of the ducal family was one way to attract money for expansion of exploitation[12].

The process of the establishment of Frankish rule has not really been investigated. Primitive, though attractively romantic, notions still occur. But the occupation could take different shapes. There are only vague indications of occurrences of conquest by elitary groups producing some kind of insular nobility: the kind imagined by romantic history. Only the existence of a closed group of *feudatari* on Tinos does support such a theory. As we will see, the history of the establishment of feudal society on Naxos are of a much vaguer kind. If feudal colonization of this kind would have existed, we might expect a majority of large blocks of possessions everywhere on the islands. But this has not been the general picture. On Tinos, the *feudatari* have a quarter of the island. If part of the 56 so-called fiefs of Naxos has the same kind of origin, feudal tenures on Naxos would cover much less: something like 10%. The *defter* of Naxos of 1670 indicates very large Frankish possessions outside the supposed area of the 'fiefs' especially in the plain behind the town[13]. They may indicate the material support for a Frankish garrison there. Certainly, some Frankish families were very rich, but the majority of the Frankish group had no more than middle-class fortunes.

Another way of colonizing islands was by mass settlement,

11 E. Santschi, *Régestes des arrêts civils et des mémoriaux (1363-1399) des archives du duc de Crète* (Venise, 1976), 16, 481; Sathas, *Documents*, IV, 236.

12 Museo Correr, Venice, Manuscripts P/D 751/3 (September 15th 1447, Milos); K. Hopf, Veneto-Byzantinische Analekten, *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch Historische Classe, XXXII/3* (1859), 45.

13 Başbakanlık Arşivi T.T. 800 p. 6-27.

either by importing numbers of peasants from Frankish areas or Albania; or by moving Greek populations. This would result in areas with originally uniform small plots of land. While the *defter* of 1670 shows relatively few instances of remains of large holdings of surely feudal origin, traces of large-scale colonization by peasant-colonies are much more evident[14].

Patterns of settlement will be reflected in such a detailed source as the Ottoman *defter*. Here we may see several kinds of settlement. The oldest places are usually small villages with a great diversity of products and wealth among its inhabitants. On average, these are the more prosperous places[15]. The very recent settlements are medium-sized villages with small and relatively equal possessions for each inhabitant. Typical for new settlements is economic uniformity, scarcity of trees, and scarcity of clergy[16]. When such new settlements grow older they often become relatively large villages, now with clergy and trees; the initial equality of plots of land has evolved into a fluent scale between comparatively well-off and humble[17]. The average wealth is still considerably below the average of old places, and the diversity of wealth also is less. Mixtures enlarging old places by settlement, do occur[18]. Large blocks of Frankish landowning may indicate elitary colonization in some form. Also in Naxos we see in 1670 the most important part of Frankish possessions still in the plain behind the town, and even in Santorini, larger Frankish holdings are concentrated around Skaro Castle[19]. But there is no reason to suppose that all these possessions were originally feudal holdings.

Recently some publications have given attention to colonization by groups of peasants, maybe not always with the right historical interpretation. About 1600, in the very last stage of the rule of the Bolognese Gozzadini-family over Sifnos, groups from Sifnos and from a feudal holding the Gozzadini still had on Santorini, went

14 *Ibid.* pp. 80-89 (Northern Naxos); 465-473 (Albanians on Andros).
15 *Ibid.* pp. 33-44 (Some villages in Drymalia or Tragea on Naxos).
16 *Ibid.* see the pages mentioned in note 14.
17 *Ibid.* pp. 182-211 (Parikia on Paros).
18 *Ibid,* pp. 270-73 (Skaros).
19 *Ibid.*

over to a few uninhabited islands belonging to the territory of their landlords: Kimolos, Folegandros and Sikinos[20]. The move coincided with a great demand for corn in the Mediterranean area. On each island a small fortified town of uniform houses was built. Colonizing empty islands to meet economic opportunities was earlier done in the same way. Antiparos got a small fortified town of the same kind in the early 15th century, and this kind of town architecture is found hidden in several other insular towns: Naousa and part of Parikia on Paros (here even the name of the place seems significant), the Kastro of Sifnos and Mykonos[21].

Naxos is the best-known island, but just in the case of Naxos it is difficult to estimate the importance of Frankish immigration before the Ottoman conquest because there was an immigration of new Latin families in Naxos after 1566. In 1670, these families were very rich; they had large blocks of possessions in the area around the town of Naxos and also most of the 56 mountain territories (cornfields and pastures) which were subject to a special Ottoman taxation by contract and which were considered to be the old feudal tenures established by Marco Sanudo. But this story of old feudal tenures is highly suspect. There may be some among the 56: we know at least of one, but some of the largest were constituted under Ottoman domination from portions of the belongings of the ducal family[22]. Some of them did even in 1670 belong to the last members of the ill-fated small Muslim community of the island. The *defter* shows units like the '*topoi*' of Naxos in a somewhat humbler form on Andros, Paros and Milos: there also they belonged to the richest families. The wealth

20 W. Hoepfner and H. Schmidt, "Mittelalterliche Städtegründungen auf den Kykladeninseln Antiparos und Kimolos", *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Berlin*, 91 (1976), 291-339; esp. 323-31; cf. remarks in *Archipelagus turbatus*, 114.

21 On Antiparos: Hoepfner-Schmidt, "Städtegründungen," 291-310; and M. Filippa-Apostolou, *To Kastron tes Antiparou* (Athenai, 1978).

22 P.G. Zerlentes, *Grammata ton teleutaion Fragkon Doukon tou Aigaiou Pelagous* (Ermoupolis, 1924), 95-97. The detailed list of the lands of the 56 '*topoi*' in T.T. 800 pp. 118-78; a short abstract, now in the Vatican Library, cod. Vat. Graec 2636 (26 V 1670), is published in P.G. Zerlentes, *Feoudalike politeia en te neso Naxo* (Ermoupolis, 1925), 64-66 (some errors).

of several of these families, Greeks and Franks goes back to Frankish times. In an article on a complex of large possessions on Naxos in the village of Filoti I have shown the links between the situation under Frankish rule: a base of two old complexes of mountain-pastures and cornfields belonging to two Frankish families gets into the hands of a rich Cretan immigrant in the early 16th century who married a daughter of one of the families[23]. He and his descendants had the money to buy up land and to expand the territory to the largest one-piece possession of Naxos. This complex of possessions has left many documents in archives on Naxos and has been set in historiography as a typical example of feudality in the Archipelago. This is a mistake: the 17th-century possessions of the Barozzi-family in Filoti have a much more complicated origin and are a unique case. For historians of the Ottoman Empire, the case of Filoti is interesting because we have here both an Ottoman *defter* and the papers of the local landowner. The landowner declared only a small part of his possessions to the Ottoman tax-inspector. This should warn us that also in other cases, Ottoman tax-figures may only represent part of the truth.

While the population of Naxos was divided over many villages, the wealthy families all lived in the town. Almost all of them bear the names of immigrants who arrived after the fall of the Crispo dynasty in 1566[24]. All these 'new' Catholic families (most of them come from other places in Greece like Andros, Chios and Crete) show a considerable number of female members of the original Naxian Frankish families in their genealogy[25]. Possibly, part of

23 B.J. Slot, "Le cas de Philoti, aspects de l'exploitation d'une grande propriété foncière dans le duché de Naxos avant et après la conquête ottomane," *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, 3 (1983), 191-208.

24 These families are: Barozzi (Crete), Castri (from Piacenza), Coronello (from Spain), Sommaripa and della Rocca (from Andros), Grimaldi and Giustiniani (from Chios), Kokkos/Cocco (a Greek family of not very clear origin, it also exists on Andros), Loredano (on Naxos before 1566).

25 Genealogical details on several families (not too accurate) in Ch. Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin, 1873), 480-486, 499, 501, 520. In 1618, cf. Zerlentes, *Grammata*, 115-118, 120-125, there were still several more families of the ancien regime in a prominent position than in 1670. They disappeared in many different ways from Naxos. One case is

the immigration is explained by the need the local Franks had for cash in early Ottoman times, which they sought to get by marriages and sales of land to newcomers, something already known in earlier Frankish times.

As such, the very wealthy paid about a fifth of the total landtax of Naxos, a very large amount for just nine families or 1% of the population. This concentration of wealth was an exceptional situation in the Archipelago. The families of the ancien regime, certain of which have gone over to the Greek church, are found among the medium-rich[26]. It is interesting to see that few families of the immediate entourage of the dukes of Naxos remain on the island. It seems that there has been some migration to Santorini (Delenda, Sirigo, Da Corogna) and Tinos (Diascufo, Aliprandi). As a whole, families of the ducal entourage tended to disappear from the upper layers of the society into the middle class.

Some indications of the social effects of Frankish conquest on the Byzantines may be given by the Ottoman *defter*. In the case of the densely populated interior of Naxos we see an area which has not been very much subject to Frankish interference. The Ottoman *defter* shows a well-settled Greek community, with for the islands remarkably few occurrences of Latin surnames. Many trees, a great number of relatively small but prosperous Greek village-communities and a very wide scale of variation in wealth of the Greek villagers and the presence of well-established dynasties of priests, even in the smallest villages, indicate a long settled community. This is confirmed by other sources: the existence in the area of many Byzantine churches with mural paintings dating from both before and after the Frankish takeover indicates a continuous state of habitation. There is some prosperity: the average landtax due per household is in almost all villages over

that of the Belegno/Belonia-family, one of which is still among the signataries of one of the abovementioned documents published by Zerlentes, but his son was an agent of the Ottoman kapudan paşa, who made long travels in the service of this high dignitary, even to Holland, cf. General State Archives, The Hague, SG 12593/42.

26 Amai and Desde, two originally Catholic families (the latter occuring as early as c. 1300) have become Orthodox in the 17th century cf. Archive of the Propaganda Fide, Rome, SOCG 273, f. 95.

200 to 386 *akçe*, while the northern villages on which we will concentrate attention next show an average of less than 100 (the richest families paid over 5000 *akçe*)[27]. There is some Frankish presence, but reduced to small-holding and a few well-defined blocks on the border of the area: the mountain-pastures surrounding the fertile valley are part of Latin '*topoi*'.

On the same island of Naxos there is an area which presents a notable contrast: in the northern valleys the villages of Vothri, Skado, Sifones and Keramoti show an image of relatively recent colonization and expansion of cultivation: a thinly populated area, few Greek priests, few trees, many almost equal plots of fields and vineyards of which a large number still belongs to habitants of other places, and a few very considerable Frankish holdings[28]. There are no Byzantine churches. Interesting also is the area of Sagkri, north of the main stronghold in Byzantine times, Kastro Apalyri. Here we find many Byzantine architectural remains, but the social image is different from that of the central valley. Greek clergy is present, there is a certain variation of wealth between the villagers, but much less than in central Naxos. The average land-tax is 123-129 *akçe* per household and in the northern part there are very considerable Frankish holdings. The fertile valleys (Melanes, Potamia) between the town and central Naxos present again another image: here we have lots of poor tenant-farmers, some Byzantine churches and a high proportion of Frankish and Greek townsmen as landowners: a case of expropriation and resettlement maybe[29]. The overall image Naxos seems to present is an immigration of Latin as well as Greek elements in the Western area to the actual Khora of Naxos. They bring the Western plain into culture and go on from there to the valleys of Melanes and Potamia where large holdings of the dukes and their circle were. The centre remained relatively untouched, while the northern part was colonized in small plots. Mountain-pastures

27 These averages of tax paid by a household in the villages of Naxos, have been calculated with corrections for possessions spread over more than one village in *Archipelagus turbatus*, 308-9.

28 *Ibid.*; cf. T.T. 800, pp. 80-89.

29 T.T. 800, pp. 29-32 (Melanes and Potamia), pp. 45-50 (Sagkri).

belonged either to the duke or to Franks, as feudal holdings or not. There is no clear whiff of nobility to these Frankish landlords, it seems to be more of a bourgeois group.

The case of Santorini is somewhat different. Unlike Naxos, Santorini had little Latin immigration after the end of Frankish rule. The island remained dominated by the old families from the entourage of the Crispi: Delenda, Sirigo, D'Argenta. The island was much denser populated than Naxos, and it was intensively cultivated. *Topoi* are not to be found, even while there is talk of feudality in the case of two largest land-owning families. This is the kind of noble feudality that holds large parts of islands but which had become extinct by 1670. Remarkable is the wealth of monasteries: the enormous holdings of St. John of Patmos make this monastery by far largest landowner in the Frankish Archipelago, even more so if we take into account its possessions on Naxos and Milos. It should be remarked that this monastery had good relations with the ducal family and its Cycladian holdings very probably derived from the period of Frankish rule[30].

In its social geography Santorini is somewhat different from Naxos. The medieval situation continued after the Ottoman conquest insofar as the differences between Latins and Greeks were less pronounced in Santorini than in Naxos. This makes it sometimes difficult to say with certainty how far the group of wealthiest inhabitants of Santorini was Latin. This rich group was a mixed lot; there were certainly more rich Greeks here than on Naxos. The wealthy live spread over the island, not concentrated in one town, even if the concentration of wealth is most pronounced in the predominantly Latin Skaro and in predominantly Greek Pyrgos. Places which show the characteristics of antiquity as seen in the central part of Naxos and on the northern part of Andros are comparatively rare on Santorini, most places show characteristics

30 T.T. 800, pp. 270-337. Lands of the monastery of Patmos in 1670 on p. 335 (Santorini), 386 (Milos), 109 (Naxos). It should be remarked that probably there were other possessions in Frankish times because the rich monastery Agios Ioannis Siderianos on Milos at that time belonged to Patmos.

of being old or comparatively recent settlements. There are references to systematic settling on Santorini in other sources.

Interesting is the existence of mainly Latin Catholic villages in the Archipelago. There are many of them on Tinos, but also a few on Santorini[31]. They show the characteristics of comparatively recent settlements, but the surnames of their inhabitants do not have a very Western sound, while in very late but entirely Greek settlements like Folegandros the number of Western names is remarkable.

Syros is another case. This island was entirely populated by Latin Catholics. Part of the surnames indicate ties with the Adriatic area, but there are also Greek and very alien names. In the *defter,* Syros presents the image of an old settlement[32].

A rather interesting phenomenon on Naxos as well as on Santorini is that as late as 1670, the local basic unities of government *koinotetes* have still kept a purely geographical and not an ecclesiastical character: a clear remainder of Frankish time; the Turks tend to separate the people in religious bodies. It should be remarked that the communal institutions in the Cyclades are not another independent manifestation of the growth of local autonomy among the Greeks in Ottoman time, but a development of institutions dating from Frankish or possibly even earlier times[33].

A very few remarks should be made concerning the image the *defter* gives of Andros. Unlike all other islands, the population of Andros was organized according to belief and by parish: a corroboration of the fact that on Andros there was more Turkish influence and less local autonomy. The north, settled by Albanians, presents the image of a recent settlement. Among the villages of the centre and the south there are several old places[34]. More than the islands of the Duchy of Naxos, the economy of Andros presents a colonial aspect: its main product, silk, is exclusively destined for exportation.

31 T.T. 800, pp. 278-86 (villages Karterado and Kournohori).

32 *Archipelagus turbatus,* 14-15; T.T. 800, pp. 474-505.

33 *Archipelagus turbatus,* 368-369, notes 36 and 38: critical remarks on the treatment of the history of communal institutions in E.E. Koukkou, *O i koinotikoi thesmoi stis Kuklades kata ten Tourkokratia* (Athenai, 1980).

34 T.T. 800, pp. 398-473 (on pp. 465-73) the principal Albanian settlement.

It is a pity that we have no detailed *defter* for Tinos. A summary *defter* gives not always surnames of the inhabitants and never details individual possessions[35]. It is clear that as was the case on Andros, silk was by far the principal product. First calculations executed on this *defter* seem to show that the production of silk was concentrated in the Orthodox, not in the Latin villages. The small island Mykonos belonged in Frankish times to the *Signoria* of Tinos. We have no very interesting sources from that period but from Ottoman times still exist a number of tax-registers written by the chancellor of the local community. Such registers were the source on which the Ottoman *defter* of 1670 was based. Comparison of the volume of c. 1620 with one of a century later shows an interesting social development: there is a very marked increase of the number of Greek priests within the wealthiest group of the population[36]. It is remarkable that in the oldest places all over the islands the clergy is very rich. There clearly are some interesting studies to be made in the social place of the Greek clergy on the islands from the 15th to the 18th century.

This cruise around the Archipelago may have shown some common features, however different the facts of history were. The Frankish Archipelago was the product of an entire complex of colonial exploitation, of which feudality was a rather superficial element. That Latin immigration had relatively more volume then elsewhere and that it was part of a larger demographical policy may have been an important element in the long survival of Frankish rule. In this survival there were other elements, some strategic, some a consequence of the not too rigorous adherence of the Frankish rulers either to the Catholic church or to the universal application of the strict rules of feudality, which led to a degree of integration between new and old population. Finally, the not predominantly aristocratic character of Frankish immigration made integration easier. On some islands, where there was no important Frankish aristocratic element, Franks and Greeks finally did integrate quite harmoniously.

35 This *vakıf defteri* from the Tapu directorate in Ankara has been found by Dr. M. Kiel.

36 *Archipelagus turbatus*, 293.

III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 3

THE ANATOLIAN TOWN AND ITS PLACE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE OTTOMAN STATE (1500-1590)

SURAIYA FAROQHI / ANKARA

Recent research concerning town life in different parts of the world has tended to show that towns cannot be studied outside of the social and political context of which they form a part. Thus researchers have mostly abandoned the idea that pre-industrial towns constituted largely autonomous entities, whose leading cadres came from a milieu that differed substantially from the local political elite regarded as a whole. Originally, assumptions concerning the gulf between city and countryside in the pre-industrial period had been formulated mainly by scholars whose principal field of study was northwestern Europe during the early Middle Ages. In this region, there existed a society whose mercantile towns did in fact differ substantially from a countryside in which non-commercial relations predominated[1]. Even so, urban and rural sectors of society in Flanders or Germany are at present being described as part of one and the same social system, rather than as two separate and potentially hostile entities.

However, when studying societies in which the contrasts are less obvious, the model of towns constituting separate enclaves within society as a whole appears even less applicable than in the case of mediaeval Europe. Opposition to the view of a distinctly urban society has been formulated in an extreme fashion by certain scholars who would altogether deny that the town is a valid unit of

* My thanks go to Mr. Rauf Onay and Mr. Haluk Cangökçe for drawing the maps

1 Philip Abrams, "Towns and Economic Growth: Some Theories and Problems," in *Towns in Societies*, ed. Ph. Abrams, E.A. Wrigley (Cambridge etc., 1978), 9-35.

study[2]. One may choose not to go that far. Yet the study of societies in which towns were closely subordinate to the political elite dominating society at large, does demand a new approach. This approach is bound to differ from the concepts which, in spite of the objections that have been raised, do seem to have a certain limited validity for mediaeval Flanders or Germany.

A system of categories relating to town-state relations, that distinguishes between autonomous, semi-dependent and dependent towns, was suggested a number of years ago by Traian Stoianovich. In this framework, Ottoman towns are classified as dependent or semi-dependent according to the period studied, and contrasted with the 'autonomous' entities that existed at certain times and in certain regions of mediaeval Europe. The attraction of a tripartite scheme has always been very strong. Stoianovich's approach is useful because he takes cognizance of the fact that the Ottoman city evolved, and that both European and Ottoman towns may under certain circumstances be described as 'dependent'. In the same sense, he dwells upon the importance of the centralized state, which, both in sixteenth-century Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, reduced the towns to dependence.

Stoianovich's descriptive scheme thus is closely related to that proposed several years later by Fernand Braudel[3]. However, the latter dwells in more detail upon towns undifferentiated from the surrounding countryside, such as existed in ancient Greece or Rome. In so doing he sacrifices Stoianovich's 'semi-dependent' category. For the researcher dealing with Ottoman towns, the loss of this category is regrettable, because a classification scheme with only two classes obliges him to place all Ottoman towns in one and the same category. Yet experience has shown that approaches based upon a contrast between 'Europe' and 'the world at large' are beset with dangerous pitfalls. When using approaches of this type, the unique quality of European developments is easily exaggerated, and what is more, a dichotomous system prevents the

2 Abrams, "Towns", 27 and elsewhere.

3 Traian Stoianovich, "Model and Mirror of the pre-modern Balkan City," in *La ville balkanique XVe-XIXe ss* (Sofia, 1970), 83-110; Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800* (London, 1973), 401 ff.

researcher from analyzing the differences between various non-European societies. As a result, the specialist dealing with Ottoman urban development does not at present have a satisfying model of this particular process at his disposal. While the present article does not propose to construct such a model, it does attempt to clarify the meaning of 'dependence' and 'semi-dependence', when relating to sixteenth-century Anatolian towns and the Ottoman state.

In an attempt to gauge the degree of urban dependence, one might recall the town-founding activities of the more important dynasties during the post-Selçuk (*beylik*) period, including the impact of the Ottoman dynasty itself. Such newly established towns were generally intended to function as state or regional capitals, and the pious foundations to whom the principal public buildings belonged were controlled by administrators appointed by the ruler and his family. Under such conditions, control by the ruling dynasty over its principal towns was bound to be fairly close. At the same time, certain other Ottoman towns, of which Ankara might constitute a noteworthy example, were comparatively remote from the central power throughout the fifteenth and even the sixteenth century. In such places, local initiative in projects such as building a city wall might be comparatively significant, and the weak development of specifically urban institutions did not preclude a considerable amount of city-wide cooperation[4].

On the other hand, the position of Rumelian or Anatolian towns within the Ottoman realm can be approached not only from the side of the town, but from the side of the Ottoman state as well. Obviously, most records are directly or indirectly related to the affairs of the central administration in Istanbul. Therefore a study of these documents leads us to analyze the ways and means by which, considering the technical conditions of the time, an astonishing degree of central control was achieved. However, contrary trends were not absent, most notably during the

[4] On Ankara compare Özer Ergenç: "Osmanlı Şehirlerindeki Yönetim Kurumlarının Niteliği Üzerinde Bazı Düşünceler," in *VIII Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, (Ankara, 1980) vol. 2, 1265-1274.

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but visible in earlier periods as well. Under these conditions, one hesitates to interpret all evidence of 'decentralization' purely and simply as symptons of 'decline', as has sometimes been done. Rather, it appears that we need to draw a more differentiated picture of the Ottoman state apparatus. Seen from the point of view of local administrators or merchants, being a part of the Ottoman social system involved clear subordination to the centre in certain respects, but a considerable freedom of action in others. In fact, it is probably this flexibility which kept the Ottoman state functioning until well into the twentieth century[5].

To locate evidence of this flexibility, even for a period commonly singled out because of its high level of central control, is one of the aims of the present study. That such evidence should be available at all is all the more remarkable as most of the source material which we possess for the sixteenth century concentrates upon the centralizing aspects of the Ottoman state apparatus. This applies particularly to the tax registers (*tahrir defterleri)*[6], which were prepared to facilitate both the collection of taxes and the assignment of state revenues to Ottoman officials. If even from this material conclusions concerning the flexibility of the Ottoman state vis-à-vis local conditions can be drawn, it becomes obvious that we need to modify our conceptions of the Ottoman state's functioning. The present study is intended to contribute toward this kind of rethinking.

THE SMALLNESS OF A SMALL TOWN

Before discussing the relationship between towns, particularly small towns, and the Ottoman state, we have to explain what is meant by the term 'small town'. In Turkish demographic literature

5 Compare on this subject the present author's "The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire (1600-1630)," forthcoming.

6 Concerning the *tahrir defterleri* compare Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'Empire Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siècles," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* 1 (1958), 9-36 (from now on: *JESHO*). Halil Inalcık, *Hicri 835 Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid* (Ankara, 1954).

of recent years, the definition of a small town is straightforward: the term is used to describe settlements of 2.000-10.000 inhabitants[7]. However, for periods before 1800, and well after this date, in a good many cases the definition of a 'small town' can never be based on just one criterion. Fernand Braudel has stressed how in the society of mediaeval or early modern Europe, towns of minuscule size constituted the locus of administrative and commercial functions which today devolve upon much larger settlements. On the other hand, the same author has pointed out how in Sicily settlements that were all but villages from a functional point of view might contain thousands of inhabitants[8].

In such a context, size cannot be used as the only criterion in defining a town; the existence of a market place or shop-lined street, the level of a given town in the administrative hierarchy, the presence of cultural and educational institutions, all contribute toward making a certain settlement a town, or a 'small town', as the case may be. At the same time, the use of multiple criteria complicates the definition. For it is quite possible that a town was more important economically than its place in the administrative hierarchy would lead one to expect. Or even though quite small, a certain town may have possessed certain cultural institutions, such as a university or a *medrese,* which normally were found only in much larger places. But even at the price of increasing the number of doubtful instances, the use of multiple criteria leads to a more appropriate definition of the 'small town'.

Braudel's observations concerning pre-industrial towns apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to Ottoman towns as well[9]. Particularly in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, administrative functions of some significance were frequently assigned to very small settlements. As an example one might mention the town of Küre, which constituted the centre of a *kaza,* but was inhabited by only 628

7 Compare Tevfik Çavdar and others *Türkiye Aile Yapısı ve Nüfus Sorunları Araştır-masının Veri Toplama Teknikleri* (Ankara, 1971), 6.

8 Braudel, *Capitalism,* 374.

9 For a general discussion of Ottoman population and city size, compare Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Tarihi Demografi Araştırmaları ve Osmanlı Tarihi," *Türkiyat Mecmuası,* 10 (1951-53), 1-26.

taxpaying adult males (1486-87)[10]. Or to cite another instance, in spite of its importance during the Selçuk period, Sivas in the year 859 / 1454-55 according to official records housed only 560 taxpayers[11]. Population growth in the course of the sixteenth century led to the urbanization of Anatolia, and the administrative importance of very small towns deminished. But even at the end of the sixteenth century a place like Silifke, with a resident provincial governor, a *kadi,* a castle, a market place, shops, and probably public hostelries (*han*) was inhabited by only about a hundred taxpayers[12].

This state of affairs leads us to look somewhat more closely at the distinction between large and small towns. While the functional differences between villages and small towns are usually quite clear, the same cannot be said with respect to large and small towns. At the same time, although Bursa and Şebinkarahisar were both towns, the contrast between the two is obvious even to the casual observer. Ottoman officials in charge of compiling tax registers (*tahrir defterleri* were also aware of the difference, and refer to two categories of towns, namely 'şehir' (in the expression '*nefs*' or '*nefs-i şehir*') and '*kasaba*'. Only what criteria were used for differentiation between the two categories is never made very clear, and one cannot escape the conclusion that the officials in question used their intuition more than any standard criteria. As a result, the categories employed in the tax registers are of no particular help in determining the characteristics of the Anatolian small town[13].

10 Compare Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia. Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban Setting (1520-1650)* (Cambridge, Engl., 1984).

11 Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, Tapu Tahrir (TT) 2, 466 ff.

12 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Sixteenth Century Periodic Markets in Various Anatolian *Sancaks,*" *JESHO,* 22, 1 (1979), 53; Turkish version in *Gelişme Dergisi,* 1978 özel sayısı, 39-85.

13 Faroqhi, "Markets," 47.

OTTOMAN URBAN INSTITUTIONS

Under these circumstances, the researcher is obliged to search for characteristic urban institutions, which enable him to recognize a town in the Anatolian setting, and also to differentiate between regional and interregional centres on one side, and places of purely local impact on the other. This undertaking is less difficult than one might at first expect, as the seventeenth-century traveller Evliva Çelebi constitutes (even though he wrote about a century after the close of the period studied here) a very useful source on Ottoman urban institutions[14]. For Evliya the world consisted almost completely of towns and cities, and the prototype of all cities was of course Istanbul. Once beyond the city limits, the author recorded only the usual travel incidents, among which encounters with difficult mountain passes, *Celâlîs,* and robbers were described with particular gusto. With only slight exaggeration, one might claim that for Evliya the Ottoman territories, and by amplification the inhabited parts of the world, consisted of a network of urban settlements, with linear connections linking them.

Evliya also possessed a clear picture in his mind of the institutions to be expected in a town: mosques, *medreses,* covered markets, a *kadi's* court, and others. When starting his description, he often wrote out these categories, leaving a blank space after each, which later he filled out or not, according to the information he was able to gather. If the traveller found that one of the expected institutions was missing, he stressed the fact and sometimes attempted an explanation. Thus he might remark that a certain town had an active commercial centre, even though it possessed no covered market, or that some other place contained no manned citadel, because it was located far from the frontiers[15]. Among the characteristics of the town, Evliya often mentioned the number of houses, generally many more than one would expect after an evaluation of the sixteenth-century tax registers. This

[14] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* 10 vols (Istanbul, 1314/1896-97 to 1938).

[15] For, one example among many, compare Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname,* IX, 38.

shows that he was aware of population as a quantitative measure for the importance of a town; but at the same time, the size of the urban population was obviously not a dominant feature in his mental image of the Ottoman town or city.

Thus Evliya, in spite of his delight in numbers and enumerations, seems to be less quantitatively minded than the Ottoman bureaucrats who drew up the tax registers of the sixteenth century, or even their successors of the mid-seventeenth, who were Evliya's contemporaries. This fact is of interest, since Evliya used Ottoman official records whenever he had a chance to do so[16]. Therefore the differences in outlook between Evliya and the officials preparing the tax registers might be regarded as the difference between the professional outlook of officials and the world view of the educated layman. At the same time, parallels in outlook between Evliya and Ottoman financial officials, where the typical institutions of an Ottoman town are concerned, indicate the consensus of educated opinion within the Empire.

In every sixteenth or seventeenth-century town, however small, we find a Friday mosque. On the other hand, village mosques in which Friday prayers could be performed were comparatively rare, and peasants frequently attended Friday noon services after a visit to the town market. Apart from the Friday mosque (more than one mosque of this type was generally characteristic only of larger towns), there might be several *mahalle mescidis,* which could not be used for formal Friday services, and a number of dervish hospices or *zaviyes*. These latter institutions were not typically urban, since they might be found in villages as well. But their numbers demonstrated the concentration of population to be expected in a town. The same can be said of public baths (*hamam*) which were generally set up, often under the auspices of a pious foundation, as soon as the number of residents warranted the expense.

Even in many very small places, a court might officiate. In some instances a fullfledged *kadı* was appointed, in others a representa-

16 Concerning Evliya's use of official records, compare Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1962), 353-357.

tive of the nearest *kadı* (*naip*) might perform the functions of the court. Fortifications of one sort or another were common; but before the *Celali* rebellions and the ensuing unrest, they were quite frequently allowed to fall in ruins. Totally unfortified small towns could also be found; unlike what has been observed for mediaeval Europe or early modern China[17], walls and citadels were not indispensable attributes of every town or city.

Once administrative and cultural functions had been established in a given locality, commercial functions rapidly developed. At the very least, a market and a few shops provided for the needs of newly established functionaries, who could not easily engage in agriculture on a full-time basis. Thus a market place was an indispensable characteristic of a small town, and in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth centuries, a typical district (*kaza*) possessed but one market. On the other hand, shops of some sort were by no means a specifically urban privilege, and many rural markets boasted more or less stable installations, which often provided revenues for a pious foundation. Even small towns established near a major route might in addition possess one or two business-oriented structures known as *han,* which served both as entrepôts and as hostelries for visiting merchants[18]. Only in the bigger centres, however, might one regularly find a covered market or *bedestan*[19]; such installations were built in small towns only if the latter constituted the centre of an exceptionally active commercial hinterland.

Given the diminuitive scale of administrative, cultural, and commercial activities in a small town, the importance of agriculture was bound to be high. Many craftsmen and retailers compensated for limited commercial demand by cultivating gardens and vineyards. Thus most towns were surrounded by a belt of orchards and garden-plots. The transformation of fields located near a town

17 Gilbert Rozman, *Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton, 1973), 52-53, 98.

18 Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen,* Table 2.

19 Klaus Kreiser, "Bedesten-Bauten im Osmanischen Reich, ein vorläufiger Überblick auf Grund der Schriftquellen," *Istanbuler Mitteilungen,* 29 (1979), 367-400.

into gardens and vineyards can generally be regarded as a sign of urban growth. In certain instances (Denizli, Kırşehir) gardens and inhabited town quarters might intermingle; the result was a very loose urban tissue[20]. Moreover the inhabitants of certain sixteenth century towns were in the habit of spending the summer in gardens or on summer pastures. All these features stress the semi-agricultural character of not only the smallest towns, but also of medium-sized and larger urban settlements.

Taking these features into account, one might propose the following definition for the sixteenth-century Anatolian small town (*kasaba*): a settlement of more than 400 and less than 2500 taxpayers, that is, inhabited by about 1500 to 10,000 people. These limits are arbitrary, and have been selected for the sake of convenience[21]. In addition, the settlement in question should have been provided with a market or shoplined street, so as to ensure the performance of a minimal commercial role. Institutions, whether sponsored by the Ottoman state (fortifications) or pious foundations (*medreses*) obviously contributed to the urban life of a town. However, since it is this contribution which is to be investigated in the present study, to include administrative rank, or the existence of certain institutions, into the definition of the Ottoman Anatolian town must result in a tautology. Only when the contribution of administrative structure, and of institutions such as fortifications or *medreses,* has been assessed in detail, will the time for a richer description and more appropriate definition of the Anatolian town have arrived.

SANCAK CENTRES AS TOWNS AND CITIES

When examining the impact of the Ottoman administrative structure upon the life and development of Ottoman towns, the

20 Compare in this context Xavier de Planhol, "Le cadre géographique, le pays de Laodicée-Denizli," in *Laodicée du Lycos, Le Nymphée, Campagnes 1961-63*, ed. Jean des Gagniers and others (Quebec, Paris, 1969), 391-419.

21 Compare Leila Erder, Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Development of the Anatolian Urban Network During the Sixteenth Century," *JESHO*, 23, 3 (1980), 265-303. See also Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen* Table 1.

first step is to ascertain how provincial centres performed as urban entities. By provincial centres, both *sancak* and *eyalet* centres are meant, for *eyalet* centres such as Kütahya (Anadolu) and Sivas (Rum) were in no way unusual among provincial centres, and certainly did not dominate the urban hierarchy in any respect.

Before embarking on such a venture, however, we need to know which places were regarded as *sancak* centres. Where the *eyalet* of Anadolu is concerned, Kâtip Çelebi in most cases[22] provides this information. In other instances, Kâtip Çelebi's or Evliya Çelebi's mentioning the official residence of a *sancakbeyi* among the notable buildings of a given town may provide useful information for our purposes. Moreover, when a town had given its name to a *sancak,* it probably served as *sancak* centre[23]. Under these circumstances, the *sancak* centre is doubtful only in a small number of cases. More problematic is the fact that Kâtip Çelebi and Evliya Çelebi refer to the seventeenth century, while evidence for the preceding period is lacking. But since the seat of the *sancakbeyi* probably was moved around but rarely, the margin of error thus introduced is probably not too great.

When comparing a list of probable *sancak* centres with the list of the most populous towns existing in Anatolia at the end of the sixteenth century, we find that the entries generally correspond until we arrive at Bor, the eighteenth-largest place in the urban hierarchy. (In this context, the Anatolian urban hierarchy consists of all towns to the west of the Euphrates and inhabited by more than a thousand taxpaying adult males)[24]. All towns larger than Bor were also *sancak* centres, apart from Tokat and Bergama, while Izmir had not yet begun its seventeenth-century growth spurt, and therefore does not occur on our list. However, in the

22 Katip Çelebi, *Cihan-numa* (Istanbul, 1145 / 1732), 595-673.

23 For a map showing the *sancaks* of Anatolia during the 16th-17th centuries, compare Donald Edgar Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from the earliest times to the end of the sixteenth century* (Leiden, 1972), Map 25.

24 On the size of 16th century Anatolian towns, compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "Taxation and Urban Activities in Sixteenth Century Anatolia," *Int. Journal of Turkish Studies,* 1, 1 (1979-80), 19-53. This article also contains (on pp. 49-50) a comprehensive listing of the tax registers used for the present study.

middle and lower reaches of the hierarchy, discrepancies become increasingly frequent. Places ranking lower than twenty-eighth in size among the towns and cities of western and central Anatolia were almost never *sancak* centres in the sense described above. At the same time, insignificant settlements of much less than a thousand tax-payers had quite often been granted this dignity.

Thus one may conclude that apart from a very few exceptions, the Ottoman administration promoted large cities to the rank of *sancak* centres. In the absence of a really sizeable city, however, other criteria came into their own. Former capitals of pre-Ottoman principalities were often retained as *sancak* capitals irrespective of size. Moreover, in certain areas in which communications were difficult, the Ottoman administration may have wished to avoid overly large administrative units, a desire which might explain the many *eyalets* established in frontier areas, while the old *eyalets* of Rumeli and Anadolu remained disproportionately large[25].

OTTOMAN SMALL TOWNS AND THE *KAZA* STRUCTURE

From the point of view of the Ottoman central administration, one of the most obvious properties of the small town was the fact that it constituted a district centre and the residence of a *kadı*. Unfortunately, we do not at present possess any comprehensive studies concerning sixteenth-century Ottoman local administration, or dealing with the family background of the *kadıs*, who must be regarded as the key figures on this level. What is more, for many of the less prominent and active *kadıs*, little is often known beyond their names. Under these circumstances, the history of the Ottoman administrative structure and its relationship to town development must be read off from much more indirect evidence. Ottoman tax registers, both *mufassal* and *icmal*[26], generally contain listings of *kazas*, occasionally with an indication of the administrative rank of the incumbent *kadı*. Similar evidence can be found in geographical or administrative handbooks, and even in

25 For a listing compare Pitcher, *Historical Geography*, 126 ff.

26 On the *icmal* registers of the 15th century, compare Inalcık, *Arvanid*, XII.

the travel accounts of an Evliya Çelebi. For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, *avarız* registers provide comparable information, so that for once, there is no 'blank interval' between the late sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries[27].

To gauge the impact of the Ottoman administrative system upon the development of the Anatolian town, we might attempt to find out whether areas with a particularly dense administrative network were also remarkable for the intensity of their urban development. For this purpose, we can compare maps depicting both the *kaza* structure and the urban network at different stages in their development during the sixteenth century. In this context, developments which occurred in much more recent periods may be of some help in formulating relevant questions. It is well known that many Turkish small towns, which function as administrative centres in the second half of the twentieth century, are of comparably recent origin, having been founded in the late eighteen-hundreds on even within the present century[28]. In such instances, the establishment of a *kaza* centre in a given settlement seems to have materially contributed toward the growth of this settlement into a town.

Unfortunately, while the sequence of events is reasonably clear where recent years are concerned, for the beginning of the nineteenth century and for earlier periods, the contrary generally applies. Was a certain place promoted to the status of *kaza* centre because it was at least an embryonic town, or did the settlement in question blossom into a town because it had been made into a *kaza* centre? And if the latter was the case, by what criteria did the Ottoman administration during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, select the localities which were to be raised to the rank of *kaza* centre? While it is not possible to give hard and fast answers concerning the sixteenth century, at least some pertinent hypotheses can be formulated.

27 For this gap with respect to population figures, see Erder, Faroqhi, "Anatolian Urban Network," 295 ff.

28 Volker Höhfeld, *Anatolische Kleinstädte, Anlage, Verlegung und Wachstumsrichtung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert* (Erlangen, 1977), 21 ff.



town, 400-999 taxpayers

city, 1000-2499 taxpayers

city, over 2500 taxpayers

(?) location not known

THE URBAN NETWORK IN ANATOLIA
(about 1520-1540)

MAP
(1)

Adapted: Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia
(Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1983-4)

A glance at Map 3 immediately shows the great density of the Anatolian administrative network during the earlier part of Kanuni Süleyman's reign. In the more densely-inhabited areas of Anatolia, the Ottoman central administration seems to have aimed at a network of more or less uniform density, regardless of whether the area in question was urban or rural. Only in the much less densely settled central parts of Anatolia, which might be visualized as a band that started near Demirci and Güre in the west and gradually broadened out as one approached Ankara, Kayseri, and Sivas, is the administrative network notably less dense. *Kaza* centres were also considerably less frequent in northern Anatolia to the east of Tokat, and in southern Anatolia once one had traveled east of Konya. In the west, one can also observe some minor 'empty pockets' between Uşak and Lazkiye, and in the woodlands to the west of Antalya. All these instances of 'thinning out' seem to have something to do with relatively lower population densities. At the same time, one may assume that in the region between Konya and Malatya, the continuing impact of local dynasties, such as the Ramazanoğulları and especially the Dulkadir, may also have contributed toward keeping administrative units relatively large. In the same context, one might mention the fact that areas with a significant share of nomads also seemed to call for relatively large *kazas*. But since areas with little permanent settlement also tended to possess a relatively large percentage of nomads, it is impossible to distinguish between the impacts of these two factors.

A comparison between the maps showing administrative structure and urban development during the early part of Kanuni Süleyman's reign (Maps 1 and 3) shows that the *kaza* network during this period was far denser than the urban network. A large number of settlements ranked as the centre of a *kaza,* even though these places were inhabited only by a few hundred taxpayers. Moreover, most of the settlements whose population is not indicated must also have been rather small, however in areas where the number of small towns was comparatively large, such as in the 'lake district' of the *sancak* of Hamid, only these more or less



2 500 and over

1 000 - 2 499

400 - 999

(?) location and /or identification questionable

( ) not documented

CITIES OF ANATOLIA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

MAP ②

Adapted : from original in JESHO, XXIII, p. 273

significant urban entities had been promoted to the rank of *kaza* centre by the early years of Kanuni's reign. As yet we know very little about the manner in which the administrative network of Ottoman Anatolia was instituted after the conquests of Mehmed the Conqueror or Selim I. But it is probable that the larger towns were the first to be made district centres, with the rural *kaza* centres belonging to a second stage in the development of the administrative network.

In the course of the sixteenth century the Anatolian urban network also tended to increase in density, and it would be of interest to find out whether the intensification of Ottoman control exercised an influence in this direction. A comparison between Map 3 ('Administrative centres in 1520-1540') and Maps 1 and 2 ('Urban networks in 1520-1540': and 'Urban networks in the second half of the sixteenth century') shows that urban growth coincided only to a limited extent with the density of the Ottoman administrative network. Thus the northwestern section of Anatolia, roughly between Ankara and Kastamonu in the east and the Sea of Marmara in the west, had been covered with a dense network of rural *kazas* from the time of Kanuni Süleyman onward. If intensity of administrative control had had any impact upon town development, surely this area should have been speedily urbanized. However, as a glance at the maps will show, no such development did in fact occur, and the *sancak* of Bolu remained a totally rural and partially forested area.

Unfortunately, a direct comparison between the administrative network as it existed during the early years of Kanuni Süleyman's reign, and the network of Selim II's and Murat III's times, is rather a difficult undertaking. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to locate many rural *nahiyes* on modern maps, which have therefore been excluded from Map 3. On the other hand, sixteenth-century Ottoman administrative terminology was not very consistent where the differentiation between the two lower-level administrative units *kaza* and *nahiye* was concerned. In fact, certain tax registers of the later sixteenth century might call a



ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRES (KAZA) IN ANATOLIA

(about 1520 to 1540)

50 0 50 100 km

- ○ administrative centre (kaza), population unknown
- ● administrative centre (kaza), less than 200 taxpayers
- ⊙ administrative centre (kaza), 200 - 399 taxpayers
- □ administrative centre (kaza), also town of 400 - 999 taxpayers
- ⊡ administrative centre (kaza), also town of 1000 - 2499 taxpayers
- ⬬ administrative centre (kaza), also city of 2500 taxpayers and more
- (?) location uncertain
- Bozok kazas without known (kaza) centre

MAP

③

given administrative unit *kaza* in one place and *nahiye* in the other. For this reason an attempt has been made to show the late sixteenth-century *nahiyes* on Map 4. However this means that the two maps are not exactly parallel in their construction, and comparison is possible only within certain limits. In addition, it appears that the *mufassal* registers seem to have recorded small ad-ministrative units, which the *icmal,* concerned with giving an overall picture, might choose to ignore. Therefore the markedly greater number of purely rural administrative units appearing on Map 4 might at least in part be attributed to fortuitous causes[29].

At the same time, a comparison of Map 4 with the map showing the distribution of towns and cities during the second half of the sixteenth century (Map 2) brings out some interesting features. Thus it appears that apart from the urbanized regions which have already been referred to, there existed in Anatolia areas which, though not urbanized, were notable for their relatively dense rural population. As an example for such an area one might name the left bank of the Büyük Menderes, or else the countryside between Akhisar and Balıkesir, that is the area which in the seventeenth century was traversed by the road from Istanbul to Izmir. Conclusions of this type are based upon the assumption that a dense administrative network in most cases reflects a fairly dense population, and they are supported by the fact that in the sparsely inhabited steppes of Inner Anatolia, administrative centres were few and far between. These common-sense conlusions are of great value, since the distribution of population in sixteenth-century Anatolia is as yet only very imperfectly known. Under these circumstances, the administrative network of the time is useful to the researcher as an indirect indicator of population density. Because of this quality, it may in the future be useful for the formulation of broader hypotheses concerning urban growth.

[29] Due to the vagueness of a *kasaba-nahiye* distinction, even two maps constructed according to exactly the same principles would allow only conclusions of limited validity.


Onikdivan
Ovulus (?)
Çarşamba
Yedidivan (?)
Dördivan
Yakakabad
Dodurga (?)
Murtezaabad
Yabanabad
Kasaba
Keskin (?)
Konur
Budakönü
Kuştaş
Kızılaş
Yenimüslüman
Hüseyinabad
Karadere (?)
Süleymanlı
Bozok (?)
Dedeçeşmü (?)
Çiçekdağı
Emlak (?)
Bacı
Günyüzü (?)
Tosunlu (?)
Yalak (?)
Kaliviran (?)
Festeğil (?)
Temrezler (?)
Haydarlar (?)
Basgerdek (?)
Güvercinlik (?)
Gördük
Kavak (?)
Oynaş (?)
Kakhisar (?)
Borçnik (?)
Turgud
Eşkil
Bekir (?)
Eyübeli (?)
Hasandağ
Melendiz
Karmelek (?)
Samarak
Çobel Ali
Kestere
Sakaş
Karakoyu
Koromaz (?)
Karataş (?)
Molya (?)
Günyüzü (?)
Kenar ırmak (?)
Çubuk
Gedik
Çıkrıkçı
Hayran
Saldeil
Çimenli
Kaş (?)
Bayburd (?)
Karaş (?)
Sudremi
Kireli
Bayat
Sahra
Anamas
Ağlasun
Bakdaşun (?)
Yenişehir (?)
Kartoz
Irla
Doyran
Yenice (?)
Eğerdir
Sıravolos
Akçeşehir
Mazun
Belat
Eşrefoğlu
Kalkanlı
Kaş
Çinçere (?)
Dimdereci
Bağtum (?)
Abra Obapazarı
Akçeşehir (?)
Alabey (?)
Şekl
Mahmudlar
Sücaeddin
Bordoğan
Karataş
Küşteğil
Yüreğil
Berendi
Hamamlı (?)
Haçık
Düğadorlu
Sarıçam
Karaisek
Kıvak
Haruniye
Şayban (?)
Gökçun
Çokak
Maraş
Andırın
Kars. Maraş
Şiş
Eroğlu
Anduğı
Ulaş
Tarsus
Adana
Ayas
Anapur
Silifke
Mut
Ermenek
Alanya
Antalya
Manavgat
Köyceğiz
Fethiye
Makri
Pınaz
Elmalı
Gönen
Çan
Manyas
Kirmasti
Etrenos
Domaniç
Eskişehir
Karacaşehir
Seyidgazi
Sefrihisar
Günyüzü
Eğriçöz
Küteyya
Adalepa
Altınıtaş
Gediz
Simav
Demirci
Yenicekaya
Gördes
Çeşmi
Borlu
Selendi
Uşak
Güre
Banaz
Suhut
İsmekli
Bendik
Akşehir
Yalvaç
Doğanhisar
Ilgın
Zengicek
Kevek (?)
Seytil (?)
Hama
Ulubortu
Barla
Güneş
Uzğıdık
Karaağaç Yalvaç
Çal
Tosunlar
Hanaz
Lazkiye
Tavas
Burdur
Kemer
Karaağaç Gölhisar
Gölhisar
Istanaz
Pınaz
Elmalı
Köyceğiz
Bozdoğan
Çine
Muğla
Bozüyük
Eskihisar
Peçin
Güzelhisar (Aydın)
Sultanhisar
Yenişehir
Arpaz
Kestel
Ayasoluğ
Tire
Birgi
Sarı
Adala
Kula
Göbüyük (?)
Alaşehir
Nif
İzmir
Menemen
Yundağı
Yengi (?)
Peyraz
Ortapara (?)
Karataş
Manisa
Belen (?)
Emlak (?)
Çeşme
Güzelhisar
Kayacık
Marmara
Borlu
Çengi
Gördes
Akhisar
Yenicekaya
Pelamud
Bergama
Terhala
Ayazmend
Gırgıncı
Bigadiç
Sındırgı
Edremid
Kızılca Tuzla
Ezine
Balya
Balıkesir
Kepsud
Mendeherya
İvrindi
Çan
Biga
Çanakkale
Çatal Burgas (?)
Kale-i Sultaniye
Lapseki
Gönen
Tophisar
Manyas
Mihalıç
Uşbad
Bursa
Akhisar
Yenişehir
Yarhisar
Bilecik
Söğüd
Ermenipazarı
İnönü
İnegöl
Geyve
Terakli
Gölpazarı
Göynük
Karahisar-ı Nalh
Bağpazarı
Mihalıççık
Ayaş
Ankara
Çubuk
Kalecik
Kırşehir
Mucur
Kaman
Kırıkkale
Delice
Yerköy
Sorgun (?)
Yozgat
Boğazlıyan
Akdağ
Karahisar-ı Bahremşah
Dinek
Keskin
Çekerek
Çorum
Osmancık
Gümüş
Merzifon
Amasya
Tokat
Turhal
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Niksar
Reşadiye
Cincife (?)
Erzurum
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Gedikalan (?)
Çorum
Kalar (?)
Yavaş (?)
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Gelmugad (?)
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Kaçhisar
Kangri
Karçhasar (?)
Ladik
Şemere-i Ladik (?)
Pamukçü (?)
Eğnikhisar (?)
Kocabayası (?)
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Durağan
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Sorgun (?)
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Zonguldak
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Sinop
Hoşalay
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Sahinş (?)
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Gazilar ovacığı (?)
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Koçhisar
Gün Karalaz
Gedik
Çubuk
Karataş (?)
Karamaz (?)
Karakoyu
Koromaz (?)
Çobel Ali
Kestere
Maşere
Gökçun
Çokak
Maraş
Andırın
Kars. Maraş
Haruniye
Kıvak
Berendi
Haçık
Düğadorlu
Sarıçam
Karaisek
Kuşu
Ulaş
Tarsus
Adana
Ayas
Anapur
Silifke
Mut
Ermenek
Alanya
Antalya
Manavgat
Köyceğiz
Fethiye
Makri
Pınaz
Elmalı
Gönen
Çan
Manyas
Kirmasti
Etrenos
Domaniç
Eskişehir
Karacaşehir
Seyidgazi
Sefrihisar
Günyüzü
Eğriçöz
Küteyya
Adalepa
Altınıtaş
Gediz
Simav
Demirci
Yenicekaya
Gördes
Çeşmi
Borlu
Selendi
Uşak
Güre
Banaz
Suhut
İsmekli
Bendik
Akşehir
Yalvaç
Doğanhisar
Ilgın
Zengicek
Kevek (?)
Seytil (?)
Hama
Ulubortu
Barla
Güneş
Uzğıdık
Karaağaç Yalvaç
Çal
Tosunlar
Hanaz
Lazkiye
Tavas
Burdur
Kemer
Karaağaç Gölhisar
Gölhisar
Istanaz
Pınaz
Elmalı
Köyceğiz
Bozdoğan
Çine
Muğla
Bozüyük
Eskihisar
Peçin
Güzelhisar (Aydın)
Sultanhisar
Yenişehir
Arpaz
Kestel
Ayasoluğ
Tire
Birgi
Sarı
Adala
Kula
Göbüyük (?)
Alaşehir
Nif
İzmir
Menemen
Yundağı
Yengi (?)
Peyraz
Ortapara (?)
Karataş
Manisa
Belen (?)
Emlak (?)
Çeşme
Güzelhisar
Kayacık
Marmara
Borlu
Çengi
Gördes
Akhisar
Yenicekaya
Pelamud
Bergama
Terhala
Ayazmend
Gırgıncı
Bigadiç
Sındırgı
Edremid
Kızılca Tuzla
Ezine
Balya
Balıkesir
Kepsud
Mendeherya
İvrindi
Çan
Biga
Çanakkale
Çatal Burgas (?)
Kale-i Sultaniye
Lapseki
Gönen
Tophisar
Manyas
Mihalıç
Uşbad
Bursa
Akhisar
Yenişehir
Yarhisar
Bilecik
Söğüd
Ermenipazarı
İnönü
İnegöl
Geyve
Terakli
Gölpazarı
Göynük
Karahisar-ı Nalh
Bağpazarı
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Terme
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Küre
Ayancık
Sahinş (?)
Kabakaz (?)
Gazilar ovacığı (?)
Çöğçere
Çöl

THE MARGINAL IMPACT OF FORTIFICATIONS

Among the institutions whose impact upon urban development might be investigated, two have been selected apart from the administrative structure, namely fortifications and *medreses*. In both cases, the *mufassal* and *icmal* registers contain enough information to make mapping relatively easy. Considering that the citadel formed an essential part of many Anatolian towns it seems worth investigating whether there was any relationship between the distribution of fortifications and the contemporary urban network. For the earlier years of Kanuni Süleyman's reign we possess considerable evidence concerning fortified places in Anatolia. A glance at Map 5 shows four areas of concentration: the Aegean coast, a line roughly separating western from central Anatolia and reaching from the Gulf of Izmit to Antalya, the coastal area of southern Anatolia with an extension toward Kayseri and Malatya, and the *vilayet* of Rum. Apparently this network of fortifications was meant mainly to protect the coasts and certain districts easily accessible from the sea. This is particularly obvious in the case of the Aegean coast between Bodrum and Ayazmend (Altınova), but also for the coastal strips between Antalya and Adana, or between Samsun and Giresun.

At the same time, it appears that certain stretches of coast were quite deliberately left without any defence. Fortifications must have appeared unnecessary on the shores of the Sea of Marmara, as both the Bosporus and the Dardanelles were well guarded. More difficult to explain is the state of the western Black Sea coast as far as Samsun, where Amasra was the only fortified place far and wide. The lack of coastal fortifications is all the more remarkable since the Black Sea had only become an Ottoman lake during the latter part of Mehmed Fatih's reign and the last gaps had only been closed under his son Bayezid II; that is approximately fifty years before the *icmals* examined here were compiled. Moreover, a third noticeable gap in the coastal defenses was visible in southwestern Anatolia, in the sparsely inhabited territory between



FORTRESSES AND GARRISONS IN ANATOLIA

(About 1520-1540)

MAP 5

Antalya and Bodrum.

Historical circumstances partly explain the contrast between the Mediterranean coast to the east and to the west of Antalya. Many fortresses in the *sancak* of Içel had been hotly contested during the Ottoman Sultans' wars with the Karamanoğulları[30], and were probably manned with large garrisons to keep this mountainous and potentially rebellious area under control. In addition, the threat from Christian pirates, who could easily revictual on Venetian-held Cyprus, must have induced the Ottoman central administration to maintain strong garrisons in this area[31]. Further to the east, some of the fortifications of Kanuni's time had probably been inherited from the Dulkadir and Ramazanoğulları. Since the Ottoman conquest particularly of Dulkadir territory had been both long and difficult, it is not surprising that a number of garrisons was established in this area as well.

More difficult to explain is the unusual concentration of fortifications in the towns of the *vilayet* of Rum. This area did not for the most part possess a strong tradition as an independent principality, and many parts of this province had formed part of the Ottoman Empire from an early period. As a hypothesis, one might assume that the Kızılbaş uprisings, which were concentrated in this area, had made it seem advisable to the Ottoman central administration to strengthen its control over this wealthy and commercially active province. But it is equally possible that these fortresses were an heritage from the time when the Ottoman-Iranian frontier was located near Erzincan, that is from the second half of the fifteenth century. In fact, it is possible to combine the two explanations, and to assume that the old border country fortifications were manned with strong garrisons to quell any possible pro-Iranian movement[32].

30 Compare the articles on the Karamanlılar in *IA* (by Şihabeddin Tekindağ) and *EI*, 2nd edition (by Faruk Sümer).

31 On the question of Mediterranean piracy in the 16th century see Alberto Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice 1580-1615* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1967), passim.

32 On Ottoman-Safevi relations and their impact upon the area in question, compare Hanna Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert," *Der Islam*, 41



- • 1-50 soldiers garrisoned
- ● 51-100 soldiers
- ◉ 101-150 soldiers
- □ 151-200 soldiers
- ▣ 201- soldiers

ANATOLIAN FORTRESSES SENDING SOLDIERS TO THE NAVY (980/1572-73)

MAP 6

When comparing Map 5 with the distribution of towns and cities in Anatolia during the early years of Kanuni Süleyman's reign (Map 1) it becomes obvious that towns and fortifications coincided only to a very limited extent. As both strongly fortified and urbanized areas one might name the *vilayet* of Rum, and to a very much lesser degree, the Aegean coast[33]. Nor does the network of fortifications between 1520 and 1540 seem to have had any major impact on the history of urban settlement in the latter part of the sixteenth century. For while an increasingly dense network of towns established itself in the coastal areas of the Aegean, this growth was probably caused by the economic development of the Izmir region, with its activity in interregional and international trade. Thus in this particular case, a direct impact on the part of the fortifications network does not appear very probable. If the presence of fortified places had really exercised a stimulating effect upon urbanization, we would expect to observe these effects first and foremost on the Mediterranean coast. But quite obviously, although the conquest of Cyprus had stimulated economic activity in this somewhat outlying area, even the more important fortresses, such as Mud, Avgadi, or Manyan, showed little or no tendency to develop into towns.

For the latter part of the sixteenth century, documentation concerning manned fortifications is less easy to come by. However, we do possess some relevant evidence in a document which dates from the time of the Cyprus war (980 / 1572-73)[34]. This rescript orders the commanders of the more important Anatolian fortresses to place a certain number of their men at the service of the Ottoman navy. To determine the number of soldiers required, generally about half the garrison, the number of men serving in the more important fortresses has been recorded in the rescript. Unfortunately, it is very probable that the list of fortresses is incomplete, as

(1965), 95-223.

33 However it appears that the fortresses of Inner Anatolia were particularly numerous along the 'diagonal route', leading from Istanbul to Aleppo. See the first of the two maps attached to Franz Taeschner, *Das anatolische Wegenetz nach osmanischen Quellen*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1924-26).

34 Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, Mühimme defterleri (MD) 21, 44-45.



MEDRESES IN ANATOLIA
(about 1520 - 1540)

there is no reference to either the Aegean or the Mediterranean castles, and it is not very likely that at the height of the Cyprus war, these fortresses should have been denuded of their garrisons. To the contrary, the garrisons of the Aegean and Mediterranean seaboards were probably being maintained at full strength or even increased, so that they would not have been required to furnish a contingent to the navy. Incomplete though it may be, the map which can be prepared on the basis of the 980 / 1572-73 *ferman* is however instructive, in that it shows how fortress garrisons tended to increase as one approached the Iranian frontier (Map 6). Once again, the connection between the Anatolian system of fortifications and the urban network in the same area, appears to have been marginal.

THE *MEDRESE* AS AN URBAN PHENOMENON

Among the institutions commonly mentioned in Anatolian small towns, *medreses* were unusual in that contrary to *zaviyes,* fortifications, or *kaza* centres, they were rarely found in villages. Even Friday mosques were less exclusively urban. Admittedly a number of *medreses* might be found in rural areas, such as for example in the *sancaks* of Kastamonu, Teke or Menteşe. Moreover, in certain cases it is impossible to determine whether a *medrese* was urban or rural. For particularly in the *icmal* registers of Kanuni Süleyman's early reign, often only the *kaza* where the *medrese* was located has been recorded, and not the town or village[35]. But even when allowance is made for all these cases, the distribution of *medreses* can be expected to conform

35 Map 7 shows certain gaps because the listings of pious foundations found in the *icmals* are lacking or unusable for certain *sancaks,* such as for instance Saruhan or Menteşe. TT 166 is particularly defective in this repect. Moreover, certain records give only the number of *müderris* present in a given locality. Since we do not know for sure whether the latter were all affiliated with an institution, these data have been ignored in the present context.

Aptullah Kuran, *Anadolu Medreseleri* (Ankara, 1969).

Metin Sözen, *Anadolu Medreseleri, Selçuklular ve Beylikler Devri,* 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1970, 1972).

Cahid Baltacı, *XV-XVI Asırlarda Osmanlı Medreseleri, Teşkilat, Tarih* (Istanbul, 1976).

more closely to the urban network than that of the other phenomena examined in the present context.

A glance at the map showing the respective distributions of towns and *medreses* (Map 7) confirms this assumption[36]. But in addition, it would be of interest to find out whether the largest number of *medreses* was always to be found in the most populous settlements. Unfortunately, no information has been located concerning the number of *medreses* operating in Bursa during the early years of Kanuni Süleyman. After Bursa, the major population centre of western and central Anatolia during those years was undoubtedly Ankara. However, this town was not the centre of *medrese* life. Rather, *medreses* were apparently concentrated in Amasya, Tokat, and Konya, and to a lesser degree, in Kayseri, Aksaray, Karaman (Larende) and Kütahya. Thus the heritage of the Selçuk and *beylik* period seems to have been dominant as late as the 1520s or '30s, for among the major *medrese* centres, only Kütahya had not been particularly prominent under the Selçuk sultanate. Even so, a certain amount of correspondence between the number of *medreses* and the size of the town can be observed. Kayseri, Tokat and Amasya ranked immediately behind Bursa and Ankara as far as population was concerned, while Konya, Kütahya and Aksaray could at least be considered medium-level centres. Only in Karaman (Larende) must the historical importance of the town alone account for the number of *medreses,* for at the beginning of the sixteenth century, it appears to have been a settlement of very modest size.

Among the towns on record as possessing 2-5 *medreses,* no common characteristics strike the eye. This category includes historical centres of appreciable size, such as Sivas or Malatya, both of which had been of importance during the Selçuk period. In spite of their modest size during the first half of the sixteenth century, Peçin, Milas and Iznik were well provided with *medreses* because they had been the political centres of fourteenth

36 On the distribution of towns and *medreses* in late 16th century Anatolia compare also Suraiya Faroqhi, "A map of Anatolian Friday Mosques (1520-1535)," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları,* 4 (1984), 161-173.

or early fifteenth-century Anatolian *beyliks*. On the other hand, an insignificant country town with little historical importance, such as Taşköprü, might also boast two *medreses*. Thus one can say that during the early years of Kanuni Süleyman's reign, the geographical distribution of towns and *medreses* corresponded reasonably well. However, historical factors, more than population size, determined the number of *medreses* to be found in any one town.

At the lower end of the scale, a single *medrese* was a common enough feature in ordinary country towns. Thus even for the sixteenth century, a hundred and fifty years before Evliya wrote, the *medrese* might be regarded as a characteristic element of the Anatolian town. We must conclude that after 1540, the *medrese* spread to many localities where it had not previously existed. Certainly, this may in part be an optical illusion. *Vakıf* registers of Selim II's and Murad III's time were often more carefully kept than the *icmals* of Kanuni Süleyman's early reign, at least where pious foundations were concerned. However, it is probable that many new institutions were founded as well. Between 1520 and 1540, no town (presumably apart from Bursa) appears to have contained more than 15 *medreses*. On the other hand, in the later years of the sixteenth century, we find 16 such institutions in Kayseri, 21 in Amasya and 29 in Konya. At the same time, the number of *medreses* in Tokat declined to about 5 or 6; this observation confirms our assumption that the increase in the other cities was real and not fictious. One is tempted to assume that as the city increased its commercial importance as a stopping place on the route to Iran, religious activities receded into the background.

Parallels in the distribution of towns and *medreses* are apparent in the latter half of the sixteenth century as well (Maps 2 and 7): the urban concentrations of the *vilayet* of Rum, the Aegean coastlands, and the lake district of Burdur, Uluborlu and Isparta are clearly visible on the map showing the distribution of *medreses*. At the same time, the more important centres of population were in most cases also the cities endowed with the largest number of *medreses*. Ankara had by now acquired 11 *medreses,* and there-

by the number of its teachers and students conformed more closely to its relative position as a centre of population. But in the latter half of the sixteenth century, just as in the preceding period, certain irregularities were not lacking. To cite but one example, a number of *medreses* had been built in Amasya, even though the town had grown much less rapidly than most of the other cities of western and central Anatolia. Thus Amasya became more 'scholarly', while Tokat was becoming more 'commercial'[37].

But aside from these localized discrepancies in the shapes of the urban and *medrese* networks, divergencies on a regional scale also attract attention. Thus while in most parts of Anatolia *medreses* were largely an urban phenomenon, the rural *medreses* of the *sancak* of Kastamonu continued to exist. At the same time, the hinterland of Bursa, in which towns of any size had always been conspicuously rare, was at the end of the sixteenth century amply supplied with *medreses,* some of which were located in settlements of very modest size. It is probable that these institutions were in one way or another connected with Bursa as the centre of Anatolian religious learning, and the *medreses* of Yenişehir, Inegöl, Mihaliç (Karacabey) or Bozöyük can be taken as evidence for the impact of this city upon the region surrounding it.

While the afflux of teachers and students undoubtedly contributed toward enlarging the urban market in a city like Bursa, most *medreses* were too modest in size to have much impact upon growth. At least this is true as long as only the officially registered and *vakıf*-supported students are taken into consideration — however from Akdağ's accounts it appears that at least in the second half of the sixteenth century fairly large numbers of young men were more or less unofficially enrolled in *medrese* programs[38]. Thus in most cases one should probably regard the *medrese* more as an indicator of achieved urban status, than as a

37 Ronald Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum," *Int. Journal of Middle East Studies,* 7 / 1 (1976), 21-57.

38 Mustafa Akdağ, *Celali Isyanları 1550-1603* (Ankara, 1963), 85 ff.

factor contributing toward urban growth on a large scale. That the *medrese* can in fact be interpreted as an indicator of 'urbanness', at least where small towns are concerned, may be gathered from the case of Samsun. This town, a modest port throughout the sixteenth century, also possessed a *medrese*. However probably due to the attacks of Cossack and Abaza pirates, the town lost population in spite of its fortifications. About 1650, it was no more than a shadow of its former self, and the *medrese* had disappeared[39].

At the end of the sixteenth century, as in earlier periods, the importance of a city in terms of population was not always directly reflected in the number of its *medreses*. Apart from the impact of historical factors, there may have been some 'functional specialization', with Bursa, Konya and Amasya forming the main poles of attraction for students seeking a *medrese* education. But even so, this limited correlation of urban size and *medrese* distribution is of great value for the student of seventeenth-century Anatolia. For at this time, counts of urban population are few and far between, so that it is impossible to map the network of Anatolian towns and cities. On the other hand, however, information on the distribution of *medreses* is available, even though the data provided for instance by Ottoman records of teacher appointment have not as yet been evaluated. Thus it might be possible to formulate certain hypotheses concerning the urban network of the seventeenth or even eighteenth centuries. Moreover, such an undertaking is of particular interest, since for the years after 1600 we also possess the impressions of European travellers. The observations of these men, even though often much distorted through ignorance and prejudice, can still be used to fill out gaps in our knowledge and provide a yardstick for comparison.

39 Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*, Chapter 4.

CONCLUSION

In certain respects, the tour of exploration whose results have been discussed in the present article has led us to results that are rather different from those originally expected. Considering the enormous weight of the Ottoman state organization, particularly during the 'classical' period between about 1450 and 1650, it had seemed probable that Anatolian urbanization was primarily induced by the actions of the Ottoman state. In a different context, it had previously been established that Ottoman rulers and princes of the Anatolian dynasties played an important role in constructing covered markets and other business-oriented structures, and thus acted as founders of towns[40]. Under these circumstances, one would have expected the urban system to closely follow the *kaza* and *sancak* structure, with most *sancak* centres developing into what were, by local standards, medium-level cities, while villages in which a district centre had been established gradually grew into small towns. Equally, one might have expected the distribution of fortifications and garrisons to reflect two aims: on one side, the defense of the frontier, but perhaps even more importantly, the control of the principal centres of population.

However, these expectations have been fulfilled only to a very limited extent. On the upper levels of the urban hierarchy, most big cities did in fact constitute *sancak* centres. But further down the scale, many *sancakbeyis* were obliged to reside in very insignificant places, while settlements of much greater importance remained mere district centres. Thus *sancaks* were often formed without very much regard for the size of the settlement that was to constitute its centre. More importantly, the privilege of being a *sancak* centre does not seem to have contributed much toward urban development, at least if other stimulating factors were missing. *Mutatis mutandis,* the same observations apply to the *kaza* centres. Thus it must be concluded that the Ottoman ad-

40 Compare: Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Şehirlerin Teşekkül ve Inkişafı Tarihi Bakımından Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Imaret Sitelerinin Kuruluş ve Işleyiş Tarzına Ait Araştırmalar," *Ist. Univ. Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası,* 23, 1-2 (1962-63), 239-96 and Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen,* Chapter 1.

ministration did not regard the *kaza* as an administrative unit which necessarily had a town as its base. Throughout the sixteenth century, but equally during the period that was to follow, the Ottoman administration instituted a large number of rural *kazas,* whose administrative centres did not develop into even moderately urbanized places before the late nineteenth or even the twentieth century.

By the same token, the network of fortifications as it existed during the earlier part of Kanuni Süleyman's reign did not correspond very closely to the urban network, at least if one disregards the exceptional case of the *vilayet* of Rum. Defense of the Aegean coast, and of the frontier against Iran, but also control of certain more recently conquered former Anatolian principalities, seem to have constituted the main policy considerations behind the network of fortifications as it existed between 1520 and 1540. Again, the existence of a major fortress did not necessarily induce urban development, even when combined with the attributes of a *sancak* centre: the case of Karahisar-ı Şarki (Şebinkarahisar) might be cited as an example in this respect[41].

Medreses differed from administrative centres and fortifications in that they reflected the Anatolian urban network reasonably well, and as a result one may interpret the distribution of *medreses* as an indicator regarding the presence of towns. What is more, starting from the relatively accessible information concerning *medreses* of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, one may attempt to reconstruct the urban network of the times, concerning which no direct official information is available.

In addition, a study of the distribution of urban institutions tends to confirm the impressions gained from the perusal of seventeenth-century Ottoman authors such as Evliya Çelebi or Katip Çelebi. At least as much as by the number of people living in a given settlement, its urban character was determined by the administrative and cultural institutions functioning in it. Correlation between town size and the development of these institutions being only

41 Leila Erder, Suraiya Faroqhi, "Population Rise and Fall in Anatolia 1550-1620," *Middle Eastern Studies,* 15 / 3 (1979), 322-45.

approximate, definitions based upon population size, and definitions based upon the size and number of urban institutions, coincide only for the biggest cities. As to the small towns which form the principal subject of this study, institutional criteria may serve to weed out those places which should not be regarded as towns. A settlement may have been promoted to the rank of a *kaza* centre, and possibly by virtue of this fact may have acquired a market. But without a *medrese,* a Friday mosque, and a number of public baths and *zaviyes,* contemporaries do not seem to have regarded a place as a real town.

These considerations bring us back to our starting point, namely to the problem of urban integration and the degree of dependence of the Anatolian town upon the Ottoman central government. On the one hand, the elaborate and hierarchically organized administrative system of the Ottoman Empire failed to shape the urban hierarchy in its own image. This may be taken to indicate that the Ottoman central government was not particularly concerned about towns and cities as half-way stations upon the road which agriculturally-based taxes took from the Anatolian village to Istanbul. One might even follow this logic one step further, and assume that such intermediaries between the countryside and Istanbul were not considered particularly desirable, since they tended to diminish the amount of revenue at the disposal of the central administration.

But at the same time, it is obvious that the institutional characteristics of the sixteenth-century Anatolian town, mosque, *medrese,* fortifications and others, had come into being either upon the direct initiative of the Ottoman central government, or, at the very least, had been founded or continued to exist with official toleration. The importance of such toleration became particularly apparent when the territory of one of the former Anatolian *beyliks* was taken over by the Ottoman state; for without official recognition and the assignment of revenues, the foundations of Karamanoğlu Ibrahim Bey or Dulkadirli Alaeddavla Bey could scarcely have continued to function for centuries after the Ottoman conquest. Moreover, the Ottoman central administration of the

fifteenth century also established a sizeable number of urban foundations, at least before the reconstruction of Istanbul absorbed most of the available capital. Thus one might draw the conclusion that it was not as much the 'official' network of administrative units and fortifications that shaped the Anatolian urban network of the sixteenth century, as the Ottoman government's toleration and support of locally based foundations.

This situation in turn would explain why many reseachers doing detailed work on Anatolian towns between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries have observed features which seem to point at a 'semi-dependent' rather than at a 'dependent' town. If the Ottoman administrative apparatus for its functioning had relied more heavily upon the provincial towns, the results would probably have been different. But as it was, the notables of even minor Ottoman towns of the sixteenth century were able to develop a certain amount of cohesion, which permitted them to defend themselves vis-à-vis the Ottoman central administration. Other explanations of the 'semi-dependent' features of Anatolian towns are certainly possible; the present suggestions are meant to be a starting point for further discussion.



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Source : S. Faroqhi "Der Bektaschi - Orden in Anatolien (Vienna , 1981)

ANATOLIAN MEDRESES OF THE LATE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
THE FIGURES INDICATE THE NUMBER OF MEDRESES IN A GIVEN LOCALITY

MAP 8

III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 4

LES COMMUNES DANS LES REGIONS GRECQUES DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN: FONCTIONS FISCALES ET RESTRICTIVES

Quelques observations générales

SPYROS I. ASDRACHAS / PARIS

L'institution communale en Grèce pendant la domination ottomane a une fonction fiscale qui détermine d'une part sa continuité et, de l'autre, son pouvoir restrictif: la fonction fiscale consiste à la distribution et à la perception de l'impôt que l'administration centrale établit à partir des estimations qu'elle a faites par rapport aux effectifs démographiques et aux disponibilités économiques de la commune ou de la région plus vaste dont elle fait partie. La source de la fiscalité étant par excellence la production rurale, des populations dépourvues des revenus fonciers se voient imposées à partir des critères qui répondent au modèle de l'économie rurale et, dans ces cas extrêmes, c'est la commune en tant que pouvoir qui établit l'assiette fiscale en s'appuyant sur d'autres critères, ceux qui résultent de la stratification économique et sociale réelle de la population[1]. Ces cas extrêmes illustrent un mécanisme d'ensemble

[1] La bibliographie sur les communes est très nourrie: après avoir cité les travaux de D. Zakythinos, *La commune grecque. Les conditions historiques d'une décentralisation administrative* (tiré-à-part de *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*, 2, 1948) (Athènes, 1948); J. Visvizis, "L'administration communale des Grecs pendant la domination ottomane", *1453-1953. Le cinq-centième anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople* (fasc. hors série de *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*) (Athènes, 1953), 217-38; N. Pantazopoulos, *Ἑλλήνων συσσωματώσεις κατά τήν Τουρκοκρατίαν* (tiré-à-part de *Gnoseis*) (Athènes, 1958), je mentionne parmi les publications plus récentes, Elena Grozdanova, *B'lgarskata selska obština prez XV-XVIII vek* (avec un résumé français, pp. 196-206: 'La commune rurale bulgare aux XVe-XVIIIe s.') (Sofia, 1979); Hélène Couccou, *Οἱ κοινοτικοί θεσμοί στίς Κυκλάδες κατά τήν Τουρκοκρατία* (Athènes, 1980) et, surtout, G. Contogiorgis, *Κοινωνική δυναμική καί πολιτική αὐτοδιοίκηση. Οἱ ἑλληνικές Κοινότητες τῆς τουρκοκρατίας* (Athènes, 1982), ainsi que B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus. Les cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane c. 1500-1718*, I-II (Publications de

qui vaut pour tout l'Empire ottoman: le surplus est issu de l'économie rurale et c'est ce surplus qui est approprié par l'Etat qui, à son tour, le distribue aux représentants de son appareil militaire, administratif, religieux. L'appropriation de ce surplus par l'Etat se fait par le biais de la fiscalité: ceci ne veut pas dire que tout le surplus soit approprié; cependant l'incidence de la fiscalité sur les revenus était telle que la marge des revenus nets des producteurs directs s'avérait restreinte. Les autorités communales sont appelés à assumer le rôle de l'intermédiaire dans le transfert de cette partie du surplus appropriée par l'Etat.

Il va de soi que la notion du surplus est prise au sens du surplus en général: toutes les économies n'étaient pas excédentaires et l'imposition frappe la production et la population sans en tenir compte du niveau de la production et des revenus. Les impôts étaient exigibles en nature et en argent: la fraction monétaire de l'imposition est un indice minimal de la monétarisation des économies et, par conséquent, de la participation du producteur direct au marché. Ces déductions reflètent la logique du modèle économique de l'Empire: or, ce modèle qui prévoit, d'une part, des économies villageoises excédentaires et, de l'autre, l'existence d'un marché accessible au producteur direct, ne s'affirme dans la réalité que par de médiations multiples, qui chargent la notion de la monétarisation et du marché avec des significations qui ne sont pas les nôtres. C'est ainsi, pour évoquer quelques exemples, qu'une partie de la production devient une "marchandise" par voie de contrainte (ventes obligatoires à l'Etat à des prix "coupés") et la formation des prix n'est pas toujours tributaire du jeu de l'offre et de la demande: l'exigence fiscale déclanche une commercialisation obligatoire qui ne présupose nécessairement pas l'existence de stimulus économiques provenant du marché; qui plus est, la fraction monétaire de l'impôt peut être desservie par le biais de l'endettement des producteurs qui conduit à la prévente de la

l'Institut Historique-Archéologique Néerlandais de Stamboul, 51, 1982) (I, 155-60, 172-76, 214-18, 240-43 et 260-65) où est citée la bibliographie antérieure. Pour une esquisse des fonctions fiscales de la commune, Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Φορολογικοί μηχανισμοί καί οἰκονομία στό πλαίσιο τῶν ἑλληνικῶν κοινοτήτων (ιζ'-ιθ' αἰ.), *in Ζητήματα ἱστορίας* (Athènes, 1983), 235-53.

production future aux prix de la dépression saisonnière. La fonction fiscale de la commune s'exerce à travers ces réalités économiques et sociales et les reflète[2].

L'imposition en nature, étant proportionnelle à la production obtenue, ne pose pas de gros problèmes de déséquilibre entre revenus nets et dû fiscal: c'est le contraire qui se passe avec l'imposition en argent qui, d'autre part, présente une oscillation dans le temps, due soit à la superposition d'autres impôts soit à l'adaptation de ceux-ci à la dépréciation monétaire. L'aggravation fiscale entraîne la désarticulation du système d'équilibre qui existait au sein des sociétés villageoises, désarticulation qui s'exprime par deux réactions typiques:

a) l'endettement de la commune avec, comme conséquence, la mise en vente des biens communaux ainsi que des propriétés privées, champs et vignes;

b) la fuite sélective ou totale des paysans entraînant l'abandon précaire ou définitif des villages.

La première réaction est à l'origine d'un changement dans le monde de production: en effet, les cultivateurs qui travaillaient sur leurs propres champs se voient obliés de cultiver les mêmes champs, qui maintenant appartiennent à un propriétaire auquel ils versent une partie de la production, ordinairement le tiers ou le quart: leur marge pour obtenir un surplus et un revenu net devient minime, parce qu'à l'obligation fiscale s'ajoute une autre, la réalisation d'une rente foncière qui va au propriétaire de la terre aliénée. D'habitude, celui-ci est un personnage qui ne dispose pas que des ressources pécuniaires: il dispose aussi d'un pouvoir résultant soit de son rang dans l'appareil administratif et militaire, soit d'une suprématie guerrière acquise dans les conflits entre les clans ou les communautés qui se disputaient de la protection qu'ils offraient aux populations environnantes. Le cas d'Ali Pacha de

2 Pour une vue d'ensemble, je me permets de renvoyer à Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Le surplus rural dans les régions de la Méditerranée Orientale: les mécanismes", *Actes du IIe Colloque International d'histoire. Economies méditerranéennes: équilibres et intercommunications, XIIIe-XIXe siècles,* II (Athènes, Centre de Recherches Néohelléniques de la Fondation Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique) (sous presse).

Jannina ainsi que des chefs albanais illustre en Epire ce phénomène; l'un et les autres sont devenus maîtres d'un grand nombre de villages par tous les moyens possibles: achats forcés ou volontiers, achats par le biais de l'endettement, achats par la prise en charge de la dette communale.

La tâche de la commune est de sauvegarder l'équilibre qui est la condition préalable pour la mise en mouvement du mécanisme fiscal: pour que la commune, en tant qu'agglomération humaine, existe, elle doit répondre à l'exigence fiscale; pour y arriver, il faut que la production soit réalisée et, en même temps, contrôlée. Si la production est réalisée sur place, on contrôle le mouvement des personnes en empêchant les fuites; si la production et les revenus sont effectués ailleurs, on s'efforce de contrôler les émigrants: les liaisons familiales, le droit de la commune de prendre possession sur les biens de l'émigré s'y prêtent. C'est ainsi que la commune, en tant qu'institution, exerce un pouvoir coercitif et non suelement par rapport à sa fonction fiscale.

Le contrôle du mouvement des personnes, de la production et des revenus résulte du fait que l'impôt, malgré sa base personnelle, devient une affaire collective du moment où la perception du dû fiscal est prise en charge par la collectivité à travers ses représentants: avant que le total de l'imposition devienne un *maktu,* c'est-à-dire une somme forfaitaire que les autorités communales répartissent ensuite parmi les contribuables, la commune doit répondre aux carences que provoque le mouvement des personnes. C'est ainsi que, selon les stipulations des *kanunnâme,* le paysan qui émigre est astreint au paiement d'un impôt pour la terre qu'il a laissée vacante, le *çift bozan*; en réalité, c'est la commune qui s'en charge[3]. Elle a donc par contrainte tout intérêt de stabiliser la population et de nouer un tissus de solidarités internes qui renforcent ses fonctions restrictives. La solidarité com-

3 Voir entre autres sur ce sujet, J. Kabrda, "Contribution à l'étude de la rente féodale dans l'Empire ottoman", *Sborník Prací Filosofické Brněnské University,* 13 (1966), 66. Parmi les témoignages qui démontrent que l'impôt est payé par la commune, N.S. Stavrinidis, *Μεταφράσεις τουρκικῶν ἱστορικῶν ἐγγράφων ἀφορώντων εἰς τήν ἱστορίαν τῆς Κρήτης,* I (Candie, 1975), 219 (1671).

munale tient en grande partie au fait que la récession démographique n'entraînait pas réciproquement une diminution du dû fiscal: or, ceci était largement tributaire de l'impôt personnel qui ne dépendait pas de la production soumise à des prélèvements proportionnels; c'est ainsi qu'un recul des effectifs humains comportait une augmentation de l'assiette personnelle, étant donné que le montant de l'impôt non proportionnel était, déjà, fixé. Pour en former une idée de l'incidence de cette fraction inélastique de l'imposition, nous rappelons que les impôts personnels représentent, selon le cas et même sans tenir compte de la capitation, les 33,5%, les 24,3%, les 21,4%, les 34%, les 25% de la rente fiscale perçue par les timariotes d'un nombre de villages en Grèce, aux XVe et XVIe siècles, rentes composées d'impôts et droits sur la production et sur les personnes; compte tenu de la capitation ainsi que des *avarız,* ces pourcentages seraient deux fois supérieurs. Si la commune était soumise au paiement d'un *maktu,* le recul démographique affecterait aussi l'imposition proportionnelle, exception faite des cas où la dîme n'entrait pas dans le *maktu.* Les impôts personnels sont exigibles en argent; ils ne sont pas les seuls qui entrent dans la fraction monétaire de l'imposition: les impôts sur le cheptel, les vignobles, les moulins, les droits sur les mariages, les délits ainsi que d'autres impôts et redevances sont également perçus en argent: ils représentent dans certaines économies villageoises les 65,4%, 56,44%, les 41%, les 67%, les 74,9% de la rente fiscale totale, capitation et *avarız* n'étant pas pris en considération[4].

Nous avons signalé que cette partie monétaire de l'imposition est à même de déclencher le mouvement de désarticulation du système d'appropriation du surplus: car, si ce système présuppose le contact du contribuable avec le marché, rien ne nous assure que l'existence d'un surplus conduisait nécessairement à ce contact; qui plus est, si ce contact a eu lieu, rien n'indique qu'il s'agissait

[4] Pour ces chiffres, Sp. I. Asdrachas, *Μηχανισμοί τῆς ἀγροτικῆς οἰκονομίας στήν τουρκοκρατία (ιε'-ιστ' αἰώνας)* (Athènes, 1978), 45, 81, 123 et Evangelia Balta, *L'île d'Eubée à la fin du XVe siècle d'après les registres nº 0.73 de la Bibliothèque Cevdet à Istanbul,* II (Paris, 1983), 21 (Thèse de doctorat à Paris I).

d'un contact qui incitait le producteur de "monétariser" son économie, chose qui serait possible si le surplus n'était pas absorbé, pour l'essentiel, par les impôts. Or, dans la mesure où nous pouvons avoir quelques ordres de grandeur quantitatifs, nous appercevons que les marges pour la réalisation de revenus nets ne représentaient grand'chose: quelques 12% de la production brute céréalière, si on se fie à certains exemples du XVe et du XVIe siècle. Dans le même sens, les excédents fictifs d'une exploitation céréalière — type correspondent aux 33% de la production brute: compte tenu des systèmes de partage entre le cultivateur et le maître de la terre, cet excédent serait presque zéro pour le cultivateur, si le partage se faisait à moitié et si le rendement était de l'ordre 1 : 5; si, au contraire, le partage se faisait au tiers, l'excédent correspondrait, avec le même rendement, aux 9,8% de la production brute. Bien sûr, ces calculs n'ont qu'une valeur tout-à-fait relative: un partage à moitié nécessiterait la mise en exploitation des terres accusant un rendement plus haut que 1 : 5; cependant, ces calculs montrent également que les possibilités de monétarisation essentielle des économies villageoises s'avèrent réduites. Dans la réalité, les marges des revenus nets ne dépendent pas seulement des cultures céréalières: il y en a d'autres, complémentaires et par excellence commercialisables, notamment la viticulture qui, dans les exemples que nous avons présentés, représente les 29% du montant total (en valeurs monétaires) de la rente fiscale. Or, dans ces cas concrets, l'apport de la viticulture n'est pas en mesure de récompenser les carences des cultures céréalières et de permettre la réalisation de revenus nets considérables[5].

[5] Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Fiscalité et monétarisation dans les économies villageoises balkaniques, XVe-XVIe siècles", *L'argent et la circulation des capitaux dans les pays méditerranéens (XVIe-XXe siècles).* Actes des journées d'études, Bendor, 3, 4 et 5 mai 1979 (fasc. hors série des *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*) (Nice, 1983), 113-19. Il faut préciser que ce pourcentage est valable pour l'ensemble des excédents de chaque village. La documentation se référant à la dîme des céréales totale, ne permet pas de prendre en considération les productions individuelles et d'en dégager ainsi les échanges à l'intérieur du village, qui auraient eu lieu entre productions déficitaires et productions excédentaires. Donc, ce pourcentage exprime la possibilité d'existence d'un revenu net par rapport à la

Cela dit, toute communauté ne dépend pas que de l'agriculture: omniprésente, elle ne constitue pas pour cela la source principale de revenus de tous les milieux humains et l'exemple des îles, des villages spécialisés dans une activité artisanale, voire des villes avec leurs circuits commerciaux et leurs productions artisanales, avec leurs services multiples en dit long. La commune en tant qu'institution administrative doit drainer une partie des disponibilités monétaires de la population vers le fisc; elle ne peut ni modifier les sources des revenus, ni assumer la gestion de celles ci, exception faite des biens communaux: son rôle consiste dans le maintien de l'équilibre qui fait opératoires ces sources de revenus à l'égard de l'exigence fiscale, mais qui, en même temps, perpétue la structure économique sur laquelle s'appuie le société dont elle est le représentant. Pour y arriver, elle doit exercer ces fonctions restrictives, son pouvoir de coercition qui lui permet même d'établir l'assiette fiscale individuelle à partir des critères qui ne font pas partie des critères à partir desquels l'administration centrale a établi l'impôt: c'est ainsi que pour assurer la perception d'un dû fiscal total établi, dans les îles de l'Archipel, à la base des impôts personnels et des impôt grévant la production agricole et l'élevage ainsi que d'autres sources de revenus secondaires, la commune impose une taxe, dirait-on sur le revenu, à l'aide de laquelle on arrive à recompenser le déficit résultant d'une logique fiscale qui ne prend pas en considération les sources réelles des revenus. Nous y reviendrons.

Si la commune ne gère pas l'économie de son territoire, toutefois elle gère une partie de ses ressources: il ne s'agit pas que de la vente des biens vacants[6]; il s'agit aussi des intrées monétaires dans la caisse communale par le biais des impôts sur les pâturages. J'en donne un exemple carctéristique. Parmi les impôts qui frappent

production totale, abstraction faite des échanges intérieurs; ceux-ci, d'ailleurs, devraient se faire, pour l'essentiel, en nature à travers les partages qui s'effectuaient entre les cultivateurs et les maîtres des terres cultivées à métayage.

6 A titre d'exemple, C.P. Lazaridis, *Τά "κοινά μεζάτια" στό Ζαγόρι* (Janina, 1977); I. Martinianos (v. note 12), 186-89; A.Th. Dracakis (v. note 22), 198-99, 206 (§ vii); D. Petropoulos, *Νοταριακαί πράξεις Μυκόνου τῶν ἐτῶν 1663-1779*, (Athènes, 1960), 575-76, 746, 847; P. Zerlentis, *Σύστασις τοῦ Κοινοῦ τῶν Μυκονίων*, (Syra, 1924), 58.

l'élevage, ceux sur les pâturages d'été et d'hiver affectent l'élevage transhumant: derrière ses impôts se cachent d'autres pratiques, à savoir les loyers que versent les propriétaires des troupaux dont bénéficiait également la commune en tant que maître du sol; cependant, nous laissons de côté cet aspect pour n'insister que sur l'aspect fiscal. Il arrive donc que dans les cadastres des *timars* le droit sur les pâturages ne soit pas inséré dans les revenus fiscaux dont jouissait le maître du *timar*: les paysans prétendent que ces droits leurs appartiennent n'étant obligés que de payer ce qu'il était inscrit sur le registre; le reste de ces droits, reçus en argent, leur permettrait de répondre à d'autres obligations fiscales[7]. Bien que le *kanunnâme* qui enregistre ce cas explique que les droits sur les pâturages appartiennent au maître du sol, c'est-à-dire au timariote, toutefois il faut retenir le fait que les paysans, à savoir la commune, percevaient ce numéraire pour faire face à leurs obligations fiscales monétaires: autrement dit, la commune gérait ses ressources de revenus en modifiant leur affectation fiscale. Ceci ressort clairement d'un autre témoignage du début du XVIIIe siècle. En effet, les propriétaires des *çiftliks* d'un village de la région de Salonique refusaient de payer leur part des impôts sous pretexte que la commune recevait les impôts sur les pâturages et ne versait qu'une fraction au maître du *timar*; avec le reste on acquittait les autres impôts. Les maîtres des *çiftliks* prétendaient qu'avec ce reste on pouvait payer les leurs[8]. De ces exemples ressort explicite-ment que la desserte de l'exigence fiscale ne dépendait pas que des apports personnels: la commune bénéficie du décalage qui existe entre l'impôt nominal inscrit sur le registre fiscal et l'impôt réel. Qui plus est, le timariote qui jouit de ces impôts n'est pas, en même temps, le percepteur direct. Ce rôle est assumé par la commune qui modifie, en même temps, la structure de l'imposi-

7 J. Kabrda, *op. cit.*, 12 (1965) 108.

8 Ioannis Vasdravellis, *Ἱστορικά ἀρχεῖα Μακεδονίας*, I (Salonique, 1952), 83-84. Les *çiftliks* doivent être conçus dans le sens de l'unité d'exploitation, l'équivalant du terme grec *zevgari*, et non pas dans le sens de la grande propriété foncière, voire du village privé. A ce propos, Halil Inalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, *çiftliks*: State, Landlords and Tenants", *in* J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et P. Dumont (éd.), *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1983), 105-25.

tion et, par voie de conséquence, les obligations fiscales individuelles.

Cependant, les apports extérieurs, tels que les entrées monétaires assurées par l'élevage transhumant, ne sont pas de règle: la commune doit se procurer de l'argent à l'intérieur de la collectivité qui n'est pas toujours en mesure de se comporter au niveau individuel d'une façon positive envers les impératifs de la fiscalité. Nous avons mentionné l'endettement comme un cas, extrême et destructif, de réponse de la part de la commune à l'obligation fiscale; il existe des réponses intermédiaires. C'est ainsi qu'il se passe avec la *tansa,* une sorte de taxe sur les fortunes, dans les îles de l'Archipel; parmi les exemples, je présente celui de l'île de Patmos: c'est un exemple indicatif, parce qu'il démontre, d'une part, ce qui pouvait être l'incidence de cet impôt complémentaire sur l'imposition totale et parce qu'il fait ressortir, de l'autre, la stratification économique et sociale dont cet impôt est le reflet[9].

Pendant les années 1671 et 1680 c'est l'impôt capital qui détermine l'imposition totale de l'île: respectivement 64,71% et 72,61% contre 23,45% et 18,79% pour la *tansa* et 11,84% et 8,59% pour l'impôt sur les biens ruraux. L'impôt capital, au lieu de 3 catégories que prévoit la loi, se voit partagé en 7: c'est l'effet de la redistribution qu'effectuent les autorités communales à l'intérieur de la commune; cependant, la plupart de la population verse la somme la plus élevée, ce qui veut dire que cette obligation fiscale est inélastique. Au contraire, l'impôt complémentaire, la *tansa,* accuse une gamme variée qui reflète à son tour la gamme des revenus des contribuables et, en même temps, l'intervention des autorités communales dans la fixation d'une taxe variable reposant sur la fortune des membres de la commune: tandis que la capitation accuse, comme nous venons de signaler, une forte polarisation autour de chiffre maximal, la *tansa* présente plusieurs fréquences qui se répartissent autour des chiffres comme 20 (*paras* par

9 Tout ce qui suit résulte de l'analyse des registres fiscaux de l'île. Un inventaire de ceux-ci, V. Panayotopoulos, "'Αρχεῖο Μονῆς 'Ιωάννου Θεολόγου Πάτμου", *O Eranistis,* 3 (1965), 154-55. Cf. Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Κατακερματισμός τῆς ἀγροτικῆς ἰδιοκτησίας : τό παράδειγμα τῆς Πάτμου", *in Ζητήματα ἱστορίας,* 65-78.

personne), 40, 50, 60, 80 (1671); 15, 30 et 32, 46, 54, 86, 120, 168 (1680); 12, 25, 35, 45, 55, 65, 114 (1683). La variabilité des chiffres d'une année à l'autre s'explique par la variabilité de la taxe, tandis que la répartition en ordres de grandeur reflète, d'une part, la stratification des revenus de la population et, de l'autre, l'adaptation de la stratégie communale à cette stratification lors de l'établissement de l'assiette fiscale. Les rapports minimaux, maximaux et moyens entre la *tansa* et la capitation expriment à la fois l'intervention de la commune dans la répartition des charges fiscales et l'envergure de l'échelle des revenus réels:

Années	Rapport minimal	Rapport maximal	Rapport moyen
1671	6,25%	250%	41,31%
1680	6,25%	150%	42,51%
1683	7,51%	150%	32,30%

Considérée du point de vue de la *tansa,* la desserte de l'obligation fiscale présente la répartition suivante: en 1671, les 63,01% de la population versent les 37,58% du total de cette charge fiscale; en 1680, les 61,14% de la population versent les 35,05% et en 1683, les 70,5% versent les 44,51%. La même répartition des revenus est indiquée par l'échelle de la propriété foncière: en 1672, les 56,75% de la population possèdent les 14,67% du total des terres; les 23,18% en possèdent les 19,72%, les 8,65% et les 9,34% de la population en possèdent respectivement les 2,75% et les 26,13%. C'est le contraire qui se passe avec le paiement de la capitation: en 1681, les 76,31% de la population versent 4 *guruş* par personne, les 10% versent 3 : 20, les 5,79% en versent 3, les 3,16% et les 3,68% en versent 2 : 20 et 2 *guruş* et le reste 1 : 20 et 1 *guruş*. Donc, la commune peut procéder à une rédistribution de la charge fiscale totale à partir des classifications des contribuables plus variées que celles de la capitation; cependant, rares sont les cas où cette charge, la *tansa,* dépasse la montant maximal de la capitation. Toutefois, le mécanisme d'équilibrage à l'intérieur de la commune s'affirme dans un champs d'action plus

vaste que celui de la rédistribution de la charge fiscale.

En effet, le gros problème consiste dans l'impossibilité de percevoir l'impôt de tous les contribuables: une des raisons est le mouvement des personnes, mais aussi, et surtout, le manque de disponibilités pécuniaires. La mobilité des personnes est une condition indispensable pour la sauvegarde des sociétés qui ne sont pas appuyées sur des économies vivrières et autarchiques, comme c'est le cas avec la plupart des îles de l'Archipel grec. L'exemple de l'île de Syra en témoigne avec l'acquittement des impôts qui se fait dans les endroits d'accueil de ses émigrants, Constantinople et Smyrne: on assiste ici au contrôle que la commune exerce sur le mouvement des personnes. Il en va de même pour les émigrants de l'Epire, tel ce marchand originaire de Metzovo qui, tout en résidant aux pays roumains, s'occupe avec le fermage des impôts, ou les artisans de la même région résidant dans la ville de Janina qui, s'échappant aux obligations des corporations, restent liés fiscalement avec leurs patries d'origine où demeurent leurs familles et où ils disposent des biens[10]. Revenons aux témoignages patmiens qui nous offrent un exemple concret de l'attitude de la population envers l'impôt.

L'examen des registres fiscaux de l'île nous démontre que la population n'acquitte que partiellement sont dû fiscal; voilà quelques chiffres:

Années	Acquittement en %
1671	67,99
1679	45,76
1681	60,96
.....	.....
1751	60,85
1791	79,12

10 Marchand à Bucarest, D. Limona, "Μερικά ἑλληνικά ἔγγραφα εὑρισκόμενα εἰς τά ἀρχεῖα τοῦ Βουκουρεστίου", *Makedonika*, 11 (1971), 299-301; dans ce sens, Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Στρατηγική τῶν κεφαλαίων καί γραφειοκρατικές λειτουργίες : μιά περίπτωση ἐκμίσθωσης προσόδων στά 1790", *in Ζητήματα ἱστορίας*, 79-95. Corporations, G. Papageorgiou, *Οἱ συντεχνίες στά Γιάννενα κατά τόν 19ο καί τίς ἀρχές τοῦ 20οῦ αἰώνα* (Janina, 1982), 81 et 379 (§ IV).

Les impôts qui ne sont pas payés sont des impôts de l'année fiscale en cours, ainsi que des restes des années passées: c'est ainsi qu'en 1791, les impôts effectivement payés ne représentent que les 24,25% de la totalité du dû fiscal (le restant y compris) et les 79,12% du dû fiscal de l'année en cours. En 1690, la population contribuable de l'île ne verse que les 4,25% des arriérés, tandis qu'en 1680 elle en acquitte les 23,83%; toutefois, les arriérés de la *tansa* ne représentent que les 1,22% du montant de cette taxe, en 1680. On assiste, donc, à un comportement négatif envers l'obligation fiscale: il est commun à toute l'échelle des revenus et il se détermine soit par un absentéisme total d'une fraction de la population soit par une participation à l'acquittement de l'impôt relative: c'est ainsi qu'en 1671, les 19,74% de la population ne répondent nullement à leurs obligations fiscales, tandis que le reste participe, en général, partiellement en acquittant, selon la tranche fiscale, les 74 à 88% de leur dû. L'absentéisme peut être tributaire de l'émigration et du mouvement des personnes, mais il dépend aussi du niveau des revenus: dans ce sens, il est caractéristique le fait qu'en 1751 et 1791, la participation des revenus les plus bas à l'acquittement de l'impôt est, respectivement, de 35% et 43,86% de la population, tandis que les revenus moyens en participent avec 80,57% et 68,47%; les revenus les plus hauts se représentent avec de pourcentages pareils: 65,22% et 75%.

Tout ceci se réfère à la catégorie principale des contribuables, c'est-à-dire les chefs de ménages: si l'on passe à deux autres catégories, les célibataires et les veuves, on apperçoit le même comportement mais plus accentué. Des célibataires ne participent à l'acquittement de l'impôt que les 28%, en 1681 (contre 86,74% pour les chefs de ménages), les 9,5%, en 1688, les 23,19%, en 1696; les veuves en participent avec des pourcentages plus élevés (50,77%, en 1681). Il en va de même avec les sommes payées: en 1681, les célibataires ne versent que les 17% de leur dû fiscal, tandis que les veuves en versent les 46%.

Cette attitude devant l'impôt est récompensée par l'intervention

des autorités communales qui mettent en mouvement le mécanisme des solidarités internes: les prêts, avec ou sons intérêt, en constituent une des manifestations majeures. Les prêteurs offrent parfois à la commune des sommes qu'ils réclament ensuite des contribuables débiteurs: à titre d'exemple, un prêteur, en 1700, couvre 50 contribuables, d'autres couvrent 12, 11, 8, 7, 5, 2. Il est clair que les solidarités et les soummissions qui en résultent s'étendent sur tout le tissu social et engendrent des rapports de réciprocité qui perpétuent et intériorisent les dépendances économiques et sociales.

Les exemples évoqués font état de la fonction régulatrice de la commune dans des situations où le système d'équilibre reste en vigueur: cela ne veut pas dire qu'à l'intérieur de la commune ne se déclenchent pas des conflits entre gouvernés et gouvernants qui, parfois, expriment une contestation à l'égard de certaines formes par lesquelles s'affirmait le système socio-économique: parmi les exemples, le conflit qui sépare la paysannerie de Naxos et les notables d'origine occidentale, détenteurs de droits féodaux sur la terre[11]; les conflits qui séparent les catégories socio-professionnelles de la population de Moschopolis au XVIIIe siècle[12]; les conflits qui séparent les fractions rivales, en 1770, de Trikala[13], en somme une série de conflits dont l'exposé serait long et monotone[14]. D'autre part, il n'y a pas que des situations où le système d'équilibre est en vigueur: nous avons fait mention des désarticulations qu'a provoquées à ce système la dette communale qui s'accumule et conduit soit à la fuite, totale ou sélective, soit à la vente des terres communales ou de villages entiers[15]. Du moment où les pressions exercées sur la commune dépassent certaines limites, les

11 B.J. Slot, *op. cit.*, I, 217.

12 I. Martinianos, *Ἡ Μοσχόπολις 1330-1930* (Salonique, 1967), 170-72.

13 Parmi les témoignages, C. Mertzios, *Μνημεῖα Μακεδονικῆς ἱστορίας* (Salonique, 1947), 416-17; cf. D.C. Tsopotos, *Γῆ καί γεωργοί τῆς θεσσαλίας κατά τήν τουρκοκρατίαν*, 2e éd. (Athènes 1974), 158-59.

14 Cf. M.V. Sakellariou, *Ἡ Πελοπόννησος κατά τήν δευτέραν τουρκοκρατίαν (1715-1821)* (Athènes, 1939), 93-96 et G. Contogiorgis, *op. cit.*, 328-49.

15 Cf. Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Γαιοπρόσοδος καί ὑποχρεωτικός ἐκχρηματισμός τῶν ἀγροτικῶν οἰκονομιῶν", *in Ἑλληνική οἰκονομία καί κοινωνία*, Athènes, 1982, pp. 123 sq.

solidarités s'expriment dorénavant négativement: la collectivité accepte le nouveau statut qui s'impose après la vente du village, comme elle accepte, d'ailleurs, la fuite collective. Quelles sont ces limites, sinon l'impossibilité de répondre à l'obligation fiscale monétaire? Cependant il faut nuancer: cette impossibilité est aussi fonction des situations sociales autres que celles qui existent au sein de chaque commune à part: le cas de Moschopolis, ville riche, prisonnière d'un arrière pays à forts traits de "violence organisée", est caractéristique. En Epire c'est typique le phénomène des dettes individuelles ou collectives accumulées qui frappent plusieurs générations. Les créanciers disposent de l'argent, fruit de leurs "entreprises de protection"[16], et le placent chez les individus et les communes: Moschopolis se trouve pendant la deuxième moitié du XVIII siècle sous le poids écrasant d'une dette de cette nature, réclamée par la force des armes; la réponse de la commune est la fuite collective[17]. Ici nous n'avons pas à faire à un déséquilibre entre disponibilités monétaires et exigence fiscale, mais à l'impossibilité d'insertion d'une "poche" d'activités commerciales dans un arrière pays obéissant à une autre logique économique et sociale.

Parler des communes c'est aussi parler de typologie économique et sociale: car, s'il y a des fonctions qui s'affirment partout, comme c'est le cas avec la fonction fiscale, celles-ci se chargent des significations qui relèvent du contenu économique et social de chaque agglomération humaine. C'est ainsi que la prédominance rurale ne suffit à elle seule de caractériser l'emprise des institutions communales: en effet, là où nous avons affaire avec des villages appartenant à des propriétaires ou à des institutions, telles que les *vakıfs* ou le domaine impérial, et affermés à des particuliers, les fonctions économiques passent aux mains des fermiers des revenus et de leurs gérants, aux mains des propriétaires et de leurs représentants. Ces intermédiaires s'interposent entre les représentants communaux et de ceux qui jouissent les rentes et, qui plus est, entre les cultivateurs et le marché et ceci par le biais de l'en-

16 Voir à ce sujet, Traian Stoianovich, "Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", *Journal of Economic History*, 20 (1960), 252.

17 I. Martinianos, *op. cit.*, pp. 173 sq.

dettement. D'autre part, les réalités internes dans chaque commune ne sont pas les même: les structures claniques qui prévalent dans des régions comme Mani, en Péloponnèse, Souli et autres agglomérations en Epire[18], déterminent aussi la réalisation de la production ainsi que la formation des notabilités locales. Il en va de mêmes avec les sociétés urbaines, avec le poids spécifique des corporations et de l'Eglise; avec les agglomérations îliennes ouvertes à la mer et au négoce, avec les grandes villes, comme Smyrne où les représentants de la commune relèvent des économies et, à partir d'un moment donné, au moins au début du XIXe siècle, des mentalités différentes, expression, elles aussi, de la dichotomie qui s'installe entre le marché intérieur et le marché extérieur[19]. Cependant, le trait commun de l'action communale est la protection et la perpétuation des coutumes, c'est-à-dire du contexte juridique, économique et social qui détermine le système des équilibres internes.

C'est à partir de cette fonction conservatrice que l'institution communale exerce ses pouvoirs de coercition: elle n'est pas la seule à exercer cette fonction; dans le domaine de l'économie et de ses corollaires morales, les corporations assument le même rôle, toutes les deux s'efforçant à faire respecter les normes qui règlent la vie des collectivités[20].

L'intervention de la commune dans l'orbite de l'économique se manifeste tant au niveau juridique qu'au niveau du marché. L'intervention au niveau juridique s'exprime à travers les codifications des lois locales (qui ne sont que le reflet de situations juridiques

18 Je cite deux publications relativement récentes: E.P. Alexakis, *Τά γένη καί ἡ οἰκογένεια στήν παραδοσιακή κοινωνία τῆς Μάνης*, Athènes, 1980; G. Sarigiannis, *Ἡ δημιουργία, ἡ ἐξέλιξη καί ἡ συγκρότηση τῆς σουλιώτικης ὁμοσπονδίας (16ος-18ος αἰ.)*, Janina, 1981.

19 Voir à propos de Smyrne, Philippe Iliou, *Κοινωνικοί ἀγῶνες καί Διαφωτισμός. Ἡ περίπτωση τῆς Σμύρνης (1819)*, Athènes, 1981, *passim*.

20 Cf. Sp. I. Asdrachas, "Οἱ συντεχνίες στήν τουρκοκρατία : οἱ οἰκονομικές λειτουργίες", *in Ζητήματα ἱστορίας*, 97-115. Pour les fonctions des corporations dans le cadre ottoman, G. Baer, "The Administrativ, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1 (1970), 28-50; "Monopolies and Restrictive Practices of Turkish Guilds", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 13 (April 1970), 145-65.

d'envergure générale) qui règlent les successions et les transferts des biens; elle s'exprime aussi à travers des normes qu'elle établit, en conformité avec l'action réciproque de l'Eglise, par rapport à la nature et la valeur de la dot; elle s'exprime, également, avec les changements qu'elle introduit pour ce qui est de transfert des biens, parce qu'il y a aussi des changements, c'est-à-dire des adaptations. Tout cela est bien connu. Nous n'en illustrons que l'intervention qui modifie la coutume, en présentant un seul exemple.

On sait que dans les îles de l'Archipel grec était en rigueur le droit de préemption. En 1695, la commune de Syra codifie ses coutumes: elle précise que ce droit est en vigueur, en expliquant que le prix du bien à vendre est stipulé par deux estimateurs: donc, les biens doivent rester dans l'orbite familiale sans passer sur un marché obéissant à l'offre et à la demande. En 1812, la commune revient sur cette décision avec l'argument que cette coutume est préjudiciable aux pauvres: elle décide que dorénavant le prix sera celui de l'enchérisseur; le proche est préféré à condition qu'il accepte ce prix. Détail considérable: la parenté est établie à partir du propriétaire actuel et non pas du propriétaire initial[21]. Il est clair que la modification de la coutume fait que les transactions échappent au circuit fermé familial et qu'une valeur s'attribue aux biens.

L'intervention sur le marché se manifeste à travers le contrôle des prix et des salaires et la politique annonaire[22]: le contrôle des prix et des salaires, ainsi que le contrôle des mesures, la fixation des points de vente font, également, partie des fonctions restrictives des corporations; les deux institutions se recoupent et là où les corporations n'existent pas, c'est la commune qui exerce leur

21 Les textes *in* I. et P. Zepos, *Jus Graecoromanum*, VIII (Athènes, 1931), 499-500 et 501-502 repris par D.S. Gkinis, *Σχεδίασμα ἱστορίας τοῦ Μεταβυζαντινοῦ Δικαίου* (Athènes, 1966), 148-49 et 269-79.

22 Cf. Sp. I. Asdrachas, " 'Η ἑλληνική οἰκονομία στόν ιη' αἰώνα. Οἱ μηχανισμοί", *in 'Ελληνική κοινωνία καί οἰκονομία*, 27-31; quelques exemples, A.Th. Drakakis, *'Η Σύρος ἐπί τουρκοκρατίας* (Syra, 1948), 105-106; Hélène Couccou, *op. cit.*, p. 247; D.S. Gkinis, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 (109), 127-128 (134), 222-223 (467); Ep. Georgantopoulos, *Τηνιακά* (Athènes, 1889), 123. Pour les pratiques ottomanes, N. Beldiceanu, *Recherche sur la ville ottomane au XVe siècle* (Paris, 1973), 75-77.

rôle coercitif. Cependant, l'intervention sur le marché ne s'affirme pas partout et il dépend du degré de cohésion de chaque commune: les autorités communales de tel[23] village montagnard peuvent vendre une exploitation rurale vacante, mais rien n'indique qu'elles exercent un pouvoir coercitif sur le marché, pour la simple raison que ce marché n'existe que de façon rudimentaire, voire saisonnière. Les communes des îles, mieux structurées que les communes rurales, ancrées dans les institutions urbaines que la conquête latine y avait établies et plongées dans la civilisation de l'écrit, ont laissé les témoignages de leur intervention dans tous les domaines de la vie publique et privée: l'économique en constitue une référence implicite qui se retrouve dans telle décision des autorités communales de l'île de Kythnos, qui défend l'enlèvement des filles (expédient pour faire augmenter la dot), dans telle pratique qui exempte de la taxe douanière les biens de consommation importés dans les îles, dans l'autre qui veut que ces biens soient vendus directement et pendant trois jours aux consommateurs, les marchands n'ayant pas droit d'en acheter qu'après l'expiration de ce délai[24]; dans telle habitude dans l'île de Chalki qui charge les représentants communaux avec la vente des éponges; en somme, il s'agit d'une intervention économique qui va de pair avec tous les réglèments qui concernent le maintien de l'ordre moral, le droit successorial, la constitution de la dot, le droit de préemption, la responsabilité collective, ainsi que toutes les mesures de police, parmi lesquelles celles qui se réfèrent aux animaux, traduisent aussi le souci de maintenir l'équilibre entre l'agriculture et l'élevage. En matière de fixation des prix, les autorités communales interviennent tant par rapport aux échanges

23 Artotina, en Etolie. D. Loucopoulos, *Ὁ Ρουμελιώτης καπετάνιος τοῦ 1821 Ἀνδρίτσος Σαφάκας καί τό ἀρχεῖο του* (Athènes, 1931), 61 (1774); cf. note 22.

24 Kythnos, A. Vallindas, *Κυθνιακά* (Syra, 1882), 85-87. Marché; la pratique est bien répandue dans les îles: à titre d'exemple, Hydra: I.P. Maniatopoulos, *Τό Ναυτικόν Δίκαιον τῆς Ὕδρας (1757-1821)* (Athènes, 1939), 105 (§ xxiii); Andros, D. Paschalis, "Νομικά ἔθιμα τῆς νήσου Ἄνδρου", *Archeion ton Oikonomikon kai Koinonikon Epistimon*, 5 (1925), 167-68; Santorini, les *capitula* de l'île *in* I. et P. Zepos, *op. cit.*, VIII, 503-17 (chap. XI); Tinos, D. Drossos, *Ἱστορία τῆς νήσου Τήνου* (Athènes, 1870), 242-46.

intérieurs que par rapport aux échanges entre les îles, comme il se passe, à titre d'exemple, avec la fixation du prix du vin que Sériphos et Poros exportent à Hydra[25]. Une commune comme celle de Syra arrive, au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, à prendre des décisions d'une importance majeure, faisant de cette île un port franc[26].

Tous ces cas caractéristiques peuvent nous aider à former une idée de l'impact des institutions communales sur la société et sur l'économie à travers les fonctions restrictives qu'elles assument tout au long de la domination ottomane. Ces cas n'obéissent ni à une chronologie, ni à une répartition géographique rigoureuses et systématiques; cependant, ils illustrent un mécanisme d'ensemble, voire la logique de l'institution: il s'agit à la fois d'une institution qui perpétue la conquête et qui réproduit un système d'équilibres, qui est condition préalable pour le maintien de ces collectivités elles-mêmes et par elles-mêmes. Notre esquisse a insisté sur l'intervention de la commune dans le domaine de l'économie et dans la mesure où cette économie est, d'une part, liée avec la fiscalité et, de l'autre, manifestée dans l'orbite où les institutions communales pouvaient avoir une emprise: politique annonaire, réglémentations du marché, droit successorial, coutumes réglant le transfert des biens. Nous avons laissé de côté la transgression de la fonction fiscale par les représentants communaux, qui est au centre des conflits à l'intérieur de la commune et qui traduit la logique du système fiscal: en effet, dans la mesure où le contrôle de la collectivité sur l'action de ses réprésentants s'atténue, ceux-ci font de leur fonction une entreprise d'enrichissement personnel, voire de spéculation sur les revenus publics; le système offre les possibilités pour y arriver: fermage des impôts, répartition verticale des charges fiscales, impositions extraordinaires, gérance de la dette, tout cela, allant de pair avec la stratification produite à l'intérieur des commune, ouvre un champs d'action aux autorités communales, leur permettant de participer à l'appropriation du surproduit à travers le mécanisme de la fiscalité. Cette transgres-

25 P. Zerlentis, " Ὑδραίων καί Σεριφίων ἐμπορικαί σχέσεις", *Nissiotiki Epetiris*, I (Syra, 1918), 224-45.
26 A.Th. Drakakis, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

sion n'a rien à faire avec la norme qui veut que le représentant de la commune soit rémunéré par la collectivité et, parfois, exempté de certaines charges; cependant, c'est la transgression et non pas la norme qui a marqué l'image des autorités communales.

III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 5

BYZANTINE AND OTTOMAN THESSALONIKI

VAS. DIMITRIADES / RETHYMNON

Any student of the history of the Ottoman Empire or the Islamic people generally, is well aware of the Islamic conception of the world divided into two parts, the *darülislam* and the *darülharb* that is the Domain of Islam and the Domain of War. He knows also that the purpose of the Ottoman Empire was to expand the *darülislam* to the charge of the *darülharb*. The question arises how far a country or a town belonging to the *darülharb* could be changed into a real *darülislam* after its occupation by the victorious Ottoman troops?

Let us consider Thessaloniki. This city, this year (1985) celebrates its 2,300th anniversary since it was built by King Cassander of Macedonia in 316 B.C. and was given by him its name in honour of his wife Thessaloniki, sister of Alexander the Great.

The town became eminent soon after its creation and much coveted by all the ensuing states in the Balkans. It became one of the most important Roman towns in the East and the main Byzantine stronghold in the Balkans after Constantinople. Its strong fortifications held back the Slavic invasions during the sixth and seventh centuries, and the Bulgars in the tenth century but the town succumbed to the Saracens in 904 and the Normans in 1185, who sacked it and destroyed its buildings. In 1204 it became for twenty years part of the Frankish kingdom of Baldwin when the Fourth Crusade resulted in the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire. In the following two centuries it was again a Byzantine town, playing an important role at the dynastic struggles of the last emperors. Social strife taking the appearance of inter-ecclesiastical disputes between the Zealots and the Hesychasts in the middle of the fourteenth century, and the impending danger of the Ottoman Turks during the last decades of the same century caused a large part of the inhabitants to abandon the town and seek refuge in safer places.

For the first time Turkish troops appeared under the city walls in 1372. They were certainly raiders, followers of the great marchlord (*uc beği*) Ğazi Evrenos Bey. It is most probable that the four years' siege which resulted in the first surrender of the town to Hayreddin Paşa in 1387, was undertaken by Ğazi Evrenos Bey's troops, having as their base the newly founded town of Yenice-i Vardar.

The town's people, abandoned by their Byzantine princes, came into terms with Hayreddin Paşa. The first Turkish occupation was rather mild; the "'ορισμός", the act by which the inhabitants kept certain privileges has been lost; however, it should be similar to the act by which the town of Yanena (Ioannina) in Epirus surrendered to Sinan Paşa in 1430

This mild occupation did not last for long; In 1391, according to the Byzantine historian Ducas, Sultan Bayezid I "'είλε καὶ Θεσσαλονίκην καὶ τα μετά την Θεσσαλονίκην χωρία" (he took over both Thessaloniki and the villages beyond Thessaloniki). It is not certain what exactly happened; does this "'είλε" mean that Thessaloniki in the years between 1387 and 1391 had been able to get rid of the Turkish garrison, and the town was retaken by the Turks for a second time, or Sultan Bayezid I, applying his policy of consolidating the Ottoman state repealed the privileges given to the town by his father's general and introduced to Thessaloniki and its area the *timar*-system? I am rather inclined to believe that the second case happened. There is no indication that the town's population or the Byzantine army were strong enough to throw the Turks off the walls. Moreover a second siege and the ensuing pillage would be events of great significance, same way or other mentioned by both Turkish and Byzantine sources, just as it happens with the following capture of the town in 1430, but apart from this small passage by Ducas, nobody else refers to it. Anyway, in the homilies of Isidoros, the contemporary archbishop of Thessaloniki, there are several indications that churches and monasteries in the the town were confiscated by the Turks, new taxes were imposed among which "παιδομάζομα", the recruiting of boys for the jannisaries' corps was the heaviest.

Following the battle of Ankara in 1402 Emperor Manuel II, persuaded next year Süleyman Çelebi, one of Bayezid's sons who was in charge of the Ottoman possessions in Europe, to give him back

Thessaloniki and some adjacent places, as well as a few islands in the Aegeaen sea. During the internal wars for the succession to the throne between Bayezid's sons, the town suffered greatly. Twice, in 1412 and 1416, it was besieged; and it started paying a heavy tribute in 1417. The Evrenos family raided incessantly the country; the town people could not go out of the town. Famine and insecurity obliged most of the people to abandon the town; only 20 to 25 thousands remained in it. Realising his inability to hold the town Andronicus, the Byzantine governor, left it to the Venetians in September 1423. The Venetians' harsh attitude towards the Orthodox Christian population, and their meagre measures against the imminent Turkish danger led more inhabitants to take refuge somewhere else. The town became more and more deserted.

The end came on 29 March 1430. After a short siege of only three days, the Turkish troops led by Sultan Murad II himself and Sinan Paşa, *beylerbeyi* of Rumeli, took the town over; for two days the Turks sacked the town, enslaving or killing the remaining inhabitants. On the third day the Sultan entered and prayed in the Acheiropoietos church, converting it into a mosque.

The town Murad II conquered was in fact an empty shell, a heap of ruins, but full of a tradition of more than seventeen centuries. The few inhabitants who survived the carnage, and those who were given their freedom bought back either by the Sultan himself or George Branković, the *Despot* of Serbia, together with those who came back trusting the promises of the Sultan, were no more than ten hundreds. Murad tried to revive the city, giving the best of the empty houses, the abandoned monasteries and the unused churches to his personnel. He also forced a thousand Turks to move from Yenice and settle down in Thessaloniki. He repaired the walls and the towers of the town which were falling into ruins, and he built a new bath, which still exists in the centre of the town. The Islamisation of the town had begun. How far did it proceed?

According to the Islamic pattern, a town's religious and political centre was the Friday mosque; next to it the *saray*, the principal goverment building, should be erected and nearby the hamam, the public baths, and the *suk* or *çarşı,* the market of the town, with the *bezesten,* a strong-roofed building with iron doors for storing in the

most valuable merchandise, like silk and velvet fabrics and golden objects.

Could this ideal town pattern be applied on Thessaloniki? The Byzantine town of Thessaloniki, based on the Roman campus, was completely different. The central mosque, the *Cuma camii,* was the church of Acheiropoietos at least until 1524, when Aya Sofia was also converted to a mosque and became the official mosque of the town. Both were far from the town market, the first among Christians and the second among Jews.

A glimpse at the situation prevailing in the town during the first years after the conquest we catch through the narrative of John Anagnostes, who was also a witness to the the siege. He describes also the desolation and the capture of the churches and the monasteries. He refers to the settlement of Turks from Yenice-i Vardar and he says that Turks and Greeks were living " 'αναμίξ" i.e. mixed up, haphazardly in the same quarters. Which were those quarters and where were they?

The answer to those questions is given by a *tahrir defteri,* a survey of the town's population for financial purposes, which took place in 1478. This valuable document was the subject of a recent article by Dr. Heath Lowry. In this *defter* the Turkish settlers were written down in *cemaats,* i.e. in groups. Each of them had as its centre a *mescid,* i.e. a mosque without a minaret, but, and this is important, those *mescids* were located in quarters having still their Byzantine names.

Until recently, these names were known through Greek documents, but we were not certain about their location, and there was a lot of confusion and speculation among scholars. While I was preparing "*The Topography of Thessaloniki during the Ottoman times*", I had already investigated where every mosque in Thessaloniki was put. It was easy now to relocate with enough certainty the Byzantine quarters and draw some more conclusions about the place where some churches, monasteries and gates were.

According to that data it was found that the district of St. Menas extended from the harbour as far as the Gate of Vardar, the west end of Egnatia Street; the Chrysi (Golden) district was located still northwards, where the western gate of St.Demetrius Street was; therefore that gate should be the Golden Gate mentioned by the

Byzantine documents, and not the western gate of Egnatia Street; The Litea or Liti gate, located until now at the west end of St.Demetrius Street, was very probably the small gate of the north walls, which led to an open place for prayers. The Omphalos district, located until now southwards of St.Demetrius Church, where the Roman Forum was, is clearly the area between the Chrysi district and the Government House of today. Using archaeological evidence Prof. G.Bakalakis in an article sets that district at the same place. The St.Demetrius district was around the church of the same name. The Katafigi district was around and westwards of the Panaghia Chalkeon Church. The Acheiropoietos district was near the church of the same name. The Aghia Pelagia district was correctly located by Dr. Lowry to the east of the harbour and near the sea-walls as far as the present metropolitan church of St.Gregory Palamas. The Asomaton district was in the northeastern area of the town, around the Vlatadon Monastery. Therefore we must reconsider the opinion accepted until now that the Rotonda was the Asomaton Church. In the Hippodrome district, which as we know was in the south-eastern area of the town, there was a mosque named Metropole; that means that the last Byzantine cathedral had been transformed into a mosque before 1478; that church could not be Aghia Sophia or the Rotonda, since both became mosques later. The Metropolis mosque is identified with the large octagonal building belonging to the Roman Palace, whose ruins were excavated several years ago. Later on its Turkish name was *Akçe Mescid* and a populous Turkish district existed around it until this century. The Octagon was destroyed some time during the Ottoman period and a new small mosque bearing the same name was erected over its ruins. The cathedral was probably the church of Panaghia Odighitria. A Greek Hospital nearby, probably the previous Metropolitan seat, was in use until 1823.

Another district, inhabited solely by Turks, under the name of Aya Sayakia or Aya Sinada, was near the eastern part of St.Demetrius Street. The mosque of Koca Kasim Paşa in that district was probably the St.Isaac Monastery. Finally the small district of Yani Mavrou Kali, being completely inhabited by Greeks, and therefore without a mosque, has not been identified.

We do not have enough time to stay longer on this interesting

subject. Let us mention only that in nine Byzantine quarters there lived 27 Turkish *cemaats* of 20 to 30 families each, and one more with Turkish only residents but in a Byzantine named quarter. In each of these nine quarters there lived about one hundred Greek families; in addition there was a small, completely Greek quarter, the only one with a person's name. We can assume that most of those mosques were previously churches; it would be most improbable to build so many mosques in such a short time, while there were a lot of empty churches in the town. In all there were 862 Turkish families, about 4,000 persons, apart from the administration and the garrison, and 1275 Greek families, about 6,000 persons.

Jews are not mentioned in this survey. Dr.Lowry suggests that the few Jewish families left in the town after the past adventurous years had been forced by Mehmed II to emigrate to Constantinople after its conquest. He may be right because we find only two *cemaats* of Jews who had come from Germany and Spain in the meantime, mentioned in another survey, which I think was written down sometimes about 1525. The Jews, refugees from Germany and mainly from Spain, who find asylum in Thessaloniki and Istanbul, come in continuous waves since 1492 and change drastically the composition of the population. Jews form more than half of the total number of the inhabitants.

In this second *tahrir defteri* there are ten Greek quarters, with 1678 families, but still under the same names; on the other hand the Turkish quarters are mentioned by their names, no longer belonging to Byzantine ones. Now there are 38 of them with 1650 families. The number of the Jews can not be estimated, because from the Turkish *defter* the pages with most of their names are lacking.

During the years between 1478 and 1525, in spite of this new development in the town, the Turks did not cease turkicising it. A few mosques were built, a caravansaray appeared in the middle of the town, just where a Byzantine building was until then, and close to it a *bezesten,* still existing, was erected. But the most striking element was the islamisation of the most important Byzantine churches, left until then in Christian hands. In 1492 the most sacred church in town, that of St.Demetrius, was turned into a mosque by Kasim Paşa; in 1500 the beautiful church of St.Panteleimon, still existing, was turned into a mosque by *kadi* Ishak Çelebi. In 1510 Yakub Paşa converted to a

mosque the church of Santa Aikaterini. Between 1520-1525 Cezerî Kasim Paşa seized a monastery, whose Katholikon is known today as Agioi Apostoloi, and turned it into another mosque. In 1524 the important church of Aghia Sophia became a mosque by Makbul Ibrahim Paşa, the Grand Vizier of Süleyman the Magnificent. Later on, in 1590, Sinan Paşa took over the Roman building of the Rotonda, then a church dedicated to the Angels. Greeks were left with a few small churches, probably belonging to monasteries of Mount Athos, which were successful in obtaining certain privileges by the Turks and their properties in the town had been immune from confiscation. Those churches, low and without bell-towers, were hidden in yards surrounded by houses, so that they would not be in danger from passing Turks.

The map of the town during that time should not differ considerably from the earlier one. Turkish districts were scattered among Greek ones in the flat part of the town, which extends almost as far as todays' St.Demetrius street, and was known as "Κάμπος", plain. The only change was the presence of more and more Jews; they began settling down first around the synagogue of Etj-a-Haim, in the Turkish *defters* etj-Haim; that was joined to the sea-side walls and close to a gate leading to the harbour, probably according to the Jews' tradition, and known as the synagogue of Romaniotes, those few Jews who spoke Greek and were living in Thessaloniki before it became Turkish. As Jews were coming continuously in, they were spreading towards the centre of the town, claiming more and more space, until they covered most of the area between Egnatia Street and the sea-walls. Only one later Jewish district was a little further, just at the south side of the ancient Agora. In the same place the *dönme,* the Jews converted to Islam in the middle of the 17th century, used to live, until they left for Turkey in 1923.

In spite of the great number of the Jews and the number of the Turks almost equal to the Greeks, the town still kept its Byzantine character to some extent. The district names, the churches still existing even used as mosques, the market-place, baths, administrative buildings, all had kept their Byzantine types. Still, the names of the Greek inhabitants preserved in the last Tukish survey, were to a great degree Byzantine ones; even more, the part of the *kanunnâme,* the tax-

regulation for the town which is preserved in the same Turkish *defter,* contains the Byzantine names of several taxes.

Another similar survey of the year 1568, TT 723 in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, sent to me recently (1985) by Dr. Michael Kiel, gives a few new names of Greek districts. These indicate that the Greeks have already begun to concentrate at the eastern part of the town, but they are still living in areas, where the church had become a mosque, like Ahiropit, Ayo Dimitri, Chrisi and Aya Sofia. Four of them, by the names Londarino, Aslan Mermeri, Aya Sofia and Kamara bear the indication *cedid,* i.e. new. We can assume that the population was moving from one place to another, forming new districts.

The Moslem districts have augmented to 32, still existing in every part of the town, but the tendency to concentrate more and more at the slopes existing to the northern part of it, known as *bayir,* slope, is obvious. New quarters appear at this part of the town, while the Turkish population in those which are central is diminishing and some of them mentioned in the previous *defters,* do not appear in this one. The Jews have now 26 synagogues, but they are still written down as *cemaat,* groups, not *mahalles,* quarters.

The image of the town must have changed drastically at the beginning of the 17th century. A terrible fire, the biggest enemy of the town, destroyed it almost completely in 1630. Twenty synagogues were then destroyed and a great number of Jews left the town and settled down elsewhere. It is very probable that many Greeks also went away. Several years elapsed before the town started being rebuilt. We do not possess for the time being enough material to know exactly what happened during the rest of the century. Anyway Turkish archives kept in Thessaloniki, and dated from the end of the 17th century, indicate that the town had more or less the shape we find until the last decades of the 19th century. The Turks live in the upper part of the town, the Greeks and the few Bulgars who have moved into the town live in the eastern part of it and a few scattered places, and the Jews keep the rest of it. There is also a Frankish quarter near by the market, where Europeans from every country live.

In spite of the 30 or 50 minarets, which gave to the traveller coming by sea the impression of a Turkish town, a better look revealed that Thessaloniki was rather a conglomeration of various ethnic elements,

each one of them keeping its peculiarities, its habits and its institutions. Each one was living in separate areas, mixing with the others as little as possible, even in the market place. During those last decades of the Turkish occupation, Thessaloniki was an important international trade-centre, a hearth of ethnic struggles, a focus for foreign interests and a starting point of rebellious movements. But under the Turkish *ferace* and the Jewis *cübbe,* the Byzantine town still existed, to be revealed after the Greek army took over the town in 1912, and to be irrevocably destroyed to some extent by the great fire of 1917.

IV. MONASTERIES, TEKKES AND THEIR FATES : 1

THE FATE OF BYZANTINE MONASTIC PROPERTIES UNDER THE OTTOMANS:

EXAMPLES FROM MOUNT ATHOS, LIMNOS & TRABZON

HEATH W. LOWRY / WASHINGTON, D.C.

To the Byzantinist the question of the fate of late-Byzantine monastic properties under the Ottoman Turks is one deserving far more serious study than it has hitherto received. While scholars have long been aware of the fact that various Ottoman Sultans extended tax-exemptions to the monastic communities of Mount Athos[1] and to those of the Matzouka (Maçuka) valley in Trabzon (Trebizond)[2], the

[1] In the past generation several articles dealing with the status of Mount Athos under the Ottomans have appeared. Arranged chronologically, they include: a) P.Lemerle and P.Wittek, "Recherches sur l'histoire et le status des monastères athonites sous la domination turque," *Archives d'Histoire du Droit Oriental,* 3 (1947), 411-72; b) Elizabeth Zachariadou, "Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodromos Monastery (Serres)," *SOforsch,* 28 (1969); 1-12, and c) "Ottoman Documents from the Archives of Dionysiou (Mount Athos) 1495-1520," *SOforsch,* 30 (1971), 1-36; d) Vančo Boškov, "Jedan originalan nišan Murata I iz 1386, godine u manastiru Svetog Pavla na Svetoj Gori," *Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju,* 27 (1979), 225-46; e) "Ein Nišan des Prinzen Orhan, Sohn Süleyman Çelebis, aus dem Jahre 1412 im Athoskloster Sankt Paulus," *WZKM,* 71 (1979), 127-52; and, f) "Jedno originalno pismo-naredba (biti) Murata II za Svetu Goru," *Hilandarski Zbornik,* 4 (1978), 131-36; and, g) Heath W.Lowry, "A Note On the Population and Status of the Athonite Monasteries Under Ottoman Rule (ca. 1520)," *WZKM,* 73 (1981), 115-35 (hereafter: Lowry, *Monasteries*). On this last article, see the review by N.Beldiceanu, "A propos de deux registres ottomans de recensement des monastères du Mont Athos," *Byzantion,* 52 (1982), 496-99, in which he questions in particular the dating I had advanced for the resisters utilized in this paper. For the continuing debate on this matter, see: "Polémique a propos d'un compte rendu paru dans Byzantion LII (1982), pp.115-135," 55 (1985), *Byzantion,* 403-14.

[2] See Anthony Bryer, "Late Byzantine Rural Society In Matzouka," in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society,* eds. Anthony Bryer & Heath Lowry (Birmingham and Washington, D.C., 1986) (hereafter: Bryer & Lowry (eds.),

nature of such exemptions has not as yet been adequately examined. In the present study, via a series of case studies based on the surviving Ottoman *tahrir defteri* from the island of Limnos, supplemented by examples from Chalkidiki and Trabzon, I shall attempt to fill in a few of the missing pieces of this puzzle.[3]

We will begin our examination with a brief introduction to the Ottoman *tahrir defteri,* the source upon which it is based. This particular tool of Ottoman administration was designed primarily to provide the bureaucracy with accounts of the tax-revenues of an area and their distribution to the fief-holders (timariots) who administered the territory for the state. These *tahrir*s were thereore first and foremost tax-registers.[4] As such they could not be expected to include information on any type of property exempted from taxation. This limitation suggests *ipso facto* that the Ottoman *tahrir defteri* should be

Continuity), 51-95. For a study on Byzantine monastic holdings in Maçuka, based on the testimony of the extant *tahrir defteri,* see: Heath W.Lowry, "Privilege and Property in Ottoman Maçuka in the Opening Decades of the *Tourkokratia*: 1461-1553," in Bryer & Lowry (eds.), *Continuity,* 97-128; also, N.Beldiceanu, "Biens monastiques d'après un registre ottoman de Trébizonde (1487): Monastères de la Chrysoképhalos et du Pharos," *REB,* 35 (1977), 175-213 (hereafter: Beldiceanu, *Biens monastiques*).

[3] The present paper derives from research conducted under the auspices of the joint Dumbarton Oaks-University of Birmingham project devoted to the study of continuity and change in late Byzantine and early Ottoman society. As such, its author bears a debt of gratitude to Professors Giles Constable (Director, Dumbarton Oaks) and Anthony Bryer (Director, Centre for Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham, England) for their unstinting efforts on behalf of this project. One of my collaborators on the project, Dr. John Haldon of the University of Birmigham, has most graciously assisted me in deciphering the texts of several Byzantine monastic documents cited in this study.

[4] All too often the first generation of scholars utilizing these registers tended to endow this particular source with qualities which they were never intended to possess. Even the father of *defterology,* the late Ömer Lutfi Barkan (without whose work the foundations enabling this and similar studies would not have been laid), used phrases such as "systematic censuses," "uniformly executed," and "the data are genuine statistics", in stressing the value of the *tahrir*s as a demographic tool. See: Ö.L.Barkan, "Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Survey," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East,* ed. Michael Cook (London, 1970), 167. For a detailed analysis of the limitations inherent in the *tahrir*s, due to their being tax-registers rather than cadastral surveys, see: Heath W.Lowry, *Trabzon Şehrinin İslamlaşma ve Türkleşmesi, 1461-1583* (Istanbul, 1981), 141-77 (hereafter: Lowry, *Trabzon*).

of limited value for the study of monastic properties, if indeed, such holdings were granted immunity from taxation by the Ottoman rulers.

However, as I have established in earlier studies on Mount Athos,[5] and on the Aegean island of Limnos (Lemnos),[6] the *tahrirs* covering these regions do in fact include references to monastic properties which were being taxed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Clearly, whatever tax-exemptions were granted to the Athonite monasteries did not include their dependent houses (*metochia*) in either Chalkidiki or the island of Limnos. In other words, while the Athonite foundations enjoyed tax-exemptions covering their properties on the peninsula itself, their outlying holdings were not included in this status. To support this assertion we can cite two factors:

a) A note in a *tahrir* covering the Chalkidiki region setting forth in detail the nature of the partial exemptions enjoyed by the Athonite foundations in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. There we read:

> The monks of the monasteries of the aforementoined island of Aynaroz pay the value of their capitation tax [*cizye*] and the tithe [*öşür*] on the produce of their grains and vegetable and fruit gardens by way of a fixed annual rate [*ber vech-i maktu*] of 25,000 *akçe*s. After the above-mentioned monks have paid their aforementioned annual fixed sum, they hold royal exemptions from several earlier sultans stating that the agricultural produce, as well as that of the gardens and vineyards on the peninsula of Mount Athos [*aynaroz adası içinde olan...*] are exempt from the tithe [*öşür*] and from extraordinary levies [*avarız-i divaniye*]; and [due to the fact that] our present great ruler, may God glorify his victories, has confirmed these exemptions with a royal letter of exemption, and thereby confirmed the provisions of the earlier Cadastral Survey, these exemptions have been recorded in the present Imperial Cadastral

[5] Lowry, *Monasteries*, 115-35.

[6] See the article in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 235-59, entitled: "The Island of Limnos: A Case Study on the Continuity of Byzantine Forms Under Ottoman Rule," and also: Heath W.Lowry, "A Corpus of Extant *Kanunnames* for the Island of Limnos As Contained in the *Tapu-Tahrir Defter* Collection of the *Başbakanlık* Archives," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 1 (1980), 41-60 (hereafter: Lowry, *Kanunnames*).

Survey.[7]

For our purposes, the essence of this note is the distinction it makes between those properties actually located on the Athonite peninsula (which enjoyed the tax-exemptions it enumerates), and those outside the confines of the Holy Mountain, which were subjected to the *öşür* or tithe on their agricultural produce;

b) The appearance of taxable properties, identified as belonging to one or another Athonite monastery, in all of the *tahrir defteri* covering the Chalkidiki/Strymon region and the island of Limnos.[8]

Turning from Macedonia to eastern Anatolia we see that the treatment of monastic properties in Trabzon differed to some extent from that of the Athonite foundations. Trabzon in general, and the Matzouka valley in particular, was the site of a great number of late Byzantine monasteries. In Matzouka alone, three foundations in particular stand out: Vazelon, Soumela, and the Peristera.[9] Not only were they major land-owners at the time of the Ottoman conquest in 1461, they are all known to have maintained the ownership of their properties into the opening decades of the twentieth century.[10] Yet, unlike the Athonite holdings, the study of the extant Trabzon *tahrir*s does not reveal any properties belonging to these Matzoukan monasteries ever appearing in these registers among the lists of tax-revenue producing sources. These late fifteenth and early sixteenth century

[7] This note is appended to a list of the Athonite monasteries which is found in *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 403* of ca. 1520 on p.1043. A facsimile and transcription of this document appeared in Lowry, *Monasteries,* 134-35

[8] The following list of registers, all of which are housed in the Istanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives, in the *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* series contain such references: a) Chalkidiki: *TT 70* of 1519, *TT 403* of ca. 1520, *TT 143* of 1527; and, b) Limnos: *TT 25* of 1489, *TT 75* of 1519, *TT 434* of ca. 1525, *TT 307* of 1557, *TT 490* of 1567, *TT 702* of ca. 1595, and *TT 724* of 1614. For descriptions of these Limnos registers see footnotes 19-24 following.

[9] See A.Bryer, "Late Byzantine Rural Society in Matzouka," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity,* 87-90; and also A.Bryer, "The Estates of the Empire of Trebizond: Evidence for Their Resources, Products, Agriculture, Ownership and Location," *Archeion Pontou,* 35 (1979), 370-477, and A.Bryer, "The Late Byzantine Monastery in Town and Countryside," *Studies in Church History,* 16 (1979), 219-41.

[10] See A.Bryer, "Late Byzantine Rural Society in Matzouka," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity,* 51-95.

tahrirs, however, contain frequent references to former monastic properties which by order of the Ottoman sultan had been confiscated and turned into *timars* (fiefs).[11] As I have established elsewhere,[12] the opening decades of the *Tourkokratia* in Trabzon, saw many of the Trapezuntine monasteries losing their properties and becoming defunct. Those that remained, included the three Matzoukan foundations of Vazelon, Soumela, and the Peristera. Each of these, while losing properties in other regions of the Province of Trabzon, retained their holdings in the Matzouka valley, i.e., those in the neighborhood of the monasteries themselves. These local properties (the equivilant of the Athonite properties on the Holy Mountain itself), were granted tax-exemption by the Ottoman Sultans, and consequently do not appear in the tax-registers (*tahrir deferi*).

While at first glance the Athonite and Matzoukan experiences appear somewhat contradictory, they are in fact quite complementary. In both regions the monasteries were allowed to maintain, with partial or full tax-exemption, those of their holdings in physical proximity to the monasteries themselves. The differences stem from the fact that the Athonite monasteries were allowed to keep a portion of their out-lying *metochia* (although the exact amount is impossible to establish). However, unlike Chalkidiki and the island of Limnos, the Matzoukan monasteries would appear to have had most (if not all) of their out-lying properties confiscated. We must not forget though that the surviving *tahrirs* for Trabzon, *MM 828* of 1486 and *TT 52* of 1515, were compiled in the opening decades of Ottoman rule, whereas the only extant register to mention Mount Athos, *TT 403* of ca.1520, was drawn up almost a full century after Chalkidiki's incorporation into the Ottoman polity.

The now missing fifteenth century *tahrirs* for Chalkidiki compiled during the first decades of Ottoman rule may have contained the same

[11] An overall survey of properties confiscated in the Trabzon district of Maçuka (Matzouka) is found in Heath W.Lowry's "Privilege and Property in Ottoman Maçuka in the Opening Decades of the *Tourkokratia*: 1461-1553," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 97-128. Beldiceanu, *Biens Monastiques*, provides an analysis of such properties confiscated from the monasteries of the Pharos and Chrysokephalos.

[12] See: "Privilege and Property in Ottoman Maçuka in the Opening Decades of the Tourkokratia: 1461-1553, "in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 97-128.

examples of 'confiscations' of monastic properties as we see in the Trabzon registers.

Turning from the general to the specific, let us focus on a *metochi* (dependent house) of the Athonite monstery of Pantokrator on the island of Limnos, and trace the change it underwent during the first 125 years of Ottoman rule, and from this analysis attempt to construct a profile of the changing status of monastic properties under the Ottomans.

The island of Limnos is a particularly fertile site for a study of this nature. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries nine Athonite monasteries each held one or more *metochia* on the island.[13] In addition, the Monastery of Saint John the Theologian on Patmos also held properties on Limnos.[14] From the surviving monastic documents it is possible to piece together a more or less comprehensive profile of these monastic properties on the island in the period preceding the Ottoman conquest in 1479. The picture which emerges is startling. The impression is clear that throughout the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the island's population was declining. Many properties taken over by the monastries in this period were taken by what may only be termed default. The number of entries beginning: "The monks of the monastery of *x* requested that they be given the *abandoned property* of *y* on Lemnos," are numerous. As many of these requests were granted, the net result for the monasteries was a several-fold increase in their properties on the island-fields, vineyards, pastures and churches. The scholar who has detailed this process, John Haldon, estimates that by the mid-fifteenth century, the combined holdings of the monasteries on Limnos totaled up to twenty five percent of the island's territory.[15]

Noticeably absent from this drive for expansion was the *metochi* of the Anthonite monastery of Pantokrator, whose modest holdings on Lemnos are recorded in two late fourteenth century documents. The

[13] See the study by John Haldon entitled: "Limnos, Monastic Holdings and the Byzantine State, ca. 1261-1453," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity,* 160-215.

[14] F.Miklosich & J.Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca medii Aevi,* 6 vols. (Vienna, 1860-1890), VI, no.cvii.

[15] See the analysis presented by John Haldon in "Limnos, Monastic Holdings and the Byzantine State, ca. 1261-1453," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity,* 160-215.

first, a chrysobull of 1393 issued by the emperor Manuel Palaiologos mentions a Pantokrator property on Limnos in the place known as Ano-Chorion,[16] and the second, a *praktikon* (inventory of possessions) drawn up three years later in 1396, lists the monastery's possessions on Limnos as including: a) A *pyrgos* or fortified tower at Ano-Chorion near the village of Pesperagos; b) a sheep-fold(*mandra*) in the place known as Phakos; and, c) the fields known as Ano-Chorion at Pesperagos.[17] While cognizant of the possibility that other documents (now lost) may have at one time existed certifiying other Pantokrator holdings on Limnos, it is more likely the modest holdings outlined above were in fact the full extent of this monastery's properties on the island.

One other Athonite document referring to the Pantokrator *metochi* on Limnos has survived, and it is a relatively late (1500) letter concerning a dispute in which the monks of Pantokrator and Dionysiou were engaged over the ownership of the aforementioned *mandra* (sheep-run) at Phakos. This dispute was settled in favour of the *metochi* of Dionysiou, which accounts for it's being preserved in the archives of this Athonite monastery.[18]

These documents make it possible to state with certainty that at least from the end of the fourteenth century (1393) through the fifteenth century (1500) the Athonite monastery of Pantokrator had a dependent house (*metochi*) on the island of Limnos. Were we to confine our examination to surviving Byzantine sources our knowledge concerning the Pantokrator *metochi* on Limnos would not continue beyond the year 1500.

However, aided by the fortuitous survival of a number of primary Ottoman sources for the island of Limnos from the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it is possible to extend our examination. A series of six *mufassal tahrir defteri* (detailed tax-registers) for the island have survived, which allow us to trace the status of Pantokrator's holdings

[16] Published by Franz Dölger in *Aus den Schatzkammern des Heiligen Berges* (Munich, 1948), document 12, pp. 49-52.

[17] Published by Louis Petit, *Actes de l'Athos II.: Actes du Pantocrator,* (Amsterdam, 1964), document 10, pp.31-34 (hereafter: Petit, *Pantocrator*).

[18] Published by Nicolas Oikonomidès, *Actes de Dionysiou,* (Paris, 1968), 187-89 (hereafter: Oikonomides, *Dionysiou*).

on Limnos throughout the first 125 years of the *Tourkokratia.* Dated respectively in the years 1489,[19] 1519,[20] ca. 1525[21] 1557,[22] 1567,[23] and 1614,[24] these six *tahrirs* provide us with a variety of information on Limnos, including the names of all adult male taxpayers, the names and amounts of the various levies to which they were subject. From entries dealing with the monastic properties on the island we can discern some of the history of Pantokrator's *metochi* during this period. Let us look at them in chronological order and see what kind of pattern emerges:

[19] *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 25* (hereafter: *TT 25*). Housed in the Istanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives this register is a 72 page *mufassal* (detailed) *tahrir* exclusively devoted to the island of Limnos. Prefaced by a *kanunname* (law-code) for the island (p.1), it is dated h.895/1489 (p.3). First utilized in Lowry, *Kanunnames*, it has recently been studied by N.Beldiceanu, "Structures Socio-économiques à Lemnos à la fin du XVe siècle," *Turcica,* 15 (1983), 247-66.

[20] *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 75* [hereafter: *TT 75*]. Likewise housed in the *Başbakanlık* Archives, this register is a *mufassal* survey covering the entire Province of Gelibolu of which the island of Limnos was a part. This *tahrir* contains a *kanunname* for Limnos (p.5), and a detailed breakdown of the taxable properties on the island (pp.137-96). It was compiled in h.925/1519 (p.9).

[21] *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 434* (hereafter: *TT 434).* Housed in the *Başbakanlık* Archives, this register is a detailed (*mufassal*) survey for the Province of Gelibolu, as such it includes a *kanunname* for Limnos (folio 5r-5v) and a detailed tax breakdown for the island (folios 73-124). While undated the *defter*'s introduction (folio 11) states that it was compiled during the reign of Süleyman Han the son of Selim Han, i.e., between the years 1520-1566. A close comparison of its contents with those of *TT 75,* the dated *tahrir* of 1519 which proceeds it, and with those of *TT 307,* likewise a dated *tahrir* of 1557, which follows it, enables us to locate *TT 434* early in the reign of Süleyman. This dating is indicated by virtue of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the names of tax-payers listed in *TT 75* of 1519 are also seen in *TT 434.* Consequently, I have tentatively dated this register as ca. 1525-1535.

[22] *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 307* (hereafter: *TT 307*) is a dated *mufassal* register comprising 113 pages devoted exclusively to the island of Limnos. Compiled in h.965/1557 (p.3), it contains a *kanunname* for the island (pp.1-2).

[23] *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 490* (hereafter: *TT 490*) is a dated *mufassal* (detailed) register of the Province of Gelibolu, of which Limnos was a *nahiye* (county). Compiled in the year 1567 (p.17), it contains the following sections on Limnos: a) a *kanunname* on pp.7-8; and, b) breakdown of taxable properties on pp.92-172.

[24] *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 724* (hereafter: *TT 724*) is a detailed survey covering the Province of Gelibolu. It includes a *kanunname* for Limnos (pp.2-3) and a breakdown of the island's taxable properties (pp.43-138). It was compiled in h. 1023/1614.

1) In 1489, *TT 25,* has an entry reading: *karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz* (the village of the Tower of Aleksi), which is immediately followed by a note reading: *mezraa-i manastır-i Pandkraatıra* (the deserted site of the Monastery of Pantokrator). This entry concludes with the notation: *hasılı cümlede mahsubdır* (its income is included in the total).[25] This is followed by a breakdown of the individual levies assessed the inhabitants of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz, together with those levied on the deserted site of the Monastery of Pantokrator. While notable chiefly for their brevity these three phrases tell us a great deal about the *metochi* of Pantokrator as it existed ten years after the final Ottoman occupation of Limnos.

Of primary importance is the linkage of the name of the Monastery with that of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz so we are thus able to pinpoint the *metochi*'s site (See: MAP I. overleaf).

From the data provided by the late fourteenth century monastic documents of 1393 and 1396, we already know that the Pantokrator *metochi* was in the vicinity of the village of Pesperagoz near the sea-shore, and that it contained a *pirgoz* (tower).[26] The 1489 *tahrir* now provides us with the name of a *pirgoz,* the tower of Aleksi, allowing us to deduce that the unnamed tower of 1396 and that referred to as the tower of Aleksi in 1489 must be one and the same. Furthermore, the probability exists that the tower's name (*Aleksi Pirgoz*) has, in the interim between 1396 and 1489, replaced that of Ano-Chorion (which does not appear in *TT 25*), as the name of the nearby village.

The fact that the village of Pesperagoz continued to be so called throughout the 433 years of the *Tourkokratia,* and is still identifiable today (see: MAP 1.), places the *metochi* of Pantokrator on the west coast of the Gulf of Mudros. A series of map references allows us to pinpoint its location. Choiseul-Gouffier's 1783 map of the island shows a *couvent* lying immediately north of a village he calls *Pisperao,*[27]

[25] *TT 25:* p.32. See *Appendix I* to this paper.

[26] See: Dölger, *Schatzkammern;* 49-52, and, Petit, *Pantocrator,* 31-34.

[27] Comte M. de Choiseul-Gouffier, *Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1783). See: Volume II., Planche 14 for Limnos map.

ISLAND OF LIMNOS: ca.1489
Scale: 1:200,000.



while C.Fredrich's map of 1906 labels the same site as the village of Alexopyrgas.[28] This identification is confirmed by the most detailed map ever drawn of Lemnos, the 1943 British intelligence effort, known as Aegean Islands: 1:50,000 (Limnos West), which shows a village of Alexopirgus lying due north of Pesperagou, and just west of a new settlement known as Nea Koutalis (founded in the 1920s by refugees from the island of Koutali in the Sea of Marmara).[29]

Of particular importance in the *TT 25* entry is the use of the word *mezraa* (deserted site) in conjunction with the name of the Monastery of Pantokrator, for it suggests that this foundation's *metochi* was unoccupied in 1489. This impression is strengthened by the fact that the other six monastic *metochia* on the island (Ayios Pavlos,[30] Dionysiou,[31] Koutloumous,[32] Lavra,[33] Philotheou,[34] and, Vatopedi[35]) are similarly described. It would appear that following the Ottoman re-occupation of the island in 1479, the members of the Athonite dependent houses on Limnos returned to the Holy Mountain.[36] That this was a temporary condition is attested to by references in the second extant *tahrir,* that of 1519, which as we shall see confirms that these *metochia* were occupied once again.

The *TT 25* notation reading: *hasılı cümlede mahsubdır* (its income is included in the total), i.e., the tax revenues from the deserted site of the Monastery of Pantokrator are included together with those from the village of Aleksi Pirgoz, suggests that the peasants of Aleksi Pirgoz

[28] C.Fredrich, "Lemnos," *Mitteilungen Des Kaiserlich Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* (*Athenische Abteilung*), 31 (1906), 241-56 + Map.

[29] See: British Royal Engineers, *Aegean Island: Limnos West* (London, 1943), scale: 1:50,000. This map was drawn by the 46th. Survey Coy. S.A.E.C. in October of 1943, and based upon a Greek map of the same scale of 1931. I have been unable to find any copy of the Greek map which served as a base for *Limnos West.*

[30] *TT 25*: pp.40-41.

[31] *TT 25*: pp.40-41.

[32] *TT 25*: p.61.

[33] *TT 25*: p.25.

[34] *TT 25*: p.35.

[35] *TT 25*: pp.41-42.

[36] For a detailed analysis of this process, see: Heath W.Lowry, "The Island of Limnos: A Case Study on the Continuity of Byzantine Forms Under Ottoman Rule," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity,* 235-59.

were farming the monastery's lands as well. In all probability they were its *paroikoi* (dependent peasants). *Appendix I.* shows the *TT 25* entry for Aleksi Pirgoz and Pantokrator, from which we see that in 1489 the village was inhabited by seven households (*hane*s) of peasants, who paid a total of 660 *akçe*s (small silver coins) per annum in taxes. While it is impossible to determine with certainty what portion of this figure represents the produce of the *metochi* and how much represents the taxes on the peasant's own holdings, there are indications that the majority of the 660 *akçe* total represented the liabilities of the peasants. For 39% of the 660 *akçe* figure was clearly the sum of the personal taxes paid by the seven adult male tax-payers residing in Aleksi Pirgoz, i.e., their *haraç* (land tax) and *ispence* (poll-tax) totalling 255 *akçe*s. The combined taxes on the agricultural produce of the village and the monastery lands represent only 61% of the total or 405 *akçe*s.

From these agricultural taxes it is possible to identify the major crops as wheat (*hınta*), barley (*şaîr*), and beans (*börülce*). In addition there were a total of 10 *dönüm*s (1 *dönüm* equals approximately 940 m^2 or 1/4 of an acre) of vineyards, the produce of which, known as *şira* (new wine) was also taxed.[37] Finally, there were eight hogs (*huk*) taxed at the rate of 1 *akçe* per head per year.

[37] The closest we have to a contemporary definition of the term *şira* as applied to the product of Christian owned vineyards, is in Bernard Randolph, *The Present State of the Morea, Called Anciently Peloponnesus* (London, 1686). There (p.19), Randolph, who lived in the Morea for several years, describes this product in the following terms:

> Though the *Turks* drink no Wine, yet they take New Wine and boyl it up to a Syrrup (which they call *Becmez,* and we call *Cute,*) putting it into small Jarrs, they drink it mingled with Water, for this they account to be no Wine. They call new Wine *Shira,* and old Wine *Shirab.*

Randolph's explanation fits the situation on Limnos as attested by a passage in the *kanunname* prefacing the 1519 taxregister (*TT 75*: p.5) which reads:

> Port and customs practices on the island of Limnos: From old wine (*hamr*) which is sold in the villages of the island, for amounts of from 20 *medra*s to more than 100 *medra*s, 2 *medra*s of new wine (*şira*) are collected and taken for the Imperial Treasury.

The Ottomans were taxing the new wine, or the unfermented product of the vine, which, depending upon one's desire could either: a) be boiled into a syrup (*pekmez,* i.e., Randolph's *becmez*); b) mixed with water and used as a grape-juice drink (it is in this form that the term *şira* is used in modern Turkish today); or, c)

From the taxable crops and animals in Aleksi Pirgoz we may postulate the diet of the peasants as primarily consisting of bread, and soup or beans, occasionally flavored with pork (and as will be subsequently discussed, the sheep and its various edible by-products). What sugar was consumed came from the *şira* (new wine or grape syrup). This fifteenth century diet is not unlike that still enjoyed by peasants throughout the eastern Mediterranean basin.

2) In 1519, the second of the extant Limnos *tahrirs* (*TT 75*) has an entry reading: *manastır-i Pandoketira der kurb-i karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz* (the Monastery of Pantokrator in the vicinity of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz). This is followed by the sentence: *keşişler oturur, eker, ve gelirinin öşrini verirler* (it is occupied by monks who farm and pay the tithe on their produce). Immediately beneath this entry the names of ten monks are listed: Papas Konomos, Papas Tziriniki, Papas Yaso, Papas Kiryanos, Papas Piladiyo, Papas Yakomi, Papas Kiko, Papas Maksimo, Papas Nifaton, and Papas David. These ten individuals, each of whom is identified by the title of monk (*papas*), were the residents of Pantokrator's *metochi* on the island of Limnos.[38]

What has clearly happened in the interim between the surveys of 1489 and 1519 is that Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos has been reoccupied by its owners. As a result it now appears as a separate entry in the *defter,* i.e., its revenues are no longer shown together with those of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz. In addition, the monks who occupy it, together with their agricultural taxes on the produce of the *metochi*'s lands are also named in the register.

One of the more interesting aspects of the Pantokrator entry in *TT 75* is the data it provides vis-à-vis the dependent peasants attached to the monastery. This information comes from the following entry which reads: *reaya-i ki mezkūr manastırda hizmet ederler – haracat verirler hassa-i mir liva* (the peasants in the service of the aforementioned monastery whose *haraç* [land tax] goes to the income of the *mir liva*). It then lists four dependent peasants and the amount of their *haraç:* Dimitri – 32 *akçe,* Nikola – 32 *akçe,* Istimal – 32 *akçe,* and Todor – 32

fermented into old wine (*şarap,* i.e., Randolph's *shirab*) which was called *hamr* in the fifteenth century *tahrirs*.

[38] *TT 75*: 154. See also *Appendix II* attached to this paper.

akçe. The importance of this passage can not be over-emphasized. These *reaya* in the service of Pantokrator are *paroikoi,* dependent peasants bound to the *metochi*'s land just as their fathers and grandfathers had been in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In other words, the Monastery of Pantokrator in the early sixteenth century (under Ottoman rule) had managed to preserve one of its most characteristic Byzantine rights apparently with the official recognition of the Ottoman state, since these dependent peasants in the service of the monastery enjoyed a kind of limited tax-exemption. They paid the *haraç* (land-tax), but they did so at the special rate of 32 *akçe*s each. Thus they were distinguished from both the monks (who were totally exempt from the *haraç*) and from the other peasants of the island who paid two personal taxes, both the *haraç* and the *ispence.*

Parenthetically, Limnos enjoyed a rather unusual tax system in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While throughout the Ottoman empire peasants in this period generally paid their personal taxes, the *haraç* and *ispence* at the set rate of 25 *akçe*s per *hane* (household), on Limnos these levies were paid on a graduated scale in accordance with one's economic status.[39] Three tax categories were used: a) *ālā* (well to do), b) *mutavassıt ül-hal* (of average means), and, c) *edna-i hal* (poor); and each peasant appears in the *tahrir*s with one of these labels. In 1519 (*TT 75*), those classed as 'well-to-do' paid 40 *akçes* in *haraç* and 25 *akçes* as *ispence* (for a total of 65 *akçe*s in personal tax per annum), while those 'of average means' paid 35 *akçe*s *haraç* and 25 *akçe*s *ispence* (for a total personal tax of 60 *akçe*s per annum). Finally, the 'poor' were assessed their personal taxes at the rate of 30 *akçe*s for the *haraç* and 15 *akçe*s for *ispence* (for a total of 45 *akçe*s per annum). In contrast to these normal categories of personal taxes which totaled 65, 60, and 45 *akçe*s respectively, the dependent peasants attached to the monastery of Pantokrator (or the other *metochia* on the island) were exempted altogether from the *ispence,* and paid their *haraç* at a reduced set rate of 32 *akçe*s apiece enjoyed financial advantages over their fellow Limniot peasants whose personal taxes totaled 45, 60, or even 65 *akçe*s.

[39] This graduated tax system is described in Lowry, *Kanunnames*, 43-45.

A number of new levies appear on monastery crops in 1519 (see: *Appendix II*). They now are paying the *oşür* (tithe) on *bakla* (broad-beans), *nohud* (chick-peas), *kettan* (flax) *resm-i kovan* (tax on bee-hives), *piyaz ve sir* (onions and garlic), and *alef* (straw). Missing from the current levies is the tax on hogs, suggesting that these animals may well have been the property of the villagers of Aleksi Pirgoz whose assessments were lumped together with those of the deserted site of the monastery in *TT 25*. Under the heading: *hasil-i āşar-i manastır-i mezbur* (the income from the tithes of the aforementioned monastery), Pantokrator's annual taxes total 752 *akçes*, a noticeable increase over the 405 *akçes* paid jointly by the monastery and the village of Pantokrator in 1489. As the village of Aleksi Pirgoz is listed in 1519 as paying a total of 1,078 *akçes* in agricultural taxes,[40] we may deduce that the actual share of Pantokrator's 1489 taxes was approximately 41% of the 405 *akçes* it paid jointly with Aleksi Pirgoz, i.e., 167 *akçes*.[41] Clearly, the increase reflected in the 1519 *tahrir* reflects the fact that in the interim between these two surveys the monks of Pantokrator had reclaimed and resettled their 'deserted' *metochi* on Limnos.

An interesting detail in the 1519 *tahrir*'s entry for the monastery is the name of a monk which appears in this register as Papas Nifaton.[42] As mentioned earlier, the archives of the monastery of Dionysiou on Mount Athos preserve a letter written in the year 1500 by the Metropolitan of Limnos to the monastic council on the Holy Mountain, concerning a dispute between the *metochia* of Dionysiou and Pantokrator on Limnos over a *mandra* (sheep-fold) of which both

[40] *TT 75*: p.183.

[41] Recalling that 255 *akçes* of the combined taxes paid by the inhabitants of Aleksi Pirgoz and Pantokrator were the personal taxes paid by the peasants of Aleksi Pirgoz, i.e., their *haraç* and *ispence*, the total agricultural taxes in 1489 came to 405 *akçes*. In 1519 the villagers paid a total of 1,078 *akçes* in agricultural taxes and the monastery paid a total of 752 *akçes* (880 *akçes* less the 128 *akçes* earmarked as the *haraç* of its dependent peasants), marking the combined agricultural taxes of the two sites 1,830 *akçes*. Of this sum the 752 *akçes* paid by Pantocrator accounted for 41% of total. Assuming that the arable land in 1489 and 1519 remained the same, it would appear that Pantokrator's share of the 1489 agricultural taxes should likewise have been 41% of the total levy of 405 *akçes*, or, 167 *akçes*.

[42] *TT 75*: p.154.

claimed ownership. The Metropolitan, one Ioasaph, writes that the claim of Pantokrator was presented to the Council of Elders by "the most holy among monks, Neophytos, of the holy and sacred *koinovion* of Pantokrator."[43] The likelihood is strong that the monk Neophytos is the same individual who appears in our 1519 survey as Nifaton.

3) The third of our surveys, that of ca. 1525 (*TT 434*) shows little variance with the profile we drew from the 1519 *tahrir* which preceded it by a decade. Once again, ten monks are listed by name as the residents of the Monastery of Pantokrator. Comparing the names preserved in 1519 and ca.1525 we see that there has been no turnover in personnel:[44]

Table I.: Monks Attached to Pantokrator's Metochi on Limnos

In 1519 (TT 75) & 1525 (TT 434)

(Listed in order of appearance)

TT 75 (1519)	*TT 434 (1525)*
1) Papas Konomos	1) Papas Konimo
2) Papas Tziriniki	2) Papas Tzirniki
3) Papas Yaso	3) Papas Yaso
4) Papas Kiryanos	4) Papas Kiryanos
5) Papas Piladiyo	5) Papas Piladiyo
6) Papas Yakomi	6) Papas Yakomi
7) Papas Kiko	7) Papas Niko
8) Papas Maksimo	8) Papas Maksimo
9) Papas Nifaton	9) Papas Niyafakdoro
10) Papas David	10) Papas David

Aside from minor variations in the spelling of the names, all ten of the monks identified in 1519 are traceable in the ca.1525 *tahrir* as well.

A comparison of the tithes (*öşür*) paid by the monks on their agricultural produce with that which they were assessed in *TT 75,*

[43] Oikonomides, *Dionysiou,* 187-89.
[44] *TT 434:* Folio 81r.

does however establish that we have indeed two separate surveys (compare *Appendix II* with *Appendix III*). Specifically, the rate per *kile* of *şaîr* (barley) has increased from 4 to 5 *akçes*; the monastery's assessment on *kettan* (flax) has grown from 10 to 14 *akçes* per annum; and the miscellaneous levies (*bad-i hava*) have been increased from 55 to 90 *akçes*. The net result of all these changes was that the monks of Pantokrator who had paid a total of 752 *akçes* in agricultural tithes and taxes in 1519 (the scribe's total in *TT 75* was 880 *akçes*, because he included the *haraç* of the four dependent peasants [i.e., 32 x 4 = 128 + 752 = 880] in his figures), were paying a total of 840 *akçes* in ca.1525.[45]

Another significant change between the 1519 and ca. 1525 *tahrirs* is the latter's failure to mention the category of dependent peasants attached to the monastery. The *paroikoi* who were listed in *TT 75* are noticeably missing from *TT 434* and each of the ensuing registers as well. The obvious implication of the omission is that this traditional Byzantine monastic privilege has come to an end. From this time forward peasants who may still have worked monastic properties were simply listed as residents of the villages they occupied, with none of the partial tax-exemptions which were seen in 1519.

4) A generation later in 1557 (*TT 307*) the *tahrir* entry for Pantokrator reads: *manastır-i Pandokrator nam-i diğer Aleksi Pirgoz* (the monastery of Pantokrator which is also known as Aleksi Pirgoz).[46] In so doing it confirms our earlier identification as to the site of the Pantokrator *metochi*.

Unlike the earlier *tahrirs*, *TT 307* 1557 fails to provide us with a breakdown of the individual agricultural taxes the monastery was assessed. Instead (see: *Appendix IV*) it is listed simply with the notation that it pays *öşr-ağnam* (tithe on sheep) of 516 *akçes* and *resm-i ağil* (tax on sheep-folds) of 50 *akçes*, i.e., levies related to animal husbandry totalling 566 *akçes*. While we may postulate the existence of sheep among the monastery's holdings throughout the period under study (due to the monastic document of 1500 which dealt

[45] *TT 434:* folio 82v. As may be seen from *Appendix III* the scribe who compiled this register has incorrectly totaled the individual tax-revenues, i.e., he had arrived a total of 750 *akçes* when the component parts of his tax list actually total: 840 *akçes*.
[46] *TT 307:* p.84. See also *Appendix IV* of this paper.

with a dispute over the ownership of a *mandra* or sheep-fold[Turkish: *ağil*]), were it not for this reference to specific taxes in the 1557 register any study relying exclusively on the *tahrir* entries for Pantokrator would overlook the sheep and its by-products among the monastery's income producing assets. What is strange is not the fact that five of the six extant *defters* fail to mention the sheep, but rahter that TT 307 of 1557 does. For, in general, the taxes on sheep were not part of the revenues of the local timariots, and therefore do not appear in the *tahrir defteri.*

Given the fact that the *kanunname* (law code) prefacing this register clearly states that the island's taxes on both sheep and sheep-folds are alienated for the *Hassa-i Humayun* (Imperial Privy Purse), it is difficult to account for the Pantokrator levies being listed at all.

However, given the fact that the *kanunname* states that the sheep on Limnos are taxed at the rate of 1 *akçe* each per annum, we may state that in 1557 the Monastery of Pantokrator's property included 556 sheep and two sheep-folds(taxed at 25 *akçe*s each). Clearly, the sheep and its by-products were an important part of the monastery's economic life.

Further, the 1557 register does not list the names of monks who reside at the monastery, nor even mention a number. This omission is carried by each of the succeeding registers as well. The last listing of the monks resident in the *metochi* of Pantokrator on Limnos is that preserved in the ca. 1525 *tahrir (TT 434).*

The only clue the *defter* provides as to the reason for these changes in the manner in which Pantokrator (and the island's other monasteries) is listed, comes from a notation in *TT 307* to the effect that the income provided by the monasteries, together with that of fourteen of the island's villages is now going to an official known as the *kapudan paşa,* the Admiral of the Ottoman fleet,[47] i.e., it no longer is going to provide a portion of the income of one of the island's timariots (fief-holders), as had been the case in the earlier *tahrir*s.

5) In 1567, the monastery's taxes totalling 650 *akçe*s per annum[48]

[47] TT 307: top of p.84.

[48] TT *490*: p.168. As may be seen from the facsimile of this entry provided in *Appendix V* of the present study, the scribe compiling this register lists the total taxes of Pantokrator as 750 *akçe*s, when his figures should total 650 *akçe*s.

were earmarked for the: *hassa-i hazret-i Ali Paşa mir-i miran-i cezair* (His Excellancy Ali Paşa the Governor of the Province of Algiers).[49] Once again the scribe who compiled this register made a mistake in his addition and lists the monastery's annual levy as 750 *akçes*.

In the decade separating *TT 490* from its predecessor, *TT 434*, Pantokrator's taxes have increased from 516 *akçes* to 650 *akçes*, 81 *akçes* of the 134 *akçe* increase is accounted for by two new taxes which appear for the first time in 1567. These are an assessment of 36 *akçes* for *resm-i asyab* (a tax on a mill), and 45 *akçes* listed as *öşr-i bostan* (a tithe on the produce of a vegetable garden [see: *Appendix V*]). The tax on the mill is of interest as it suggests that the monks of Pantokrator may have constructed this income producing structure in the interim between the 1557 and 1567 surveys.

6) The final *tahrir* entry for the Monastery of Pantokrator, that dated 1614 (*TT 724*), is the most problematical of the six entries (See: *Appendix VI*). While supposedly compiled almost half a century after that of 1567 it is an exact copy of the earlier *defter*.[50] The scribe has even copied his predecesser's error and listed the total tax assessment as 750 *akçes* while the figures he presents total only 650 *akçes*.

A close comparison of the contents of *TT 490* of 1567 with *TT 724* of 1614, establishes that the latter survey is in fact a copy of the earlier one throughout. To make matters even more puzzling, there is a seventh *mufassal tahriri* covering Limnos which was drawn up between the year 1595 and 1603 (dateable by virtue of its containing the *tuğra* of Sultan Mehmed III who ruled between these years).[51] This register, which is missing its final twenty pages, including the section presum-

[49] *TT 490:* p.146. The Ali Paşa referred to here also served (under Selim II) as *kapudan paşa*. For his identity, see: Ismail Hami Danişmend, *Izahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, II [2nd. ed.] (Istanbul, 1971), 403-9.

[50] *TT 724:* p.117.

[51] Housed in the Istanbul *Baştakanlık* Archives, where it is catalogued as: *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 702*, this undated survey is a *mufassal* (detailed) register covering the Province of Gelibolu. By virtue of its being prefaced by the *tuğra* of Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603) (p.11), I have tentatively dated it as ca. 1595. On pp.7-8 it contains a Limnos *kanunname*, and a breakdown of a portion of its villages and their tax-revenues are found on pp.52-102. By comparing it with *TT 490* of 1567 (of which it is an exact copy), it is apparent that *TT 702* is missing approximately twenty pages of the section dealing with Limnos.

ably including the monastery of Pantokrator (hence its exclusion from the current survey), is likewise a copy in all respects of *TT 490* of 1567. In other words, the registers of ca.1595 (*TT 702*) and of 1614 (*TT 724*) are merely copies of the 1567 survey (*TT 490*). This is most likely explainable by the fact that the Ottoman bureaucracy in the second half of the sixteenth century, simply was not functioning at the level it had maintained in the previous century. Indeed, the Limnos *tahrir*s serve as a typical illustration or case in point. By the end of the sixteenth century it would appear that the *tahrir heyeti*s (tax commissioners) assigned the task of assessing the tax levies for the province of Gelibolu (of which the island of Limnos was a part), chose to shirk their responsibility of making an assessment in person and opted instead to simply re-copy the earlier register of 1567 and assign it a new date. If this interpretation is correct, even though the practice of compiling *tahrir*s continued into the opening decades of the seventeenth century, what would appear to be a one-hundred-twenty-five year profile of the status of Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos (1489-1614), is in fact only useful for a seventy-eight year span (1489-1567).

Nonetheless, aided by our case study of the status of Pantokrator as a typical *metochi* of the Athonite monasteries on the island in this period, we may project the following profile of the fate of the island's monastic properties during the first eighty-eight years of the *Tourkokratia,* i.e., from the date of its conquest in 1479 to 1567 when *TT 490* was compiled:

a) Clearly the Athonite monasteries maintained some portion of their properties on the island of Limnos throughout this period. A total of eleven different Athonite *metochia* are mentioned in one or another of the Limnos *tahrir*s;

b) In 1479, at the time of the signing of the Ottoman-Venetian Treaty which brought an end to sixteen years of warfare between the Republic and the Porte, monks of the Athonite monasteries abandoned their properties on the island of Limnos, leaving the island with the departing Venetians. This fact accounts for the 'deserted' status of their holdings in the 1489 *tahrir*;

c) In their absence, the Athonite *metochia* on Limnos were looked after, and farmed, by their *paroikoi* (dependent peasants) who remained on the island. This explains the fact that the 1489 register lists

the agricultural taxes on these monastic properties together with those of their adjoining villages;

d) By 1519 the Athonite monasteries have both reclaimed and resettled their *metochia* on Limnos. The appearance in this register of a total of twenty-four monks listed by name, and references as well to others unnamed, indicates that this resettlement was well under way in 1519. The existence of the Metropolitan's letter of 1500 dealing with a dispute between the monk's of Dionysiou and Pantokrator on Limnos, shows that this reoccupation must have occurred prior to the year 1500;

e) The distinction in 1519 of a number of peasants (*paroikoi*) listed as being in the service of one or another of the Athonite *metochia* on Limnos, allows us to deduce that the monasteries had indeed returned to the *status quo ante bellum*;

f) The nature of agricultural crops upon which the monasteries were assessed taxes, and their close similarity to those paid by the peasants on Limnos, suggests that the diet and general standard of living maintained by the monks must not have differed much from that of the island's non-monastic inhabitants;

g) The disappearance in 1525 of the entries for dependent peasants (*paroikoi*) attached to the *metochia,* would seem to indicate that the Ottoman bureaucracy had decided that while properties of the Athonite monasteries were there to stay, peasants were peasants and going to be taxed as such and the partial tax-immunities seen for the dependent peasants in 1519, have ended by 1525;

h) The overall tax on Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos between 1489 and 1567 (one paralleled generally by the remainder of the *metochia* on the island), does not give the impression of having been too burdensome. We have deduced that Pantokrator's share of the 1489 taxes it paid jointly with the village of Aleksi Pirgoz was 167 *akçe*s per annum. In 1519, it rose to 752 *akçe*s per annum. Six years later in ca. 1525 this rate was adjusted upward slightly to 840 *akçe*s per year. This rate remained in effect until 1557 when a reassessment resulted in a drop to 556 *akçes.* Then in 1567 the annual assessment was raised once again to 650 *akçe*s, a rate which the later *tahrir*s indicate was still being paid in 1614.

Since the value of the Ottoman *akçe* (small silver coin) fluctuated

during this period, a more accurate idea of the actual amounts of the taxes paid by Pantokrator can be gained by comparing the *akçe* rates listed with the more stable Florentine gold *florin*. In 1489 the gold *florin* was equal to 49 silver *akçe*s, so the monastery's assessment of 167 *akçe*s per year equaled 3.41 gold *florin*s. By1519 the Ottoman *akçe* was pegged at the rate of 54 to the gold *florin* and Pantokrator's per annum taxes of 752 *akçe*s equaled 13.93 gold *florins*.[52] Given the fact that in 1519 a peasant listed as poor (*edna-i hal*), paid personal taxes (the *haraç* and *ispence*) at the rate of 45 *akçe*s, or .83 of a gold *florin* per year, in addition to the *öşür* or tithe on his crops (the only levy on monasteries), the 13.93 gold *florin*s paid by the monks of Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos would appear to be in keeping with the overall tax rates on the island.

i) It is difficult to account for the drop in the monastery's taxes from a high of 840 *akçe*s in ca. 1525 to only 556 *akçe*s in the 1557 *tahrir*. As noted earlier the 1557 register does not provide us with a breakdown of the individual taxes, thereby allowing us to examine this question in detail. We are simply faced with the fact that the monastery's assessment in 1557 dropped by one-third at the time *TT 307* was drawn up. Even when the 1557 figure of 556 *akçe*s per year was increased to 650 *akçe*s a decade later in 1567, Pantokrator's levies still remained far below the 840 *akçe* high of ca. 1525.

Nothing in the *tahrir*s allows us to account for this phenomenon. However, the fact remains, that in a known period of ever increasing inflation, as was the second half of the sixteenth century, the taxes paid by the Athonite *metochi* of Pantokrator on Limnos were on the decrease. Is it possible that hidden in these figures is a partial loss of monastic property, i.e., that Pantokrator's holdings had shrunk through confiscation or sale, and consequently the new assessment was made on a smaller tax base? Unfortunately this and similar queries are unanswerable on the basis of the data preserved in the *tahrir*s.

j) Throughout the period of our survey, and particularly in the *tahrir* of 1519 (*TT 75*) which lists the monks of Pantokrator on Limnos

[52] For a breakdown of the relative values of the Florentine gold *florin* and the Ottoman silver *akçe* at several points in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, see: N.Beldiceanu, *Les Actes des Premiers Sultans* I. (Paris, 1960), 173-77.

by name, the *tahrirs* fail to mention the payment of *haraç* (land tax) by the monks of the *metochi*. Their apparent exemption from this primary Ottoman levy indicates that in the eyes of the bureaucracy they were in fact viewed as the legal owners of the properties in question. This in and of itself was a major concession to the monasteries, for the Ottoman state was one in which the concept of privately held agricultural lands generally did not exist. Aside from small plots of gardens and vineyards (which were inheritable), the remainder of the agricultural land in the Ottoman realm was viewed as state property. Obviously, the Athonite monasteries enjoyed an exemption in this respect which must in many ways have paralleled the *vakıfs* (religious foundations) created on behalf of the majority religion, Islam. That this was in fact the case is shown by a copy of a *vakıfname* (list of properties held by a religious foundation) drawn up in 1568 on behalf of the monks of the Athonite monastery of Dionysiou.[53] This document, drawn up by the *kadi* of Serres, lists the properties held by the monastery (including those of their *metochi* on Limnos) in the same terminology as was used for Muslim religious foundations. It leaves no doubt that the protection afforded to religious endowments in Islamic law had been extended to cover similar foundations established by Christian monasteries as well.

In conclusion, a detailed case study of the extant *tahrirs* for the island of Limnos containing information relative to the fate of the *metochi* of the Athonite Monastery of Pantokrator, allows us not only to determine the status of this particular holding, but also to project a more general profile for the status of monastic properties under the Ottomans in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. There can be no doubt but that the Ottoman *tahrir defteri* are an important source for the study of the continued existence of known Byzantine monastic foundations into the opening decades of the *Tourkokratia*.

[53] This most interesting document, which only survives in a Greek translation of 1915, was published by Archimandritou Gabriel, *He en Hagio Orei hiera Mone tou Hagiou Dionysiou* (Athens, 1959). The *vakıfname* in question appears on pp.160-166; for the section concerning the Dionysiou holdings on Limnos see: p.164.

Appendix I.

Facsimile of *TT #25*: p. 32

Line 1

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Appendix I. Continued: Transcription & Translation

Line 1:	*karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz*	– *hassa-i mezkûr*
	village of Aleksi Pirgoz	– fief of the aforementioned
2:	*Androniko veled-i Kafori*	– *haraç*: *20*; *ispence*: *15*
	Androniko the son of Kafori	– land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
	Yani veled-i Makoryani	– *haraç*: *25*; *ispence*: *20*
	Yani son of Makoryani	– land tax: 25; poll-tax: 20
	Dimitri Ağriboz	– *haraç*: *20*; *ispence*: *15*
	Dimitri [from] Euboea	– land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
	Manol hamal-i Kaloni	– *haraç*: *20*; *ispence*: *15*
	Manol the servant of Kaloni	– land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
3:	*Tzolinmo Midilli*	– *haraç*: *20*; *ispence*: *15*
	Tzolinmo [from] Mytilene	– land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
	Yani veled-i Venzodi	– *haraç*: *20*; *ispence*: *15*
	Yani son of Venzodi	– land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
	Yani veled-i Bolihlo	– *haraç*: *20*; *ispence*: *15*
	Yani the son of Bolihlo	– land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15

4: *hane: 7*
households: 7

5: *mezraa-i manastır-i Pandkraatıra*
the deserted site of the monastery of Pantokrator

6: *hasılı cümlede mahsubdır*
its income is included in the total

7: *hasıl*
income / revenues

8: *ispence*	110					
poll-tax	110 [*akçes*]					
haraç	145					
land tax	145 [*akçes*]					
hinta	*müd* 1	*kile*	14	*kıymet*	150	
wheat	*modio* 1	*kile*	14	value	150	[*akçes*]
şaîr		*kile*	15	*kıymet*	45	
barley		*kile*	15	value	45	[*akçes*]
9: *börülce*		*kile*	7	*kıymet*	42	
beans		*kile*	7	value	42	[*akçes*]
sira		*medra*	40	*kıymet*	80	
new wine/grape syrup		*medra*	40	value	80	[*akçes*]
resm-i dönüm			80			
tax on vineyards			80	[*akçes*]		
resm-i huk			8			
tax on swine			8			
10:*yekûn*:			660			
total:			660	[*akçes*]		

Appendix II.

Facsimile of TT #75: p. 154

Line 1:

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4:

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Appendix II. Continued: Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *mnastir-i Pandokrato der kurb0i karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz keşişler oturur eker ve gelirinin ösrini verirler:*
The Monastery of Pantokrator which is located in the vicinity of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz — it is ocupied by monks who farm and pay the tithe on their produce.

2: *Papas Konomos, Papas Tziriniki, Papas Yaso, Papas Kiryanos, Papas Piladiyo, Papas Yakomi, Papas Kiko, Papas Maksimo,*
Monk Konomos, Monk Tziriniki, Monk Yaso, Monk Kiryanos, Monk Piladiyo, Monk Yakomi, Monk Kiko, Monk Maksimo,

3: *Papas Nifaton, Papas David.*
Monk Nifaton, Monk David.

4: *reaya-i ki mezkûr manastirda hizmet ederler haracat verirler hassa-i mir liva:*
The peasants in the service of the aforementioned monastery [pay] their land tax to the income of the military commander:

5: *Dimitri 32; Nikola 32; Istimal: 32; Todor 32;*

6: *hasıl-i aşar-i manastir-i mezbur:*
The income from the tithe of the aforementioned monastery:

7: *hinta*	*mud:* 2;	*kilece:* 5;	*fi:*	10;	*kaymet:*	450
wheat	2 *modioi;*	5 *kiles*;	at	10;	value:	450
şaîr		*kilece:*19;	*fi:*	4;	*kaymet:*	76
barley		19 *kiles* ;	at	4;	value:	76
alef		*kilece:* 5;	*fi:*	2;	*kaymet:*	10
straw/fodder/hay		5 *kiles*;	at	2;	value:	10

	ösr-i börülce ve bakla ve nodud:	*kilece 4½*	*kıymet:*	*45*
	tithe on beans, broad-beans and chick peas	*4½ kiles*	value:	45
	ösr-i kettan		*hasıl:*	*10*
	tithe on flax		income:	10
	resm-i kovan		*hasıl:*	*25*
	tax on bee-hives		income:	25
8:	*ösr-i piyaz ve sir*		*hasıl:*	*25*
	tithe on onions and garlic		income:	25
	haraç-i bagat		*hasıl:*	*56*
	land tax on vineyards		income:	56
	bad-i hava	*fi: 6*		*55*
	miscellaneous revenues	at: 6		55
9:	*yekûn:*			*880*
	total:			880 *

* The scribe's total includes the 128 *akçes* paid as *haraç* by the monastery's four dependent peasants in line 5 above.

Appendix III.

Facsimile of TT #434

Folio 81r

Line 1:

2:

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5:

Folio 82v

6:

7:

Appendix III. Continued: Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastir-i pandokratora*
the Monastery of Pantokrator

2: *Papas Konimo, Papas Tzirniki, Papas Yaso, Papas Kiryanos, Papas Paladiyo,*
Monk Konimo, Monk Tzirnike, Monk Yaso, Monk Kiryanos, Monk Paladiyo,

3: *Papas Yakomi, Papas Niko, Papas Maksimo, Papas Niyafakdoro, Papas David.*
Monk Yakomi, Monk Niko, Monk Maksimo, Monk Niyafakdoro, Monk David.

4: *hasil-i âşar-i manastır-i mezbur:*
the income from the tithe of the aforementioned monastery:

5: *hınta*	*mud:* 2;	*kilece:* 5;	*fi:* 10;	*kıymet:*	450	
wheat	2 *modioi;*	5 *kiles*;	at: 10;	value:	450	[*akçes*]
şaîr	*mud:* 1;	*kilece:* ;	*fi:* 5;	*kıymet:*	125	
barley	1 *modioi;*	*kiles*: ;	at: 5	value	125	
alef		*kilece:* 5;	*fi:* 2;	*kıymet:*	10	
straw/fodder		5 *kiles*;	at: 2;	value:	10	
öşr-i börülce ve bakla ve nohud		*kilece:*4½;	*fi:* 10;	*kıymet:*	45	
tithe on beans, broad-beans & chick peas		4½ *kiles*;	at: 10;	value:	45	
öşr-i kettan					14	
tithe on flax					14	
6: *resm-i kovan*					25	
tax on bee-hives					25	

	öşr-i piyaz ve sir	*25*
	tithe on onions and garlic	25
	haraç-i bağat	*56*
	land tax on vineyards	56
	bad-i hava ve cürm-i niyabet	*90*
	miscellaneous fines and levies	90
7:	*yekûn:*	*750*
	total:	750 [*akçes*]*

* The actual total of the individual entries listed here is 840 *akçes*, i.e., the scribe has made an error in his addition.

Appendix IV.

Facsimile of TT #307: p. 84

Line 1:

2:



Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastır-i pandokrato nam-i diğer aleksi pirgoz*
The Monastery of Pantokrator which is also known as Aleksi Pirgoz

2: *ösr-i ağnam*	506	
tithe on sheep	506	[*akçe*s]
resm-i ağil	50	
taxes on sheep-folds	50	[*akçe*s]

Appendix V.

Facsimile of TT # 490: p. 168

Line 1:

2:

3:

Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastir-i pandokrato – ter havas-i müşarileyh*
The Monastery of Pantokrator (fief of the aforementioned)

2: *hınta*	*kile: 15;*	*kıymet:*	*195*	
wheat	15 *kiles;*	value:	195	[*akçes*]
şaîr	*kile: 20;*	*kıymet:*	*120*	
barley	20 *kiles;*	value:	120	
alef	*kile: 10;*	*kıymet:*	*50*	
fodder	10 *kiles;*	value:	50	

öşr-i börülce ve nohud ve bakla	*kile: 13;*	*kıymet: 65*
tithe on beans, broad-beans and chick peas	13 *kiles*;	value: 65
haraç-i bağat (tithe on vineyards)	84	[*akçes*]
3: *öşr-i bostan* (tithe on gardens)	45	
asyab (mill)	36	*resim* (tax)
öşr-i kovan (tithe on bee-hives)	55	
yekûn (total):	750 (actually 650*akçes*)	

Appendix VI.

Facsimile of TT #724: p. 117

Line 1:

2:

3:

Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastir-i pandokrato – tabi-i m* [*ezbur*]
The Monastery of Pantokrator – attached to the aforementioned

2: *hınta* (wheat)	*kile: 15;*	*kıymet* (value:	*195*	[*akçes*]
şaîr (barley)	*kile: 20;*	*kıymet* (value:	*120*	
alef (fodder)	*kile: 10;*	*kıymet* (value:	*50*	
öşr-i börülce ve nohud ve bakla (tithe on beans, broad-beans, and chick peas):			*65*	
haraç-i bagat (land tax on vineyards):			*86* *	
3: *öşr-i bostan* (tithe on gardens):			*45*	
asyab (mill):			*36*	*resim* (tax)
öşr-i kovan (tithe on bee-hives):			*55*	
yekûn (total):			*750* **	

* Here the scribe miscopied the 84 *akçes* seen in *TT #490* as 86.

** While the actual total of the revenue listed is 650 *akçes* (or 652 given the error on the vineyard tax), the scribe compiling this register copied the error made by predecessor who drew up *TT #490*, and lists the total income as 750 *akçes*.

IV. MONASTERIES, TEKKES AND THEIR FATES : 2

THE LONG-LIVED RELATIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS IN CENTRAL ANATOLIA:

DERVISHES, PAPADHES, AND COUNTRY FOLK

MICHEL BALIVET / ISTANBUL

The usual way of studying the different civilizations in Anatolia, and in particular the Byzantine and the Turkish ones, is to regard them successively and discontinuously. This is a classic conception, since the Byzantine historians themselves employed it, particularly when explaining the decline of the Byzantine political power to the advantage of the Turks[1].

Such a fragmentary vision one may think possible for an approach to pure political history, becomes noticeably inadequate and distorting as far as the history of Anatolian cultures and mentalities is concerned, since it gives a greater importance to factual history, ignoring that of continuous deep phenomena.

This is particularly striking in central Anatolia, in an area limited, northwards by Ankara, eastwards by Kayseri, southwards by the Taurus range and westwards by Konya.

The Cappadocia of Basilian patristics as well as that of the rock-cut churches and the artistic and monastic wealth we know, are to be

[1] Kritoboulos' introduction to his History is as follows: '*Who doesn't know that, ever since men have existed, rule and supreme power did not stay in the same hands, nor were the privilege of one nation or one people; but that, like wandering stars, supreme power passed from people to people, from place to place; it continuously changed its favourites, and established itself everywhere, sometimes with the Assyrians, the Medes and the Persians, sometimes with the Hellenes and the Romans, according to the circumstances and the course of years. It is not surprising then that nowadays we should suffer the same thing, and that the power should leave the Romans to go to others, as in the past it had passed onto them from others, keeping its proper nature and its mobility,*' *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. D.R.Reinsch, in *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae*, XXII (Berlin, 1983), 14.

found in these limits, and so are the capital towns of the three greatest Anatolian dervish orders, Konya and the *Mevlevi,* Hacı Bektaş and the *Bektaşi,* and Ankara and the *Bayrami.*

Now, the last artistic and religious bloom of Byzantine culture in Cappadocia is absolutely contemporaneous with the brightest period of the Seljuk civilization in Asia Minor.

Even, there is often between the two cultural worlds mutual acceptance[2] and recognition of the links that, from now on, unite Christians and Moslems in the area[3]. Moreover, many Christians, either Greek- or Turkish-speaking, still lived in these parts up to the beginning of our century[4].

In the area of our study, the XIIIth-century flowering on both sides, as well as the existence of Christian minorities up to the XXth-century, show that it is never quite right to speak in terms of sudden succession or of brutal exclusion of one civilization by another, in places or at times when very progressive processes of co-penetration and inter-influence have acted deeply to create a common cultural substratum.

This Turkish-Byzantine interaction, particularly extensive at popular level, even exists in apparently as exclusive matters as religion; in the same district, sometimes in the very same village, we meet very similar types of inter-confessional connections, from the

[2] The existence of a few verses in Greek in the works of Celāleddin Rūmī and by Sultan Veled, is significant: R.Burguière et R.Mantran, "Quelques vers grecs du XIIIe siècle en caractères arabes", *Byzantion,* 22 (1952), 63-80; W.Mirmiroglou, Οἱ Δερβίσσαι (Athens, 1940), 391.

[3] Cf. St.George of Belisirma, where the Christian husband of the *ktitorissa* of the church, emir Basil, is represented clad in his kaftan and his turban as a Seljukid notability, and where, associated in the same dedication, are '*the highest and noblest great sultan*' Masᶜūd and the *basileus* Andronicus II; N. and M.Thierry, *Nouvelles églises rupestres de Cappadoce,* (Paris, 1963), 202-204; same double allegiance on an inscription dated 1289, which mentioned the restoration of the church of St.Chariton monastery, near Konya'...*under the patriarchate of Kyr Gregory and under the reign of the most pious emperor and autocrat of the Romans Kyr Andronicus, in the days when reigned our master, the noblest great sultan Masᶜūd, son of Kay-Kāūs*'; F.W.Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford, 1929), 381.

[4] S.Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1971), 444 sqq.

Seljuk period to the end of the Ottoman Empire.

We shall try to illustrate this matter through the comparison of two Greek texts and two Turkish texts[5], which describe the relations between Greek priests, Turkish dervishes, and peasants of central Anatolia.

At Pharassa[6], a Greek-speaking village up to the population exchanges in 1924[7], two sheikhs from Hacı Bektaş had come to visit the *papas* of the village:

'*...The Father greeted them and offered them coffee. Meanwhile, the sheikhs began to ask him inept and astounding questions... The Father, to get rid of them, told them: "I cannot listen to you because I have a headache". But they would not understand and one of them said to Father Arsenius: "Papas Efendi, we shall make an amulet*[8] *for you and if you wear it, all your life-long you will no longer have any headache". The Father then replied severely: "My power is greater than yours and, by the power of Christ, I can make you unable to move at all from the place where you are seated". He then suddenly left them and went to his cell. When they had finished their coffee, the sheikhs wanted to leave but they could not move from their seats as they had the impression that they were attached by an invisible bond; it was then necessary for them to call Father Arsenius to free them off. The Father came immediately but did not speak to them; he just beckoned them away, and this is how they could free themselves from the place. The sheikhs understood their fault, begged pardon from the Father, and told him as they were leaving: "Papas Efendi, pardon us; your strength is great because you hold it from your very great faith. As for us, we work with Satan."*'

A Moslem sheikh tells about his Master the following anecdote which takes place in the neighbourhood of Sis[9]: '"*When our Master left for Damascus, the caravan of Syria went to a cavern where they dismounted. Forty monks were living there, and they had practised*

[5] One is in Persian but is about Turkish Anatolia.

[6] Today Faraşa, on the river Zamantı affluent of the river Seyhan, at about 30 km S.E. of Yahyalı, Türkye map (Fizikī-idarī, B.Darkot), Geographical Institute De Agostinini (Novare, 1972).

[7] R.M.Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, 1916), 30-35.

[8] Μουσχᾶ in the Greek text.

[9] The actual Kozan, at about 50 km. S.E. of Pharassa.

austerities so widely that they were pursuing the mysteries of the world of the superior beings, had some knowledge of the secrets of the inferior world, read the secret thought of men, and received presents and votive offerings from all parts. As soon as they saw our Master, a young boy to whom they had beckoned to jump in the air, thus remained, stopped in his flight a little above the ground. Our Master, his blessed head bent, was observing the scene. The young boy suddenly started shouting: "Come to my help, I am tied up, I shall die here on the spot otherwise, I am terrified by this person looking at me." He was told to come down. "I cannot, said he, it is as if I had been nailed here." They all stepped forward to our Master's feet and begged him saying: "Do not dishonour us." He answered: "The only way, is to formulate the sentence on the Unity of God." Immediately the young boy uttered the profession of faith of the Moslems, and landed lightly on the ground; all, in a body, became true believers and wished to go away with the Master; but the latter would not let them; he said to them: "You must stay here and serve God, and do not forget us in your prayers." Therefore they went on leading their lives of devotion and mortification and came to know the secrets of the superior and inferior worlds; they built a monastery in that place and were helpful to travellers.'

The similarities between our two texts are obvious: geographical, the Taurus range; circumstancial, as in both cases Moslem sheikhs take the initiative to pay a visit to Christian clerics and they are most welcome.

In both instances there is a real competition of supernatural powers, between a reputedly magic force on one hand, and a true spiritual force on the other; the talisman of the *Bektaşi* dervish is of no avail compared with the miraculous power of the *papas* of Pharassa. In the same manner, the levitation trick played by the monks at the cavern, is thwarted by the spiritual power of the sheikh.

In the two stories, the miracle brought on by the holy person has the same "technical" appearance: the two *Bektaşi* ...'*do not succeed in moving...feeling as if bound by an invisible tie;*' "*I am tied up,*" cries the young boy in the other story "... *it is as if I had been nailed here.*"

Quite obviously, in the Greek anecdote, the *papas* has the last word, the dervishes admitting his spiritual superiority and the lower nature of the forces which, as for them, they manipulate. On the

contrary, in the Moslem story, the monks throw themselves at the feet of the sheikh confessing the impotency of their magic, and become true believers.

Let us, by the way, point out the "smooth" transformation of a monastic place into a moslem *tekke,* by means of integration and not expulsion; it alludes to, on the hagiographical side, a historical process which did not fail to occur more than once in medieval Anatolia.

New stories, new similarities. In the first anecdote, enters the same priest of Pharassa, whom Greeks and Turks used to call by the nickname of *Hacıefendi*: it was Wednesday; a blind Moslem woman has been taken to the priest to be cured, but it was a day when the *papas* would stay in his cell. The blind woman's companions '*...knocked at the door of the cell, and then left the woman outside and made for the village. Meanwhile, a village girl from Pharassa, who had a withered hand, came to the cell of Hacıefendi, picked up a handful of earth from the door-step, with which she rubbed her painful hand and felt relieved. So were the Pharassiot people accustomed to do on the two days when (the father) would lock himself in, in order not to disturb him. When she saw the blind woman, she (the village girl) asked her why she was waiting and the blind woman told her the reason. So the Pharassiot girl answered her: "Why do you stay here sitting, wasting your time: Don't you know that Hacıefendi never opens his door on Wednesdays and Fridays? Take a little earth from the soil in front of his door and rub your eyes with it to be relieved, as we all do on these days when we are sick." Having said, she left and went on her errands. The Moslem woman, at first astonished by what she had just heard, felt her way to the doorstep, gathered some earth, rubbed her eyes with it and at once, feebly, she was able to see. She was so happy, she grabbed a stone and started to knock madly on the door of Father Arsenius. The latter opened and when he saw she was a Moslem woman, though he usually would not have spoken on that day, made an exception and asked her what she wanted. She told him, the Father took the Gorpel, exorcised her and immediately she was able to see quite clearly. Happy as she was she then fell at his feet and prostrated herself before him with devotion, but the Father stopped her saying: "If you want to prostrate, do it before Christ, He is the one who gave you light, and not me." Then she left and joined her companions, and they went back to their village.*'

A Turkish anecdote is parallel to this story. A sheikh whom the text refers to repecfully as *Hünkar*[10], is going through a Greek village in Cappadocia called Sinassos[11]: '*...The Master, on the road that goes from Kayseri to Ürgüp, arrived in a Christian village, named Sinassos*[12]*. The Christians had been cooking rye bread; among them, a woman was carrying a basketful of that bread on her head. As soon as she saw the Master, she put down the basket saying: "O dervish, take a loaf, please; on our land wheat doesn't grow, do not disgrace us." The Master, as soon as he heard these words, (exclaimed): "Let there be (from now on) rye sowings and wheat harvesting in plenty. Make little dough and get big loaves." Nowadays, still, in the village, they sow rye and harvest wheat. When they bake a small amount of dough, a big loaf comes out of the oven; when they sow rye, it becomes wheat, but when they sow wheat they harvest rye. For that reason, the Christians of the village go on pilgrimage to the Master; every year they gather together to go there and bring presents and votive offerings, and rejoice.*

The parallelism of the two texts is interesting, and the social context is slightly different from the first two.

Here, no more "specialists" on contemplation, either Moslem dervishes or Christian monks, challenge each other; but the same pious men viewed in their intercourse with the country folk that surround them, the Anatolian village people.

[10] Sultan, here sovereign of the spiritual world.

[11] A few km. south of Ürgüp, today Mustafa Paşa, Avanos map, Harita Genel Müdürlügü 1953; cf. I.S.Archelaos, *Ἡ Σινασσος* (Athens,1899). On Sinassos, see now *Sinassos in Cappadocia*, ed. F.Pimenides *et al.* (Athens, National Trust for Greece, 1986).

[12] *Sineson* in the Turkish text; another miracle of the priest of Pharassa is said to have occured at Sinassos: '*As he was going from village to village with his chanter Prodromos, Father Arsenius one day, went through Sinassos. The Turks in the village prevented him from getting in touch with the Christians. Father Arsenius simply said to Prodromos: "Let's go and you will soon see the Turks run after us". After half an hour's walk from the village, Haciefendi fell on his knees and raised his hands. In no time, clouds started to gather and a strong gale burst. The whole village was shaken; the Turks understood immediately their fault and sent two men of arms* (ζαπτιέδες, zaptiye) *to catch up with the father; when they arrived they fell at his feet and begged his pardon in the name of all the village. Father Arsenius forgave them and came back to Sinassos. He made the sign of the cross towards the four cardinal points, and, immediately, the storm stopped.*'

The village people go spontaneously and unconventionally, if need be, to the representative of antoher religion. In both cases, besides, they are women, and it is not by accident, if we keep in mind that the female element is very important as a link between the two societies in Anatolia (popular devotion, family traditions, matches outside the community etc...).[13]

The Christian woman at Sinassos, on her own initiative goes to the dervish; her behaviour has a double meaning: for the sake of respect and hospitality, she offers him bread, and at the same time, she manages to show him the great difficulties the village has to cope with.

The Moslem woman at Pharassa requires to be led by her fellow-believers to the *papas,* hoping he will cure her. She has a complete faith in the efficiency, even indirect, of the blessed man, since for lack of his direct presence, she has no hesitation whatsoever in rubbing her eyes with the soil which the thaumaturge has walked on, and this on the advice of a Christian girl. By the way, the latter is not at all surprised or shocked when she sees a Turk waiting at the door of the *papas* and even gives her advice on how to derive the best benefit from the holiness of the place.

At Sinassos, the dervish immediately sympathizes with the Christian woman's complaint, and by a miracle, solves the difficulty.

In the same way, the inopportune enthusiastic attitude of the woman knocking at his door with a stone, on a day when he was supposed to stay in his cell, does not irritate the *papas.* But on the contrary, as soon as he understands that he is dealing with a Moslem woman, he grants her a favour and accepts to cure her.[14]

The two saints do not hesitate to spread their blessing to the other communities; the Greek text makes it quite clear: '*...the Father, when sick people were taken to him, never tried to know whether they were Christians or Turks.*'

The consequence of these miracles is a real cult of the benefactor: the Turk of Pharassa falls at the feet of the *papas,* and, back home, does not fail to widen the reputation of the priest towards whom,

[13] Vryonis, 466.

[14] *Ἐπειδὴ εἶδε πῶς ἦταν Μουσουλμάνα, ἐνῶ δὲν μιλοῦσε αὐτὴν τὴν ἡμέρα, ἔκανε διάκφιση.*

regularly, Moslem patients flock. As for the Greek peasants of Sinassos, they spontaneously organise an annual pilgrimage to the saint[15].

The reader has probably realised that the two Moslem texts are medieval: one is from the *Manāqib al-ᶜārifīn* of Aflākī, a work written to celebrate the memory and the miracles of Mevlāna Celāleddin Rūmī, founder of the famous order of the "whirling dervishes"[16]. The other extract is from the *Vilāyet-nāme* by Hacı Bektaş, the main source of the *Bektaşi* Golden Legend[17]; the first work is from the XIVth century, the second from the XVth, but the two relate facts supposed to have taken place in the XIIIth century, in Seljukid, Laskarid and Palaeologue Asia Minor.

By contrast, the Greek text is a biography of Father Arsenius of Cappadocia, composed in Greece a few years ago from the memories gathered among the refugees from Pharassa. Arsenius of Cappadocia was born towards 1840 at Pharassa and died in Corfu on November the 10th, 1924, shortly after his arrival from Asia Minor[18].

We shall notice a very great chronological amplitude for very close phenomena. This could not be purely incidental, nor be only a matter of similar behaviour of the "homo religiosus universalis". In this parallel approach there is a definite mark of the perenniality in the interconfessional behaviour, of a long-lived, centuries old, modus

[15] '*O köydeki Hrıstianlar, Hünkār'ın oturduğu makamı ziyaret ederler, her yıl toplanıp gelirler.*' The *tekke* of Haci Bektaş was still frequented by Christian pilgrims at the time of V.Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie,* I (Paris, 1892), 341: '*Tout autour de l'une des cours, il y a des chambres à l'usage du grand nombre de visiteurs musulmans et chrétiens qui viennent chaque jour vénérer le tombeau du fondateur Hadji-Bektach-Véli, considéré par les Chrétiens indigènes comme étant le même personnage que Saint Charalambos. Dans cette croyance, en entrant dans le turbé, les visiteurs chrétiens font le signe de la croix, tandis que les pélerins musulmans vont dans la mosquée attenante faire leur namaz. Les uns et les autres sont bien reçus également.*'

[16] Trans. from the Persian by C.Huart, *Les Saints des Derviches tourneurs,* (Paris, 1918-1922), 65.

[17] *Vilāyet-nāme, Manākıb-ı Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī,* ed. A.Gölpınarlı (Istanbul, 1958), 23-24; E.Gros, "Das Vilayetname des Hadji Bektash", *Türkische Bibliothek* 25 (1927), 43.

[18] (Father Païsios), Ὁ Πατὴρ Ἀρσένιος ὁ Καππαδόκης, (Salonica, 1975): pp.86-87 (the two *Bektaşi* sheiks), pp.84-86 (the blind Moslem woman), p.37 (the Father cures Christians and Turks), pp.37-38 (the miracle at Sinassos).

vivendi between Christians and Moslems, which seems to be a constant in Anatolia from the Middle Ages[19].

It is a type of popular devotion founded on the largest common denominator for separate confessional parties, living in the same place, a devotion based on integration and syncretism, and not exclusion and dogma. That pragmatism urges the faithful to give priority to the magic or religious efficiency of a rite or to that of the minister of the cult, rather than to their strict confessional obedience.

It is necessary to refer to the numerous cases noted by F.W.Hasluck, from the Middle Ages to the First World War, such as among many other examples, the prophylactic use of baptism by the Turk[20], the same pilgrimage places and the worship of the saints for both Christians and Moslems[21], prayers said in common[22], etc... Such

[19] The great intimacy between Moslems and Christians among the Seljukid society in Konya, very often shocked the non-Anatolian Moslems: '*Dans le voisinage, on se demandait si les Seldjoukides n'étaient pas devenus païens, mages ou guèbres, et Nour-eddin Zenghi, prince d'Alep, un musulman convaincu, exigea que Kylydj-Arslan II renouvelât, entre les mains de son ambassadeur, la profession de foi de l'islamisme, parce qu'il ne le croyait pas un vrai fidèle;*' C.Huart, *Konia* (Paris, 1897), 14-15; cf. too in 1212, Ibn Arabī's letter calling to order Kay-Kāūs whom the Spanish theologian thinks too liberal towards his Christian subjects: '*Parmi les atteintes portées à l'Islam et aux Musulmans, d'autant que ceux-ci sont peu nombreux (dans les territoires récemment conquis), il y a la sonnerie des cloches, les démonstrations d'incroyance, la prédominance d'un enseignement polythéiste dans ton pays et le relâchement des contraintes imposées aux peuples (non musulmans)*', Ibn Arabī *Les Soufis d'Andalousie (Rūh al-quds et Durrat al-fākhirah)*, trans. R.W.J.Austin (Paris, 1979), 38.

[20] Hasluck, 31-34; the prince of Karaman, had been '...*baptisié en la loy gregues que pour oster le flair*'; Bertrandon de la Broquière, *le Voyage d'Outremer*, ed. C.Schefer (Paris, 1892), 115; cf. also, the sultan Izz al-Dīn and his sons who were supposed to have been baptized; George Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, ed. A.Failler, in *CFHB*, XXIV/2 (Paris, 1984), 339,347.

[21] E.g. the famous and ancient equation Hızır-Elijah-Saint George, already in the XIVth century, in Cantacuzenus: *The martyr of Christ, George, whom, we Christians we honour, and who is also honoured by the Moslems is called by them* Χετὴρ Ἠλίας ed. Migne, PG 154, col.512; cf. A.Gökalp, "Hızır, Ilyas, Hidrellez: les maîtres du temps, le temps des hommes", in *Quand le crible était dans la paille...hommage à Pertev Naili Boratav* (Paris, 1978), 211 sqq.; A.Y.Ocak, *Islam-türk inançlarında Hızır yahut Hızır-Ilyas kültü*, (Ankara, 1985).

[22] The *tekke* of Mamasun, near Aksaray, still in activity in 1916, in which: '...*At the east end is the Holy Table, at which itinerant Christian priests are allowed to officiate, and a*

radically non-conformist principles are sometimes uttered in a very spectacular way: '*a saint is for everybody*', they said in Anatolia[23]; or: '*any saint, since he is a saint, belongs to my religion*[24]; or else: '*if the papas cannot do anything for me, I go to the dervish*' (and the other way round, of course)[25].

The lack of consideration due to these mechanisms of cultural exchanges and religious interpenetration in the study of Turkish-Byzantine and then Ottoman Anatolia, leads one to ignore an essential element in understanding not only the process whereby Byzantine became Ottoman Anatolia, but also the survival of a popular Anatolian culture common to all its peoples until this century.

picture of St.Mamas, while in the south wall is a niche (mihrab) giving the orientation of Mecca to Turkish pilgrims. There is no partition between Christian and Moslem worshippers, but the latter, while at their prayers, are allowed to turn the pictures from them. The sanctuary is administered by dervishes'; Hasluck, 576.

[23] *Ibidem,* 72.

[24] At Rumkale, on the river Euphrates, the Turks took hold of the famous church of St.Nerses, '*...afin de donner à entendre par là qu'ils révèrent les Saints, et que celuy auquel cette Eglise est dédiée, estoit de leur party, et Musulman comme eux*'; M.Febvre, *Théâtre de la Turquie* (Paris, 1682), 45-46.

[25] A characteristic anecdote in Hasluck, 78: a *papas* who was not successful in exorcising his wife, without hesitation decides to consult a magician, a Turkish woman (Τούρκισσα μάγισσα) who succeeds in breaking the possession; see also the scene witnessed by L. de Launay, *Chez les Grecs de Turquie* (Paris, 1897), 182-84, in the crypt of St.Demetrius (Kasimiy camii), in Salonica: '*Un sacristain turc arrive, suivi, de deux Grecs et me fait signe de le suivre... A ce moment commence une véritable scène de sorcellerie du moyen-âge. Imaginez dans l'obscurité de la crypte, ce vieux Turc, le gardien de la mosquée, derrière le cierge allumé, qui, avec sa veilleuse éclaire seul la pièce... Sur sa tête est un haut bennet gris, comme celui des derviches de Scutari... "To onoma, ton nom?" dit le Turc, qui vient de mesurer avec la ficelle, un des ornements du tombeau et a commencé en ce point, un noeud encore lâche. Il tient, en se courbant, l'anneau que forme la corde sur le haut du cierge allumé et attend qu'on lui réponde. "Giorgios", répond le Grec; et le Turc, répétant: "Giorgios", serre le noeud dans la flamme; il fait remarquer au Grec, d'un air satisfait, que le chanvre n'a pas brûlé... Et, quand il a fait ainsi trois noeuds, seigneusement, il met la ficelle sacrée dans un petit paquet qu'il trempa dans l'huile de la lampe; il ajoute quelques parcelles de la terre du tombeau; il enveloppe le tout et le remet au Grec, qui parait tout heureux. Il lui explique, d'ailleurs: Si tu es malade, toi, ton père, ta mère, tes enfants, le noeud sur la partie souffrante et vous serez guéris... (Puis), mes deux chrétiens sortierent tout heureux des mystérieuses incantations, qu'un sacristain musulman, au fond d'une mosquée, venait religieusement d'accomplir pour eux.*'

V. BEYOND BYZANTINES AND OTTOMANS : 1

BETWEEN ARAB AND TURK: ALEPPO FROM THE 11th TILL THE 13th CENTURIES

JØRGEN S. NIELSEN / BIRMINGHAM

Located on the northern edge of the Fertile Crescent, Aleppo has always been well-situated at a meeting point of long-distance trade routes. Overland commerce between Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia tended to be more secure over the longer northern arc than cutting across the Syrian desert. The city was similarly well-placed to attract the overland routes from Anatolia and the Mediterranean routes through Levantine ports. But these advantages carried with them related drawbacks. Armies and popular migrations tended to follow similar routes, and the area was one which more naturally was a frontier than it was a stable, self-contained economic region.

The financial and military organization of Syria by the Arabs in the 7th century had placed Aleppo initially in the *djund* of Ḥims and then of Qinnasrīn. Its precarious position near the borders of the Byzantine empire was compounded by its location in an area of dispute between Iraq and Egypt. The town was in turn occupied by Tulunids and Ikhshidids, the latter in particular coopting the *Kilābī* bedouin as local agents.[1] Subsequently, for the first time in the Islamic period, Aleppo was the capital of a local dynasty, the Hamdanids, and, sharing in the brilliance of its ruler, Sayf al-Dawla, gave indications of its potential. But the city was sacked by Nicephoros Phocas in 962. The Hamdanids moved their capital east to Mayyāfāriqīn and left Aleppo to the rivalries of Byzantium, Fatimid Egypt and local Arab chieftains. One of these latter, Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās, made Aleppo his capital in 1023, but his successors' quarrels again brought in Fatimid and Byzantine interests. By this time, the gradual westward movement of Turkish tribes had become irresistible and culminated in the establishment of Seljuk control in Aleppo in 1079. But the marginal position of the city in

[1] "Ḥalab", EI² (Leiden, 1960-).

Seljuk strategic perspectives, and then the blocking off of the routes to the west by Crusader expansion, combined to prolong Aleppo's weakness.

Then, from the early 12th century, the situation changed markedly. In 1129 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī conquered Aleppo from his base in Mosul. In 1146 his son Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd succeeded in Aleppo and proceeded to make it his base for expansion throughout Syria, an expansion using *Sunnī* orthodoxy as its ideology. Having put an end to the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt and put the Crusaders on the defensive, Nūr al-Dīn's Ayyubid successors gave Syria a period of stability and expansion in which Aleppo played a leading part. Italian traders, after an initial commitment to their Crusader allies, found the stability of the hinterland more attractive, and in 1208 the Venetians were granted a trade concession in Aleppo, which in 1225 was extended to the Ayyubid port of Latakia.[2]

A new succession of disasters followed from the mid-13th century. The Mamlūk coup in Egypt was quickly followed by the Mongol conquest of Aleppo in 1260. The city now became the frontier province of the Mamlūk state. The decline of the Latin Levant and the reassertion of Byzantine fortunes on the Bosphorus coincided with the Mongol expansion and gave Genoan trade routes through the Black Sea dominance over the Venetian Levantine routes.[3] The effects of the consequent decline of Aleppo were mitigated by the undoubted political and administrative continuity provided by the Mamlūks, and the level of activity, even during depression, remained higher than in pre-Zangid days.

In 1400 Tīmūr sacked Aleppo, and again the sack coincided with a change in the Mediterranean commercial balance. Genoa's northern routes were being disrupted and its Byzantine allies were weakening, while Venice was entering a new period of strength. With those changes Aleppo again began to thrive, laying the basis for the richest

[2] N.Elisséeff, *Nūr al-Dīn: Un grand prince musulman de Syrie au temps des Croisades (511-569 H./1118-1174)*, III (Damascus, 1967), 871f.; Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth, *Aleppo: Historische und geographische Beiträge zur baulichen Gestalt, zur sozialen Organisation und zur wirtschaftlichen Dynamik einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole*, Beihefte zum TAVO, Reihe B, no.58 (Wiesbaden, 1984), 233.

[3] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*, 233f.

period of its history under Ottoman rule.

In attempting a detailed account of the centuries of Aleppan expansion, decline and renewed expansion from the 11th till the 15th centuries, we are almost uniquely favoured by the source material. The information provided by several outsiders – travellers and administrators – is given substance by the four local historians: Ibn al-ᶜAdīm (d. 1262), Ibn Shaddād (d. 1285), Ibn al-ᶜAdjamī (d. 1479), and Ibn al-Shiḥna (d. 1485).[4] In addition, detailed Ottoman sources appear sufficiently early to provide the basis for an account of the late 15th century. Aleppo has also attracted the attention of significant scholarship in the present century. The work of Sauvaget[5] remains important for any study of pre-Ottoman Aleppo. However, his judgments on the relation between classical and Islamic Aleppo and his disparagement of the Ottoman period were criticized already by Richard Hartmann.[6] In their monumental joint work for the *Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients,* Heinz Gaube and Eugen Wirth have now substantiated these criticisms, while confirming and expanding enormously on Sauvaget's account of the medieval city.[7]

Drawing mainly on such secondary sources, I shall attempt to describe the internal development of Aleppo over the first half of this period in the context of the expansion of Turkish influence throughout the region. I am basically interested in the developments which preceded and laid the foundations of Aleppo as the great commercial centre it became from the 15th century onwards. This entails tracing the relations between government and population, the ethnic and

[4] Ibn al-ᶜAdīm, *Zubdat al-ḥalab fī tārīkh ḥalab,* ed. S.Dahan, 3 vols. (Damascus, 1951-54), is an excerpt from his *Bughyat al-ṭalab fī tārīkh ḥalab,* ed. A.Sevim (Ankara, 1976); Ibn Shaddād, *Al-aᶜlāq al-khaṭīra fī dhikr umarā' al-sham wa'l-djazīra,* ed. D.Sourdel, 2 vols. (Damascus, 1953); Ibn al-Shiḥna *Al-durr al-muntakhab fī tārīkh mamlakat ḥalab* (Beirut, 1909); Ibn al-ᶜAdjamī, *Kunūz al-dhahab fī tārīkh ḥalab,* remains unpublished but part has been translated by J.Sauvaget, *Les trésors d'or (Beirut, 1950).*

[5] J.Sauvaget, *Alep,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1941); The second volume consists of maps and plates, and page references in the following will be to volume I.

[6] R.Hartmann, "Zur Geschichte der Stadt Ḥaleb," *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung,* 47 (1944), cols.5-11.

[7] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*

religious character of that population, and the changing economic base.

1. Internal politics

Historians working on the cities of the medieval Arab world have tended to be overly concerned with identifying institutional structures. This led scholars like Bernard Lewis and Louis Massignon to read the existence of guilds into source references to groups described as *futuwwa* or *fityān*. The idea that autonomous professional and craft associations already came into existence in the 10th century has now been discredited. The theory had no foundation in the contemporary sources but seems to have represented an extension backwards of the Ottoman *futuwwa*-guild originating in the 14th-century *akhīs* of Anatolia.[8]

The problem remains, however, of describing the socio-political processes in medieval Arab cities. Syrian cities have particularly attracted attention, because they appeared, at least for a time, to be on the verge of developing into independent city states. Aleppo, even more than Damascus, would seem to illustrate the phenomenon. Between being the capital of the Hamdanids and then of the Mirdasids, the city was the centre of regional revolts against the Fatimids. Soon after the conquest in 1079, Seljuk princes led Aleppo back into local autonomy. Other cities shared the experience. Local dynasties appeared at various times in Tripoli, Ḥims and Ḥama as well as occasionally elsewhere.[9] The whole Ayyubid state structure, in fact, ressembled more a federation of city-based feuding principalities than a centralized empire.

Two points need to be made, however, to qualify this impression. Firstly, the autonomy that was undoubtedly achieved was usually based on the military resources not of the native populations of the

[8] A useful survey of research on the appearance of guilds in Middle Eastern cities is provided in S.M.Stern, "The constitution of the Islamic city," in A.F.Hourani and S.M.Stern (eds.), *The Islamic City* (Oxford, 1970), 25-50, and in C.Cahen, "Y a-t-il eu des corporations professionelles dans le monde musulman classique?" in *ibid.* 51-64. G.Baer, "Guilds in Middle Eastern history," in M.A.Cook (ed.), *Studies in the economic history of the Middle East* (London, 1970), 11-30, should also be consulted.

[9] See "Ḥims" and "Ḥamāh" in *EI*², and K.Salibi, *Syria under Islam: Empire on trial* (Delmar, 1977), 118ff.

cities but rather on those of surrounding tribal and semi-nomadic populations. Secondly, the implication that, by contrast, cities in other regions or in other periods had no autonomy would by mistaken. Even at their most centralized, medieval Islamic governments had to achieve a certain amount of consent from the governed, as Hugh Kennedy has recently re-emphasized with reference to the early Abbasid period.[10] Essentially, therefore, the apparent autonomy of the Syrian cities was different in degree rather than in essence.

The structures, through which the urban population itself expressed its political will, were clearly very fluid in nature. Only when they operated with a high degree of organization and could make a thorough nuisance of themselves in challenging the institutions of official government did they attract the attention of the writers, on whose accounts we depend. In what Sauvaget calls the period of anarchy preceding the establishment of Zangid power, the Aleppan population's primary means of giving force to its collective desires and grievances were the *aḥdāth.* These are generally regarded as being a form of local militia. There is evidence that in Iraq, during an earlier period, the *aḥdāth* were the permanent troops of a city, whose function was to keep the peace, in that sense little different from the *shurṭa.*[11] But in Damascus and Aleppo the *aḥdāth* first attracted attention during the Fatimid period, and then they appeared as bands of armed youths, recruited by city quarter, who were maintained and, in varying degrees, controlled by the urban elite. It is possible that the *ra'īs,* or leader of the *aḥdāth* sometimes appeared from within the ranks of the *aḥdāth* and sometimes was appointed by the urban notables seeking to bring the *aḥdāth* under control. The sources occasionally speak of the *ra'īs al-aḥdāth* being the *ra'īs* of the city,[12] and one of these men was apparently strong enough to build himself a

[10] H.Kennedy, "Central government and provincial elites in the early ᶜAbbāsid caliphate," *BSOAS,* 44 (1981), 26-38.

[11] P. von Sievers, "Military, merchants and nomads: The social evolution of the Syrian cities and countryside during the clasical period, 780-969/164-354," *Der Islam,* 56 (1979), 212-44.

[12] Ibn Shaddād, *op.cit.,* quoted in Sauvaget, *Alep,* 97.

fort on the southern edge of the city.[13] It was always difficult to keep the *aḥdāth* under control, since the bulk of the recruits appear to have come from the more marginal sectors of society. The Syrian cities had by the 10th century developed a noticeable pattern of social stratification, which on occasion pitted the populace against the elite, as when, in 962, the *aḥdāth* and population of Aleppo looted their own city while the notables were absent negotiating surrender terms with the Byzantines.[14] The comparison between the *aḥdāth* of medieval Aleppo and the militias of today's Beirut, which Gaube and Wirth make by implication,[15] is useful not only in helping to understand their nature but also to explain their inconsistent and often vague appearance in the sources.

It is, of course, no coincidence that the *aḥdāth* quickly ceased to feature in Aleppo's internal history after the establishment of Zangid rule; it was only the absence of strong central government which had allowed them space to function. The Zangid sultans brought with them such strength of resources that local interests had to find other, and ultimately quieter, means of expression.

2. *Religious policy*

But the Zangids also changed the agenda of Aleppan urban politics, with their adoption of *Sunnī* Islam as the ideology of state. At the regional level this was in line with a trend which had started in the first half of the previous century. The Twelver Shiite Buyids gradually lost their influence in Baghdad while a major *Sunnī* theological resurgence took place.[16] The Seljuks took Baghdad in 1055 and restored political

[13] This has commonly been identified with Qalᶜat al-Sharīf, cf. Sauvaget, *Alep*, 103, and Elisséeff, *op.cit.*, I, 177; Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*, 97, doubt whether this fort ever existed.

[14] Sievers, *op.cit.*, 237.

[15] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*, 67. More detailed discussion of *aḥdāth* may be found in C.Cahen, "Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie Musulmane du moyen âge," *Arabica*, 5 (1958), 225-250, and 6 (1959), 25-56, 233-265, and in E.Ashtor-Strauss, "L'administration urbaine en Syrie mediévale," *RSO*, 31 (1956), 73-128.

[16] See G.Makdisi, *Ibn ᶜAqīl et la résurgence de l'Islam traditionaliste au XIe siècle* (Damascus, 1963), especially at 383, where he identifies a *Ḥanbalī* basis to the *Sunnī* revival, while H.Laoust, "La pensée et l'action politique d'al-Mawardi," *REI*, 36

patronage of Sunnism. Further Seljuk advance forced the *Ismāᶜīlī* Shiite Fatimids out of most of Syria in the last decades of the 11th century. But Seljuk strategic interests looked more towards Anatolia, and Aleppo was left under semi-autonomous Seljuk princes.

The religious composition of the Syrian population, then as now, was complicated. A constant pressure for local autonomy, urban or tribal, has been associated with the marked success of a variety of extreme Shiite and heterodox movements with partly Shiite origins: *Qarmāṭīs, Nuṣayrīs* and Druzes as well as *Ismāᶜīlīs* far from clear to what extent these groups recruited from Muslim populations or from as yet unconverted Christian and Jewish groups.[17] It is equally unclear how the population of Aleppo was distributed confessionally at the arrival of the Zangids. Ibn Buṭlān, visiting the city in the mid-11th century, noted that it contained six synagogues and one *djāmiᶜ* mosque, and that the lawyers followed the *imāmī* school, which could mean Shiism in a general sense or, more specifically, the Twelver line.[18] Under the Hamdanids Shiism had attained government support, and the Shiite call to prayer was heard from 969.[19] Ismailism had been favoured by the Fatimids, but the anti-Fatimid splinter group known as the Assassins became the politically dominant *Ismāᶜīlī* trend in Aleppo during the 11th century. The Seljuk prince Riḍwān (1095-1113) encouraged the Assassins as an instrument of his own policy in the region, to the extent that they were allowed to set up a propaganda centre (*dār al-daᶜwa*) in the city.[20] There are reasons to suspect that their assassination of the ruler of Ḥims in 1103 had been encouraged by Riḍwān.[21] But the Assassins were not popular in Aleppo, and they were occasionally exposed to Twelver Shiite attacks.

(1968), 12-92, speaks in more general terms of a *Sunnī* revival in which Shafiism played a leading role.

[17] R.W.Bulliet's quantitative analysis of Muslim names does not allow him to support his hypothesis, that the success of these movements represents the "laggard" stage on his conversion scale: *Conversion to Islam in the medieval period* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 111f.

[18] Quoted in Yāqūt al-Rūmī, *Muᶜdjam al-buldān,* 5 vols. (Beirut, 1957), II, 283.

[19] Elisséeff, *op.cit.*, 428.

[20] *Ibid., loc.cit.*

[21] B.Lewis, *The Assassins: A radical sect in Islam* (London, 1967), 100.

Riḍwān's successor had to resort to the *aḥdāth* to curb them, but as late as 1120 they were still so threatening that when they demanded to be given a fortified position, the ruler felt the safest response would be to demolish the fort.[22]

However, the Twelver Shiites continued to constitute a significant proportion of the population, and Shiite theology and law remained dominant for several decades. The resurgence of Sunnism had minimal effect in Aleppo before the Zangids. It is true that the Mirdasid rulers had transferred the *khuṭba* from the Fatimids to the Abbasids already in 1069 against Shiite protests, but this step must be regarded as primarily an act of astute foreign policy in view of the Seljuk threat at the time. When *Sunnī* Islam began seriously to be asserted in Aleppo it came not in challenges to the symbols of Shiite domination but in the encouragement of centres of *Sunnī* teaching.

Taking advantage of the clashes between opposed Shiite groups at the death of Riḍwān, the first *Ṣūfī khānaqāh,* al-Balāṭ, was opened in 1115, and in the following year construction of the first *madrasa* commenced. Shiite opposition to both projects culminated in an attempt to demolish the *madrasa,* which was only completed with government protection in 1123.[23] In 1129, ᶜImād al-Dīn Zangī gained control of Aleppo, but it was only after 1146, when his son Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd made Aleppo the base for his own ambitions, that the balance shifted decisively in *Sunnī* favour. The instruments of his religious policy were the *khānaqāh* and the *madrasa.* Both of these institutions were of relatively recent origin, though they housed activities whose pedigree led back several centuries. Trimingham dates the "transformation of *Ṣūfī* companionships into initiatory colleges" to this period of Shiite decline and *Sunnī* resurgence. Such colleges, in different times and places variously known as *ribāṭ, zāwiya* or *khānaqāh,* were little more than hospices when they first appeared, and Trimingham suggests that al-Balāṭ, one of the first to be built in Syria, was of this unelaborate character.[24] The *madrasa,* in the sense of a residential college with an associated mosque or prayer room, is of

[22] *Ibid.,* 104.
[23] Elisséeff, *op.cit.,* II, 428f; Sauvaget, *Alep,* 122f.; Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.,* 82.
[24] J.S.Trimingham, *The Sufi orders in Islam* (Oxford, 1971), 14f.

roughly the same parentage. They had developed in Persia and Mesopotamia in the latter half of the 10th and the early 11th centuries and had spread with the Seljuks. But the significance lay in the adoption by the state of both institutions as instruments of government policy.[25] It is in this sense only that the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk can be regarded as the founder of the *madrasa.* When Nūr al-Dīn took control of Aleppo in 1146, no further *madrasa* had been built, but his mother had opened a *khānaqāh* for women in 1139. He quickly banned the Shiite call to prayer. The main mosque, which had been Shiite since 1114, was opened to all, and in 1149 the Shiite leaders were arrested or fled.[26] During these first few years, there were a number of Shiite rebellions, but it remains difficult to assess their background, strength and consequences, since our sources are mainly *Sunnī,* and since we just do not know enough about the popular strength of Shiism at the time.[27]

But as Sunnism became established, Nūr al-Dīn also had to avoid building up tensions among the main *Sunnī* schools, tensions which in the Iraqi towns had often broken into open civil unrest.[28] In Syria, as in Egypt, the native *Sunnī* populations seems to have tended towards the *Shāfiᶜī* school, while the immigrants, especially those of Turkish background, tended to be *Ḥanafī.* By evenhanded support of both schools balanced by due consideration of popular religious needs, Nūr al-Dīn was able to lay the foundations of a religious policy which contributed to the stability of the next century. Thus, when he built his first *madrasa,* the Ḥallāwiyya, he appointed to it the *Ḥanafī muftī* Burhān al-Dīn Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Balkhī, to counterbalance the *Shāfiᶜī* allegiance of the earlier *madrasa.*[29]

[25] G.Makdisi, *The rise of colleges: Institutions of learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh, 1981), 29-32; Elisséeff, *op.cit.,* III, 753.
[26] Elisséeff, *op.cit.,* II, 429.
[27] H.M.Khayat, "The Šīᶜite rebellions in Aleppo in the 6th AH/ 12th AD century," *RSO,* 46 (1971), 167-95, gives a chronologically reliable account, but his evaluation of events remains unreliable because he is unable to clarify the relationship between the religious movements and the social structures of Aleppo.
[28] Cf. C.Cahen, "Mouvements populaires," and his "Zur Geschichte der städtischen Gesellschaft im islamischen Orient des Mittelalters," *Saeculum,* 9 (1958), 59-76.
[29] Elisséeff, *op.cit.,* II, 429.

Nūr al-Dīn sponsored the foundation and endowment of several more *madrasa*s and a number of *khānaqāh*s.[30] He also encouraged his leading *amīrs* to do the same. At his death in 1174 there were three *Ḥanafī* and four *Shāfiᶜī madrasa*s, as well as a *Ḥanbalī* and a *Mālikī* teacher appointed to the main mosque. In addition, when the mosque had been fired in 1169, apparently by *Ismāᶜīlī* arsonists, the reconstructed mosque was endowed with a post for instruction in *ḥadīth*.[31] Nūr al-Dīn had founded three *khānaqāh*s, one of them for women, and his *amīr*s had established six others. Even popular shrines and pilgrimage sites were restored and provided with amenities. Shiism had not disappeared from Aleppo, and when Nūr al-Dīn died the Shiites built a shrine to Ḥusayn, funded by public subscription, just outside the Antioch gate, but this apears no longer to have been regarded as a political threat and was left unchallenged, since Yāqūt al-Rūmī reports a number of Alid shrines thriving openly a few decades later.[32]

Aleppo was rapidly becoming a centre of *Sunnī* scholarship, as this policy grew and was continued by the Zangids' Ayyubid successors. Dominique Sourdel has used the information provided by Ibn Shaddād to chart the expansion in the academic establishment of Aleppo during this period.[33] By the year 1203-4, the number of *madrasa*s had risen to seventeen, eight *Shāfiᶜī* and nine *Ḥanafī*. Barely six decades later, in the year the city was sacked by the Mongols, the total was 44, of which 21 were *Shāfiᶜī* and 23 *Ḥanafī*.

But by this time, an increasing proportion of these *madrasa*s were small and insufficiently endowed with resources to employ full-time teachers. To service the 44 *madrasa*s there were only 29 teachers, again evenly divided between fourteen *Shāfiᶜīs* and fifteen *Ḥanafīs*. Of the teachers, whom Ibn Shaddād identifies in the century before 1260, a very high proportion were strangers to Aleppo, mostly immigrating from the east. Thus about two thirds of the *Shāfiᶜīs* were immigrants and about one third of the *Ḥanafīs*. Such a high proportion of

[30] Sauvaget, *Alep*, 122ff.
[31] Elisséeff, *op.cit.*, III, 757, 762f., 777.
[32] *Ibid.*, III, 772f.; Yāqūt, *op.cit.*, II, 284.
[33] D.Sourdel, "Les professeurs de Madrasa à Alep aux XIIe-XIIIe siècles," *BEO*, 13 (1949-50), 85-115.

immigrants was clearly, at least in part, an indication of the shortage of local talent. But comparisons with Damascus during the same period show some striking differences. Nearly half of the Damascus *Shāfiᶜīs* and almost two thirds of the *Ḥanafīs* were immigrants.[34] Without a more detailed study of the sources, we can only speculate as to the reasons for these differences. It is possible that the *Sunnī* population of Aleppo may have been predominantly *Ḥanafī* reflecting the large Turkish immigration which had taken place since the 11th century and earlier. The larger proportion of imported *Shāfiᶜīs* would then be a confirmation that the pro-*Shāfiᶜī* policy of the Ayyubids was applied as vigorously in Aleppo as it was in Cairo and Damascus.[35]

Another element in official control of religious activity appears to have been a strictly enforced distinction between local mosque, *masdjid,* and congregational mosque, *djāmiᶜ*. Only in the latter would the Friday noon sermon be delivered, an event which had often been used by preachers to raise grievances and even rebellion against the government. Ibn Shaddād lists only five *djāmiᶜs* out of 217 mosques, namely the main mosque, the citadel mosque, and one in each of the three main suburbs, at the end of the Ayyubid period.[36] Two centuries later, when the *Mamlūks* no longer have a religious policy, many more mosques have acquired *djāmiᶜ* status – about forty in total – and the distinction between the two types has almost lost significance.[37]

3. *Military factors*

Underlying all these developments were always military factors. Military recruitment had been the primary means by which the central

[34] J.E.Gilbert, "Institutionalization of Muslim scholarship and professionalization of the *ᶜulamā'* in medieval Damascus," *SI,* 52 (1980), 105-134.

[35] I.M.Lapidus, "Ayyūbid religious policy and the development of the schools of law in Cairo," *Colloque internationale sur l'histoire du Caire* (Cairo, 1972), 279-286.

[36] Ibn al-Shiḥna, op.cit., 104; Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.,* 90.

[37] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit., 87ff.;* N.Elisséeff, *"Damas à la lumière des théories de Jean Sauvaget,"* in Hourani and Stern, *Islamic city,* 157-177, has suggested that the mosque as the common place of prayer, continuing a late Byzantine "parish" church, contributed to the development of quarters, but this will have to be reconsidered in the light of Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.,* 91f., who show that mosques tended to stretch along main streets.

Asian Turkish tribes had first carved out a niche for themselves in the structure of the early Abbasid state, and it remained an element in their subsequent migration westwards. Aleppo first experienced this influx on a significant scale in the 1040's, when the Mirdasids started recruiting among newly arrived Turkish groups. This was part of that major migration at the centre of which were the Seljuk. Most passed through, but some stayed and settled in the suburb of al-Ḥāḍir outside the south-western corner of the city, where they mixed with the already resident Tannūkh Arabs.[38] South of al-Ḥāḍir further groups settled a century later, as they arrived with the Zangids. This district was named al-Yārūqiyya, allegedly after one of Nūr al-Dīn's Turkish generals who died in 1169.[39] These settlements were far from being ethnically homogeneous. The Turks of al-Ḥāḍir soon became arabized, but the later immigrants, although integrating, were much slower to give up their separate Kurdish and Turkish loyalties. In addition the surrounding countryside continued to be inhabited by Arabs of the *Kilābī* tribes.[40]

For many years these tribal populations – whether settled or semi-nomadic – were the main human resource for the military and political ambitions of Aleppo's rulers. The professional cavalry became the core of the military structure, but the Kurdish, Turkish and Arab tribes provided the auxiliaries which made up the numbers on major campaigns.[41] The 12th century had placed enormous pressures on the capacities of the Aleppan state. The loss of almost all the 800-strong cavalry against Frank attacks in 1123 had forced the rulers to bring in the *Yarūqī* Turks from the Jazīra. But a quarter of a century later, the Zangids had been able to muster 6,000 cavalry, of which 1,000 were the Aleppan army. To achieve this Nūr al-Dīn had had to extend the *iqṭāᶜ* system of payment substantially. The *dīwān al-iqṭāᶜ* took over from the *dīwān al-rawātib,* and in 1163 *iqṭāᶜ*s were declared

[38] Sauvaget, *Alep,* 89f., 106; Elisséeff, *Nūr al-Dīn,* I, 178.

[39] Elisséeff, *Nūr al-Dīn,* III, 870; Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.,* 100.

[40] Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aᶜshā fī ṣināᶜat al-inshā',* 14 vols. (Cairo, 1913-19), IV, 231f. reports that this tribe was still the main Arab tribe of the province of Aleppo at the end of the 14th century.

[41] Elisséeff, *Nūr al-Dīn,* III, 722; H.A.R.Gibb, "The armies of Saladin," in S.J.Shaw and W.R.Polk (eds.), *Studies on the civilization of Islam* (Boston, 1962), 81.

hereditary to help reconstruct after the defeat on the Buqay^{c}a plain.[42]

When Nūr al-Dīn died in 1174 his forces were divided among the various Syrian cities, and for a time Kurds supported Saladin against Turks loyal to Nūr al-Dīn's successors.[43] The hereditary fiefholders hardly had time to build on their security, because in 1165-66 Saladin replaced many of them with his own officers.[44] In the following years, however, Aleppo's status as a virtually independent kingdom passing calmly from father to son in direct line of descent from Saladin himself, combined with the disappearance of traditional threats from west and north, gave the city a period of stability which was denied Damascus, constantly a victim to Ayyubid family squabbles. The Kurdish and Turkish officers had developed regional family ties already in the time of Nūr al-Dīn, and under the Ayyubids this process of integration into provincial and urban life continued.[45] This was parallelled at the lower end of the social spectrum, where the immigrants of the Yārūqiyya suburb joined their predecessors of al-Ḥādir in cultivating local interests. Their suburbs, south and south-west of the city walls, saw the building of the first great *khāns*, where the trade of east and west met that of the north and the south.[46] These populations passed into the Mamlūk period as "loyal" Turks, *turkumān al-ṭā^{c}a.*[47]

4. The economy

The military status and territorial expansion of Ayyubid Aleppo brought about an expansion of the fiscal base, which ultimately ensured that the city preserved a viable economic position through the years of commercial recession from the mid 13th to the early 15th centuries. We are fortunate that Ibn Shaddād lists the treasury income

[42] Elisséeff, *Nūr al-dīn,* III, 722-728.

[43] *Ibid.,* III, 724.

[44] Maqrīzī, *Al-sulūk li-ma^{c}rifat duwal al-mulūk,* ed. M.M.Ziyada, 3vols. (Cairo, 1934-70), I, 61f.

[45] R.S.Humphreys, "The emergence of the Mamlūk army," *SI,* 45 (1977), 70.

[46] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.,* 146; Ibn Jubayr stayed at one of these *khāns* outside the walls, when he visited Aleppo in 1185, *Riḥla* (Cairo, 1908), 233f.

[47] R.S.Humphreys, *op.cit.,* 161f.; B.Kellner-Heinkele, "The Turkomans and Bilād aš-Šām in the Mamlūk period," in T.Khalidi (ed.), *Land tenure and social transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut, 1984), 170.

in the various Ayyubid provinces of Syria around 1240. In Aleppo this amounted to a total of 7.88 million *dirhams*.[48] Most of this income was probably in cash, as the practice appears to have been that tax revenues paid in kind were retained at district level to support the feudal cavalry. For the same period Ibn Shaddād states that the total annual revenue of Ḥarrān, one of the more important districts of the kingdom of Aleppo, had amounted to 3 million *dirhams*. The revenue paid in kind there supported 1,000 cavalry, and the rest went to Aleppo.[49] Quite how reliable such figures are is open to question. Yāqūt al-Rūmī claims to have been shown Aleppo's books by the vizier twelve years earlier, in 1228.[50] In that year the income from *zakāt* and *djizya* alone amounted to only half that quoted by Ibn Shaddād. But the fief income supported 5,000 cavalry, and, says Yāqūt, could have supported 7,000 were it not for the fact that the highest ranking 1,000 were paid substantially higher grants.[51] Yāqūt specifically states that the revenues of Aleppo's twenty-one provincial castles are additional to these figures. If this is the case, it would explain the discrepancy between his figures and those of Ibn Shaddād, but it would also give us an indication, if not of the accurate size of the Aleppo Ayyūbid total mounted military capacity, then at least of the order of magnitude. A figure of 15,000 would appear realistic and 20,000 possible.[52] The information we have does not, however, allow us to estimate the size of the permanent core.

Nor does the information on the poll-tax income or the number of quarters allow us to do more than guess at the size of the population.

[48] Quoted in Sauvaget, *Alep*, 253f.; fiscal information has to be handled with care, because sources often specify *dīnārs* for this period, when the *dirham* was the monetary standard, and the exchange rate could be anything from 13 to 40, cf. H.Rabie, *The financial system of Egypt AH. 564-741/AD. 1169-1341* (Oxford, 1972), 174-180.

[49] C.Cahen, "La Djazīra au milieu du treizième siècle d'après ᶜIzz al-Dīn ibn Chaddād," *REI*, 8 (1934), 111.

[50] Yāqūt, *op.cit.*, II, 285.

[51] A figure of 10-15,000 *dirhams* is given, but it is difficult to compare this with the 1,500-2,000 *dīnārs* applicable in the 10th century, cf. C.Cahen, "L'évolution de l'iqtāᶜ du IXe au XIIIe siècle. Contribution à une histoire comparée des sociétés mediévales," *Annales ESC*, 8 (1953), 34.

[52] Humphreys, *op.cit.*, 74f., suggests about 3,000 by analogy with Damascus without further corroboration.

Ibn Shaddād's information on the quarters inside and outside the walls is incomplete,[53] so we cannot even produce a total based on an assumed average population per quarter, as has been attempted on the basis of more reliable information regarding the early 16th century, when the population may have been as high as 80,000, of which half lived inside the walls.[54] It is unlikely that the total population of Aleppo before the sack of 1260 can have been more than 50,000. All the textual and archaeological evidence suggests that significant areas inside the walls, especially in the south of the city, were still open land in the 13th century, which would indicate a population *intra muros* around 30,000 rather than the 40,000 of the early Ottoman period.[55] To this should be added the population of the suburbs, which was always much more mobile and therefore difficult to estimate.[56] Ibn Shaddād gives a poll-tax income of 100,000 *dirham*s paid by the *dhimmī*s around 1240. The average of the three rates chargeable according to strict Sharia was 24 *dirham*s,[57] and the general validity of this figure is confirmed by the practice in Egypt, where a flat rate of two *dīnār*s applied at a time when the exchange rate was about thirteen *dirham*s to the *dīnār*.[58] This suggests a *djizya*-paying non-Muslim

[53] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*, 98-106.

[54] O.L.Barkan, "Research on the Ottoman fiscal surveys," in M.A.Cook (ed.), *op.cit.*, 163-171, suggests 56,880 for 1530, while A.Raymond, "The population of Aleppo in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries according to Ottoman census documents," *IJMES*, 16 (1984), 447-460, suggests 80,000 for 1537/8. The discrepancy arises because, on the basis of the same source, Raymond uses a multiplier of eight per household, while Barkan uses a much lower five. Eight is reasonable for the city within the walls in the modern period, cf. Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*, 201, but the population density is likely to have been lower in the 15th and 16th centuries, when the area within the walls had only just been fully built up, and the population pressure was as yet low.

[55] Gaube and Wirth, *op.cit.*, 96.

[56] *Ibid.*, 103f., show that the suburbs suffered most from military activity, especially from the Mongol sack of 1260, as well as from epidemics due to the lack of running water.

[57] Ibn Qudāma, quoted in Elisséeff, *Nūr al-Dīn*, III, 794f.

[58] C.Cahen, "Le régime des impôts dans le Fayyum ayyubide," *Arabica*, 3 (1956), 21f.; Rabie, *op.cit.*, 174. This is on the assumption that, for accounting purposes, the purer *nuqra dirham* was used, rather than the debased "black" *dirham*, whose value could be as low as 1/40 of a *dīnār*.

population in the region of 4,000, most of which lived inside the walls. Taking into account the element of the *djizya*-exempt categories, the non-Muslim population of Aleppo may have amounted to as much as one-third of the total.

The combination of the status of capital with an expanding province was arguably more important in the economy of Aleppo than international commerce during this period. In Ibn Shaddād's treasury account only 1.23 million *dirhams* are directly attributable to such commerce, and of that the largest single item is the salt tax, accounting for 350,000, while silk only provides 80,000 *dirhams*.[59] Of course, the indirect revenues are a better indicator of the relative importance of commerce to the economy. This would include a proportion of the 1.2 million received in *zakāt,* as well as some of the income generated by the horse and camel markets, by the tanneries, the foundries, and the mint. But by far the largest part of the economy, as measured by government revenues, was generated locally and provincially. Perishable vegetables and fruit, fuel, and mutton on the hoof accounted for about one-fifth of income,[60] while provincial tributes and poll and land taxes amount to a further one-fifth. As a centre of government as well as trade there were the inevitible providers of pleasure – prostitutes, bars, etc. – which provided an income of 600,000 *dirhams*, half as much as the *zakāt.* It must also be remembered that Aleppo was becoming a major centre for the trade in slaves, at this time already providing a revenue of 100,000 *dirhams*. The Mongol expansion, while temporarily disrupting the economy and inflicting serious damage in 1260, was, so far as Aleppo is concerned, a short-lived nuisance. The loss of trade associated with the eclipse of Venice and the strengthening of the Byzantine-Genoese alliance certainly contributed to a recession, but this will have been partially compensated for by the high level of activity in the Mamlūk slave markets, generated by the enormous disruption of tribal migrations and continuing Mongol expansion in Central Asia.[61] Under the Mamlūks, although no longer

[59] This is the total of item nos. 3, 10, 11, 26, 38, and 42 as listed in Sauvaget, *Alep,* 253f.
[60] *Ibid.,* items 5-8, 12, 13, 23, 27, and 44.
[61] Humphreys, *op.cit.,* 96f.; D.Ayalon, "The Wāfidiyya in the Mamlūk kingdom," *IC,* 25 (1951), 88.

the capital of an independent kingdom, Aleppo remained the capital of a unique province. Its territory continued to expand slowly northwards into Armenian Cilicia, thus also compensating partly for the loss of trade.

In the two centuries from the mid-11th to the mid-13th centuries, Aleppo had changed character to an almost unrecognizable degree. The basic town plan may have been the same, but a city is more than its map. The level of economic activity had risen to such an extent that, when recession came in the late 13th century, it remained at a self-sustaining level high enough to enable the city to take almost immediate advantage when more favourable circumstances returned a century and a half later. The underlying character of the economy had been changed by political and military developments which made Aleppo the centre of a growing region, in which it was both economic and administrative centre. Those same political and military developments had altered the city's demographic character almost beyond recognition. The Arab city with its strong Shiite component had become a centre of *Sunnī* orthodoxy – by the 15th century it was exporting substantial numbers of scholars and administrators to Cairo.[62] Associated with the rise of Sunnism were clearly the Kurdish and Turkish migrations, which had made Aleppo a city of great ethnic variety. But it did not become a Turkish city, and one can only speculate as to why this was the case. One factor must have been the vacuum effect of gradual Byzantine collapse which drew the Turkish tribes through northern Syria and into Anatolia, with only limited settling along the route. Another factor is likely to have been Syria's growing importance to Ayyubid and even more to Mamlūk Egypt as a buffer to the north – Aleppo provided strategic depth. This helped to keep the migration routes pushed towards the north and out of Syria. But perhaps the major factor was the changing pattern of military recruitment. The Mirdasids, Zangids and early Ayyubids relied on developing a traditional patron-client relationship with whole tribal groups, whose population tended to become integrated into the

[62] C.Petry, *The civilian elite of Cairo in the later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1981), 54ff. and tables 2 and 3 at 114-117.

political, economic and social fabric. But this system was gradually declining in importance, a decline not unconnected with the increasingly rigidly administered *iqṭā*ᶜ system, which favoured an individual relationship. The sudden availability of large numbers of slaves from the early 13th century created the circumstances in which military rulers could recruit individuals and control their place in state and society.[63] We begin to move into the peculiarly Mamlūk social structure which Lapidus has described in such detail.[64] The tribal patron-client relationship still existed but it was limited to the marches of the Mamlūk state. Thus the *Dhū'l-Qādir* and *Ramaḍānī* Turks were kept separate as buffer entities outside the northern borders of the Mamlūk province of Aleppo proper,[65] while in Aleppo itself the officer class, limited in size, was able to absorb and integrate with the local elite. The perspective of the city began to change and when, with the economic upturn from about 1400, Aleppo again grew, it was no longer the south that attracted but the north, and that was where the new suburbs appeared.

[63] Humphreys, *op.cit.*, 147 ff. stresses this point as being a major factor of distinction between the Ayyubid and the *Mamlūk* military systems.
[64] I.Lapidus, *Muslim cities in the later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
[65] Kellner-Heinkele, *op.cit.*, 171ff.

V. BEYOND BYZANTINES AND OTTOMANS : 1

A CALL TO ARMS : MICHAEL MARULLUS TO CHARLES VIII

M.J. McGANN / BELFAST

Ad Carolum Regem Franciae	To Charles, King of France
Invicte, Magni, rex, Caroli genus, quem tot virorum, tot superum piae sortes iacentis vindicemque iustitiae fideique poscunt,	Unconquered king, descendant of Charlemagne,whom the holy destinies of so many men and so many gods demand as the avenger of justice and faith overthrown,
quem moesta tellus Ausonis hinc vocat, illinc solutis Graecia crinibus et quicquid immanis profanat Turca Asiae Syriaeque pinguis,	whom on this side the grieving land of Ausonia calls and on that Greece with loosened hair and all of Asia and rich Syria profaned by the monstrous Turk,
olim virorum patria et artium sedesque vera ac relligio deum, nunc Christianae servitutis dedecus obprobriumque, turpe,	once the homland of heroes and arts and the seat of true religion, but now the shame and base disgrace of Christian enslavement,
quid coelitum ultro fata vocantia morare segnis? non ideo tibi victoriarum tot repente di facilem tribuere palmam,	why do you sluggishly hinder heaven's fate which of its own accord summons you? Not for that did the gods suddenly give you the easy glory of so many victories,
primisque in annis et puero et patris favore casso tot populos feros, adusque pugnaces Britannos Alpibus Allobrogum ab nivosis,	and when in early youth you lacked your father's support, order so many fierce peoples from the Allobroges' snowy Alps to the warlike Bretons

iussere victos tendere brachia.
si te decori gloria splendidi
nil tangit immensumque in aevum
nomina per populos itura,

to stretch out their arms to
you in defeat. If you are unmoved
by the fame of shining honour and
a name that will travel across the
world through time without end,

at supplicantum tot miserae exulum
sordesque tangant et lacrimae piae,
at Christianorum relicta
ossa tot, heu, canibus lupisque,

then at least be moved by the
wretched destitution and pious
tears of so many suppliant exiles, at
least be moved by those many Christian
bones abandoned, alas, to dogs and wolves,

foedisque tangat relligio modis
spurcata Christi, sospite Galliae
rectore te nobis potentis,
cuius avum proavumque clara

and by Christ's religion so foully besmirched
while we have you in safety as ruler
of powerful Gaul, whose ancestors' and
forefathers' famed

virtus furentem barbariem unice
et Sarracenos contudit impetus,
cum saeva tempestas repente
missa quasi illuviesque campis,

valour uniquely crushed the raging
barbaric onrush of the Saracen when
like a furious storm or flood unleashed
over the plain,

non occupatae finibus Africae
contenti, Hiberi non opibus soli,
sperare iam Gallos et ipsum
ausi animis Rhodanum superbis.

not content with the lands of captured Africa
or the wealth of Spanish soil, they dared in
the arrogance of their hearts to hope for
Gaul and the very Rhone.

sed nec bonorum tunc superum favor
desideratus, nec tibi tam pia
in bella eunti defuturus,
Carle, moras modo mitte inertis,

But the help of the good gods was not felt to
be lacking at that time, nor will it fail,
Charles, when you go forth to so holy a
war. Only dismiss listless delay

occasionem et quam tribuunt cape,
aeque nocentis, dissimiles licet,
gnarus patrantem quique, possit
cum, scelus haud prohibet patrari.

and seize the opportunity which they
give, knowing that though they are
unlike, he who does not prevent the
committing of a crime though he
is able is just as guilty as he
who commits it.

(Michael Marullus, *Epigrams*, 4.32)[1]

[1] The text is taken with minor modifications from the invaluable edition by A. Perosa, *Michael Marulli Carmina* (Zürich, 1951).

If Michael Tarchaniotes Marullus is remembered at all to-day (and he has disappeared from the *Encyclopedia Britannica*), it is for his work on the text of Lucretius or for his influence on Ronsard or, most appropriately, for his Latin poetry. Although he was a fifteenth-century Greek, Byzantinists have paid him almost no attention — apart from a fanciful account by Sathas and an article by Zakythenos which unfortunately contributes little from the Byzantine side to our understanding of Marullus[2].

He synchronizes the beginning of his life with the fall of his homeland at the hands of the Turk, which places him firmly in the second half of the fifteenth century[3]. Indeed he died in the year 1500. The Latin form of his father's name is Manilius Marullus, which probably means that he belonged to the family of Μαρούλ(λ)ης or Μαρουλ(λ)ᾶς, which though not without some distinction never belonged to the high aristocracy[4]. Michael's mother, Euphrosyne Tarchaniotissa, bore a more famous name, and there were Palaeologue connections on that side of the family[5]. After the Turkish conquest Michael was taken as a small child to Ragusa, where he uttered, as he tells us, 'the first complaints and lamentation of wretched exile'. (*Epigrams*, 4, 17, 9-12)[6]. Later he crossed to Italy. At the outset he lived in the Kingdom of Naples and was associated with the Academy of Pontano. Two of his friends, the king's secretary, Antonello Petrucci, and the prince of Salerno, Antonello Sanseverino, were

2 C.N. Sathas, *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au moyen* âge, VII (Paris, 1888), preface I-LXVII; Δ.Α. Ζακυθηνός, "Μιχαὴλ Μάρουλλος Ταρχανιώτης. Ἕλλην ποιητὴς τῶν χρόνων τῆς Ἀναγεννήσεως," Ἐπ. Ἐτ. Βυζ.Σπ., 5 (1928), 200-42.

3 For the year of his birth see my paper, "1453 and all that: The End of the Byzantine Empire in the Poetry of Michael Marullus", which will appear shortly in the *Acta* of the Fifth International Congress of the International Association for Neo-Latin Studies held in 1982 at St. Andrews.

4 V. Laurent, "Légendes sigillographiques et familles byzantines", *EO*, 30 (1931), 466-84, at 482, n.1. I hope to discuss the accentuation of the Greek form of the poet's name in another place.

5 I have offered a family tree in "The Ancona Epitaph of Manilius Marullus", *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance*, 42 (1980), 401-04, at 404.

6 For the narrative sketch which follows compare, in addition to Ζακυθηνός, *op. cit.*, 200-11, B. Croce, *Poeti e scrittori del pieno e tardo rinascimento*, 2nd ed., II (Bari, 1958), 269-98.

involved in the revolt of the Barons in 1485 against the ruling Aragonese dynasty. Petrucci was put to death, but Sanseverino escaped to France, where Charles VIII had shortly before succeeded to the throne, and where Sanseverino himself continued to plot against the Aragonese.

After several years in Rome, Marullus moved to Florence, where he enjoyed the patronage of Lorenzo and Giovanni, sons of Pierfrancesco de' Medici and second cousins of Lorenzo the Magnificent. In 1494 the French entered Italy in order to attack Naples, and Marullus was summoned to join Sanseverino, who had been entrusted with a naval command. Later he entered the service of Caterina Sforza, whom his patron Giovanni di Pierfrancesco had married c.1497, and played a notable part in the defence of her castle at Forlì against Cesare Borgia. A few months later, in April 1500, his horse stumbled as he attempted to ford the flooded river Cecina near Volterra, and he was drowned. A copy of Lucretius was found on his body.

His poetic output is considerable: 4 books of *Epigrams,* 21 *Hymni Naturales* addressed to pagan deities and reflecting in arrangement and content a neo-platonic cosmos, a book of 5 *Neniae* and an unfinished didactic poem on the upbringing of a prince. In many of these poems he writes as a Greek, proud of his language and concerned that it should survive, proud also of his achievement as a Latin poet in transferring ancestral rites to the banks of the Arno[7], grateful to Florence and the Medici for their devotion to the conservation of Greek culture[8], but above all looking back to the Turkish conquest, the heroism of some Greeks, the cowardice and folly of others and sometimes expressing a hope of returning to his homeland[9].

On one occasion writing to a fellow-Greek, Manilius Rhallus, he offers him consolation for exile and concludes resignedly: "We must live wherever it pleases the gods although under Caesar's auspices I do not give up hope even of my native home".

7 *Hymni naturales,* 2, 8, 1-8.

8 *Hymni naturales,* 3, 1, 271-86.

9 See n.1 in the paper cited above, n.3.

(*Epigrams,* 3, 47, 22-24). Caesar is Maximilian, king of the Romans since 1486. Marullus' naming of him as possible liberator of Greece probably reflects the vogue enjoyed in Italy from about 1490 by Johann Lichtenberger's *Prognosticatio,* in which it was foretold that the family of Maximilian would produce an imperial saviour who would conquer the Turk and introduce the final phase of world history[10].

For Marullus however that was only a momentary flirtation with the Imperial eagle. Much more serious was his involvement with the fortunes of Charles VIII, attested not only in his poetry, but also by his leaving Florence to join the expedition of 1494. The personal hopes which this raised — that the conquest of Napels would lead on to the defeat of the Turks and his own return to Greece — find expression in a passage of *Nenia* 4, which reflecting a phase of disillusionment after the king's initial success, sadly recalls his earlier hopes: "But in my madness, alas, I imagined that some time I would see my homeland and the walls by the deep Bosporus, when under your auspices proud Scythia had been put to flight" (45-48).

An exile's dream however formed only part of the circumstances which encouraged Marullus to associate himself with Charles's enterprise. There were the ties of friendship with Sanseverino, going back to his earlier life in the Kingdom of Naples. And there were his links with the sons of Pierfrancesco. An adequate consideration of these involves a glance at Florentine politics and a world far removed from the classical metre and language of our poem.

The opening address to Charles as descendant of Charlemagne (1) is a reminder that the poem was composed in an age that breathed a heady atmosphere of prophecy, messianism and apocalypse, which in Florence entered the Platonic Academy as well as the churches crowded to hear the voices of Savanarola and other preachers. Belief in a Charlemagne *redivivus* goes back at least to the eleventh century, and from the late fourteenth century on the

10 Cf. M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages. A Study in Joachimism* (Oxford, 1969), 347-54, esp. 347, n.1.

immensely popular 'Second Charlemagne prophecy' is attested[11]. This predicted among other things that after conquests in the West (cf. 14-21), the new Charlemagne would cross the sea to Greece and there be crowned King of the Greeks. The coming of Charles VIII to the throne of France revived such ideas, and their currency may well have shaped his career, even in matters of strategy. In a poem by André de la Vigne Christianity in the form of a woman seeks rescue from the infidel: compare Greece in our poem summoning Charles "with loosened hair" (5-6)[12]. Such ideas were likely to find favour in Florence. More than a century before, in 1368, there circulated in the city a prophecy deriving from a French follower of Joachim of Fiore which declared that a French emperor would rule the world[13]. And the prophecy of a second Charlemagne would be particularly welcome in a city which regarded the first Charlemagne as her second founder and had for long followed a pro-French policy. This however had been abandoned by Piero de' Medici, son and, since 1492, successor of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Piero's position was threatened as the shadow of the Second Charlemagne fell across Italy.

Within his own family he faced the opposition of the sons of Pierfrancesco, who in April 1494 took advantage of his absence to entertain the French ambassador in one of their villas. For this they were sentenced to life imprisonment and confiscation of their property. Later this was reduced to banishment to the *contado*. In October they escaped to join Charles, and by November they were back in Florence, now in the hands of the French[14]. Their secretary and cousin, Zanobi Acciaiuoli, had been arrested with them in April. He was a follower of Savonarola and was to join his community at San Marco in 1495[15]. Savonarola himself

11 Reeves, *op. cit.*, 301-02; 320-31, esp. 328; M. Plaisance, "*L'Invenzione della Croce* de Lorenzo (=Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco!) de' Medici et le mythe du second Charlemagne" in *Culture et religion en Espagne et en Italie au XVe et XVIe siècles*, Documents et travaux de l'équipe de recherche, Culture et société au XVIe siècle, Université de Paris VIII - Vincennes, Tome IV (Abbeville, 1980), 43-66.

12 Reeves, *op. cit.*, 354-58.

13 Reeves, *op. cit.*, 216.

14 Plaisance, *op. cit.*, 46-52.

however had enjoyed good relations with Piero, and it was not until Piero made his disastrous trip to the King's camp in October 1494 that he took an overtly hostile attitude to him. Later he would state that he had foretold from as early as 1492 the coming of a Great King from beyond the Alps. This may be true, but the evidence we have points only to a late acknowledgement of the king's eschatological role. Eventually he identified Charles as the sword of the Lord which he had seen in a vision, hailed him as the future reformer of the church and predicted that he would conquer Jerusalem and convert the infidel[16]. Marsilio Ficino had used similar terms when he composed a speech welcoming Charles to Florence, saluting him as Charlemagne and declaring that he would conquer the Turks and bring freedom to Jerusalem[17].

The forces which rejected Piero's anti-French policy and looked with hope to the advent of Charles and what might flow from it viewed the situation from different angles. Religious zeal, philosophical speculation, family rivalry and political calculation all played their part. Marullus had closest links with the sons of Pierfrancesco, but the question inevitably arises whether he himself in any sense belonged to that hectic world of eschatology and apocalypse. He wrote poems to and about Zanobio Acciaiuoli, who we have seen became a follower of Savonarola, and Giovanni Pico, who admired Savonarola and was buried in the Dominican habit[18], but both men appear in these poems as highly unregenerate (*Epigrams,* 3,20 bis; 3,7; cf. also 4,31). Marullus' portrait was painted by another *piagnone,* Botticelli[19], but the connection there may well have been by way of the sons of Pierfrancesco. They may have shared some of Savonarola's views for a time, but they were politicians rather than religious zealots, changing the name Medici to Popolani rather than their dress to

15 Cf. *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani,* I (Rome, 1960), 93-94.

16 Cf. D. Weinstein, *Savonarola and Florence* (Princeton, 1970), 107, 116-18, 127-37, 165-66.

17 Weinstein, *op. cit.,* 187; Plaisance, *op. cit.,* 52, n.26.

18 Weinstein, *op. cit.,* 215-16; cf. R. Ridolfi, *The Life of Girolamo Savonarola,* translated by C. Grayson (London, 1959), 97-99.

19 R. Lightbown, *Sandro Botticelli,* II, Complete Catalogue (London, 1978), 81-82.

that of humble friars. Later Savonarola was allegedly to admit that he feared Lorenzo's tyranny, and Giovanni was rumoured to have played a part in the attack on San Marco. Besides there is nothing in Marullus' poetry to encourage the belief that the Christian concerns of quattrocento Italy, whether mediated through philosophy or popular lay devotion or transfigured by apocalyptic prophecy, meant anything to him[20]. Although he summons Charles to a holy war (42-43), he should not be located among those Greeks who accepted Latin Christianity and placed their hopes in a crusade. He is closer to the line of Plethon and Demetrios Raoul Kabakes[21] than of Bessarion or Musurus. Erasmus was not mistaken in detecting *paganitas* in his poetry[22]. Thus in its numerous and sympathetic references to Christianity, our poem is completely unrepresentative of the work of Marullus. Perhaps it is worth seeing whether beneath its univocal surface there are contradictory signals creating fault lines which will respond to a gentle tap from a deconstructive hammer.

The wretchedness of Christians, whether living in Italy or suffering under the Turk, is one of the main themes of the poem (2-12). Later it becomes one member of a contrasting pair of motives (the other being "glory") which ought to spur Charles to action (22-30). They are related to each other by means of *at* ("at least"), and in view of the prominence given at the outset to the unhappy state of Christians it might be expected that the argument would take the form: "Charles, Italy and Greece summon you, but if you are deaf to that, then at least heed the call of glory". In fact however the argument is reversed: the primary consideration is glory, and the plight of the Christians is now only secondary. It is

20 For the antagonism between Savonarola and the sons of Pierfrancesco see H.P. Horne, *Botticelli, Painter of Florence* (London, 1908; repr. Princeton, 1980), 188-89. An apparent exception to Marullus's indifference to manifestations of popular piety is *Epigrams* 2.27, but its primary concern is the praise of Antonello Petrucci".

21 Cf. A. Keller, "Two Byzantine Scholars and their Reception in Italy", J. Warb, 20 (1957), 363-70, at 366-70.

22 P.S. and H.M. Allen, *Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, V (Oxford 1924), 519 (Ep. 1497); cf. *Dialogus Ciceronianus*, ed. P. Mesnard, in *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, I, 2 (Amsterdam, 1971), 666.

true that a stronger emotional charge has been invested in the latter, but the logic of the argument runs the other way. Almost in spite of himself Marullus betrays the subordination of piety to glory.

Lastly the content and form of the final stanza (45-48). It states a legal principle not found in Roman law, but attested in the writings of Lucas of Penna, a fourteenth-century Neapolitan jurist: *qui enim patitur quod prohibere potest, ipse facere videtur*[23]. Drawing perhaps on his studies in the Kingdom fifteen years before[24], Marullus has neatly invoked a legal maxim for the benefit of a king who is to lay hold of the kingdom where it was enunciated by a jurist who indeed championed something very like the Ruler's absolute sovereignty[25].

A neat stroke, but expressed with great clumsiness. Did Marullus have to use such obscurely convoluted word order to express that thought? Surely not, as Lucas himself demonstrates — unless the obscurity somehow relates to his attitude to his material. He offers an ingeniously relevant gnōmē to round off the poem and almost destroys its effect by the arrangement of the words. Could this be the response, involuntary and unconscious no doubt, of a freethinking Greek to finding himself in the position of calling upon a Frank to undertake the traditionally Frankish adventure of a crusade, the prospect of which few who felt themselves to be Greeks could look upon without a shudder?

23 C.x, 75,1, no.7, as cited by W. Ullmann, *The Medieval Idea of Law as represented by Lucas de Penna* (London, 1946), 158; cf. also 143.

24 For the standing of Lucas in the Neapolitan school during the fifteenth century see Ullmann, *op. cit.*, 11-12.

25 Ullmann, *op. cit.*, 179-183.

V. BEYOND BYZANTINES AND OTTOMANS : 3

JEWS, ROMANIANS AND OTTOMANS IN THE MIDDLE AGES:

JOSEPH NASSI AND MOLDAVIA*

VICTOR ESKENASY / LONDON

Specialised literature on the relationship among Romanians, Jews and Ottomans in the Middle Ages is extremely scarce. The lack of any collection of documents on the history of Jews in the Romanian area rendered impossible the production of a synthesis on the subject. Consequently, opinions and historic clichés often generated by works based on extra-scientific considerations have been perpetuated for several decades now.[1]

More often than not the relations existing between Romanians and Jews, which were as a matter of fact recorded in extremely dispersed and hardly accessible sources, have been looked upon as peripheral to the international relations of Eastern Europe and bearing no influence over them.

Methodologically speaking, any attempt made to reopen the debate seems motivated so far as it may contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the actual relation of forces among the Ottoman Empire, the mediaeval Romanian states and other European powers.

Due to their geographical situation, Moldavia and Valachia had always found themselves on the very edge of the main directions of Ottoman territorial expansion. The two states whose territory was transited by the goods traded between the Orient and Central Europe

* Communication at XIX Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham, March 23-26 1985; translated by Ioana Dragomirescu's kindness.

[1] The only historical synthesis in the scientifical circuit is: Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria evreilor din terile noastre* (Bucureşti, 1913); other studies are spread into almost inaccessible publications. See also M.A.Halevy, "Comunităţile evreieşti din Iaşi şi Bucureşti, pînă la Zaveră (1821)," *Sinai.Anuar,* 3 (Bucureşti) (1931), 11-112.

were, undoubtedly, affected by Ottoman advance.[2] Although enjoying only a limited political autonomy while permanently menaced of being transformed into Ottoman provinces, Moldavia and Valachia exercised an active policy manifestly favourable to Christian European alliances. At the same time, from the point of view of European strategy, their potential capacity to support a second front against the Ottomans represented a factor of particular attention and interest to European diplomacy.

The simultaneous transformation of the Black Sea into an Ottoman lake,[3] linked in with the gradual monopolisation of the Danubian strategic axis constituted the two main Ottoman endeavours that affected the Romanian states.[4] Within less than a century, that is from the moment when the cities of Kilia and Cetatea Alba (Mavrokastron) situated at the Danube mouth had been conquered and until the fall of Buda (in 1541), Moldavia and Valachia had been gradually deprived of important commercial sources. Simultaneously, their autonomy had irreversibly diminished until they finally became part of the Ottoman sphere of interest.[5]

Against this general background, the contacts between the Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Romanians, visible at several levels, often played the role of a real barometer at moments of intense crisis. Together with Greeks and Armenians, Jews were often mentioned as transiting the Romanian territory for business. Outstanding is the part they played as diplomatic mediators or pressure factors at decision making moments at the Ottoman court. And, in relation to this latter remark, mention should also be made of the fact that the activity of the Balkanic community as well as the development of its economic or

[2] On trade routes, see recently Şerban Papacostea, "Inceputurile politicii comerciale a Tării Româneşti şi Moldovei (secolele XIV-XVI). Drum şi stat, Studii şi materiale de istorie medie," 10 (Bucureşti) (1983), 9 – 56 with the bibliography of problem.

[3] See Gheorghe Bratianu, *La Mer Noire. Des origines à la conquête ottomane* (München, 1969).

[4] More recently, see Virgil Ciocîltan's latest two part contribution on subject: "Competiţia pentru controlul Dunării inferioare (1412-1420), *Revista de istorie,* 35 (Bucureşti) (1982), 10 and 11, 1090-1100 and 1191-1203.

[5] N.Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches. Nach den Quellen Dargestellt,* III (Gotha, 1910).

political contacts north of the Danube preceded the settling of the immigrant Spanish-Portuguese community.

An example worth mentioning is the moment of crisis in the eighth decade of the 15th century. The anti-Ottoman coalition of Venetian inspiration extended itself to include the Romanian area. The negotiations with Venetian envoys to Buda and especially to Suceava, Moldavia's capital, were paralleled by ample diplomatic talks carried through the intermediacy of Isak Beg, Uzun Hasan's legate. Isak Beg, orator and diplomat acknowledged by contemporary documents as "natione hispanus, fide autem hebraeus"[6], succeeded in obtaining in 1473 the adhesion of Stephen the Great, the prince of Moldavia, to the anti-Ottoman coalition.

And if Isak Beg appeared in records as one of the first Jewish mediators of importance in the Eastern European area, Moldavia's involvement was marked by a relatively surprising event equally related to Jews, for Jewish merchants transiting Moldavia were put to prison and considerable ransoms were claimed for. The imprisonment and torture of Ottoman subjects was an unprecedented event in Moldavia's political tradition. It certainly left an impact on the Constantinopolitan world, rendered the political crisis more acute and led to its manifestation in the sphere of arms. The historiography on this subject has been ready to see the event either as a mere act of mediaeval authority or simply as an anti-Semitic measure[7].

Still, the evidence given by Elia Capsali, the Rabbi of Candia, is self-explanatory. Both the imprisoned Jews, who refused to give in in front of the pressure put upon them, and the Jewish community of

[6] E.Cornet, *Le guerre dei Veneti nell'Asia* (Vienna, 1856), 48. On Isak Beg's life and activity see L.Tardy, *Iszak Zsidó, orvos a Perzsiai Uralkodó, es Korvin Mátyás Összekötöje a törökellenes világliga megszervezésében* in *Monumenta Hungarie Judaica,* XII (Budapest, 1969), 27-44. On the subject of the wars between Venetians and Ottomans, see N.Iorga, "Veneţia în Marea Neagra (III)" in *idem, Studii asupra evului mediu românesc,* ed. Ş.Papacostea (Bucureşti, 1984), 230-96; Ş.Papacostea, "Venise et les Pays Roumains au Moyen Age", in *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV, (Firenze, 1973),* and *idem, Stephen the Great, Prince of Moldavia 1457-1504* (Bucharest, 1981), 41.

[7] Andrei Pippidi, *Contribuţii la studiul legilor războiului în evul mediu,* (Bucureşti, 1974); Ştefan Andreescu, "Autour de la dernière phase des Rapports entre la Moldavie et Gênes," *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire,* 21 (Bucureşti) (1982), 270, n.37.

Constantinople, protested against the arbitrariness of this measure that was looked upon as an infringement of Ottoman interests as well as of the international commercial law.[8] And once again Moldavia was subjected to military reprisals, under political circumstances in which the measure mentioned before appeared as a mere symbolic representation of a declaration of hostility. It was only due to the Ottoman army being simultaneously wasted on several battle fields that the possible danger of having the Romanian state transformed into an Ottoman province was eluded.

This happening is worth mentioning since in the 16th century the identification of interests of the Balkan Jewish community with Ottoman authority turned into a reality with wide implications on the international relations in the area.

From Professor Cecil Roth's synthesis to the more recent one put together by Professor S.W.Baron, all historians have agreed that the energetic implant brought about by the Sepharadic immigrant community strongly activated the Balkan-Ottoman Jewish community.[9] This phenomenon exerted an immediate influence on the Romanian states. On the one hand, documents refer to the settling of the first communities in Valachia[10]. Thanks to them commercial exchanges flourished, direct relations being thus established between the Balkan Jews and the important Polish and Hungarian communities. To this more easily detectable level a second one added itself: that of political relations. The acute Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry regarding the domination of Transylvania, the parallel interests that Ottomans and Poles had in Moldavia had been factors determining a diversified diplomatic activity.[11] Ottomans used all channels of information in order to

[8] M.A.Halevy, "Relaţiile lui Ştefan cel Mare cu evreii," *Sinai.Anuar,* 2 (Bucureşti) (1929), 38-48; *idem*, "Les guerres d'Etienne le Grand et d'Uzun-Hassan contre Mahomet II, d'après la 'Chronique de Turquie" du candiote Elia Capsali (1523)," *Studia et acta orientalia,* 1 (Bucureşti) (1957), 189-198.

[9] Cecil Roth, *The House of Nasi. Dona Gracia* (New York, 1969); Salomon W.Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews,* XVIII, *The Ottoman Empire, Persia, Ethiopia, India and China* (New York, 1983).

[10] Victor Eskenasy, *Izvoare referitoare la istoria evreilor din România*.I., (Bucureşti, 1982), xxviii and 50-52, no.39.

[11] N.Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité orientale, V, Epoque des braves. Problème de la Transylvanie au XVIe siècle* (Bucarest, 1940).

achieve their political objectives, and they took maximum advantage of the relations among Romanians, Jews and Poles.

The decade preceding the battle of Lepanto is a good example in support of this assertion. One of the documents published some time ago, and recently quoted by Baron, contributes valuable details for a just estimation of this historical moment and for the understanding of the structuring mechanism at the basis of Ottoman decisions.[12] The document referred to is an anonymous report written around 1570, that gives a direct description of the network of Jewish acting in Central and Eastern Europe on behalf of Joseph Nassi, Duke of Naxos and favourite advisor of the sultan.[13] Behind the raw information given by the document, one can perceive the image of a political action of significant scope and with important final consequences. The document enumerates no fewer than 25 individuals hired by Nassi in the main trade centres of the area mentioned above, from Vienna and Prague to Cracow and Lwow. All information followed a well established route starting in Vienna, going through Cracow, Lublin, Lwow, Camenita and Hotin (two important centres on the northern border of Moldavia), to arrive at Kilia (an active port situated at the mouth of the Danube), and to finally get to Constantinople by the Black Sea.

Nassi's activity in the Eastern European area does not represent a historical novelty. He had already been present since 1562 at the court of Poland, and was later on considered as a key character in the relations with Ottomans. Important commercial privileges attested this special consideration.[14] At the same period an equally important activity, full of consequences, was developed by Nassi in Hungary.[15]

Of particular interest are the details that confirm and give additional meanings to the information contained in the document, revealing the personalities of several characters who passed for mere spies of

[12] V.Meystowicz, *Documenta Polonica ex archivio generali Hispaniae in Simancas,* I Pars (Romae, 1963), 169-71, no.133 (=*Elementa ad fontium editiones,* VIII); S.W.Baron, *op.cit.,* 191 and 457-77, n.47.

[13] An almost exhaustive bibliography on Nassi, see at S.W.Baron, *op.cit.,* 472ff.

[14] S.W.Baron, *op.cit.,* XVII, *Poland and Lithuania 1500-1650,* 48-49 and especially Moses Schorr, "Zur Geschichte des Don Josef Nasi," *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums,* 41 (Breslau), 169-77 and 228-37.

[15] *Monumenta Hungariae Judaica,* II 1540-1710, (Budapest, 1937), 19-24.

Nassi's. Originally they were trade agents, speaking several languages and knowing in depth the countries where they lived. On behalf of Nassi they became the beneficiaries of important commercial privileges promulgated at the court of Poland.[16] It is the case of the Jew Zaccaria, who might be identified among Nassi's spies, being his representative for the wax trade in Poland. Among the trade agents who operated in both Poland and Moldavia, Abraham Mosso and Chaim Cohen seem to have played an extremely important part. They both appear in documents issued at the court of Poland, reference being made to them as either Nassi's representatives or mere well - known traders. They used to conclude agreements for the transportation of goods by Polish and Romanian carriers from Lwow to Suceava and Kilia respectively. These carriers would also engage themselves to remain in Kilia until the Ottoman vessels returned from Constantinople (usually in about two weeks) and agreed that a Jewish agent, who certainly was the bearer of the correspondence, accompany the goods.[17] Of equal importance, according to the document, Abraham Maimon lived in Hotin, the northernmost town of Moldavia, wherefrom he directed towards Constantinople the information sent by other correspondents.[18]

More than once Romanian historiography characterised Joseph Nassi as a mere adventurer of the epoch treating him thus with undeserved disdain.[19] The document under discussion is not the only one that supports the view according to which Nassi played an important part in the history of Eastern Europe at the epoch of the battle of Lepanto. One can even comment on his part in terms of being a reflection of a coherent Ottoman policy that was fully aware of the contextual situation and that made a pragmatical use of the Jewish

[16] M.Schorr, *op.cit.,*; M.Balaban, *Zydzi Lwowscy na przetomie XVIgo i XVIIgo wieku* (Lwow, 1906), 9-11 and 460-61.

[17] N.Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei şi Cetăţii Albe* (Bucureşti, 1899), 295-96, no.XLIV; *idem, Studii şi documente cu privire la istoria românilor,* XXIII (Bucureşti, 1913), 352-53, no.180.

[18] V.Meystowicz, *op.cit.,* 170.

[19] Information on Nassi's activities in A.Pippidi, "Les Pays danubiens et Lépante" in *idem, Hommes et idées du Sud-Est Européen à l'aube de l'âge moderne* (Bucarest-Paris, 1980), 29ff.

community of Constantinople and of its correspondents in Moldavia and Poland.

In Moldavia this political interference was encouraged by the period of internal crisis the Romanian state was going through.[20] The rapid succession to the crown of a "swarm of pretenders" – *essaim de preténdants,* to quote Nicolae Iorga,[21] brought even better into relief the part played by Constantinopolitan community and by Joseph Nassi in particular.

The crisis started with the replacement of prince Alexandru Lapuşneanu (1552-61). Without being explicit on this point, the diplomatic sources of the period seem to reveal that the Ottoman reaction was, among other things, the result of the prince's policy of intolerance towards Jews and other allogeneous elements living in Moldavia. The open attitude of the new prince, Iacob Heraclid Despot (1561-1563), was on the contrary stressed on several occasions.[22] In 1562 a list of Despot's supporters in Constantinople mentioned among the persons of utmost importance "the trader Joseph Nassi, the Sultan's favourite".[23] It was in fact the year when Nassi was being introduced to the sphere of Eastern European political problems.

In the meantime, Alexandru Lapuşneanu, the ex-prince of Moldavia, who found refuge in Constantinople, started trying to regain the power with the support of the Ottomans. French diplomats commented on his diplomatic and financial efforts and mentioning among the characters who were indispensable to his success "the Jew Nassi, who is the favourite".[24] Moldavia's political instability favoured his attempts. Iacob Heraclid had been assassinated by another pretendant, called Ştefan Tomşa. Constantinople reacted speedily. Through

[20] N.Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains...,* V; see also Şt. Andreescu, *Restitutio Daciae (Relaţiile politice dintre Ţara Românească şi Transilvania în răstimpul 1526-1539)* (Bucureşti, 1980); Şt.S.Gorovei, *Muşatinii* (Bucureşti, 1976); A.Pippidi, *Tradiţia politică bizantină în ţările române din secolele XVI-XVIII* (Bucureşti, 1983).

[21] N.Iorga, *op.cit.,* second part, cap. II.

[22] Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor,* II, 1, 404, no.CCCLXXIX and *Călători străini despre ţările române* (Bucureşti, 1970), II, 131-32, 140 (diplomatic reports from April 8 and 13, 1562).

[23] Hurmuzaki, *Documente...,* I, i, 424, no.CCCXIV (June 6, 1562).

[24] *Arhiva istorică a României,* I (Bucureşti), xix, 148, no.220 (October 29, 1563).

the intermediacy of a certain Abraham, the Jew who was the Sultan's interpreter with Sigismund II Augustus – and who could be also identified as a member of Nassi's network – the Ottomans agreed with the Poles to get rid of the killer.[25]

In spite of the peace neagotiations between Habsburgs and Ottomans regarding Transylvania, the swarm of pretenders continued to focus their attention on the throne in the years to follow, thus endangering the political stability of the area. Among these pretenders, a certain Gheorghe Heraclid, who claimed to be a relative of the ex-prince Despot, asked in 1566 for the support of the Genoese Signory. "A great Jew, trader in Moldavia" played the intermediary in his case. There are reasons for us to think that he was also one of Nassi's agents.[26]

Nassi's involvement in Moldavia's problems certainly continued afterwards. It is difficult to appreciate today an attitude that, at the epoch, passed for one of remarkable political opportunism. But over and above his personal interests Nassi evidently represented the general political tendencies of the Ottomans. His presence in Moldavia was meant to at least act as a brake on the inclusion of the state in Poland's sphere of interest. When the new prince, Bogdan Lapuşneanu, came to the throne in March 1568, the Sultan also granted Nassi the privilege of exclusive control on the trade of Cretan wines in Moldavia.[27] This privilege added to the one he had been granted one year before for the wax trade in Poland, turned Nassi into a personality of prime importance in the area. And the simple fact that the states under discussion accepted him implied his value as a political mediator and communication channel among Ottomans, Romanians and Poles.

The year when the battle of Lepanto was fought also marked the summit of Nassi's policy in Eastern Europe. Both the general international conjuncture and the political tradition of the Romanian states led them to join the Christian coalition that was being formed. It is

[25] E.D.Tappe, *Documents concerning Romanian History, 1427-1601, collected from British Archives* (London-Hague-Paris, 1964), 38-39, no.46.

[26] Virginia Sacerdoţeanu, *Ceva cu privire la pretendentul Gheorghe Despot, Revista istorică,* XX (Bucureşti, 1934), 3-7; A.Pippidi, *Hommes et idées...*, 41, 261-62.

[27] Abraham Galanté, *Don Joseph Nassi Duc de Naxos, d'après de nouveaux documents* (Constantinople, 1913), 29, no.5.

difficult to measure to what extent Constantinople was aware of the Romanian diplomacy's preparations.[28] One thing is nevertheless certain, namely that in the spring of 1571 the possibility of the accession of the Duke of Naxos to the throne of Moldavia was discussed. Reports coming from diplomats accredited to Constantinople stressed and interpreted the rumour, Habsburg diplomats looked upon this alternative as a proof of the impossibility of having Moldavia ruled by Christian princes.[29] Venice saw this possible nomination as a mere means by which Nassi could have been indemnified for the losses suffered in Naxos.[30] Anyway, the decision was postponed and thus, once again, Moldavia got over a critical moment.

Later on, in the summer of the same year, in Venice, the prince of Valachia offered his and Moldavia's support to the Christian coalition. The victory of Lepanto was going to trouble the balance of forces in the political area of interest to us and to determine a more visible opposition against the Ottomans.[31] But even if the authority of Joseph Nassi, Duke of Naxos, declined after the battle of Lepanto, Ottoman political strategy that made use of the contacts of the Jewish community living north of the Danube can be followed further on and identified as a political attitude of remarkable constancy.

[28] A.Pippidi, *Les Pays danubiens et Lépante,* in *loc.cit.*
[29] Quorundum sane opinio, quod Valachiam non amplius Christianis Vaivodis datum iri audiuissent..., cf. Hurmuzaki, *Documente,* II, i, 613, no.DXCIV (March 8, 1571).
[30] *Ibidem,* VIII, 162, no.CCXXIV (March 11, 1571).
[31] A.Pippidi, *op.cit.,* 48, n.120.

V. BEYOND BYZANTINES AND OTTOMANS : 4

ON THE ALLEGED "DESTRUCTION" OF THE GREAT HORDE IN 1502

LESLIE COLLINS / LONDON

"May Allah preserve us from evil-doers"

Great Khan Mengli Giray

It is commonly supposed that a considerable state in Europe called the Great Horde, or Golden Horde,[1] was destroyed in the year 1502. The Great Horde is thought to have been destroyed by the forces of a

[1] This state was not called by Tatars "the Golden Horde". In 14th- and 15th-century Russian chronicles and documents it was frequently called the "Large Horde", the "Great" or "Grand Horde" ("Bol'shaya orda", "Velikaya orda") – "this year [1398] Emperor Toktamysh of the Great Horde [Bolshia ordy] sent ambassadors...": *Nikonovskaya letopis'*, cited in B.D.Grekov and A.Yu.Yakubovsky, *Zolotaya orda i yeyo padeniye* (Moscow-Leningrand, 1950), 381; "you must write to me whatever news comes there about the Great Horde": Ivan III of Moscow to Semyon Borisovich in the Crimea, June 1486 (printed in G.F.Karpov, ed. *Pamyatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniy Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoyu i Nogayskoyu ordami i s Turtsiyey,* I: *s 1474 po 1505 god. Epokha sverzheniya mongol'skogo iga v Rossii* [hereafter: Karpov, PsMK, I], Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, XLI (Saint Petersburg, 1884), 53). Almost all the diplomatic records of Muscovite relations with the Great Horde prior to 1502 have been lost and the printed Polish-Lithuanian records of relations with the Great Horde lack the Great Khans' titles. These is no doubt however that the above-mentioned Russian forms are accurate translations of the Tatar terminology: state documents issued in and after 1502 reveal this. (See the document quoted in Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* [Stanford, 1978], 18, and compare it with the documents, cited below in notes 27-29.) Before 1502 Mengli Giray, khan in the Crimea and apparently a dispossessed Great Horde Khan, referred to the Great Horde as "the Horde": "then the Horde will not have moved against me": Mengli Giray to Ivan III of Moscow, 5 September, 1500 (Karpov, *op.cit.*, 330) Another expression used by Tatars to denote this state and its government was "Great Ulus" ("Great People") which was sometimes translated into medieval Russian as "*belaya orda*" ("White Horde") as is revealed by a comparison of an original Tatar document with its original

certain Mengli Giray. (Mengli Giray, a descendant of the Mongol conquerer Chingiz Khan, is usually referred to as a ruler of the "Crimean Tatars".) When carrying out this annihilation Mengli Giray, it is alleged, was serving as the agent, or dupe of a Russian prince called Ivan. (Ivan III, sometimes called "the Great", was, in 1502, the Grand Prince of Moscow.)

Among the many writers who have dealt with this catastrophe and its meaning, one – the Soviet historian Konstantin Bazilevich – penned this brief and nutty passage which I present here to persuade the general reader that I am not making this up: "[after 1480] Ivan III with great skill directed the activities of Mengli Giray towards the destruction of his most evil enemy. The destruction of the Great Horde was a great triumph of Muscovite foreign policy".[2] Verbum oris est verbum mentis.

There is no evidence that the Great Horde was destroyed in 1502 other than the statements by historians that it was.

How is this to be explained? It cannot be explained by reference to

Russian *resumé*: M.A.Obolensky, *Yarlyk khana zolotoy ordy Tokhtamysha k polskomu korolyu Yagaylu 1392-1393 goda* (Kazan, 1850) 22, 66. – The best Russian translation of the Tatar original is to be found in V.Radlov, "Yarlyki Tokhtamysha i Temur Kutluka" (*Zapiski Vostochnogo otdela imperatorskogo russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva,* III, *1888 g.* (Saint Petersburg, 1889) where "*Uluk ulusnun turushunga*" translated "for the well-being of the great people" (*ibid.*, 15). Sometimes this expression was put into medieval Russian as "*Velikiy ulus*" ("Great Ulus"): "Prince Achika of the Great Ulus to Grand Prince Vasiliy", "From Babashikh of the Great Ulus to the Grand Prince Vasiliy". – These letters, of July 1515 and September 1508 are printed in G.F.Karpov and G.F.Shtendman eds., *Pamyatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniy Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymom, Nagayami a Turtsiyeyu,* II. *1508-1521* (hereafter, Karpov, PsMK, II), Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, XCV (Saint Petersburg, 1895), 39, 172. See also the text of an instruction by the Great Khan Hadjdji Giray, written in 1453 and printed in A.N.Kurat, ed., *Topkapu Sarayi Muzesi Arsefindeki Altin Ordu Kirim ve Turkistan Hanlarina ait Yarlik ve Bitikler* (Istanbul, 1940), 65. Great care must be taken when we endeavour to comprehend the Russian usage of Great Horde ("*Bol'shaya orda*") in translations from the Tatar, because the encampment of *any* khan was also called "Great *ordu*". See, e.g., the letter of Mengli Giray the khan in the Crimea (of 17 June 1501) to Ivan III, which was "written at my Great ordu by Mare Waters": Karpov, PsMK, I, 362.

[2] K.V.Bazilevich, *Vneshnyaya politika russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva vtoraya polovina XV veka* (Moscow, 1952), 490.

the relevant documentary sources – the correspondence of knowledgable Tatars, Poles, Russians etc. in the early sixteenth century – because these abundant sources reveal that the Great Horde was not destroyed at all. Is it the case that historians know better than Ivan III and his sovereign contemporaries about the significant event of their respective reigns? This is a tempting line of enquiry: Ivan III did not know about the destruction of a dangerous state which neighboured his own and maintained diplomatic relations with it after 1502 – so did his heirs. But no one has criticised Ivan's shortsightedness. Is this due perhaps to a prejudice in favour of the man who engineered the destruction of the Horde (a prejudice which permits the blind citation of documents which show that he didn't)? Ivan's contemporary, Aleksandr, King of Poland, did not know about the destruction of the Great Horde either; he it was who informed the Pope in 1504 that the power of the ruler of the Great Horde had been augmented since 1502. Perhaps there has been a mistake. An oversight. But, could clerical error alone have caused a decent veil to be drawn before the meaning of historical documents long in print? The circumstances of the Great Horde's disappearance have apparently warranted no historical enquiry in the past 200 years. Could this be because the affairs of the Great Horde, the mature concerns of its Tatars, their real world, are not material for proper history, except when the rag-bag of facts or fictions known about them can be pillaged to explain or ornament the history of states that mattered more? Does the critical reception by students and writers in the last 200 years of the news about the "end" of the Horde signify a mute recognition that its sacrifice was a millenial gesture, made to provide a conclusion, with prejudice, to a period in Russian history?

Ivan and Aleksandr were not themselves without prejudice towards the Tatars. That they regarded them as an infernal nuisance is well-known (and documented). From the time of the notorious "Mongol conquests" in eastern Europe during the 13th century the forbears of Ivan and Aleksandr had to put up with what Buonacorsi (Aleksandr's tutor) called those "imbecile" Tatars (an attitude characteristic of Christians of that time towards Muslim states which did *not* appear likely to conquer the world). But they did not ignore them. We do. Why?

The general reader will, it is hoped, be equipped to attempt answers to these questions if he peruses the following passages, which contain brief accounts of (i) how the Great Horde became detached from history; (ii) what the Great Horde was; and (iii) what happened to it in 1502.

* * * * * * * *

In 1480 there unfolded the story of the collapse of Tatar authority over the lands of north-east Russia. In that year Grand Prince Ivan III refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Great Khan of the Great Horde. Now this khan was called Ahmed. He was a representative of a royal dynasty known to Tatars as the House of Namagan. In the summer of 1480 Ahmed approached the Muscovite frontier on the understanding that he would be joined by the forces of his ally Kazimierz, who was the King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania. Towards the beginning of winter Ahmed withdrew from the Muscovite frontier, defied by his erstwhile vassal Ivan, betrayed by his erstwhile ally[3] Kazimierz. One of Ahmed's sons devoted several succinct passages to this affair in letters to one of Kazimierz's sons, e.g., "My father Ahmed and your father the king were united in brotherhood. For the sake of that brotherhood they swore an oath... My father Ahmed kept his word, but your father the king did not appear at the appointed time"; "My father mounted his horse, yours did not"; "My father's knights and princes said 'Ivan is your dependent and the king's, but the king has not come on campaign with you this year and you should return.' Then they took my father's bridle and turned back."[4] Russia's historians are persuaded that the year 1480 marks the end of an era, the age of the 'Tatar yoke" in Russian history – that is to say, the period in which the Tatar khans of the Great Horde proved able, on the whole, to ensure that their neighbours, the rulers

[3] During the khan's retreat some of his people raided territory subject to Kazimierz: *ibid.*, 160.

[4] These quotations are drawn from the records of the diplomatic relations between the Great Horde and Poland/Lithuania printed in K.Pulaski, ed., *Stosunki z Mendli-Girejem Chanom tatarow perekopskich (1469-1515). Akta i listy* (hereafter, Pulaski, Akta) (Krakow-Warsaw, 1881), 238, 240, 248.

of the Russian principalities, remained their reliable friends and tributaries.

The year 1480 is celebrated also in accounts of Tatar history. Why so? The Tatar state known as the Great Horde or Golden Horde was one of the most powerful states in Europe during the late middle ages and the circumstances of its creation and its history during the period of its greatest power have not been ignored by historians. However, few of those historians have been Tatars. In the main they have been either native Russians or amateurs of Russian history from many lands. The interest of most historians in the Great Horde grew out of their need to understand better Russian affairs during the period of the "Tatar yoke" – a period which began in the mid-thirteenth century when Batu (a grandson of the Mongol conquerer Chingiz Khan) mastered several civilised states in eastern Europe as well as numerous nomadic lordships in the east European steppe. Subsequently, the princes in the Russian lands were subject to the government of a state established by Batu in the east European steppe (although their tribute payments, according to a fourteenth-century observer, were divided between four khans (perhaps between the heirs of Batu and the heirs of Batu's brothers, at least two of whom received patrimonies in eastern Europe).[5] The historiography of Batu's state is dominated by four books, two in Russian, two in German. Three of these cover its history from the mid-thirteenth century to 1480; one takes its history as far as 1502. The two Russian books devoted to the history of this "Golden Horde" – I repeat, from its creation to 1480 – are interestingly entitled "The collapse of the Golden Horde"[6] and "The Golden Horde and its Fall".[7] The German works are called "A History of the Golden Horde in the east European steppe, that is, the Mongols in Russia" and "The Golden Horde. The Mongols in Russia".[8]

[5] Mufadel ibn Abi'l Fada'il. See V.V.Bartol'd, "Dvenadtsat' lektsii po istorii turetskikh narodov sredney Azii" printed in V.V.Bartol'd, *Sochineniya,* V (Moscow, 1968) 139.
[6] M.Safargaliyev, *Raspad Zolotoy ordy* (Saransk, 1960).
[7] Grekov and Yakubovsky, *op.cit.*
[8] J. von Hammer Purgstall, *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak, das ist, der Mongolen in Russland* (Pesth-Vienna, 1840); B.Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland, 1223-1502* (Leipzig, 1943).

Naturally, if the overriding interest in the story of the Great Horde or Golden Horde is the Russian interest, then the history of that state after 1480 cannot have much attraction for historians of Russia. Indeed, its history apparently loses much of its appeal at the end of the fourteenth century. Its affairs in the fifteenth century were quite complicated: the Great Horde was sometimes subdivided and there were many changes in its government (and occasionally in its several governments). Its story in this period cannot be told in a few pages. Few, alas! are the pages accorded to the history of the Great Horde "in Russia" or even "outside Russia" in the period of its "fall". (A.Yakubovsky, for example, in a 428-page study, gives to the history of the Great Horde between 1410 and 1480 23 pages; of these about ten concern the Great Horde.)[9] This may partly be due to the circumstance that, while the "suzerain" Great Horde was experiencing a "time of troubles" from the late fourteenth century to 1502, one of its vassal states was enjoying a period of rapid growth. The story of the rise of Moscow is well-documented and is apparently smooth and easy to understand, while the affairs of the Great Horde in this period (and also of the Tatar lordships established about its periphery) appear to have been chaotic. Accounts of the Great Horde in the fifteenth century are unsatisfactory and provide few answers or no answers at all to questions concerning the nature of the Great Horde, its location in any given season (*sic*), the identity and interests of its rulers and its "ruling circles", the power-bases of those who sought to rule it, etc. How different is the history of Muscovy in this period, in which the "who?", the "where?" and the "what?" present few problems to the student and scholar!

In consequence, the story of the repudiation by Ivan III of the suzerainty of the Great Khan in 1480 has little impact upon the general reader, thoroughly persuaded that the suzerain power was then in chronic decline, and who is perhaps even puzzled that this repudiation was so long delayed: for had not one hundred years elapsed since the Muscovite Prince Dimitriy of the Don had administered a severe lesson to the then ruler of the Great Horde, Mamay of the princely House of Kiat? (That is another event, celebrated in Russian history

[9] Grekov and Yakubovsky, *op.cit.*, 406-28.

and in histories of the Tatars, into which we have no present need to inquire.)

Those who teach or write about Russian history may have observed with what small surprise students and readers accept also the news that the Great Horde vanished before the end of the reign of Ivan III, in circumstances almost as sudden and dramatic as those attending the creation of the Great Horde. Could it be that we are captivated by the romance of the guileful Ivan III prompting his "faithful" Tatar ally, Mengli Giray, down in the Crimea, to annihilate the Great Horde? Are we perhaps consumed with emotions born out of a sense of poetic justice? (For is it not "just" that the presumed end to the Pharaonic role in Russian history of the Great Horde – an end celebrated in the historiography of Ivan III's activities in 1480 – should have been capped, so soon after [in 1502] by the extinction of the Pharaohs themselves and all their works?) Do we think it apt that the "agent" of this catastrophe should have been a Tartarian, blood-kin to ancient Batu? Why do we not ask "who says so?" and inquire why the historiography of the Great Horde after 1502 is as bare as the historiography of the heirs of Ozymandias?

The answer to the question "who says so?" is "practically everybody". Student note-takers in the early nineteenth century perhaps singled out as an aide-memoire a short passage from a volume of Russian history by Nikolay Karamzin (published in 1817) to the effect that in June1502 the Crimean khan informed Ivan III of Moscow that "the ancient Great Horde no longer exists".[10] For sure, since 1817 the Great Horde has been comprehensively "vanquished",[11] "annihilated",[12] "crushed",[13] "utterly routed"[14] etc. by generations of histo-

[10] N.Karamzin, *Istoriya gosudarstva rossiyskogo,* VI (Saint Petersburg, 1817), 293.

[11] E.g., "in 1503 the Great Horde was finally beaten... it was vanquished by Crimea and Muscovy": B.Spuler, "Batuids" in H.A.R.Gibb et al., eds., *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* I (The Hague, 1960), 1108.

[12] E.g., "Mengli Giray's warriors annihilated the army of Shaikh Ahmed who with a few followers managed to escape": I.Grey, *Ivan III and the Unification of Russia* (London, 1964), 130; "in 1502 the sons of Shmed were finally beaten and the Great Horde destroyed": A.N.Nasonov, L.V.Cherepnin, A.A.Zimin, eds., *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma, konets XV veka-nachalo XVII veka* (Moscow, 1955), 155.

[13] E.g., "Mengli Giray's attention was distracted by the Golden Horde (which he crushed in 1502)": George Vernadsky, *Russia at the dawn of the Modern Age* (New

rians.

But, as I have already stated in my preamble, there is no evidence that the Great Horde in 1502 "fell under the blows of the Crimean Tatars";[15] there is no sound documentary basis for assertions about the Great Horde's "liquidation"[16] or to the effect that it "ceased to exist"[17] or was "wiped off the map".[18] Yet Solov'yov – author of the most influential multi-volume history of Russia – put his seal on this notion, while Vel'yaminov-Zernov – unquestionably the most able and careful or all the historians of the Tatars – in Europe – wrote: "the Horde never rose again and its very name disappeared".[19]

What was the literary origin of these post-Karamzin variations or substitutes for thought dressed out as summations of critical analysis? Historians rarely cite sources to substantiate generally accepted truths,

Haven-London, 1959), 94.

[14] E.g., "The relics of the Golden Horde were utterly routed by the Crimean Tartars, only Shaikh Ahmed and a handful of men managed to escape": John Fennel, *Ivan the Great of Moscow* (London, 1961), 247.

[15] E.g., "around 1500 the Horde itself fell under the blows of the Crimean Tartars": N.Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York-London, 1963), 117.

[16] *sic.* I.B.Grekov, *Ocherki po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy vostochnoy Yevropy, XIV-XVI vv* (Moscow, 1963), 233.

[17] "[after 1480] the Horde never recovered even the semblance of its previous condition and ceased to exist twenty years later": V.D.Nazarov, "Konets zolotoordynskogo iga" (*Voprosy istorii,* X, Moscow, October 1980), 120; "La Horde d'Or cessa ainsi d'exister depuis 1502": C.Stählin, *La Russia des origines à la naissance de Pierre le Grand* (Paris, 1946), 167; "in 1502 the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray delivered the final blow to the Golden Horde and ended its existence": S.G.Pushkarev, *Obzor russkoy istorii* (New York, 1953), 139.

[18] E.g., "The final blow to Russia's secular enemy was dealt in 1502 by the Crimean Tartars, who defeated the Golden Horde and wiped it off the map": M.Florinsky, *Russia: a History and an Interpretation,* I (New York, 1961), 64; "such was the end of the Golden Horde. It was swallowed up by Russia in 1502": S.Lane Poole, *Musulmanskiye dinastii* (Saint Petersburg, 1899), 190, and the translator's note (V.V.Bartol'd): "as is well known, the... khanate was destroyed by the Crimeans, allies of the Russians, but this fact did not entail the territorial enlargement of Russia" (*ibid.,* 190, note 2).

[19] "Mengli Giray resolved this matter in 1502, falling upon Shaikh Ahmed and dealing his Horde the final heavy blow... Thus ended the existence of the famous Golden Horde": S.M.Solov'yov, *Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremyon,* III (reprinted Moscow, 1960), 87; "the Horde never arose again...": V.V.Vel'yaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovaniye o Kasimovskikh tsaryakh i tsarevichakh,* I (Saint Petersburg, 1864), 119, 248.

but Vel'yaminov-Zernov always did. In this instance he cited Karamzin.

But Karamzin never wrote that the Horde's "very name disappeared";[20] nor did Mengli Giray ever inform Ivan III that "the ancient Great Horde no longer exists".

It is not unusual for the "end" of the Great Horde to be linked with a yarn about the destruction of its "capital city". It is generally accepted that the Great Horde at the beginning of the sixteenth century possessed a capital called Saray situated somewhere on the river Volga and that this "city" was – as I.B.Grekov has written – "finally destroyed in 1502".[21] But – at the risk of boring the reader – I am obliged to say that there is no evidence that the Great Horde had a capital city called Saray, situated on the Volga, in 1502. Nevertheless, its "destruction" in that year, by the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray (who else?), about which there is no proof whatsoever, seems to be regarded as a particularly important aspect of the aforementioned "liquidation" of the Great Horde. Halil Inalcik, for example, has written: "Mengli Giray destroyed Saray in 1502, thereby striking a mortal blow at the Golden Horde". Lemercier-Quelquejay ("in 1502 when Mengli Giray struck a mortal blow at the Horde by destroying its capital Saray") and others concur.[22]

Documents from Moscow's Crimean archive (printed in 1884) reveal that Mengli Giray could not have journeyed to the Volga in 1502 or even have sent an army there to destroy, or even "partially"[23] to destroy Saray-by-Volga. It appears indeed, that the only time when the khan could have entertained seriously the notion of visiting the banks of the Volga in 1502 to search for the fabulous capital of the Great Horde was between August and September. But he was then ill, perhaps from the effects of some hard riding done earlier that year, for

[20] Karamzin did not quote from Mengli Giray's letter, he simply gave his *opinion* of its contents.

[21] I.B.Grekov, *op.cit.*, 150.

[22] H.Inalcık, "Kırım hanlığı" printed in *Islam Ansiklopedisi,* VI (Istanbul, 1954), 747: C.Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les khanats de Kazan et de Crimée face à Moscovie en 1521," *Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique,* XII – 4 (La Haye, 1971), 483.

[23] "Mengli Giray... personally led an army against the Golden Horde and entered and partially destroyed its capital of Saray": Fisher, *op.cit.*, 15.

he claimed in a letter written to the Grand Prince of Moscow (Ivan) that he was at that time suffering from a disability which prevented him from mounting his horse![24] Furthermore, as he revealed in other letters sent to Moscow from various places in the Crimea – from Saray (*sic*), Ap Chetyrlyk etc – he had felt obliged to keep his armed forces close to the Crimean peninsula in the same period.[25]

But, to return to the less infantile problem of the destruction of the Great Horde (whose "very name disappeared" in 1502): historians interested in the international relations of eastern Europe in the early-modern period – say, from 1502 to 1783 – will have been struck by an expression which occurs in almost all state documents emanating from the court of the khans of the "Crimean Tatars" or directed thither from the chanceries of proper monarchs such as the kings of Poland and the Tsars of Russia. The expression in question is "the Great Horde".

If the Great Horde ceased to exist in June 1502 then why – we should inquire – did Mengli Giray, who is credited with its destruction, take the title "Great Khan of the Great Horde" in the summer of 1502, and why did he and his heirs (who ruled until 1783 a state called by historians the "Crimean Khanate") employ as their first title "Great Khan of the Great Horde"? Alan Fisher, in a recently published history of the Crimean Tatars, noting the use of this strange title by the Crimean khans, has suggested that it was for "internal consumption".[26] I am not sure what this means, unless it implies that the descendants of Chingiz Khan whose capital was situated in the Crimea from 1502 onwards were a vainglorious bunch, laying claim in a provincial, Crimean fashion to the inheritance of a vanished people-state. However, if we examine the available published diplomatic correspondence of states such as Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy we find that these governments actually addressed the Chingizid khans in the Crimea as Great Khans of the Great Horde. Here are one or two examples: Aleksandr, King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania, addressed Mengli Giray in the summer or 1502 as "Great Khan of the

[24] Karpov, PsMK, I, 445. And read pages 417-52.
[25] *Ibid.*, 430-33, 444-45, and cf. 454, 462.
[26] Fisher, *op.cit.*, 18.

Great Horde" (this letter was first printed in 1783);[27] Ivan IV (the "Terrible") used the same address (in a letter printed in 1789),[28] while in 1681 a Russian ambassador from the court of Tsar Fyodor was instructed to travel to the Crimea "in the Great Horde" and to call Murad Giray "Khan Highness of the Great Horde" (this one was printed in 1848).[29]

Were the Polish and Russian monarchs pandering to the amusing vanity of petty Asiatic warlords? Were they happy to maintain diplomatic relations with a non-existent state: or did they understand that the Great Horde was not destroyed but simply taken over in the *last round* of a dynastic struggle which had, since the late fourteenth century occupied, chiefly, three families descended from the brothers of Batu: the royal houses of Namagan, Shiban and Tuka Timur?

The object of the warring dynasties had been to possess the Great Horde, whose people generally nomadised between the rivers Dnieper and Volga. Its possession became the subject of dispute following upon the extinction of the House of Batu. The power bases of these families lay in family patrimonies established after the Batuid conquests. The great orientalist V.V.Bartol'd has noted how "in the empire founded by [Chingiz Khan] as in all nomad states, the principle remained in force that the empire belonged not to the ruler but to the ruling family, and that each member of this family had a right to [people], an estate and an income",[30] so we should not be surprised to learn from the Shibanid historian Khan Abu'l-Ghazi, that the family of Batu's brother Tuka Timur received the Crimea as a patrimony. While this family may also have possessed territories elsewhere (as Safargaliyev points out)[31] other sources appear to bear out Abu'l-Ghazi's claim. The names of some members of this House who lived in the

[27] M.M.Shcherbatov, *Istoriya rossiyskaya ot drevneyshikh vremyon* (Saint Petersburg, 1771-94) IV, part 3, 246-47.

[28] *Ibid.*, V, part 4, 47.

[29] N.Murzakevich, ed., "Stateynyy spisok... poslannika... k Murad Gireyu v 1681" (*Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey*, II, Odessa, 1848) 568ff.

[30] V.V.Bartol'd, "Chingiz Khan" printed in V.V.Bartol'd, *Sochineniya* V, 627. Bartol'd is the master of Tatar history whose massive work, his *ordu*, still rolls bright and effortlessly through the skinny *uluses* of his joyless imitators.

[31] Safargaliyev, *op.cit.*, 54-55.

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries will be familiar to historians of eastern Europe, e.g., Budjak, Hadjibey, Bek Yaruk of Mankermen, Tulek Timur and his great-nephew Toktamish Khan, and Tash Timur Khan (great-grandfather of Mengli Giray). According to the author of a genealogical work compiled in 1426 for a son of Tamerlane,[32] the first Tuka Timurid to bear the title khan was Dervish Khan, of the seventh generation after Chingiz. (Toktamish Khan belonged to the eighth generation, Tash Timur Khan to the ninth. Perhaps this Dervish was the first of his House to rule part of the Great Horde for a brief space of time after 1359 (?).[33] On the basis of this genealogist's

[32] "Muizz al-ansab fi shadjarat salatin mogul". Excerpts from this work, and other Persian writings in Russian translation, put together by Baron V.G.Tizengauzen and most painstakingly reworked by A.A.Romaskevich and S.L.Volin, are printed in V.G.Tizengauzen (sost.), *Sbornik materialov otnosyashchikhsya k istorii Zolotoy ordy,* II (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941). Budjkak (Budjak) – 6th generation after Chingiz. Hadjdji Bey is an old name for Odessa. Two Tuka Timurids bore this name, one in the 6th and one in the 10th generation after Chingiz. There were two called Yaruk; one of them, the brother of Mengli and the grandson of Tulek Timur was attacked on the Dnieper by Tamerlane. Tulek Timur (6th generation after Chingiz) is mentioned in connection with an expedition sent against a Tatar rebel in the lower Dnieper area in 1299 or 1300 by the Great Khan Tokta. In Tokta's army, among the "khans and commanders of 10,000" was Tulek Timur (according to the contemporary Egyptian author Rukn ed-Din Baybars). Perhaps this was the same Tulek Timur, "governor" of the Crimea, whom Ibn Battuta met in the 1330s (?). See Tizengauzen, *op.cit., 59, 61, 121, 179.* For the Egyptian authorities mentioned above, see Tizengauzen, *Sbornik materialov, otnosyashchikhsya k istorii Zolotoy ordy,* I (Saint Petersburg, 1884), 113, 280.

[33] Two men called Dervish, of the house of Tuka Timur, are mentioned by the genealogist. Both, interestingly, belonged to the seventh generation after Chingiz (one being the son of Tulek Timur). According to Ibn Khaldun Toktamysh lived in the Great Horde as a child. Was Ibn Khaldun wrong, or did Toktamysh (8th generation after Chingiz, the grand-nephew of Tulek Timur and close relative of the latter's son Dervish Khan) and his immediate family seek refuge, like so many others, at the court of Chimtay Khan of the Uzbeks, when the throne-struggle in the Great Horde developed after 1359? Why did Tamerlane later give him so much assistance? Did his "age" among the descendants of Batu's brothers of his generation give him a strong claim to the Great Horde? See Tizengauzen, *op.cit.,* I, 406. (If the objection were to be raised "but Ibn Khaldun said Toktamysh was Berdibek's son, and he wasn't" then one could reply with the following quotation from a letter written by a Tatar noble to Vasili III of Moscow, which serves to explain Tatar conceptions of "age" and status through the terminology of the family: "Your grandfather Grand Prince Vasili [II] called my

materials we gather that Dervish Khan was the ancestor of such Great Khans of the Great Horde as Ulugh Muhammed (tenth generation after Chingiz), Hadjdji Giray (eleventh generation) and Mengli Giray (twelfth generation).

Representatives of the House of Shiban first came to rule part of the Great Horde for a brief period in the 1360s.[34] During the thirteenth century the House of Batu's brother Shiban had received some lands to the west of the Volga,[35] but most of its patrimony lay to the east of that river (and chiefly to the east of the river Yaik – which is now called the Ural river). However in the last decade of the fourteenth century – after the extinction of the House of Batu – much of this Shibanid territory was seized by Temir Kutluk, a representative of a dynasty called by Tatars the House of Namagan. From this power base the heirs of Timur Kutluk strove – in competition with the Tuka Timurids and Shibanids – to gain possession of the Great Horde. Concerning these interlopers the Shibanid Khan Ibak wrote to Ivan III in 1493: "Among the children of Chingiz my [fore]father Emperor Shiban's patrimony stood close to yours ... but since those times the Temir-Namagan patrimony has been created and now we [the Shibanids] are further away from you [but now] having come to the Volga I stand on my [fore]father's patrimony; seeking out the places of my [fore]father I am campaigning against the [descendants] of Temir Kutluk".[36]

It is not known from which of Batu's brothers the House of Namagan was derived. The Astrakhanid dynasty which ruled Bukhara in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was definitely descended from Temir Kutluk and its members understood that their more

father Kogush his son" (Karpov, PsMK, II, 39). The same Prince Agish Shirin, son of Kogush, explained how he came to be head of the house of Shirin as follows: "I am equal to the [grand]sons of Tekne [Tehinia Shirin]. Prince Dovletek [grandson of Tekne] was only four years older than I. Then Kovletek died and the Sovereign said "among the Shirins you are old and your reward has come" and made of poor me a Prince [to the exclusion of Dovletek's brothers]" *ibid.*, 40).

[34] Khan Arabshah and others.

[35] Shiban's grandson Tokday apparently had a wintering place south of the river Terek, in the north Caucasus: Tiengauzen, *op.cit.*, II, 55.

[36] PsMK, I, 189-99.

remote ancestor was a certain Tuka Timur. But which one? The Tuka Timur who was Batu's brother? The Tuka Timur who was the grandson of Batu's brother Orda Ichen? Or the one who was the latter's grandson? "Allah knows better" – as our genealogist wisely noted. But, for our purposes, it doesn't matter. Tatars called the khans Temir Kutluk and Ahmed khans of the Namagan patrimony,[37] because they were both descended from a man called Numkan or Namagan in this order (according to the afore-mentioned genealogist): Numkan, Kutluk-Timur, Timur, Timur Kutluk, Timur, Kuchuk Muhammed.[38] Ahmed of Namagan, who figured in the 1480 affair, was the son of Kuchuk Muhammed.

With the death of the Batuid Khan Berdibek, about 1359, the Great Horde was orphaned. The extinction of the House of Batu had catastrophic consequences for the Great Horde. Its throne changed hands many times in the next century and a half as Shibanids and (chiefly) representatives of the houses of Namagan and Tuka Timur took control of it – sometimes ruling the Great Horde and their family patrimony as well, sometimes (especially when the individual khan was not undisputed head of his own house and master of the family patrimony) ruling the Great Horde alone.

Not infrequently the Great Horde was itself divided in this period, sometimes between khans belonging to one house as in 1484 when Murteza of Namagan (son of Ahmed) informed the Grand Prince of Lithuania that the Horde then had two separate administrations, one headed by himself, the other by his brother Seyyid Ahmed (*sic*).[39] Sometimes the Horde was divided between khans of rival houses, as

[37] Concerning a Great Horde attack upon the Crimea in 1490 Mengli Giray wrote that the sons of Ahmed "under Seyyid Ahmed, Shaikh Ahmed and Achika [Mankit] as many as there are in the Namagan patrimony came and trampled our homes" while Prince Bakhtiar Shirin wrote to Vassili III "I have heard that you have given the Meshchera possession to a royal prince of the Namagan patrimony (Karpov, PsMK, I, 108? II, 251).

[38] Tizengauzen, *op.cit.*, 62. This Numkan or Namagan was not the same as the Numagan (fl. about 1277) who was a son of Kubilay Khan. There is a town Namagan in the province of Ferghana which is thought to have been founded in the 16th century. Was this area the seat of the ancient patrimony of Namagan?

[39] Pulaski, *Akta*, 210.

was the case in 1433 when the Russian princes paid tribute to the Tuka Timurid Seyyid Ahmed (a descendant of Toktamish) and to Kuchuk Muhammed of Namagan.[40]

Because too little space has been devoted to the history of the Great Horde in the fifteenth century historians appear effectively to have lost it in the 1440s only to find it again in the 1460s. Essentially there seem to be five reasons for this oversight. Firstly, the frequent dynastic changes in the government of the Great Horde are sometimes seen as concerning chiefly the history of the family habitat or patrimony of the successful contender for the throne of the Great Horde – as much as to say that the history of the Norman kings of Sicily is the history of Normandy. Secondly, sometimes the fate of a Great Khan who lost control of the Horde in a sudden turnabout is seen as concerning the fate of the state itself. (Or, with its last Norman king Sicily and the Sicilians ceased to exist.) Thirdly, the Great Horde is sometimes confounded with the habitat of its ruler (Sicily was Normandy). And vice-versa (Normandy was Sicily). Fourthly, there is a fashionable obsession with the creation of "daughter states" of the Great Horde "in decline", though something like these daughter states – the patrimonies had existed since the very creation of the Horde (Normandy was a daughter state of Sicily). Fifthly, confused by the funny names used by Muslims, historians sometimes allow the dead to walk and in the case of the Great Horde, to rule. (The raids carried out by the defunct Seyyid Ahmed – a Tuka Timurid – on the Musovite frontier in the 1460s are an interesting episode in the story of the rise of Moscow.)

Safargaliyev, for example, author of the most recent large study of the Horde, is convinced that the House of Namagan (based in its patrimony Astrakhan) possessed the Great Horde between 1440 and 1467. (It may be doubted whether this House possessed more than its patrimony in this period – a patrimony moreover which shrank then under the blows of infuriated Shibanids.)[41] Now the Great Horde of

[40] See Safargaliyev, *op.cit.*, 241 – he quotes from an original document printed in *Sobraniye gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*, I (Saint Petersburg, 1813), 108.

[41] The Shibanid Abu'l-Khayr heavily defeated Kuchuk Muhammed and his sons Ahmed, Mahmud, Djavak and Bashiak, see the resumé of a manuscript by Mas'ud in B.A.Akhmedov: *Gosudarstvo kochevykh Uzbekov* (Moscow, 1965), appendix 2. It is

Seyyid Ahmed (of the House of Tuka Timur), which nomadised in the 1440s between the Dnieper and the North Caucasus,[42] was taken over by his relative Hadjdji Giray (from his patrimony, the Crimea) in stages between 1449 and 1455.[43] Concerning this, Safargaliyev notes

not certain when this happened. Perhaps in the 1450s. There is no evidence that the Trans-Yaik princes Musa and Yamgurchu Mankit (who later deserted Abu'l-Khayr after he had their father Vakkas killed) became vassals of Ahmed of Namagan, though they assisted Ahmed (and the Shibanid Ibak) in the breaking of Abu'l-Khayr's son Shaikh Haydar.

[42] See the quotation – from a letter of King Kazimierz – printed in L.Kolankowski, *Dzieje Wielkiego Ksiestwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonow* (Warsaw, 1930) 265, note 4. See also the quotations and references in *ibid.*, 272, notes 4-7; 273, notes 1-3. Kolankowski misleadingly calls Seyyid Ahmed Khan of the Noghay Tatars (p.272). He meant that the khan occupied territories which were a century later to be occupied by some of the Noghay Tatars who then left their traditional grounds in lands east of the Yaik river.

[43] In spring 1453 Seyyid Ahmed was defeated by Hadjdji Giray (*ibid.*, 273 – the reference: the chronicle of Jan Dlugosz) who that year issued an instruction from "the Great Ulus" (see above, note 1). Mengli Giray described the winter of 1501-02 as similar to the one after which his father "took the Horde" (Karpov, PsMK, I, 414); perhaps he was referring to the winter of 1452-53. In 1455 Seyyid Ahmed was defeated by Hadjdji Giray once more and much of the rest of his Horde was taken (see the sources cited in Kolankowski, *op.cit.*, 280-81). Seyyid Ahmed and many of his nobles were taken into Lithuanian and Moldavian captivity. Spuler, followed by Grekov & Yakubovsky and, e.g., Inalcık, believes that Seyyid Ahmed escaped from captivity. In consequence we have a ghost-khan running about the steppe till 1465 (Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde,* 172-74; Grekov and Yakubovsky, op.cit., 420-21; Inalcık, "Hadjdji Giray" printed in H.A.R.Gibb et al., eds, *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* III, 44.) But Spuler was wrong. Ivan III, who understood these matters better than we do, wrote to Mengli Giray in 1504 – as of a well-known fact – about the death in Lithuanian captivity of Seyyid Ahmed (n.b., about the Tuka Timurid Seyyid Ahmed who was associated with Semenas Olelkaitis of Kiev, not the Seyyid Ahmed of Namagan who reigned 1484-90): Karpov, PsMK, I, 522. In a letter of 1464 the Genoese in Kaffa (in the Crimea) followed "the counsel of keeping the Great Khan of the Tatars [il gran Kan dei Tartari] Hadjdji Giray benevolent and friendly": *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria,* VII, parte 1 (Genoa, 1871), 321. This was before Hadjdji Giray's victory of 1465, when he took the Horde of Mahmud of Namagan: "all his lands together with the people and women" (Dlugosz, *Opera omnia,* V (Krakow, 1870) 397-98). Not all Seyyid Ahmed's Tatars submitted to Hadjdji Giray; included among these, perhaps were the royal princes Mamishek and Muhammed, the sons of Mustafa, who were eventually called into the service of Mengli Giray. The rest may have been those "orphans" (mentioned in Eminek Shirin's letter of 1478) who joined Ahmed of Namagan: A.Bennigsen et al., eds., *Le khanat de Crimée dans les archives du Musée du palais de Topkapi* (Paris-La Haye, 1978), 323.

that this event "promoted the recognition of the independence of the Crimean khanate"! Going on to treat the internal affairs of the patrimony of the rival house, Namagan, as though these were the affairs of the Great Horde (and at a time when the House of Namagan did not rule the Great Horde) Safargaliyev writes: "the elimination [?] of the Horde of Seyyid Ahmed [by the "Crimean" Hadjdji Giray] which had rivalled the Great Horde [?] made Kuchuk Muhammed [of Namagan] the sole khan of all the Tatars nomadising in the east European steppe; this should have led to a growth in the power of [Kuchuk Muhammed's] Great Horde, but that did not happen". (It did not happen because Hadjdji Giray now ruled the Great Horde, not Kuchuk Muhammed.) Safargaliyev opines that it "did not happen" because Astrakhan (the Namagan patrimony) "fell away from the Great Horde [ruled by Kuchuk Muhammed or his son]", i.e., it fell away from nothing. Then, observing what appears to have been a struggle between Kuchuk Muhammed's sons Ahmed and Mahmud, for control of the family patrimony Astrakhan (while under the impression that one of them, Ahmed, was then also ruler of the Great Horde), Safargaliyev sees only the creation of an independent khanate – Astrakhan – "whose throne was without question confirmed for the heirs of Mahmud".[44] But this also is incorrect: Astrakhan belonged to the House of Namagan, which is why the heirs of Mahmud's brother Ahmed also came to rule it.[45]

Eventually in the late 1460s and early 1470s the Great Horde Tatars quit the Tuka Timurid heirs of Hadjdji Giray and moved east[46] to pass under the control of the House of Namagan once more: "the people rode towards Astrakhan ... for where there is trouble, people go away from that place".[47] This population movement and dynastic change has passed unnoticed, probably because of the assumption that the Great

[44] Safargaliyev, *op.cit.*, 263, 264, 266.
[45] E.g., Ak Kepek and Yamgurchu.
[46] Mengli Giray to Ivan III: "when my father Emperor Hadjdji Giray took the Horde a merchant lived in my mother's [court] and he was suitable for any business. After the *ulus*es rode towards Astrakhan he stayed in Astrakhan" (Karpov, PsMK, I, 270-71).
[47] Mengli Giray to Ivan III: "where evil lives, the people go away from that land" (*ibid.*, 288).

Horde, recently confused with the Tatars subject to the Trans-Volgine House of Namagan, had been ruled already for ages by the heirs of Namagan and Timur Kutluk.

Officials in Poland and Lithuania in the late Middle Ages often sensibly referred to the khans belonging to the House of Namagan as Trans-Volgines (for their patrimony lay across the Volga) whether they ruled the Great Horde or not, even when their "Trans-Volgine" Tatars were sitting outside Kiev. Similarly they often referred to the Tuka Timurids of the Crimean patrimony as "Crimeans" or emperors "of the Ditch"[48] whether or not the latter ruled the Great Horde as well as the Crimea. Unlike us they did know where the Great Horde was, what it was, and who ruled it at any given time. Similar was the case with the Norman kings of Sicily – people knew that the Sicilians were not Normans.

The admirable Prince Shcherbatov wrote in 1774 "they talk frequently in Russia about the Great Horde, but nobody knows much about what that was".[49] Ah! Certainly, when Andrey Lyzlov came to write his interesting history of the Tatars in the 1690s he knew rather less than we can know about the nature and resolution of the dynastic struggle for the Great Horde, or as Murteza of Namagan wrote to Mengli Giray's brother of that struggle "about the bone", a struggle for "the ankle-bone marrow"[50] that is, the struggle for precedence and mastery of the senior patrimony or Great patrimony of Batu: the people of the Great Horde. Using the Russian sources available to him and Catholic printed works as well, Lyzlov noted how in 1501 the khan Shaikh Ahmed (son of Ahmed of Namagan and brother to Murteza) came to the west with his "Trans-Volgine Horde"[51] to aid Lithuania against Moscow. Sixteenth-century authors had noted correctly that this expedition resulted in the end of the Trans-Volgine Shaikh

[48] "... eundem Transtanaitanum alias Zawolhensem..."; "illum Fossatus elatus fortunatarum et novarum accessionum augmento...": F.Papee, ed., *Akta Aleksandra,* Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia, XIX (Krakow, 1927), 448-49.

[49] Shcherbatov, *op.cit.*, III, 33.

[50] Karpov, PsMK, I, 69.

[51] A.Lyzlov, *Skifskaya istoriya.* Lyzlov's manuscript, finished in 1692 (?) was printed in Saint Petersburg, 1776. See p.59.

Ahmed's kingdom. (Herberstein, for example, wrote "atque hic Zawolhensius regum finis fuit",[52] i.e. the Trans-Volgines, representatives of the House of Namagan, had lost control of the Great Horde.) Thus the stage was set, it seems, for the extinction of the Great Horde for the umpteenth time. (For surely, if we apply the logic of its "disappearance" in 1502 to the circumstances of its previous changes in leadership then we might conclude that the Great Horde had "ceased to exist" so that its name "never arose again" on numerous occasions. A Phoenix Horde! Another pre-Karamzin writer, Aleksey Malinovsky, wrote that "Ivan III finally destroyed the Tatars of the Great Horde" but he also drew this more interesting conclusion (he did have all the relevant documents under his hand after all, some of them he read, some he copied out): "This event had a great influence on the spread of the might of the Crimean Tatars. Having destroyed [?] the ancient enemies of Russia they themselves, through an increase in strength, then became its bitterest destroyers"[53] in other words, after 1502 the Great Horde continued to be a burden upon the Russian people and its change of leadership in 1502 was not "a triumph of Muscovite foreign policy".

The history of a state cannot be structured out of the terminology employed by foreigners to describe it. Let us therefore follow the advice of Great Khan Mengli Giray – that pioneer of archival research – and examine some documents. We may be able to establish firmly that the "taking" of the Great Horde in 1502 was not coincidental with its destruction. If this can be done, then all the wealth of detail concerning the Great Horde after 1502 and available – though mostly in manuscript sources – can be exploited (not here) to shed light on the internal history of that state before 1502, i.e. in that age of its history when its doings are thought usuful to explain the mature concerns of more important foreign, Christian states.

[52] S. von Herberstein, "Rerum Moscoviticarum commentarii" printed in A. de Starczewski, ed., *Historiae ruthenicae, scriptores exteri, saeculi XVI,* I (Berlin, 1841) 100.

[53] A.Malinovsky, "Istoricheskoye i diplomaticheskoye sobraniye del...". This work, written in the 1790s, was printed in *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey,* V (Odessa, 1863). See pp.276, 253.

On one occasion three of Mengli Giray's ambassadors saw the King of Poland and "recalled past sovereigns... [Tuka Timurids who had ruled the Great Horde] Toktamysh, Djelal ed-Din, Per Berdi, Kepek, Kerimberdi, Kadirberdi, [Ulugh] Muhammed, Seyyid Ahmed, Hadj-dji Giray" and Mengli Giray wrote to the King: "Look in your archives ... Order the letters of [those Great Khans] to be read out to you. You will learn the truth from them."[54] Sound advice.

The *ordu* and *uluses* of the Great Horde

In the summer of 1502 Mengli Giray wrote a letter to the governor of Kiev. (The name of the governor, an official in the service of the ruler of Lithuania, was Prince Dimitriy Putyatich.) In this missive Mengli Giray declared that he had just acquired his "father's throne".[55] The Great Khan did not mean by this that he had recently become khan in the Crimea for – as Putyatich well knew – Mengli Giray had been khan in the Crimea without interrruption since 1478. Nor did he mean that he had come into possession of a piece of furniture which he was anxious to sell. (Though he was in debt.)[56] He was intimating that he had just come into possesion of the state known as the Great Horde.

Tatars in the middle ages referred to the master of the Great Horde as the possessor of "the Throne". Thus, in 1478, the chief Tatar prince in the Crimean khanate (one Eminek of the noble House of Shirin) described the ruler of the Great Horde (Ahmed) as "the khan of the Throne".[57] This was a long-standing tradition. The fourteenth century author ibn Fadlallah el-Omari (d.1348 or 1349) recorded that the Great Khan called himself "the possessor of the Throne".[58] It was not unusual for Tatars also to call this the "Throne of Batu Sain". (Batu, also called Sain, was regarded as the founder of the Great Horde.) In 1481, for example, the Great Horde was "taken" by the khan Ibak, a

[54] Pulaski, *Akta,* 292-93.
[55] *Ibid.,* 265.
[56] Mengli Giray to Ivan III, September 1502: "this year I have given away all the money I possessed" (Karpov, PsMK, I, 446).
[57] Bennigsen, *op.cit.,* 323.
[58] Tizengauzen, *op.cit.,* I, 250.

descendant of Batu's brother Shiban. Some years later Ibak mentioned in a letter to Ivan III that he had once "taken the throne of Batu".[59] Precisely what he meant we can discover from a letter written by Mengli Giray in 1481. Part of this letter, happily, was printed in 1846,[60] and more of it was published in 1881. It is a letter to Kazimierz, King of Poland, and it concerns a great event. The translation of this letter runs as follows: "On 21 January the Shibanid khan... Ibak came... accompanied by Prince Mahmud, Obat... Musa and Yamgurchu; [the last two were princes of the Trans-Yaik Tatars] they trampled Ahmed's *ordu* and killed khan Ahmed. Then they took all his people and the uluses; having gathered them together, they moved away. Prince Temir [head of the Great Horde branch of the noble House of the Mankit] and the sons of Ahmed Khan and their servants came to take refuge with me... I gave many horses and a great quantity of apparel to the sons of Ahmed and to Temir".[61] When, therefore, we ask what did Mengli Giray mean when he wrote to Putyatich that he had taken the "Throne" we can suppose he meant he had taken possession of something called the Great Khan's "*ordu*" together with his "people" and had taken also something called the "*ulus*es". What were these elements of which the Great Horde appears to have been composed? Could they indeed have been gathered together quickly by a successful contender for the possession of the Throne?

"*Ordu*" is a Tatar word. It is put into Russian as "*orda*" and Englished as "Horde". This word in its English, Russian and Tatar forms often means the whole of a nomadic people-state-government and people. But "*ordu*" and "*orda*" do not always mean the whole state, so we must take care when we read "*orda*" in an original passage in Russian, or in a Russian translation of a Tatar document. Let me give one illustration to show why we must take care when confronted by an "*ordu*". Under 1502 the Russian chronicler wrote: "The taking of the *ordu* by the Crimean Emperor Mengli Giray. This year the Crimean Emperor Mengli Giray defeated Shaikh Ahmed, Emperor of

[59] Karpov, PsMK, I, 199.
[60] In K.Golebiowski, *Dzieje Polski za panowania Jagiellonow,* III (Warsaw, 1848).
[61] Pulaski, *Akta,* 209.

the Great *ordu* and took the *ordu*".[62] Now we can be certain that Mengli Giray defeated Shaikh Ahmed, ruler of the Great Horde, but does "took the *ordu*" mean "took the whole of the people-state called the Great Horde"? A reader who suspects (rightly) that "*ordu*" does not always mean the whole state could suppose (wrongly) that the Russian chronicler meant that Mengli Giray had taken in 1502 rather less than the whole state, i.e., the *ordu* (whatever that was) which was only a part of the Great Horde. What, therefore, does *ordu* mean when it is used to indicate only part of the Tatar state?

Luckily there exists a short description of such an *ordu* in the writings of an eyewitness, the fourteenth-century traveller Ibn Battuta. This will serve for an introduction to this Great Horde institution. Observing the approach of the *ordu* of the Great Khan Uzbek he wrote: "We saw a great town, with all its inhabitants, *moving*. In it were mosques and markets and the smoke of cooking rising in the air. They prepare food while in motion, as horses pull the waggons. When they reach a stopping place they take down tents from the waggons and set them on the ground. Similarly do they set up mosques and shops".[63] The Great Horde *ordu* of the late fifteenth century was the political, religious, administrative and military centre of the state. In it were found the treasury, the administrative records and archives of diplomatic correspondence, together with the officials of high and low rank responsible for them. One officer of the treasury (*ordubazar*) was a certain Burnashek whom Shaikh Ahmed sent to Kiev on business in 1501. (We know of him because when he died Mengli Giray described him as "my *bazar* official" whose "things" were under seal in Kiev: "those things are my things".)[64] This was an hereditary occupation. Many of the diplomats in the *ordu* were also hereditary diplomats. Thus, in 1484 Grand Prince Temir Mankit of the Great Horde sent as ambassador to Lithuania a certain Prince "Aitolmish" [Elchi Toktamish?] of whom he wrote "he is a great man" holding by virtue of his birth "the place of the *Elchi* [ambassador] held by his forefathers".[65] A

[62] PSRL, VIII, 242.
[63] Tizengauzen, *op.cit.*, I, 289.
[64] Pulaski, *Akta*, 265, 311.
[65] *Ibid.*, 213-14.

similar family in diplomacy was that of Tahir (envoy of Ahmed Khan to Kazimierz in 1479); Tahir's "younger brother Tabin" was the envoy of Khan Murteza to Lithuania in 1484, while "Tahir's son Yusuf" was sent to Lithuania by Shaikh Ahmed Khan in 1496. (All three were in Mengli Giray's service after 1502).[66]

The *ordu* also contained the courts of the khan, of his wives and of such of his male relatives as chose to abide with him. (Most of the khan's relatives lived in or near Astrakhan, in the family patrimony. An exception was the ex-Great Khan Murteza who was khan in Tumen on the river Terek, a petty state.)[67] The numerous nobles and servants in these courts were maintained by their royal masters; they were in turn responsible for the ordering of the public and private life of the members of the royal house and also for their security. Prominent among the *ordu* officials were the master of the camp and the chief of the khan's bodyguards. The chief of Shaikh Ahmed's guards may have been a certain Djahangir Bahadur whom the khan sometimes sent on important diplomatic missions. Introducing Djahangir to Aleksandr of Lithuania Shaikh Ahmed wrote: "he is my honest servant. From his youth he has served me and protected me. For my sake one of his eyes was spoiled and his nose damaged".[68]

The Muslim religious establishment of the Great Horde – the chief judges and jurisconsults – also travelled with the *ordu*. A representative of this group was "Molzozoda" who quit the *ordu* in 1500 to take service with Mengli Giray. Concerning him a Muscovite envoy wrote: "the khan told us that in the autumn the Great Mullah of the *bazar* of the sons of Ahmed came to serve him". Another such was Hadjdji Ahmed Seyyid who was sent to Lithuania in 1501 to beseech assistance when Shaikh Ahmed was in desperate straits.[69]

Perhaps the most important political figures in the *ordu*, after the khan, were the Grand Princes – the heads of great Tatar noble families, whose underlings and relatives controlled many of the common Tatar nomads (who lived outside the *ordu*).[70] The four most

[66] *Ibid.*, 210, 211, 220, 378.
[67] Murteza was Great Khan in 1484, 1489-90, 1494, 1497.
[68] Pulaski, *Akta*, 256.
[69] *Ibid.*; 258; Karpov, PsMk, I, 354.
[70] *Ibid.*; 108; Pulaski, *Akta*, 264.

powerful princes were known as the Great *Karach*es. Without their support the government of the Great Khan would falter or collapse utterly. One of Shaikh Ahmed's *karach*es was the chief prince of the noble House of Kiat, who is mentioned in a letter sent by the khan to Prince Mikhaylo Hlinsky and his brothers. (Mikhaylo was a direct descendant of the famous Tatar ruler of the late fourteenth century, Mamay Kiat [as Shaikh Ahmed noted][71] and was the grandfather of the Muscovite Tsar Ivan the Terrible: Mamay, Mansur, Oleksa, Ivan, Boris, Lev, Mikhaylo, Yelena, Ivan IV).[72] Another *karach* was the head of the Great Horde branch of the prestigious noble House of the Mankit. One of the grand *karach*es was the chief minister of the *ordu*. From 1484 to 1502 the chief ministers were all Mankits, first Temir, then his brother (or cousin) Achika, then Temir's son Tevkel (1498-1502).

The *ordu* represented, furthermore, a formidable military power. In 1501, according to a Muscovite observer, it contained 20,000 fighting men.[73] The Lithuanian ambassador Chalecki – a Tatar-speaker – apparently reported that Shaikh Ahmed had 60,000 soldiers, for Aleksandr informed his brother (Cardinal Fryderyk) in March 1502 that the khan had "an army of 60,000 men".[74] We cannot however be sure that this figure relates just to the number of soldiers in the *ordu*; it could embrace the *ordu* troops and as well the fighting men whom the khan could levy from among the *ulus*es, outside the *ordu*.

If we take into account the women, old people and children who travelled with the *ordu* – the families of its officials, servants, soldiers and slaves, merchants and tradesmen – then we will understand that the *ordu* of the Great Horde took up a considerable space, due to the numerous waggons and animals which carried about the people of the *ordu* and their possessions.

It now seems fairly clear what Mengli Giray meant in his letter of 1481 when he wrote "Ibak... trampled the *ordu* and... took [the

[71] *Ibid.*, 264.
[72] *Vremennik Imperatorskogo moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey rossiyskikh*, X (Moscow, 1851), 195.
[73] Karpov, PsMK, I, 367.
[74] Papee, *Akta Aleksandra*, 67.

khan's] people". But what of the *ulus*es? The power of the rulers of the Great Horde ultimately depended not upon the *ordu,* but upon the support and service of the common people. The common people of the Great Horde were divided into administrative-economic units called *ulus*es. These people were principally nomadic pastoralists, rearing horses, horned cattle, camels and sheep; they also raised crops.[75] (In 1492 they were reported to have "ploughed arable land", on another occasion "their corn did not grow and their animals were lost", while in 1500 it was said that they were unable to raise crops by the river Kuma due to the hostility of the Circassians and the people of Tumen.)[76] Many of the *ulus*es were under the management of princes who spent much of their time in the *ordu.* The *ulus*es in all the Tatar states were directly controlled by the nominees of the royal family and the great nobles. We read, for example, that a noble, one of the *karach*es in the Khanate of Kazan, possessed five *ulus*es. Mengli Giray wrote of this man "his people have five *ulus*es".[77] A large proportion of the *ulus*es in the Great Horde were under the authority of the head of the House of the Mankits. There exists a letter written by a Crimean prince which tells us something of the power of the Great Horde Mankits. In 1478 the head of the Mankit House, Temir, was at odds with the Great Khan Ahmed. Eminek Shirin wrote: "we have just heard that the khan of the Throne is advancing on Temir [Mankit]. If this comes about then Temir will come close to us [to the Crimea] because he will be pushed towards us. That will not fail to harm us because the people [lesser nobles and *ulus* Tatars] who depend from us will rally to him".[78] – This quotation reminds us that the *ulus* Tatars were nomads, able to strip a khan or their princes of power by moving away to seek better circumstances under another noble or khan and, by so doing, to strengthen their new master whose power would be augmented by their adherence. "Where there is trouble" wrote Mengli Giray, who understood these matters well, "the people go away".[79] One *ulus* of

[75] J.Barbaro and A.Contarini, *Travels to Tana and Persia,* ed. by Lord Stanley of Alderley (London, 1873), 9-16.
[76] Karpov, PsMK, I, 113, 149, 167.
[77] *Ibid.,* II, 73.
[78] Bennigsen, *op.cit.,* 323.
[79] Karpov, PsMK, I, 288.

Great Horde Tatars submitted to Mengli Giray in 1500; it comprised 3000 people. In his relation of this submission a Muscovite envoy described how one of the great men of the House of Namagan tried to stop this *ulus*: "Ebaga *ulan* and his brother... together with Kirey Kitay have come from the Horde to serve Mengli Giray. 3000 souls came with them... Ebaga brought to the Emperor Mengli Giray the son of Yakub, the royal Prince Mangishlak [Yakub was the brother of the late Ahmed Khan]. It is said that this royal prince wintered in Azov with 200 men. He came upon Ebaga *ulan* at the crossing [of the Don] but Ebaga defeated him... now that royal prince sits shackled in Kirk-yir" (Mangishlak of Namagan was the grandfather of the founder of the Astrakhanid dynasty of Bukhara.) Impoverishment was one reason for this submission. Mengli Giray wrote that the "*ulus*" had been robbed[80] – doubtless by Circassians.

The movements of the *ulus*es were not always dictated by the *ordu*. To a certain extent the *ordu* was a prisoner of the *ulus*es as can be seen from the following illustration. In 1492 the government in the *ordu* determined that the *ulus*es should move in the direction of Circassia. However, the common people were reluctant to go thither and they demonstrated their reluctance by heading in another direction. What did the *ordu* do? "The *ordu* went after the *ulus*es".[81] Again, in 1501 rumours reached the Crimea that the Great Horde "*ulus*es did not want to be near the Circassians so Shaikh Ahmed moved with them to the Don".[82] (It was about this time that the khan determined to make his fateful journey to the Ukraine. Another factor contributing to this decision may have been the menace overhanging his relative-by-marriage[83] the Shah of Shirvan, Farokh Yasar, whose state was overwhelmed in 1501 by Shah Ismail. The Great Horde had occasionally used pasture lands [the Mughan steppe?] belonging to Farokh Yasar.)[84]

Barbaro noted in the 1430s that the common people (in that part of the Great Horde then ruled by Kuchuk Muhammed of Namagan)

[80] *Ibid.*, 323, 363.
[81] *Ibid.*, 167.
[82] *Ibid.*, 358.
[83] Pulaski, *Akta*, no.4.
[84] Karpov, PsMK, I, 277.

followed close upon the *ordu:* "when the Lord was departed then this people with their cattle followed. First herds of horses, 50,100 and 200 and more in a herd. After these followed herds of camels and oxen, and after them herds of small beasts, which endured for the space of six days, that as far as we might ken with our eyes the champaigne every way was full of people and beasts following on their way. And this was only the first part [of the *uluses*], whereby it is to be considered what a much greater number should be in the middle part..."[85] Similarly in 1501 did the *uluses* stay close to the Great Horde *ordu*. In the early summer of 1501 the *ordu* crossed the Don by the river Chir and then moved up the Don until it reached a point very close to the Muscovite frontier. On this journey the *uluses* followed the *ordu,* the latter positioning itself in such a way that it could shield the *uluses* from the combined *ordu* and *ulus* forces of Mengli Giray. Two months after it had crossed the Don the *ordu* was established on an island in the river Tikhaya Sosna, while the *uluses* were disposed behind the *ordu* – between that river and the Muscovite frontier.[86] A contemporary Muscovite source states: "Shaikh Ahmed stood in a fortress at the mouth of the Tikhaya Sosna... while Shaikh Ahmed's *uluses* were on this [Muscovite] side of the Don".[87] (The question, "why did Ivan III do nothing to obstruct this two-month march towards his frontier?" could perhaps be answered by another: "did Ivan III want the Great Horde to submit to his 'faithful ally' Mengli Giray?")

The usual proximity of the *ordu* and *uluses* doubtless facilitated the calling of general Councils: in the Great Horde after 1502 such a council, attended apparently by low-level representatives of the *ulus* Tatars, was called by Muscovite observers a "Council of the land" (*zemskaya duma*).[88]

If we bear in mind that the male *ulus* Tatars greatly outnumbered

[85] Barbaro, *op.cit.*, 11.
[86] Karpov, PsMK, I, 367-68.
[87] P.Milyukov, ed., "Drevneyshaya razryadnaya kniga" printed in E.V.Barsov, ed., *Chteniya v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostey rossiyskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (Moscow, 1902), 29.
[88] Karpov, PsMK, II, 358.

the soldiers in the *ordu,* then we will understand that the Great Horde was potentally a formidable military power, and this perhaps explains why Muscovy's independence was so long delayed after 1380. The *ordu* alone constituted a significant force. If we accept the Muscovite estimation of the *ordu* troops in 1501 – 20,000, then we gather that these *ordu* troops were almost as numerous as the combined *ordu* and *ulus* troops of Mengli Giray in 1501! In 1501 Mengli Giray expected that many of the Great Horde Tatars would submit to him – "I expect many of their people will come to me".[89] In order to bring about a mass submission Mengli Giray asked his ally Ivan to send forces with cannon to frighten the Great Horde Tatars and also to drive off the *ulus* Tatars' cattle; the khan also raised the maximum possible number of troops from his family patrimony with which to confront the Great Horde on the Don. Having obtained the agreement of the masters of his *ulus* Tatars – the Kiat, Mankit, Shirin, Barin etc. princes in the Crimea – to a general levy he issued this order: "You must all... be ready to campaign alongside me. There must be one waggon to every five men; each man must have three horses. You must have arms and fodder. No one is to stay at home excepting those who are under 15 years of age. Whoever stays behind is... no servant of mine, or of my sons or princes. Such a man is to be stripped of his possessions and killed".[90] The force thus raised numbered 25,000 (according to the Muscovite diplomat who accompanied it; Muscovite envoys were most particular about figures and there seems no sound reason to doubt this estimation).[91] Had Shaikh Ahmed been able to levy his *ulus* Tatars then it is clear that he could have built a force many times larger than that of Mengli Giray. Why could he not do this? Perhaps he was uncertain of the loyalty of his *ulus* princes and, futhermore, the *ulus*

[89] *Ibid.,* I, 356.
[90] *Ibid.,* 354.
[91] E.g., in the early summer of 1500 a Muscovite envoy reported that the Shirin Prince Dovletek "has been sent by the khan together with Kazimer [the chief prince of the Kiat House in the Crimea] and other princes" to attack the Grand Principality of Lithuania, "and they say that with them were, in all, 800 men" i.e., the heads of the Kiat and Shirin houses led a none too considerable party. Meanwhile Dovletek's brother "Kochek, the son of Eminek, Ideshka... and Hozyai (also a Shirin)" returned from the principality" and with them, they say, were 1000 men": *ibid.,* 323. The figure 25,000 is mentioned on p.368.

Tatars were in poor condition. Many of these pastoralists, nomads *par excellence,* were *without horses*! This was a consequence of several successive bad seasons, poor grazing, bad harvests, harsh winters: the Great Horde was described as "thin', "hungry" and "lacking horses" in 1491, 1492, 1497, 1498, 1499, 1500 and 1501.[92] In 1501, it seems, Shaikh Ahmed, a great politician, used as a counter in the game of international relations the very weakness of the Great Horde. He won in the summer of 1501, but lost everything that winter.

In the summer of 1501 Shaikh Ahmed managed to preserve the loyalty of his princes and to protect his *ulus*es from Mengli Giray. The records of Shaikh Ahmed's relations with Ivan III at this time have been destroyed, but Mengli Giray's stepson was in the service of Ivan and his brother-in-law was the chief prince in the Great Horde, so the khan in the Crimea doubtless knew why Moscow took no effective action against the Great Horde between May and mid-or late July and why his envoy Kutush, who arrived in Moscow on 23 July with instructions that he should be sent back "quickly", was held in Moscow until 8 August (leaving the very day another embassy from the khan arrived).[93] Mengli Giray was disappointed in his hopes that the Great Horde would submit and marched his forces back to the Crimea, leaving the Great Horde by the Muscovite frontier. "I have heard that you and I have an alliance"[94] he wrote to Ivan at this time. It seems

[92] *ibid.,* 167, 255, 323.

[93] "borzo, ne izderzhav": *ibid.,* 362, 363, 366.

[94] *Ibid.,* 366. "disgraceful", "inexplicable inertia" (Fennell, *op.cit.,* 245-46). In April 1502 Mengli Giray wrote to Ivan that if he found Shaikh Ahmed again in a fortress "I'll spend the summer there... while you... if you send troops you must not turn them back, but send me intelligence. And should you not send troops, or should they be not fully prepared, then you must keep me informed" (Karpov, PsMK, I, 414). Ivan had sent Mengli Giray's stepson Mehemmed Emin towards his southern frontier in July August 1501 but there ensued no hostilities with the Great Horde because of this. Why not? Aleksandr of Lithuania's alliance with Shaikh Ahmed was directed not against Mengli Giray but against Ivan. (Shaikh Ahmed to Aleksandr, summer 1501 "I did not follow Mengli Giray, but I kept my promise to you": Pulaski, *Akta,* 260.) Did Ivan not know this? Did he not know that the Great Horde – *ordu* and *uluses* – was by his frontier until Mengli Giray's envoy told him? Or was Ivan playing an elaborate game of nerves with Shaikh Ahmed with the purpose of limiting the damage to his own cause and of preparing to draw Shaikh Ahmed out of his alliance with Lithuania and into one with Moscow: Shaikh Ahmed was heading for Kiev – which Ivan wanted!

that Mengli Giray did not consider he should make war upon people he expected soon to rule.

The taking of the Great Horde

On 8 July 1502 Tatar ambassadors were received by the Lithuanian government. They announced that Mengli Giray had "by the grace of God overcome his rival [Shaikh Ahmed] and possessed all his people together with all his tents, pavilions, fortifications, women, boys, families, horses and beasts".[95] On 28 June a Muscovite envoy hastened to Moscow (five days ahead of Mengli Giray's ambassadors) bearing this news: "Emperor Mengli Giray has driven off Shaikh Ahmed and taken his *ordu* and *uluses*". He also reported that after Mengli Giray had "taken the *ordu* to the Crimea" he intended to attack Lithuania.[96] On 3 July Ivan III received letters from Mengli Giray. One of these began "having driven off my enemy Shaikh Ahmed, his *ordu* and all his *uluses* have been given into my hands by God".[97] Twelve days later Ivan sent a letter to Mengli Giray saying "God has granted your request. You have acquired your father's royal [Throne?] Horde".[98] At the same time Ivan wrote to his ambassador at Mengli Giray's court asking him to "write to me whatever news you hear about Emperor Shaikh Ahmed, about where he is now, and whether many *uluses* and people have gone with him".[99] Ivan was apparently interested to discover, *inter alia,* whether his "faithful ally" had indeed taken overall control of the Great Horde. Mengli Giray! Son-in-law of Prince Yadgar of the House of Seydzhut who had "like a wild beast"[100] destroyed much of Moscow in 1451. Son of Hadjdji Giray who as Great Khan had grandly given Smolensk and Novgorod to the King of Poland.[101] Heir of Toktamysh (Mengli Giray and his son Muhammed

[95] "[Mengli Giray] *sic factus duplicis hordae imperator*": Papee, *Akta, 3105-06.*
[96] *Karpov, PsMK, I, 419.*
[97] *Ibid.,* 420.
[98] *Ibid.,* 444.
[99] *Ibid.,* 426.
[100] *Ibid.,* 57; PSRL, XX, 262.
[101] The document is in *Teki Naruszewicza,* XX, 173. I have not seen it. It was cited in Kolankowksi, *op.cit.*, 309 note 2.

Giray always referred to Toktamysh with respect, calling him "grandfather") who had sacked Moscow in 1382. Mengli Giray, who in his youth and while still able to claim to be Great Khan, apparently before all the Great Horde *ulus*es submitted to Ahmed of Namagan, had donated Smolensk, Odoyev and Ryazan' to the King of Poland![102] Mengli Giray, step-father of the Tuka Timurid Khans Abd al-Latif of Kazan ("our patrimony") and Mehemmed Emin of Meshchera (Kasimov) –"our patrimony"[103]– who would have dared to face Ivan III and *credit* him with Mengli Giray's achievement in 1502? Mengli Giray did not thank him; he merely asked him to rejoice!

How did Shaikh Ahmed of Namagan lose the Great Horde for the third time? In August 1501 the *ordu* – reduced in strength by as many as thirty men (killed in duels with Mengli Giray's knights)[104] but augmented by the force of a Mankit noble, Udem,[105] who came either from Kazan or Meshchera – quickly covered the hundred kilometres separating its temporary fortress from the frontier of great provinces newly won by Ivan III from Lithuania, the hearths of the princes Shemyachich and Mozhaysky. Accompanied by the *ulus*es the *ordu* moved to Kanev (in Lithuanian hands) and took Ryl'sk, Chernigov and Novgorod-Sieverskiy. Shaikh Ahmed forbade looting and handed these places to the Lithuanian ambassador. In November Shaikh Ahmed's brother wrote to Aleksandr of Lithuania "we want to winter by Kiev" while Shaikh Ahmed wrote "having crossed the Desna we shall winter on your side". The *ordu* was established by Kiev while the *ulus*es scattered to find winter food for their animals. In February-March 1502 the *ordu* moved to the mouth of the Sula (a tributary of the Dnieper) and built fortifications some 250 kilometres from Kiev.[106]

Communications between the *ordu* and *ulus*es broke down during the winter. Shaikh Ahmed wrote "a hard winter came, a great snow

[102] Pulaski, *Akta*, 292-93. In 1471-72 Mengli Giray was still addressed as "*Thartarorum terre imperator, Mengli Giray, magnus Caesar*" (by the King of Bohemia) and as "*potenti domino Mengli Giray, magno imperatori terre Thartarorum*" (by the King of Poland): *ibid.*, 192-200.
[103] Karpov, PsMK, II, 251.
[104] *Ibid.*, I, 368.
[105] Pulaski, *Akta*, 261.
[106] *Ibid.*, 263? Karpov, PsMK, I, 419.

fell. My people could not move. The servants and *uluses* were far away". Many Tatars ran short of food and some raided territories in the Ukraine possessed by Aleksandr. Tevkel Mankit wrote to Aleksandr: "Our people and servants were far off and we have shamed you. Without the khan's knowledge and without my knowledge, horsemen and footmen, hungry and starved, have caused damage to your Ukraine people. Those who went were seeking corn".[107]

At the beginning of 1502 some starving *ulus* Tatars began to submit to Mengli Giray: "50 men on foot have come from the Horde while others have come with their women".[108] In April 1502 Ivan III (in Moscow) was informed in a chirpy letter from Mengli Giray about the harshness of the winter. And about bird life: "at this time people here are usually reaping and larks are building their nests. But now an unusual winter has come. When Hadjdji Giray took the Horde, such was the winter, and apart from that occasion I cannot recall such a winter".[109] In January Mengli Giray got his princes' agreement to another general levy of his *ulus* Tatars – they were given two months to prepare – and he put the finishing touches to his father's mausoleum: inscribed upon it were the words "Aid from God and a quick victory".[110] At the beginning of May Mengli Giray's forces crossed the Perekop isthmus to the mainland. They were met at Mare Waters by a Great Horde *ulus*. These people had been marching south for up to 25 days before encountering the Khan. "That *ulus* is going on to Perekop" it was reported. According to the Muscovite envoy "other people met the Emperor at the Samara river". At that place Mengli Giray wrote of the submission of many Great Horde nobles: "now many noble people, having quit Shaikh Ahmed, have come to me here". It is not unlikely that this party included Shaikh Ahmed's wife and Udem Mankit. (On 6 June Mengli Giray wrote "Udem has lent me his strength and now abides with me".) Advancing "very quickly" from

[107] Pulaski, *Akta*, 258-60.
[108] Karpov, PsMK, I, 381.
[109] *Ibid.*, 414.
[110] Dambrovski and Borzenko, "Bakhchisarayskiye arabskiye i turetskiye nadpisi" (*Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey*, II [Odessa, 1848], 526).

the Samara he approached the rivers Sula[111] and Turpachaya *voda,* where the remnants of the *ordu* and *uluses* were concentrated.

During the winter of 1501-2 the harsh weather destroyed the military capability of the great Horde *ordu,* while Shaikh Ahmed's intransigence, and the appalling situation of the *ordu* and *uluses*, cut the ties which bound the chiefs of the *ordu* to him. In November 1501 there came to the *ordu* an envoy from Ivan who offered to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Great Khan if the latter would end his alliance with Lithuania. Tevkel's wife wrote to Aleksandr "they sent a letter from Moscow and we have sent that letter on to you with Mikhail [Chalecki]." Tevkel wrote "Ivan, the dependent of my Emperor says this: I shall be his soldier and dependent [*ratay i kholop*]". But Shaikh Ahmed refused to accede to this request made just before the approach of winter, and asked Aleksandr to send at least 4000 troops to his assistance. This aid had long ago been promised. Shaikh Ahmed's mother Dovlet Saltana (widow of the Great Ahmed who had been let down by Kazimierz in 1480) tried to exert moral pressure on Aleksandr: "my husband and emperor Ahmed was in brotherhood with your father the king, and both have gone to face God". So did Shaikh Ahmed who wrote: "You asked me to come to you with all my House and I have come to you with all my House and with all my knights as you asked... I stood 40 days with the *ordu* by Kanev and even after that there came no news of you whatsoever." (Grand Prince Aleksandr, crowned King of Poland on 12 December 1501, was unable to raise troops to aid his ally or the Grand Principality in circumstances which caused his vice-chancellor to write, later: "we have discovered the significance of private affluence and public insufficiency".) Tevkel Mankit wrote: "we stand between two armies ready to fight either Mengli Giray or the dependent [*kholop*] Ivan. If you do not come quickly then we cannot stay between two armies".[112]

In April more envoys came to the *ordu* from Moscow and Shaikh Ahmed's people captured the despatches of one of Mengli Giray's envoys to Ivan – which included a copy of a letter detailing the khan's plans to win over the Great Horde (he planned to take cannon with

[111] Karpov, PsMK, I, 416, 419, 421.
[112] Pulaski, *Akta,* 259, 260, 262; Papee, *Akta,* 120.

him) and the reference to the taking of the Horde by Hadjdji Giray. Ivan's envoys brought to Shaikh Ahmed "those gifts which he did not give to my father or to my brothers".[113] The khan's advisers apparently urged him to break with Aleksandr but he refused. Neither Ivan's promises nor his gifts were enough. Shaikh Ahmed raised the stakes; but the table collapsed. The only assistance Aleksandr could send him was the news that the Poles had ratified their alliance with the Great Horde and a doctor who arrived too late to treat Shaikh Ahmed's brother Enay. Coming on top of everything else the death of his "good brother" put the khan into a deep depression. Then, led by his wife Djan Saltana Mankit, most of the *ordu* people broke with the khan and marched south to submit to Mengli Giray. In a speech delivered before the assembled nobility of Poland at Radom in 1504 Shaikh Ahmed declared that his wife had taken with her "the greatest part of his forces" and submitted to Mengli Giray. This was no sudden flight, for the Muscovite ambassador to the Great Horde was able to give a message to a man who travelled with the deserting *ordu* people; that message was for the Muscovite ambassador to the court of Mengli Giray. (Mengli Giray, not the ambassador, received this message.)[114]

Mengli Giray's forces took the *ordu*'s positions between 2 and 6 June. At Radom in 1504 Shaikh Ahmed said that the Tatars who had deserted his *ordu* joined Mengli Giray's forces in the attack on these positions, and that the *ordu* people in those positions were either killed or captured.[115] We have no means of knowing whether this was a great or small engagement. Shaikh Ahmed escaped. There is no evidence that he was pursued. His party included his mother, his brothers Hudjak and Halek, his chief prince, Tevkel Mankit, other notables, his household retainers and the Muscovite and Polish envoys. On his eastward journey Shaikh Ahmed picked up some stray *uluses* which were close to the Don. In mid-August the Muscovite

[113] Pulaski, *Akta,* 264-65.

[114] B.Wapowski, "Kroniki Bernarda Wapowskiego" published in *Scriptores rerum polonicarum,* II (Krakow, 1874), 56; the doctor Isak did not get home till 1504; a long House-call: T.Wierzbowski, ed., *Matricularium regni poloniae,* pars III, (Warsaw) no.1418, p.89; Pulaski, *Akta,* 258,; Karpov, PsMK, I, 418; Papee, *Akta,* 104.

[115] Wapowski, *op.cit.,* 56.

ambassador in the Crimea replied to his master's request for information (of 15 July) as follows: "they say he has 4000 people with him, they say he had *ulus*es with him, but very few".

Did this "Trans-Volgine Emperor" return to his Trans-Volgine Empire? No. He had no Trans-Volgine empire. The Namagan patrimony east of the Volga was mostly possessed by another member of his family, the Khan Abd al-Karim of Astrakhan (the son, or brother of Shaikh Ahmed's uncle, Mahmud). Shaikh Ahmed was no stranger to misfortune. He had lost three thrones and had had previous experience of his horse "growing sweaty beneath him" as he fled disaster. With characteristic energy he set about finding allies. But his party shrank as his followers deserted to find places for themselves in Astrakhan or the Great Horde. Within a year his *ordu* has been slimmed to 500 men who were as afraid of his allies as they were of his enemies. Prince Tevkel Mankit later wroter of his experiences after 6 June: "I lived like a Cossack". Some minor Trans-Yaik princes told the ex-Great Khan "we grieve for you".[116] Muscovite envoys in the Great Horde reported that Shaikh Ahmed could not recover it: "he has no means". His brother Murteza, Seyyid Muhammed, Bahadur and the khan Abd al-Karim desired "to recover our patrimony"[117] – the Great Horde, but only Abd al-Karim had any firm power base. (Seyyid Muhammed had sought to enter the service of Ivan already in 1501. Two of Shaikh Ahmed's nephews, Yusuf and Isak entered Ivan's service in 1502.)[118] Shaikh Ahmed's brothers – and Ivan III – thought that the best solution was to establish him in Astrakhan. (Moscow's interest in helping this extraordinary politician to secure a new power base is self-explanatory.) But Abd al-Karim objected[119] and Shaikh Ahmed spent the years 1504-27[120] west of the Dnieper, mostly in

[116] Karpov, PsMK, I, 433, 456, 467, 518.
[117] Pulaski, *Akta,* 279.
[118] V.Tatishchev, *Istoriya rossiyskaya* (reprinted Moscow-Leningrand, 1966), VI, 96; Karpov, PsMK, I, 385.
[119] *Ibid.,* 456, 486, 490.
[120] According to Spuler, the "last Khan" of the Golden Horde was beheaded in 1505: B.Spuler, *The Mongols in History* (London, 1971), 104; cf. his "Aussenpolitik der Goldenen Horde" (*Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,* Jahr. 5, Heft 3/4 (Breslau, 1940). 365. Shaikh Ahmed was in fact sent to Astrakhan via Vilnius and Kiev in spring 1527. See Sambocki to Dantiscus, 14 June 1527: *Akta Tomiciana,* IX, 212. He was

Grand Principality of Lithuania.

How did Mengli Giray deal with his new subjects? Did for example Kiat *ulus*es go to Mengli Giray's Kiat princes, etc? Where were the common people established? Our chief source of information about the Great Horde after 1502 is the Muscovite "Crimean" archive, which had been opened in 1472.[121] Unfortunately it contains no letters from the Great Horde between June 1503 and July 1504, while records of Muscovite-Great Horde relations between March 1505 and October 1508, between September 1509 and May 1515 are also missing. One consequence of this is that the first surviving letter from Moscow after 1502 addressed to "the Great Khan of the Great Horde"[122] is dated May 1515. Careful examination of unpublished Great Horde records relating to the period after 1530 should shed some light on these questions. But in any case the evidence we do possess is something luxuriant compared with that concerning previous take-overs of the Great Horde. Under 1382, for example, virtually all we have is this: "Mamay's princes dismounted, beat their foreheads on the ground before Toktamysh and swore allegiance to him... This Emperor Toktamysh took Mamay's *ordu* and his empresses and his treasury and caught all his *ulus*es".[123] (Note how closely these events seem to resemble those of 1502.) This evidence cannot be examined here, for I lack space, but one or two points can be made.

On 4 February 1503 Mengli Giray sent a pregnant message to Ivan: "Prince Tevkel has come". Tevkel, the man best informed about Great Horde-Muscovite relations had submitted to the Great Khan. Mengli Giray wrote: "I have given him his father's place and treasury and districts... and since he has sworn his oath and called me his sovereign... there is [now] no evil between us. We have put aside the evil between us and have laid our souls under one breast". Tevkel's uncle Achika (chief prince in the Great Horde 1487-94, 1497) also submitted (in 1504). He eventually succeeded Tevkel as head of the Mankit House. Eventually the Mankit *ulus*es of Tevkel came to be

escorted to the frontier by 5,000 Lithuanian cavalry

[121] Karpov, PsMK, I, 448, 451, 474.

[122] *Ibid.*, II, 132.

[123] PSRL, VIII, 41.

called the *ulus*es of Mansur (Tevkel's great-grandfather) so that they could be distinguished from the *ulus*es of other branches of the Mankit House. In 1515 Muhammed Giray wrote that the Mankit, Barin and Shirin princes made him khan.[124]

In 1502, conscious that Shaikh Ahmed might find allies and seek to win back the Great Horde, Mengli Giray appears to have settled many common Tatars west of the Dnieper. In the summer of 1502, for example, his younger sons collected an army of 70,000 men at a point west of the Dnieper for an expedition against Poland and Lithuania.[125] (That was the greatest Tatar attak made upon the west for a century. According to a Polish source that army was composed of "Crimeans mixed with Trans-Volgines," i.e. Great Horde Tatars.)[126]

In 1501 Mengli Giray had been able to raise 25,000 men. Various reports made in 1502 record the great increase in his power. It was reported from Moldavia that Mengli Giray now possessed "100,000 horsemen". A Polish author noted that the "60,000 men" and "more than 100,000 women and boys" of Shaikh Ahmed's Horde passed under Mengli Giray.[127] Mengli Giray's success in 1502 caused Tatars from Kazan to enter his service. (One Kazan noble, Agish, succeeded Eminek's son as head of the House of Shirin in 1508.) In 1509 Mengli Giray took numerous Nogay (Trans-Yaik) and Astrakhan *ulus*es: it apparently took 20 days for these to pass through the entrance to the peninsula. In 1509 Mengli Giray is reported to have sent 250,000 men against Astrakhan. "I shall be a Toktamysh"[128] he said. In 1504 the King of Poland reported that the Great Khan had plans to establish his

[124] Karpov, PsMK, I, 471, 518, 515, 520; II, 500, 156.

[125] Near the rivers Sinyukha and Southern Bug: *ibid.*, I, 432.

[126] Wapowski, *op.cit.*, 50. The attacks embraced an area including Krakow, Kiev, Turov, Lwow, Lublin: Karpov, PsMK, I, 469.

[127] E. de Hurmuzaki, ed., *Documente privitoare la istoria Romanilor*, VIII (Bucarest, 1894), 37; Maciej z Miechowa, "De sarmatia asiana & europaea" in J.Pistorius, ed., *Poloniae historiae corpus* (Basle, 1582), 129.

[128] Karpov, PsMK, II, 70, 80, 172. The khan of Kazan recognised Mengli Giray, of course. In a letter to the King of Poland of 1506 "Mehemmed Emin tsar' of Kazan" mentioned "the Great Tsar' Mengli Giray": Pulaski, *Akta*, 294.

son-in-law on the Ottoman throne.[129] What were the chief consequences for Tatar history of the events of 1502? There were two. 1502 marks the end of the dynastic struggle for mastery of the Great Horde. The power of the House of Namagan in Europe was broken. (In the mid-sixteenth century there were, apparently, just 10,000 common Tatars in the khanate of Astrakhan.)[130] The shift of the Great Horde Tatars to the west for the last time was to cause another general movement to take place. Many of the Trans-Yaik Tatars, called also Noghays also moved west under their Mankit princes. By 1508 one of their two Grand Princes (who as we have noted recognised Mengli Giray as Great Khan) was able to write that his pasture grounds were by the Volga. That same year Vassili III of Moscow inquired whether "all the Noghays are on this side of the Volga, or only some of them".[131] Many of these Noghays were to submit to the rulers of the Great Horde. Previously they had usually been subject to the Shibanid royal house.

The north-east Russian principalities under Moscow and the west Russian principalities (under Lithuania) had rarely suffered much from the Great Horde when it had been under the Namagan dynasty. Under that house the Great Horde had often been concentrated near the lower Volga – many months journey from the Russian principalities, due to the great river crossings involved in jouneying thither and the need to make detours since the Tatars' beasts required regular water and forage. Under the Tuka-Timurids, as well as the Crimean based Mamay Kiat, the Great Horde lay frequently much closer to the Russian lands. This proximity was felt. Moscow thrice destroyed and many scores of great raids from the last quarter of the fourteenth century until the eighteenth century.

I will not speculate here about the significance of 1502 for the Ottoman Empire. I find the literature on the Ottoman-Great Horde

[129] King Aleksandr understood that Mengli Giray intended to obtain for his son-in-law (the Ottoman royal prince and governor of Kaffa) the Ottoman throne upon the death of Bayezid: Papee, *Akta*, 449.

[130] According to B.D.Grekov, *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma IX-XV vv.*, part 2 (Moscow, 1953), 440.

[131] Karpov, PsMK, II, 7, 12.

relationship peculiar, partly because it has shouldered the burden of Christian historiography of the Tatars. Perhaps Ottoman and Turkish accounts of the Great Horde after 1502 must be approached in the same critical light as we approach Ottoman accounts of the history of the Habsburg Empire. Do they square with western histories of the "Kings of Vienna"? And do Ottoman accounts of the Great Horde square with Great Horde documents?

* * * * * * *

In conclusion, the Great Horde was not destroyed in 1502. The historians who say it was destroyed lack the authority of its Great Khan, its ex-khan, the contemporary rulers of Poland (Aleksandr) and Moscow (Ivan III) and numerous others who knew that it was not destroyed but taken over, again. Whoever makes a bizarre construction of this event and suggests that in taking over the Great Horde its new khan somehow destroyed it is saying, in effect, that the Great Horde was destroyed (so that "its name never arose again") on a score of occasions from the late fourteenth century onwards, because it was taken over on divers occasion by rival royal princes. Whoever uses the pejorative word "claimed" e.g., "Mengli Giray and his heirs claimed to rule the Great Horde" is saying truer than he knows: Mengli Giray "claimed" to rule the Great Horde as Ivan III "claimed" to rule Moscow; he claimed to rule it because he did rule it.

VI. PATRONAGE IN ART AND LITERATURE : 1

ART AND PATRONAGE IN SERBIA DURING THE EARLY PERIOD OF OTTOMAN RULE (1450-1600)

SRETEN PETKOVIĆ / BELGRADE

The patrons of art in the medieval Serbian state were its rulers, members of their ruling families, and high church dignitaries. From the first decades of the 14th century the nobility, too, began to commission works of art. Being sufficiently powerful and wealthy, members of the nobility erected churches, adorned them and made precious gifts to them, designating them sometimes for their burial-places. Historical sources do not mention merchants and craftsmen as patrons of art, nor do they make reference to any other contributors, but it is not unlikely that there were such patrons, especially in the first half of the 14th century.[1]

The final conquest of the Serbian territory by the Turks in the latter half of the 15th century marked the end of an epoch and, among other things, the beginning of a new period of artistic activity. The classes which provided the chief patrons of art had disappeared almost overnight. The members of the ruling family and of the higher nobility had either perished on the battlefield or had begun their hard life as emigrants in the neighbouring Christian countries, particularly Hungary. But the clergy, from the highest dignitaries to the country priests, stayed with their subjugated people. The role of the Church as the patron of arts, not particularly significant in the preceding three centuries while the Serbian state was independent, gained in importance after the Turkish conquests. Historical sources seem to show that the Serbian Church adapted itself rapidly to the new conditions. Already in the first years after the fall of Smederevo in 1459 some of

[1] The historical sources concerning the donors at the churches in towns like Novo Brdo, Prizren or Skoplje are lacking.

the most eminent of the Serbian monasteries, such as Mileševa, Ravanica, and Resava, were endowed with *timars*, and in return they undertook to send soldiers to war at the Sultan's summons.[2] Some church dignitaries, too, succeeded in establishing good relations with their new lords – for example, Siluan the Metropolitan of Toplice, who was given by the Turks a *timar* worth more than 4,200 aspers.[3] The Metropolitan of Raška, Joanikije, was able to commission in 1564 the rebuilding and painting of the narthex of the monastic church Nova Pavlica, dating from the ninth decade of the 14th century.[4] The inscription, which has been preserved, shows that the founder was under the patronage of Mihailo Abogović, a great Serbian nobleman who belonged to the Turkophile party before the fall of the Serbian state and whose brother, converted to Islam, was the *beglerbeg* of Rumelia.

This was, however, an exception. Judging by the absence of monuments from the decades following the fall of Smederevo they were not conducive to artistic activity, for the scenes of war were still quite near.[5] It was only towards the end of the 15th century that there began in some parts of the former Serbian state the rebuilding and adornment of some monasteries (Prohor Pčinjski in 1489; Ajdanovac in 1492; Matka near Skoplje in 1496/7; Jašunje near Leskovac and Poganovo near Pirot in 1499).[6] The existing inscriptions show that the founders were still wealthy individuals. The rebuilding of the Church of the Virgin at Jašunje was commissioned by a nun and three other members of her sisterhood, who were probably members of noble families;[7] Milica and her son Nikola, who commissioned the rebuilding

[2] B.Djurdjev, "Hrišćani spahije u severnoj Srbiji u XV veku," *Godišnjak Istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine,* 4 (1952), 166-67; O.Zirojević, *Tursko vojno uredjenje u Srbiji 1459-1683* (Beograd, 1974), 160; M.Filipović, "Pogled na osmanski feudalizam," *Godišnjak Istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine,* 4 (1952), 37.

[3] O.Zirojević, *op.cit.* 158-59.

[4] R.Petrović, "Otriće u Novoj Pavlici,"*Saopštenja*, 15 (1983), 243-48.

[5] S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo na području Pećke patrijaršije 1557-1614,* 114-15. In Balkan regions, which Turks had occupied earlier, the revival of artistic life began by the middle of the 15th century. This, for example, was the case with the district of Ohrid.G.Subotić, *Ohridska slikarska škola XV veka* (Beograd, 1980).

[6] *Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi,* No 357, 374, 387, 10050, 10051, 10052.

[7] M.Ćorović-Ljubinković, "Jašunjski manastiri," *Starinar,* n.s. 1 (1950), 229-30.

and painting of monastery Matka and endowed it with a vineyard, were members of the lower nobility.[8] The founder of the Church of Prohor Pčinjski near Kumanovo was a certain Marin from Kratovo, perhaps the man who leased the mine at Kratovo.[9]

At the beginning of the next century there began to appear collective founders – village parishioners led by their priest – who take the place of the last survivors of noble families as patrons of art. The Church of St. Paraskevi in the village of Pobužje near Skoplje was rebuilt in 1500 at the joint expense of the entire village;[10] the village church at Štrpci near Prizren was rebuilt in the same way in 1577.[11] From that time onward, until the end of the 17th century, this type of patronage is repeatedly in evidence. There are even cases of an entire village pooling its capital together in order to buy a single manuscript book.[12] But such contributors are never commissioners of large-scale undertakings. This method of the provision of funds is rather an illustration of the general poverty.

Nevertheless, during the first half of the 16th century there already appear founders from the ranks of eminent Christians who had joined the Turkish *timar* system, acquired various privileges and consequently become fairly well-off. The church at Trijebanj in Herzegovina was built by *voivod* Radoje Hrabren in 1534, and his descendants continued to look after the foundation of their ancestor.[13]

However, the foundations of the first century of Ottoman rule were totally eclipsed by the great commissions after the restoration of the Serbian ecclesiastical organization – the Patriarchate of Peć. The Serbian Church was restored in obscure circumstances, probably with the support of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, the future Grand Vizir, and in spite of the opposition of the Archbishopric of Ohrid, which claimed

[8] G.Subotić, *op.cit.* 141-143.

[9] The region of Kratovo in the 15th and 16th centuries was famous for its silver and gold mines, leased by the Christian gentry.

[10] V.Petković, "Zapisi i natpisi u starim srpskim crkvama," *Starinar,* III ser. knj. 10-11 (1936), 43.

[11] *Zapisi i natpisi,* No 733.

[12] *Ibid,* No 1030.

[13] V.Ćorović, "Hercegovački manastiri," *Starinar,* III ser. 10-11 (1936), 31.

the right to rule over the Serbian bishoprics.[14] The first few years were spent on the re-establishment of the internal organization of the Church. From 1565 onwards began a vigorous artistic activity, which developed under the strong influence of the restored Church organization.[15] This is clearly seen in the personal involvement of ecclesiastic representatives in the revival of the artistic activity.

Three enterprising kinsmen who were at the head of the Serbian Church, related to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, set an example with their initiative. Makarije Sokolović, the first patriarch of the restored Church, rebuilt the large narthex in the Patriarchate of Peć, his main seat, in 1565[16], and a small church in the village of Budisavci, where he had a summer residence, in 1568.[17] His nephew Antonije, the future patriarch, rebuilt the narthex of Gračanica in 1570.[18] The two relatives, together with Metropolitan Dionisije, also a Sokolović, rebuilt the narthex of the monastery Nikola Dabarski.[19] All these were large-scale, costly undertakings which involved not only construction works, but also the painting of large wall surfaces and gifts of icons, vestments and church vessels.[20] The expense must have been great, but so was their income, accruing from the lower clergy and parishioners in the territory under their jurisdiction, which extended from the Adriatic to the area north of Budapest. Although they paid heavy taxes to the Ottoman court, the Serbian patriarchs and metropolitans

[14] P.Kostić, *Dokumenti o buni smederevskog episkopa Pavla protiv potčinjavanja Pećke patrijaršije arhiepiskopiji Ohridskoj,* Spomenik SKA LXI (Sremski Karlovci, 1922) 32-39.

[15] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 118-19.

[16] *Ibid.* 119-122.

[17] M.Ivanović, "Crkva Preobraženja u Budisavcima," *Starine Kosova i Metohije,* (1961), 113-14.

[18] S.Petković, *Slikarstvo spoljašnje priprate Gračanice, L'art byzantin au debut du XIVe siècle* (Beograd, 1978), 203-212.

[19] S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo,* 126-28; M.Šakota, "O ktitorskoj kompoziciji u priprati crkve manastira Banje kod Priboja," *Saopštenja,* 13 (1981), 47-56.

[20] The fact that the more important monasteries had been receiving donations from ecclesiastical dignitaries is testified by golden objects from the second half of the 16th century excavated in 1977 in one of the hiding places of St. Nicolas of Dabar. M.Šakota, *Riznica manastira Banje kod Priboja* (Beograd, 1981), 40-58, 71-82, 97-100 *et passim.*

still had some money to invest in foundations.

The example of the highest church dignitaries was followed by eminent monastic communities. As early as 1568 Simeon, the *hegomenos* of monastery Studenica initiated a major undertaking and commissioned the repainting of the greater part of the monumental monastic church, built in the 12th century.[21] The monks of Morača, a monastery dating from the 13th century, were even more ambitious – they rebuilt the church and covered with wallpainting almost the entire building in 1573-77.[22] There was a considerable number of similar undertakings in the subsequent decades.

Although some monastic communities were wealthy, many were on a quite poor level. Their rebuilding could not be financed from their scant income, and they sought the help of well-to-do individuals.[23] In some cases wealthy laymen devoted to the Church even took upon themselves the entire financial burden of the rebuilding of a monastery, which meant not only reconstructing of the church building, but also decorating it with wallpainting, making the iconostasis and providing the necessary liturgical vessels.

The new lay founders belonged to three categories of Christians. One group consisted of local representatives of the people, who held the title of *knez* or *voivod* and who served as a link between the Christian *reaya* and the Ottoman governors. *Knez* Vitomir Stepanov is mentioned among the founders of the rebuilding of monastery Brezovica near Plav in 1567,[24] and several men holding the same title contributed to the rebuilding of monastery Dobrilovina in 1609.[25]

The second category of lay patrons consisted of town craftsmen and tradesmen. They usually merely helped to rebuild a monastery. For example, Hovan, a goldsmith from Foča, made a contribution towards the cost of the painting of the church of monastery St. Trinity near

[21] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 122-25, 167-69.

[22] S.Petković, "Tragom jedne slikarske grupe iz druge polovine XVI stoleća," *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta,* 8, 2 (1964), 541-44; S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo,* 138-39, 174-76.

[23] Thus the monks of Morača monastery had been supported by the local leader ("Veliki knez") Vukić Vučetić. S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo,* 62.

[24] *Zapisi i natpisi,* No 6339.

[25] *Ibidem,* No 992.

Pljevlje in 1595.[26] There are, however, some cases of large gifts of money for a building or artistic undertaking. Lacko and Marko Jovšić, probably tradesmen from Gornji Kovin near Budapest, financed the rebuilding of the large church of monastery Novo Hopovo in 1576.[27] The role of craftsmen and tradesmen as patrons of the church and of art was to become considerably more important in the 17th century.

The third group of lay founders is the most interesting one. It consisted of *sipahi*s who did not renounce the Christian religion and who supported their Church although they served in the Ottoman army. A *sipahi* named Jovan Klisur rebuilt the monastery Gostović in Bosnia about 1600.[28] Jovan and Pavle Velimirović, both *sipahi*s, built the old church at Bogovadja in 1554.[29] A *sipahi* named Vojin gave a substantial contribution towards the construction and painting of the narthex of the Church of St. Trinity near Pljevlje, where his portait was painted in recognition of his generosity.[30] One could also cite many minor examples of *sipahi*s helping the Church, either by donating a book bought on their return from the wars in some distant region,[31] or by endowing a monastery with a piece of land so that the monks would pray for the salvation of their sinful souls.[32]

Finally, it should be mentioned that the patrons of the Serbian art from the 15th to the 17th century also included some rulers of independent Orthodox states. From the beginning of the 16th century Russian emperors supported eminent Serbian monasteries. This was especially the case of Mileševa and Chilandar in the time of Ivan the

[26] S.Petković, *Manastir Sveta Trojica kod Pljevalja* (Beograd, 1974), 18-19, 46.
[27] *Zapisi i natpisi,* No 724.
[28] N.Filipović, *Manastir Udrim ili Gostović u Bosni* (Sarajevo, 1940), 16. *Sipahi* Milisav, having rebuilt and redecorated Zitomislić monastery in 1609, is presented on a fresco holding the model of the church. Lj. Kojić, *Manastir Žitomislić* (Sarajevo, 1983), 21-24.
[29] *Zapisi i natpisi* No 3627.
[30] S.Petković, *op.cit., 18-19.*
[31] When the monastery of Staro Hopovo was forced in 1568/1569 to pay an extra tax, a certain Dobrosav, officer in the Turkish army from the neighbouring Irig, contributed 1,000 aspers. B.Djurdjev, "'Prodaja crkava i manstira' za vreme vlade Selima II," *Godišnjak Istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine,* 9 (1958), 244.
[32] S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo,* 62.

Terrible.[33] Wallachian and Moldavian *voivods* also appear as patrons of the Serbian Church and its art from the first half of the 16th century.[34] The money donated by these rulers, which was collected every seventh (more rarely every third) year, helped individual monastic communities to fight off poverty, but there is no evidence that these infrequent gifts of money stimulated artistic activity.[35]

One might think that the large number of individual patrons, though of modest means, provided sufficient funds for the commission of works of art in Serbian monasteries after 1557. But this was not the case. Of the hundreds of church buildings which have been preserved from the 16th and 17th centuries, only a few are notable for their size (Piva, Papraća, Novo Hopovo). There were, however, numerous churches of modest dimensions.[36] The construction of larger churches sometimes lasted a long time – it took, for example, thirty-odd years to build the monastery of Žitomislić.[37] The painting of a church might also take a long time. Sometimes only the altar space was painted,[38] and in the case of larger edifices, such as Novo Hopovo, as many as eight decades might pass between the completion of construction and painting.[34] If we add to this that some monastic churches were built of timber (Marča, Bodjani)[40] or of stone and mud instead of mortar,[41] we shall have a better idea of the difficulties confronting those who strove to maintain the continuity of artistic activity.

[33] S.Radojčić, "Veze izmedju srpske i ruske umetnosti u srednjem veku," *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta,* 1 (Beograd, 1948), 246-254.

[34] S.Anuiki, *Sveti Sava u poveljama rumunskih vojvoda,* Zbornik Sveti Sava, Spomenica povodom osamstogodišnjice rodjenja 1175-1975 (Beograd, 1977), 361-64.

[35] An archive source shows that the monks from Mileševo monastery received financial help from the Russian Emperor for the purpose of redecorating the walls with fresco paintings. However, the main church wall paintings certainly do not originate from this period. S.Petković, *op.cit.* 63.

[36] M.Šuput, *Srpska arhitektura u doba turske vlasti 1459-1690* (Beograd, 1984), 32-41.

[37] Lj.Kojić, *op.cit.* 49-50.

[38] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 53.

[39] *Zapisi i natpisi* No 4985, 4990. Similarly, Piva monastery was built in 1586 while the wall paintings were completed as late as 1626.

[40] G.Vitković, "Kritički pogled na prošlost Srba u Ugarskoj," *Glasnik SUD,* 43 (Beograd, 1976), 127; P.Momirović, *Manastir Bodjani* (Bodjani, 1980), 45-47.

[41] V.Krasić, *Manastir Grabovac,* Letopis Matice srpske knj. 127 (Novi Sad, 1881), 61.

The modest appearance of the buildings and the delays in the completion of undertakings were interpreted by earlier scholars as a consequence of Ottoman domination. In fact, the Turks hindered the erection of monastic buildings only partially; they decreed that no new churches might be built, but allowed old ones to be rebuilt; they also prescribed that Christian churches, especially those in towns, must not surpass in size and external decoration their mosques.[42] The greatest obstacle to a more vigorous development of art was the general poverty which oppressed not only the subjugated people, but also the lower classes of their Ottoman lords. The Ottoman Empire was still a great military power, but its strength was being sapped by a persistent economic crisis with increasingly devastating effects. Its consequences affected most strongly its Christian subjects. As a result, foundations became rare and artistic activity died out almost completely in the Serbian territories after the end of the 17th century. However, in the period under survey, i.e. in the latter half of the 16th century, this agony still lay far ahead, and the Church and its members were eager and ambitious to revive their ecclesiastical and artistic activity.

From the earlier times founders had the right to exercise considerable influence on the choice of the type of the building, the iconographic programme of wall-paintings, and the subjects of icons. Since the patrons of Serbian art of this period came from various backgrounds, there was no uniformity in the types of buildings, iconography and aesthetic ideals. Much depended on who the patrons were.

Architecture offered a considerably more limited scope for the manifestation of individual preferences. The strict Turkish laws permitted the Christians to rebuild only the buildings constructed up to the time of Mehmed the Conqueror. Although some *kadis* and local officials seem to have shown a certain leniency in the enforcement of these laws,[43] most founders from the first decades of Ottoman rule had to follow the ground plan and even the architectural forms of the former buildings.

[42] S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo,* 47-49.

[43] Occasional warnings to Turkish officials (*kadis*) not to allow the building of new churches can be considered to be an indirect proof that such cases have been taking place. S.Petković, *op.cit.* 49.

If the dimensions and external appearance of church buildings were carefully watched by the Turks, the Christians had complete freedom to adorn the interior of their churches as they wished. It is in these undertakings that the founders had a chance to exercise stronger influence on the appearance of their foundations.

In the second half of the 16th century the repainting of the major churches was financed by the highest church dignitaries (the narthexes of the Patriarchate of Peć, Gračanica, Nikola Dabarski and, probably, Mileševa).[44] Since original frescoes still existed in these churches dating from the 13th and 14th centuries, the founders, full of reverence for the works of the past, repeated, wherever possible, the old figures and compositions. However, there were parts of wall surfaces from which the earlier frescoes had disappeared irretrievably, and the dignitaries of the Serbian Church instructed the artists to represent on them figures and scenes in which they were particularly interested. Since the leaders of the Serbian Church were in conflict with the Ohrid Archbishopric, which had for a time governed the Serbian church organization, they commissioned, in the first decades after 1557, wallpaintings representing Serbian archbishops and patriarchs from the 13th and 14th centuries, some of whom were also saints, to be included in the first zone of the narthexes of Peć, Gračanica and Nikola Dabarski, and in the church at Budisavci. The message of these paintings was quite clear – the Serbian Church had a right to be independent because it had a long tradition and because some of its representatives were even canonized.[45] Some of these foundations (Peć, Gračanica) also feature the figures of the famous Balkan anchorites Gavrilo Lesnovski, Prohor Pčinjski, Jovan Rilski and Joakim Sarandaporski.[46] Here, too, the implication is clear: it was necessary to show that the Serbian church organization had taken over the cults of anchorites-saints from the central regions of the Balkan

[44] To this group of generous donors belonged Patriarch Makarije, Metropolitan and future Patriarch Antonije, and Metropolitan Dionisije – all from the Sokolović family.
[45] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 84-86; G.Babić, *Nizovi portreta srskih episkopa, arhiepiskopa i patrijaraha u zidnom slikarstvu (XIII XVI v.),* Zbornik Sava Nemanjić – Sveti Sava. Istorija i predanje, (Beograd, 1979), 330-34.
[46] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 86-87.

Peninsula. The founders from the ranks of patriarchs and metropolitans deliberately emphasized this in defence of the recently achieved independence of their Church.

Representatives of the ecclesiastical circles acting as founders also fostered the cults of the Serbian saints of the Nemanjić dynasty. The founder of the independent Serbian Church, St. Sava, belonged to this family, and his father Stefan, who became a monk towards the end of his life, was the founder of the dynasty. The cult of these two saints from the house of Nemanjić had already been widespread, but after the restoration of the Serbian ecclesiastical organization almost all the newly painted churches, from the smallest to the largest, had representations of St. Sava and Stefan-Simeon Nemanja.[47] The cult of Stefan Dečanski, also from the Nemanjić family, grew rapidly, too. In the narthex of Nikola Dabarski even the well-established cycle of St. Nicholas included, obviously at the orders of the founders, two scenes depicting the miraculous restoration of sight to Stefan Dečanski by St.Nicholas.[48] The popularity of this cult of old rulers is attested by the fact that the paintings in the monastery of Orahovica (1594) show the entire Nemanjić and Lazarević dynasty.[49] The Church of St. Trinity near Pljevlje (1595) and the church at Gradište (1620) show the Nemanjić family again, this time in the lowest zones.[50] In the period of Ottoman rule the Serbian Church did not only guard the Christian religion, but it also fostered the sense of national identity in their subjugated people. The figures of the Serbian rulers on church walls reminded the pious congregations of the glorious past of their nation. We should also mention that soon after the execution in Sofia of a goldsmith from Kratovo because of his religious views, the Serbian Church introduced his figure next to the most eminent saints of the

[47] M.Corović-Ljubinković, "Uz problem ikonografije srpskih svetitelja Simeona i Save," *Starinar* n.s., 7-8 (1956/1957), 77-90; G.Subotić, *Ikonografija svetog Save u vreme turske vlasti,* Zbornik Sava Nemanjić, 343-55.

[48] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 174.

[49] R.Grujić, "Starine manastira Orahovice u Slavoniji," *Starinar,* 14 (1939), 27-32.

[50] V.Djurić, *Fresko slikarstvo manastira Gradišta u Paštrovićima,* Istoriski zapisi XVII, 2 (Titograd, 1960), 278-79. The Nemanjić dynasty is represented from its founder Stephen Nemanja down to its last descendant Emperor Uroš V with the exception of these members who did not particularly excel as rulers.

Eastern Church in the lower zone of wall-paintings.[51] Believers could thus see for themselves what glory awaited those who persevered in their Christian faith and refused to become Muslims. We can therefore say that especially the lower, most clearly visible zones in the churches rebuilt by founders from the ranks of the Serbian church leaders had a clear ideological concept and that there is a tendency on the part of the patrons to impart a more general character to the iconographic programme and to make it partly an expression of a particular ecclesiastical and even national policy.

The wish to exercise an ideological influence on the believers through paintings is less pronounced in cases where the main patrons were monastic communities and ordinary parishioners or their chiefs, *voivods* and *sipahis*. The only ambition of individual patrons seems to have been to have their portrait, usually with a model of the church, painted, in accordance with the time-honoured right of founders, in some conspicuous place in the first zone of the church.[52] As laymen, they knew little of theological concepts reflected in iconography, so they left the making of the iconographic programme to the better-informed monks. The more learned representatives of the monastic community observed the old rules, already worked out in various painters' manuals (*erminias*). Nevertheless, they tended to emphasize as much as possible the role and importance of monks-saints and hermits, whom they themselves sought to imitate. They also sought to honour as much as possible the founder of their monastery, especially if he was canonized and if they kept his relics. Dečani Monastery still has about ten icons dating from the 16th and 17th centuries showing the saint and founder of the monastery, King Stefan Dečanski; there is even an ornate icon with his figure in the centre and scenes from his life around it.[53] The cult of St. Sava of Serbia, who built Chilandar monastery on Mount Athos and was buried in the monastery of

[51] S.Petković, *op.cit.* 87-88.

[52] Exceptionally, some of the abbots insisted to be represented as donors: e.g. abbot Toma at Morača monastery in 1573, or monk Ananije at St.Trinity monastery near Pljevlja in 1592.

[53] V.R.Petković, *Legenda sv. Save u starom živopisu srpskom,* Glas SKA, CLIX (Beograd, 1933), 62-76; M.Šakota, *Dečanska riznica* (Beograd, 1984), 93-94, 110-12.

Mileševa, was promoted by the monks from these houses and when they travelled to distant Russia, they took icons representing this saint as presents to the Russian Emperor and Patriarch.[54]

One might think that peasants had no influence on the iconographic programme in village churches because they had virtually no theological knowledge. However, even these humble patrons had their requirements and their taste. In small, low churches, half sunk into the ground, the choice of saints shown in the first zone was selective. They always included St. Nicholas of Myra, St. George, St. Paraskevi and St. Kyriaki. All of them were known as tutelary saints, quick to respond to prayer and come to succour. Some of them were protectors of livestock and crops, and peasants prayed to them to prevent hail or to guard their sheep from wolves.[55], Moreover, these patrons even left traces of their moral views in the traditional iconographic schemes. New categories of sinners were introduced into the composition of the Last Judgment: the peasant who seeks to appropriate his neighbour's land, the inn-keeper who dilutes wine with water, sorceresses, even those guilty of bestiality.[56]

This brief survey shows that founders exercised an important influence on the iconographic programme of the paintings they commissioned. One might suppose, however, that their influence on the style of these works was slight and that they were not interested in that aspect of their foundations. But it is not so.

Studies of the paintings in churches rebuilt mainly by the dignitaries of the restored Serbian Church in the decades following 1557 (the narthexes of Peć, Gračanica, Nikola Dabarski, perhaps Mileševa) show that they are stylistically heavily dependent on the models from the first half of the 14th century.[57] The artists whom Patriarch Makarije engaged in 1565 to paint the narthex of the Patriarchate of Peć (two of whom – Andreja and Longin – are known by name) very skilfully imitated their more gifted predecessors from the time of the

[54] S.Radojčić, *op.cit.* 251-255; S.Petković, "Una icona russa rafigurante santi serbi nella Pinacoteca Vaticana," *OCP,* 37 (1971), 293-96.
[55] S.Petković, *Zidno slikarstvo,* 67-69.
[56] *Ibidem,* 77.
[57] *Ibidem,* 134-37.

Palaeologi. They employed the same compositional principles, emphasized the narrative aspect of their paintings, painted figures with faces similar to those from the first half of the 14th century and used colours in the same way as their 14th century predecessors. Nothing in the paintings dating from the fifth and sixth decades of the 16th century indicated that the development of style would take such a turn. We can assume, therefore, that the patrons who commissioned these wall-paintings and icons specifically asked that they should be based on early 14th century paintings and that, consequently, their artists imitated the style of these models as best they could.

One might ask why patriarchs and metropolitans from the Sokolović family set such tasks to their painters. The answer is fairly obvious: their wish was to impart to the art revived immediately after 1557 some of the spirit of the period of the greatest glory of the Serbian state, the period of the reigns of King Milutin, King Stefan Decănski and, partly, King and Emperor Dušan. The paintings commissioned by them were not only to be similar in iconography to those made two and a half centuries earlier; they were even to employ an artistic idiom as close as possible to that of the earlier paintings. It is a credit to the founders that they knew how to chose painters who could meet these requirements.

Other founders did not share this attitude to the native tradition of art. Apart from a few exceptions (Studenica, 1568; partly Lomnica, about 1580),[58] monastic communities were not particularly anxious to ensure that the paintings commissioned by them should imitate the style of the earlier models. Even less interested in the early 14th century style were minor patrons – *sipahi*s, goldsmiths, *voivod*s, village chiefs and country priests. They were interested in what was painted, not how it was painted. Many of them seem to have liked expressive figures, vigorously drawn and painted in bright, almost garish colours. Being without higher aesthetic ideals, the patrons of minor foundations sought and found painters of modest abilities who fulfilled their demands.

In conclusion, we can say that the institution of patronage in Serbia adapted itself successfully to the changed political and economic

[58] *Ibidem*, 122-25, 131-33.

conditions after the Turkish conquests. Turkish rule is usually represented as mercilessly oppressive; but less emotional analyses show that between the 15th and the 17th century it was even more tolerant as regards religious affairs than many Christian countries of Europe.[59] If the Christians observed the basic Turkish laws, they were allowed to practice their religion and even to rebuild and adorn their churches. More than three hundred churches rebuilt in the period from the middle of the 15th to the end of the 17th century have been preserved in the territory of the Patriarchate of Peć. Nearly half of them still have contemporaneous wall-paintings. Such extensive building and artistic activity in this early period of Turkish domination would not have been possible if at the same time there had been religious persecutions of the Christians.[60] In order to erect a Christian church it was necessary to secure, in addition to the official licence, considerable funds, and that was not at all easy in the circumstances of general poverty. It was owing to the joint efforts of a very broad circle of patrons – from peasants and *sipahis* to patriachs – that the Serbian art of the 15th-17th centuries could survive in the adverse conditions of the Turkish domination and lay the foundations for the revival of artistic activity (now based on West European, not Byzantine traditions) in the 18th and 19th centuries.

[59] It seems significant that Western travellers who visited Belgrade mention to have seen, apart from the mosques, also Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian and Jewish places of worship. M.Quiclet, *Les Voyages de M.Quicles à Constantinople par terre* ... (Paris, 1664), 108; A.Poullet, *Nouvvelles Relations du Levant* ... (Paris, 1667), 128; E.Brown, *A Brief Account of some Travels in divers parts of Europe* ... (London, 1685), 27; Č.Mijatović, "Pre trista godina," *Glasnik SUD*, 36 (Beograd, 1872), 210-12.

[60] It is important to point out that this number refers only to churches which are preserved.

VI. PATRONAGE IN ART AND LITERATURE : 2

THE PORTRAIT OF KING MARKO AT MARKOV MANASTIR (1376-1381)

ZAGA GAVRILOVIĆ / BIRMINGHAM

Dedicated to the memory of Anne Pennington.

The monastery of Marko, named after one of its founders, king Marko, lies in the valley of Markova Reka, near the village of Sušica, Macedonia, Yugoslavia.* The church is dedicated to St.Demetrios, patron of Thessalonica, the μυροβλύτης, a saint venerated throughout the Orthodox world.[1]

According to a painted inscription preserved in the naos, the building of the church was started during the reign of tsar Dušan in 1346/7. Its *ktitors* were king Vukašin and his son Marko. It was completed during Marko's reign. The year still partly visible is either 1376/7 or 1380/1.[2]

Vukašin and his brother Uglješa Mrnjavčević were two powerful Serbian magnates who during the reign of Dušan's young son, the emperor Uroš (1355-1371) attempted to form a coalition against the Turks, but failed. They both fell in the battle of Marica, near Černomen, in 1371. The centres of Vukašin's lands were Prizren, Prilep and Skoplje while Uglješa reigned in Serres.

Vukašin was crowned king, co-regent to Urŏs, in 1365. His

* I would like to take this opportunity to thank the staff of the Institute for preservation of ancient monuments of Macedonia, Skopje, Yugoslavia, for their kindness and cooperation during my visits to the monuments in their care.

[1] L.Mirković i Ž.Tatić, *Markov Manastir* (Novi Sad, 1925). For a complete bibliography up to 1975 I refer to V.J.Djurić, *Vizantijske Freske u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade, 1975), 80-83 and 218-19.

[2] The latest examination of the inscription favours the date 1376/7: C.Grozdanov i G.Subotić, "Crkva Sv.Djordja u Rečici kod Ohrida", *Zograf* 12 (1981), 73-74.

eldest son Marko reigned as king from 1371. A vassal of the Sultan Bayezid I, he fought and fell in the battle of Rovine in 1395.[3]

Historians have often pointed out the discrepancy between the historical Marko about whom little is known, a figure caught in the succession of events which were about to bring tremendous changes to the society to which he belonged, and the famous Marko of Serbian epic poems, the colourful, bold, eccentric, justice-loving and generous hero, fond of good wine, and a determined defender of the Christian faith; the endearing Prince, or young king, "Kraljević Marko" as he is popularly called. It is known that Marko's legend started being formed as early as the beginning of the 15th century.[4]

It is through the testimony of both Vukašin's and Marko's art patronage that one has been able to form a clearer impression of their historical profile. That evidence has been greatly enriched by archaeological and restoration work during the last 30 years, followed by a number of important studies by Yugoslav scholars, centred especially on the wall-painting at Markov Manastir.[5] The present article, offering some new observations on the fresco composition above the south entrance to the church of St.Demetrios, is intended as a contribution to this lively research.

The fresco which I am discussing includes the portraits of king Marko and king Vukašin. It was known to some 19th-century visitors interested in the antiquities of the area, who also described other portraits still preserved in the church at that

[3] *Istorija Srpskog Naroda I,* ed. S.Ćirković I (Belgrade, 1981), 584-602; II, ed. J.Kalić, (Belgrade, 1982), 36-54; G.Ch.Soulis, *The Serbs during the Reign of Tsar Stephen Dušan (1331-1355) and his Successors,* ed. J.S.Allen and S.Vryonis Jr. (Dumbarton Oaks, 1984), 91-104.

[4] *Marko the Prince,* trans. A.Pennington and P.Levi, introd. and notes by S.Koljević (London, 1984).

[5] Among more recent publications see especially C.Grozdanov, "Novootkrivene kompozicije Bogorodičinog Akatista u Markovom Manastiru", *Zograf 9* (1978), 37-42; Id. "Iz ikonografije Markovog Manastira", *Zograf* 11 (1980), 83-93; D.Todorović, "Polijelej u Markovom Manastiru", *Zograf* 9 (1978), 28-36.

time.[6] In the 1890s the panel with the royal portraits and the surrounding composition were covered with plaster. They came again to light in 1964 during the restoration work.[7] (Figs.1-6)

A full size standing figure of Marko is on the left side of the large tympanum above the south entrance into the church. (Figs.2-3). It is a counterpart to the portrait of king Vukašin on the right, less well preserved. In the central lunette above the door, St.Demetrios is represented in bust, on a light blue background. He is wearing a military dress and is holding a spear, a sword and a shield. The accompanying inscription is in Greek: Ο ΑΓΙΟΣ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ Ο ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ (Fig. 2).

Above him Christ Emmanuel is blessing with both hands.[8]

In the upper register, under the arch, on a dark blue background, are represented the Virgin and child of the type τοῦ Πάθους, with the archangel Gabriel bringing the instruments of Christ's Passion. (Fig. 4). On the left, king David with an open scroll on which the beginning of Psalm 44[45].10 is inscribed, in Greek: Ἄκουσον θύγατερ κ(αὶ) ιδε κ(αὶ) κλίνον τὸ... (Hear, O daughter, and see, and incline [thine ear]...) (Fig.5). On the right, king Solomon also with an open scroll and the text from Proverbs 31.29 (in a slightly altered order), also in Greek: Πολλαὶ θυγατέραι ἐπόησαν δύναμιν πολλαὶ δὲ ἐκτίσαντο πλοῦτον σὺ δὲ ὑπερκεῖσαι καὶ ὑπερῆρας πάσας. (Many daughters have wrought valiantly, many have obtained wealth, but thou hast exceeded, thou hast surpassed all.) (Fig.6).

Further down on the left, St.Stephen the first martyr, dressed

[6] Svet. Mandić, *Drevnik, Zapisi konzervatora* (Belgrade, 1975), 121-40.

[7] K.Balabanov, "Novootkriveni portreti kralja Vukašina i kralja Marka u Markovom Manastiru", *Zograf* 1 (1966), 28-29; for further bibliography see V.J.Djurić, *Vizantijske freske...* (*loc.cit.*).

[8] The iconography of the panel was studied by V.J.Djurić, "Tri dogadjaja u srpskoj državi XIV veka i njihov odjek u slikarstvu", *Zbornik za Likovne Umetnosti* 4, (Novi Sad 1968), 67-100 (esp. 87ff). In addition to a whole range of excellent observations Djurić gave the readings of all existing inscriptions on the fresco, Serbian and Greek, (some of which I reproduce), with the exception of the epithet under St.Demetrios' name. I am pointing this out since this epithet is relevant to my discussion. The lettering is clear and there is no doubt that this inscription is contemporary to the others, and to the painting of the fresco.

in classical clothes, is holding a fan-shaped scroll in his left hand (text illegible). (Fig.2 and 5). Still lower, on the left, St.Catherine, who appears to be holding a crown in her left hand (Figs.2 and 3), and on the right, another woman saint, probably St. Anastasia Pharmakolytria, holding a small flask in her right hand. (Fig.6). Both women saints wear a veil and a diadem on their head.[9]

The names accompanying the busts of the archangle Gabriel, St.Catherine, St.Stephen, David and Solomon are preserved, and they are in old-Serbian.

On the scroll held by king Marko the following works in old-Serbian are still legible: „А(зъ) вь Х҃а Б҃а вла(говѣ)рьни крал(ь) Марко сьз(ь) дах(ь) и поп(и)с(а)хь (сы) божествии храм(ь)...
(I, In Christ faithful king Marko, built and decorated this divine church...)

From the point of view of artistic expression Marko's face bears the characteristics of a true portrait. His imposing appearance is enhanced by an unusual feature, namely a large horn which he is holding in his right hand. The horn is similar to the one held by Samuel, in the naos, with a better preserved jewelled ornament.(Fig.7)

The background to the royal portraits is bright red.

In the arch above the tympanum are placed two anchorites, one of whom is St.Makarios and an angel in a medallion (Fig.5) and lower down two women saints. Only small fragments of fresco remain on the face of the arch above the entrance (Fig.2).

It seems likely that this whole composition formed originally the interior decoration of a small annex, adjoining the south façade of the

[9] In Byzantine iconography, St.Catherine of Alexandria normally holds a small cross. Her attribute at Markov Manastir although not quite clear, is sufficiently well preserved to show that it is a crown or a diadem. It resembles the crown held by St.Catherine represented with St.Agatha and St.Eugenia on the fresco in the Catacomb of St.Gennario, Naples (after 763, possibly 12th c.?). See Hans Achelis, *Die Katakomben von Neapel* (Leipzig, 1936), Tf.47. With a few exceptions, St.Anastasia Pharmakolytria being one, attributes in the hands of saints are rare in Byzantine iconography and are usually considered a western import. In Serbia, the most notable example of the departure from the rule is St.Stephen at Sopoćani (13th c.) holding stones in the folds of his *himation*.

church, a chapel which was demolished in 1963, but which is believed to have served as a baptistry.[10]

In his study published in 1972 (see note 7) V.J.Djurić has commented on the horn held by king Marko and has evoked the Old Testament horn of anointing to explain this feature as an example of the well known association of the ruling monarch and King David, a comparison often found in medieval texts, in Byzantium as in Serbia, and reflected in art throughout the centuries.[11]

According to Djurić, the representation of king Marko holding the horn was inspired by Psalm 88(89).20: "I have found David my servant; I have anointed him by my holy oil". The fresco would have been painted around 1372 to commemorate Marko's succession to the throne. Its unusual iconography would be emphasising the role of Marko as the "New David" who in a critical moment, aware of the danger facing his state, hopes for the protection of God, as it was promised to David (Psalm 88[89].21: "For my hand shall support him; and mine arm shall strengthen him...")[12]

Considering briefly the figures in the upper part of the panel (the Virgin of the Passion and the archangel Gabriel, David, Solomon and the three saint martyrs), Djurić supposed that their presence might be interpreted as the ktitor's allusion to the inevitable suffering and sacrifices which were to follow the defeat at Černomen in 1371.

[10] The opinions being divided, the question of the date and function of this annex is still open. In favour of the opinion that it served as a baptistry in the 14th c. speaks a marble baptismal font found in the chapel, bearing an inscription with the date 1393. See G.Tomović, *Morfologija ćiriličkih natpisa na Balkanu* (Belgrade, 1974), 89. Svet. Mandić, *op.cit.* 127-129.

[11] In addition to the bibliography quoted by V.J.Djurić, "Tri dogadjaja...", see especially S.Spain Alexander, "Heraclius, Byzantine Imperial Ideology and the David Plates", *Speculum* 52 (1967), 217-37, and H.Buchthal, "The Exaltation of David", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute* 37 (1974), 330-33.

[12] This interpretation was accepted by C.Walter, "The Significance of Unction in Byzantine Iconography", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies,* 2 (1976), 53-73. As Djurić had observed, the only other examples so far known of a royal or imperial patron holding a horn is the portrait of Manuel I Komnenos of Trebizond (1238-1263) at St.Sophia, Trebizond, known from a 19th c. drawing. *The Church of Haghia Sophia at Trebizond,* ed. D.Talbot Rice (Edinburgh, 1968), fig.79. Cf.Djurić, "Tri dogadjaja..." 97.

While in broad lines Djurić's explanation of the unusual royal portrait at Markov Manastir is correct, I believe that it is possible to define with more precision the meaning of the whole composition above the south door, including the royal portraits, by taking into account all available details depicted on the fresco.

I will deal first with the epithet which accompanies the bust of St.Demetrios in the lunette and which reads O ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ (Merciful) (Fig.2). This epithet is unusual for St.Demetrios.[13] In wall painting it is normally applied either to St.John the Almsgiver or to Christ.[14]

In Markov Manastir, on the painted dedicatory inscription mentioned earlier, placed above the same south door but on the naos side, St.Demetrios is referred to as "pobedonosac" and "mirotočac" (which correspond to *tropaiophoros* and *myrovlytis*)[15].

On a fresco above the west entrance to the church, the monumental riding figure of St.Demetrios between St.Nestor and Loupos, receiving the martyr's crown, arms and armour from Christ, is identified in Serbian without epithet,[16] while the inscription by the standing figure of St.Demetrios in military dress on the left of the south door, on the naos side, has completely disappeared.

It is known that in the Byzantine literary tradition the epithet ἐλεήμων can contain a double meaning, or rather an allusion to the olive tree (ἡ ἐλαία) its fruit and the oil (τό ἔλαιον) which it produces, association which in the Greek language allows a play on words. The positive qualities of the olive, tree and fruit, based on biblical

[13] I would like to thank my friends Valerie Nunn, Eugenia Petrides and Jill Storer, at the University of Birmingham, for their helpful suggestions concerning this particular problem.

[14] St.John the Almsgiver, patriarch of Alexandria (6th-7th c.), O ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ in Greek, МИЛОСТИВЫ in Slavonic, is often represented either in the apse or in the naos, among ecclesiastic dignitaries. For Christ with the epithet O ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ see for instance the fresco at Staro Nagoričino (1316-1318), near the altar, G.Babić, "O živopisanom ukrasu oltarskih pregrada", *ZLU* 11, 1975, 28, fig.25. The Emperor John III Vatatzes (1222-54) later canonised, became known as Merciful during his lifetime. See R.Macrides, "Saints and Sainthood in the Early Palaiologan Period", *The Byzantine Saint* ed. S.Hackel, (London, 1981), 67-87.

[15] Text reproduced in the article quoted in note 2.

[16] Lj.Manojlović, "Ilustrovani Kalendar u markovom Manastiru", *ZLU* 9 (1973), 61-81, esp.70-1.

references, and the beneficial properties of the oil (with references to light and the use in sacraments) constitute a rich symbolism which is then metaphorically connected to one of the most important Christian virtues, Mercy (ἡ ἐλεημοσύνη, from ἐλεέω and ἔλεος).[17]

The most striking examples of this association can be observed in Byzantine painting, on certain miniatures in Psalters with marginal illustrations (ranging from the 9th to the 14th century) where a female personification (ΕΛΕΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ) or a king accompanied by the inscription ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ or a man ΑΝΕΡ ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ wear a crown or a head-gear decorated with olive branches.[18]

The horn of holy oil held by king Marko on our fresco and the small bottle of oil or myron held by the woman saint on the right side of the panel indicate already that an allusion to oil is present in the iconography of the scene. In view of the frequent association of ἐλαία-ἔλεος and their derivatives, it is logical to suppose that St.Demetrios' epithet, while meaning "merciful", may allude to the holy oil too.

The importance of St.Demetrios' cult and the central place which the relic of his blood and his myron-giving tomb in Thessalonica held in that cult ar well known.[19] Liturgical hymns composed in honour of St.Demetrios abound in references to the fountain of the incessantly flowing holy and saving substance in the city which the Saint has

[17] This particularity has been treated in detail by E.Antonopoulos, "Miséricorde, Olivier: Agents et Attributs", *Byzantion* LI/2, 1981, 345-385, article which is the first part of a longer planned study. See also *A Patristic Greek Lexicon,* (ed. G.W.H.Lampe), Oxford 1976, s.v. ἔλαιον.

[18] Antonopoulos, op.cit., figs. 1-6.

[19] P.Lemerle, *Les plus anciens recueils des miracles de Saint Demetrius,* I, II (Paris, 1979-81). A.Grabar, *Martyrium, Recherches sur le culte des reliques et l'art chrétien antique,* (London, 1972), I, 450-7, II, 87f: *Id.* "Quelques reliquaires de saint Démétrios et le martyrium du saint à Salonique", *DOP* 5 (1950); *Id.* "Un nouveau reliquaire de saint Démétrios", *DOP* 8 (1954), both articles reprinted in *L'Art de la fin de l'Antiquité et du Moyen Age,* (1968), 435-54 and 455-60. D.I.Pallas, "Le Ciborium hexagonal de Saint Démétrios de Thessalonique, Essai d'interprétation", *Zograf* 10 (1979), 44-58. In medieval Serbia the cult of St.Demetrios was widespread. Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the Nemanjić dynasty, canonised and *myrovlytis,* is compared to St.Demetrios by his son Sava, as reported by Domentijan in the Life of St.Simeon. See *Stare Srpske Biografije* trans. L.Mirković (Belgrade, 1938), 292.

protected on many occasions.

It is important to note that the wound in St.Demetrios' side caused by the executioner's spear is compared to Christ's wound, and his blood and myron to the life-giving blood and water flowing out of Christ's side on the cross.[20]

In a homily pronounced in honour of St.Demetrios, St.Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) compares the saint to a fruit-loaded olive tree in the house of God.[21]

A similar metaphor, considerably elaborated, occurs in a troparion (old-Serbian version) sung on the *Orthros* of the feast of St.Demetrios, on the 26th October. In it, the Saint is praised for having blossomed as a fruitful olive tree; having been forcibly "squeezed" by the lance-bearing hands, his myron now flows from his tomb, for the comfort of the faithful. The Saint is praised as the merciful lover of the poor.[22]

In the Old Church Slavonic canon for the feast of St.Demetrios for which the Greek original is not known,[23] a troparion evokes Solomon and the Song of Songs while referring to the Saint's oil (масть) and its fragrance (бл҃гооуханиꙗ). The canon is ascribed to St.Methodios of Thessalonica, one of the two brothers Apostles to the Slavs.[24]

[20] *Menaia* (Venice, 1843) (for 26th October). A.Grabar, *L'Art de la fin de l'Antiquité...* 440-442, 458-460. S.Eustratiades, "Ο Ἁγ. Δημήτριος ἐν τῇ ὑμνογραφίᾳ, *Επ. Ετ. Βυζ. Σπ.* 11, 1935, 142-3, 146.

[21] Migne, PG 151-2, col. 537. St.Gregory Palamas uses a quotation from Psalm 51.(52).8"...καὶ ἐλαία κατάκαρμος ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ...

[22] Zbornik crkvenih bogoslužbenih pesama (Belgrade, 1971), 128.

[23] Carminorum Christianorum Versio Palaeos Iovenico-Rossica, Menaea Septembris, Octobris, Novembris, ed. V.Jagić (Petropoli, 1886), 186-90. R.Jakobson, "Methodius' Canon to Demetrius of Thessalonica and the Old Church Slavonic Hirmoi", *Sbornik Prací Filosofické Fakulty Brnénské University,* F 9 (1965), 115-21. D.Obolensky, "The Cult of St.Demetrius of Thessaloniki in the History of Byzantine-Slav Relations", *Balkan Studies* 15 (1974), 3-20. B.S.Angelov, *Iz starata bulgarska, ruska i srbsa literatura* (Sofia, 1958), 19-35.

[24] The mention of Solomon, of the oil (or the fatness of the olive) and of the perfume occur in the sixth ode of the canon. V.Jagić, *op.cit.* 188. Cf. Angelov, op.cit. 29. It is usually accepted that the tradition of St.Demetrios' body being buried at his basilica in Thessalonica and being myrovlytis is not earlier that the 10th c. However, one of the early accounts of the Saint's miracles reports that the relic (it was a flask containing blood) exudes perfume to the dust around it. See Lemerle, op.cit. 87-90. It is to that same relic of the Saint's blood that St.Methodios, composing his canon in the 9th c., refers.

A Serbian liturgical work contemporary to king Marko, Služba (*akolouthia*) to the canonised king Milutin (d.1321), which was composed around 1380 by Danilo Banjski (later patriarch Danilo III), contains an especially rich fund of metaphors involving the olive-tree, olive oil and mercy (*maslina - milost*). Almost as in Greek, where a complete play on words ἐλαία - ἔλεος is possible, the two Slavonic words, *maslina* and *milost,* achieve a harmonious combination of sound and meaning.[25]

There are two historical documents in which St.Demetrios' *myron* is mentioned as a possible substance for the anointing of the baptised. In his well known argumentative correspondence with the patriarch of Nicaea after 1225, Demetrios Chomatianos, the archbishop of Ohrid, boasts of the rivers of the *myron* flowing from the martyr's tomb which could be used for anointing, if need be, as opposed to, as he ironically indicates, the "manufactured" substitute consecrated by the Patriarch.[26] In 1355, on the other hand, the patriarch of Constantinople Kallistos I shows dissatisfaction with the use of St.Demetrios' *myron* in the sacrament of baptism and reiterates the patriarchal monopoly of the preparation of the *myron* for chrismation. This second instance is particularly interesting since it shows that at some stage, in this case in Bulgaria, St.Demetrios' *myron* was used for anointing purposes.[27]

It would be difficult to speculate on the possibility of such use of St.Demetrios' *myron* in the State of king Marko. I suggest, however, that St.Demetrios' epithet O ΕΛΕΗΜΩΝ was chosen by Marko as a prayer for his patron saint's mercy and intercession, but with a specific emphasis on the protective grace assured to the faithful by the saint's outpouring myron. I further suggest that in addition to the horn held by king Marko and the ἀλάβαστρον held by St.Anastasia Pharmakolytria, the unusual epithet is a sign used for expressing an idea connected with anointing.[28]

[25] *Srbljak* II, ed. D.Bogdanović, S.Petković, Dj.Trifunović, (Belgrade, 1970), 78-121.
[26] D.M.Nicol, "Kaisersalbung. The Unction of Emperors in Late Byzantine Coronation Ritual", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 2 (1976), 44-45.
[27] Patriarch Kallistos' letter to the clergy of Trnovo, in F.Miklosich and J.Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi,* I (Vienna, 1860), 441f.
[28] I am thinking of the pre-baptismal anointing with consecrated oil, the post-baptismal anointing with myron (the specially prepared substance containing oil, balsam and

V.J.Djurić has emphasised that the unusual iconography of the fresco is largely inspired by Psalms. One should bear in mind, however, the variety of the interpetaions of Psalms by medieval authors and the diversity of their usage in liturgy. While it is, for instance, true that the text of Psalm 44(45).10 on the scroll held by David on our fresco occurs normally near the scene of Annunciation in church decoration (Djurić), that same Psalm is shown to be charged with baptismal symbolism in the writing of St.John Chrysostom. Mentions of scents, palaces and of royal garments of the King's daughters in Ps.44(45) are applied to the souls of the baptised who have, as a new robe, put on Christ and who now constitute the Church. The Church is Christ's Bride whom David prophetically led to the vision of intelligible things by saying "All the glory of the King's daughters is within".[29]

The text chosen for Solomon's scroll (Proverbs 31.29) certainly has a similar meaning. I believe that both texts should be considered under this baptismal angle which is further justified by the presence of the two virgin saints, St.Catherine of Alexandria and St.Anastasia Pharmakolytria and their atributes. All these representations are signs translating the nuptial symbolism included in the rite of Christian initiation considered as the spiritual marriage of the neophyte to Christ, an aspect of baptism frequently expounded by the Church Fathers, especially by St.Cyril of Jerusalem and St.Gregory of Nyssa.[30]

This approach does not preclude the connection between the quotations from the biblical texts on the fresco and the Virgin of the Passion represented above Solomon and David. On the contrary, the Virgin who is also the Bride of Christ and the Queen par excellence,

aromats, consecrated always by the Patriarch on Maundy Thursday) and of the royal or imperial anointing, also with myron, which was introduced in Byzantine coronation rite only in the 12th c. – For the rich symbolism connected with baptismal anointing see J.Daniélou, *Bible et Liturgie* (Paris, 1951), 57f. and 76f. S.Brock, *Holy Spirit in the Syrian Baptismal Tradition,* The Syrian Churches Series 9 (1976), 16-19, 39-40. For the problems concerning the unction of the emperor see Nicol, op.cit. in note 26.

[29] *St.John Chrysostom, Baptismal Instructions,* trans. and annot. by P.W.Harkins (London, 1963), 162-63.

[30] J.Daniélou, *op.cit.* 259-80; S.Brock, *op.cit.* 50-52. See also J.Radovanović, "Neveste Hristove u živopisu Bogorodice Ljeviške u Prizrenu", *ZLU* 15 (1979), 115-34.

contributes by her presence to the nuptial symbolism which I have suggested. On the other hand, the particular iconographic aspect of the Virgin of the Passion with the expressive gesture of the child shunning the instrumenta martyrii brought by the archangel, refer more explicitly to the Crucufixion and to the wound in Christ's side. In Christian thinking the blood and the water that came forth (John 19.34) symbolise both Baptism and Eucharist, the two principal mysteries of the church.[31] Still connected with Christ's wound, a parallel interpretation based on the Judeo-Christian tradition of the Tree of Mercy (or of Life) in Paradise, traces the origin of *myron* to Seth's seeking the *oil* of that Tree, which is the Cross, for the anointment of his father, Adam.[32]

At the same time, we should remember that the motif of Christ's wound (because of its particular relevance to the martyrdom of St.Demetrios) as well as the references to St.Demetrios purity and virginity (ἁγνεία, ῡαρθενία) are a current theme in all works written in honour of that saint. In the same works, because of the wish to extol St.Demetrios' purity and myron, imagery from the Song of Songs whose author was believed to be king Solomon, was often used, and, as we have seen, Solomon figures in the Slavonic canon ascribed to St.Methodios.[33] Similar references are found in St.Gregory Palamas' homily mentioned earlier.

The role of St.Stephen in the composition above the south door at Markov Manastir is probably the most complex one. The first Christian martyr and deacon, St.Stephen was the patron saint of the rulers of the Nemanjić dynasty and was usually given the most prominent place in Serbian church decoration programmes. Yugoslav scholars have considered that phenomenon on several occasions, taking also into account the cult of St.Stephen in medieval Hungary, but the problem requires further research.[34]

[31] S.Brock, *op.cit.* 88-93.

[32] See *Ibid.* 106 and 114, n.164. Gospel of Nicodemus in *Evangelia Apocrypha,* ed. C.Tischendorf (Leipzig, 1853), 303-4.

[33] See above p. and note 24.

[34] For the latest discussion of the topic see I.Djordjević and E.Kyriakoudis, "The Frescoes in the Chapel of St.Nicholas at the Monastery of St.John Prodromos near Serres", *Cyrillomethodianum* 7 (1983), 167-234, esp. 185f.

On the other hand, considering St.Stephen in the western as well as in the Byzantine tradition, important observations were made by E.Kantorowicz who drew attention to St.Stephen's imperial connections defining him as a court saint both in Byzantium and in the West.[35] Following this line of research, one should also note that in Byzantium, until the second half of the 9th century, imperial marriages took place in the court chapel dedicated to St.Stephen built by the empress Pulcheria in 428 as a shrine for the relic of the Saint's arm.[36]

Very important observations were made by A.Grabar concerning the representation of St.Stephen on the 9th century mosaics in the patriarchal apartments at St.Sophia, Constantinople. Grabar emphasised that it was the account of St.Stephen's vision of God (Act 7, 55-57) which prompted the inclusion of this saint into a mosaic ensemble created immediately after the end of the Iconoclastic controversy.[37]

In the field of theological studies, J.Meyendorff has pointed out the importance given to the vision of St.Stephen in the hesychast doctrine of St.Gregory Palamas, recalling that it was a subject which centuries earlier St.Gregory of Nyssa had introduced into the Christian mystical literature.[38] And the value of St.Gregory of Nyssa's writing on St.Stephen and its relevance for the later development of the medieval mystical thought was in its turn analysed by Jean Daniélou.[39]

My explanation for the inclusion of St.Stephen on our fresco is the following: in a composition in which, as we have seen, baptism is

[35] E.Kantorowicz, "Ivories and Litanies". *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 5 (1942), 56-81; *Id. Laudes Regiae* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946), 52, n.132.

[36] Constantine Pophyrogenitos, *De Cerimoniis,* ed. A.Vogt (Paris, 1935), Text II, 6-10, Commentaire II, 13-21, 31-41. St.Stephen in Daphne served sometimes as a coronation church. See F.E.Brightman, "Byzantine Imperial Coronations", *The Journal of Theological Studies* 2 (1901), 359-92, esp. 377. For an analysis of crowns and marriage rites in Byzantine iconography see C.Walter, "Marriage crowns in Byzantine Iconography", *Zograf* 10 (1979), 83-91.

[37] A.Grabar, *L'Iconoclasme Byzantin* (Paris, 1957), esp.234 and 247. R.Cormack and E.J.W.Hawkins, "The Mosaics of St.Sophia at Istanbul: The Rooms above the Southwest Vestibule and Ramp", *DOP* 31 (1977), 175-251.

[38] J.Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas* (London, 1964), 172 and 200.

[39] J.Daniélou, *Platonisme et Théologie Mystique* (Paris, 1944), 267f.

alluded to by references to anointing and to the bridal, virginal aspect of the neophytes, St.Stephen's presence relates to the regal side of the spiritual marriage of the baptised and to the mystical path upon which the neophytes are engaging. It is a reminder that the enlightenment of St.Stephen manifested the progress towards the vision of God and the possibility open to Christians of rejoining the Wisdom of Christ.

I believe that it was precisely that ideology, converging on the enlightenment of the ruler and of the baptised that lay at the basis of the imperial connotation attached to the cult of St.Stephen in Byzantium, influencing the ideas of Kingship in other states.

It is certain that king Marko commissioned the south door panel bearing in mind the long established veneration of St.Stephen by his predecessors, rulers of the Nemanjić dynasty, with the complex ideology it implied. He combined these considerations with his own devotion to St.Demetrios, including the veneration of that saint's relic and its rich and widespread symbolism. The iconography of the fresco can be understood as a statement of the royal and priestly character of the baptised Christians[40] in which Marko's role of a wise king and defender of faith holds an important place. The horn of oil in his right hand emphasises the ideology based on the belief in the enlightenment by the Spirit of the anointed, man and king, and in the strength which that anointing provides and assures.

The programme of the fresco decoration above the south door at Markov Manastir speaks strongly in favour of accepting the possibility that the now demolished annex did originally serve as a baptismal chapel. It was described as a "south narthex" (*priprata*) by the 19th century visitors and the 14th century baptismal font was found there in 1925.[41]

Alternatively, a programme such as the one above the south door could well correspond to a more general tendency of decorating the entrance into the church by a specially devised ensemble of pictures in which the wisdom of the king and the enlightenment of his Christian

[40] This concept stems from Exodus 19,6 (You shall be for me a kingdom, and priests and a holy people') and 1 Peter 2.9 ('You shall be a chosen race, serving as priests for the kingdom'). See S.Brock, *op.cit.* in n.28, 58-62. J.Daniélou, *Bible et Liturgie...* 256-175.
[41] See note 10.

subjects constitute the main theme.

I have observed that phenomenon, for the main, western, entrance into the church in a few earlier monuments in medieval Serbia.[42] It is conceivable that a programme with a similar ideological background was sometimes planned for the south entrance too.

In either case the fresco which embellished the south door at Markov Manastir was an appropriate gateway to the interior of the church where a carefully planned wall-painting ensemble executed with great artistic skill, complemented by an ingeniously designed polyelaion[43] interpreted the intention of the ktitors in a remarkable way.

The analysis of the fresco points to several directions for further research, especially towards the background of connections between Mount Athos, Thessalonica and the centres of learning in fourteenth century Serbian State, including the vast field of its less well preserved and less well known monuments of architecture and painting.

Considering the time and the area in which the church of St.Demetrios at Sušica was built and decorated, it represents a valuable art-historical and historical document of general interest to which Kraljević Marko has contributed a great deal, by lifting, on this occasion, not a mug of bubbling wine, but a horn of the oil of gladness.

[42] See my articles in *Zograf* 11 (1980), 44-53 and in *JÖB* 32 (1982), 185-193.

[43] Fragments of the monumental bronze *polyelaion* from Markov Manastir are preserved in the museums of Skoplje, Belgrade, Istanbul and Sofia. See the excellent article by D.Todorović, quoted in note 5. Since this article was sent for publication (1985) I have had the pleasure of reading Roman Jacobson, "Sketches for the History of the Oldest Slavic Hymnody: Commemoration of Christ's Saint and Great Martyr Demetrius", written in 1981 and first published in *Roman Jacobson Selected Writings* VI (*ed. S. Rudy*), Berlin - New York - Amsterdam 1985, 286-346 and XX. - I was glad to see that my observations concerning King Solomon, The Song of Songs and the bridal symbolism in liturgical and literary works written in honour of St. Demetrios and relevant to the iconography on the fresco at Markov Manastir, find further support in Roman Jacobson's penetrating study.

VI. PATRONAGE IN ART AND LITERATURE : 3

BYZANTINE ARCHITECTURE AND PAINTING IN CENTRAL GREECE 1460-1570

Its demographic and economic basis according to the Ottoman census and taxation registers for Central Greece preserved in Istanbul and Ankara*

MACHIEL KIEL / UTRECHT

It is essential for the historian of Byzantine art after the fall of Constantinople, and for the cultural history of the period in general, to use rich information contained in the Ottoman census and taxation registers (*tahrir*) of the 15th and 16th centuries[1]. With the help of these Ottoman sources a number of mistakes can be corrected. Uncertain points can be clarified and some long cherished legends be done away with, or they can be confirmed or modified. An example of the latter category is the case of the well-known monastery of Kaisariani on the flank of Mount Hymettos, overlooking Athens. The abbot of this monastery, we are told, offered the keys of Athens to Mehmed the Conqueror on a silver plate. Hence it was granted tax exemption for the centuries to

* The field work and the work in the Ottoman archives which forms the basis of this report was made possible by generous bursaries of the Netherland Organisation for Pure Scientific Research (Z.W.O.), The Hague.

1 For this kind of source see in detail: Ö.L. Barkan, "Türkiye'de Imparatorluk Devirlerinin büyük nüfus ve arazi tahrirleri ve Hâkana mahsus istatistik defterleri," *Istanbul Univ. Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 2/1 (1940), 20-59 and 2/2 (1940), 214-47; Ö.L. Barkan, "Tarihi Demografi Araştırmaları ve Osmanlı Tarihi," *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, 10 (1953), 1-26; Halil Inalcık "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," *Studia Islamica*, 2 (1954), 103-29 (in detail: 107-12); H. Inalcık's introduction to his *Hicri 835 tarihli suret-i defter-i sancağ-i Arvanid* (Ankara, 1954); J. Káldy-Nagy, "The Administration of the Sanjaq Registrations in Hungary," *Acta Orientalia*, 21 (1968), 181-223; Heath Lowry, *The Ottoman Tahrir Defters as a Source for Urban Demographic History: The Case Study of Trabzon (ca. 1486-1583)* (Diss. Univ. of California, 1977). For all possible problems reading the difficult administrative script (*siyakat*) see the monumental volumes by Lajos Fekete, *Die Siyaqat-Schrift in der Türkischen Finanzverwaltung*, I-II (Budapest, 1955).

come. The travellers Spon and Wheler[2], who visited the monastery in 1675/76, tell us that the monastery therefore still paid only one gold coin per year as tax. We find this tale repeated in most histories concerning Athens. The oldest preserved Ottoman *tahrir* dealing with Athens is a fragment from 1506, torn off from the otherwise well preserved register T.T. 35 and stored elsewhere. On page twelve of this fragment we find an enumeration of the substantial property of the monastery (olive plantations, vineyards etc.) for which it had to pay 2110 *akçe* as yearly tax. In 1506 this was roughly 45 ducats! The enumeration is accompanied by a note stating that: "According to an Imperial Order, issued *medio* December 1456 (*evasıt-i Muharrem sene* 861) the mentioned monastery (of Siriani, also known as *Koç Başı*) was given by the late sultan Mehmed (II) — may his grave be fragrant — to the monk Emonos/Imutos (Timotheos?) and was freed from paying poll-tax, *ispence* and all extra-ordinary taxes and obligations and now it is in usufruct of the monk called Nikodimo". The order paraphrased in the 1506 register was thus written half a year after the annexation of Athens by the Ottoman governor of Thessaly, Turahanoğlu Ömer Beg (June 1456)[3], more than a year and a half before Mehmed the Conqueror himself came to visit the 'City of the Sages'. Thus the legend contains a considerable amount of truth but has to be used with great care.

The foregoing is concerned with *petite histoire* only. Of more importance is the possibility the material offers to reach a deeper insight in the whole matter of post-Byzantine art and precisely the forces which made it possible, its material basis. It seems we are confronting a paradox. Modern Greek historiography has seen the Ottoman period, and especially the 15th and 16th centuries, in a

2 *Naukeurige Reyse door Italien, Dalmatien, Grieckenland ende de Levant* gedaan in de jaren 1675 en 1676 (Amsterdam, 1689), (also in French, English and German versions) pp. 223-25 (of the Dutch ed.). The Turks knew the monastery as '*Koç Başı*' because of a curious sculpture of a ram's head at the fountain. This name figures in Spon and Wheler and also in Ottoman *tahrirs*.

3 For the Ottoman conquest of Athens and its date see for example: Franz Babinger, *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit* (München 1953), 170 and 191; William Miller, *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge, 1921), 151-53 and 160-61, all based on the chroniclers of Chalkokondylas and Kritovoulos.

rather negative light. The cities decayed, the villagers fled to the mountains, and the whole country suffered a grave demographic decline[4]. In such circumstances it is highly unlikely that Christian religious architecture and painting could flourish. On the other hand, art historical stock-taking of the recent decades has shown a multitude of large and beautiful churches and monasteries, all built in the 15th and especially in the 16th century, the supposed period of decline on all fronts. The Ottoman registers give us the key to understand this, as I hope to show.

On the Venetian-controlled island of Crete post-Byzantine painting flourished and from there well educated masters crossed over to the Ottoman controlled mainland of Greece to decorate the spacious walls of the new churches. This is the well known Cretan School of painting[5]. At the same time, on the mainland, emerged a school of painters which originated from the Ottoman administrative centre Thebes, then an important city. Frangos Katelános and the two brothers Georgios and Frangos Kontaris were the chief exponents of this School of Thebes[6]. The spread of the principal works of this outstanding school is depicted on the

4 Apostolos E. Vakalopoulos, "La retraite des populations grecques vers les régions éloignées et montagneuses pendant la domination turque," *Balkan Studies* 4 (1963), 265-76; also Vakalopoulos, *Origins of the Greek Nation, 1204-1461* (New Brunswick, 1970), 156; or in a modified and enlarged version: Vakalopoulos' contribution to *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous,* X (Athens, 1974), 72-77 and 90-91. For a more extreme view see: B.G. Spiridonakis, *Essays on the historical geography of the Greek world during the Turkokratia* (Thessaloniki, 1977), esp. 109-11.

5 For the emergence of the Cretan School see in detail: Manolis Chatzidakis, "Contribution à l'étude de la peinture post-byzantine," *L'Hellenisme Contemporain, Fascicule hors série, Le cinq-centième anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople* (Athènes, 1953), 193-216; Alexandre Embiricos, *L'école crétoise, dernière phase de la peinture byzantine* (Paris, 1967); H. Chatzidakis, "Les débuts de l'école crétoise et la question de l'école dite italo-grecque," *Mnimosynon Sophias Antoniadi* (Venice, 1974), 169-211, *idem,* "Recherches sur le peintre Théophane le Crétois," *DOP,* 23/24 (1969/70), 311-52 (both last mentioned studies are also in his *Etudes sur la peinture post-byzantine* [London, 1976]).

6 See Manolis Chatzidakis' contribution "O Frangos Katelanos kai alloi Thivaioi," *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous,* X (cf. note 4), 424-28 with excellent illustrations of the work of these painters; and Chatzidakis' study in this volume.

following map[7].



Fig. 1

7 The list of works on the Theban masters as represented on our map is given by Chatzidakis "O Frangos Katelanos" (cf. note 6). For the paintings of the Monastery of Osios Meletios between Athens and Thebes see in detail: H. Deliyanni-Doris, *Die Wandmalereien der Lite der Klosterkirche von Hosios Meletios* (München, 1975); for Katelonos' work in Epiros: D. Evangelidi, "O Zographos Frangos Katelanos en Ipeiro," *Deltion Christianikis Archaiologikis Etaireias,* 4/1 (1959), 40-54; see also: M. Chatzidakis, "O zographos Frangos Kontaris," *Deltion Christianikis Archaiologikis Etaireias,* 4/5 (1969); Th. Liva-Xanthaki, *Ai toichographiai tis Monis Diliou* (Ioannina, 1976); for Kastoria: Georgi G. Gounari, *Oi toichographies ton Aghion Apostolon kai tis Panaghias Rasiotissas stin Kastoria* (Thessaloniki, 1980); for Myrthia: A.K. Orlandos, "I en Aitolia Moni tis Myrthias," *Archeion ton Byzantinon Mnimeion tis Ellados,* 1961, I, p.74-112. The work of Katelanos on Mount Athos is that in the chapel of St Nicholas in the Great Lavra. Those on Meteora are in Moni Varlaam.

What I would like to show is that it is not by mere chance that Thebes produced such a school. In the time of these painters Thebes was a growing town with an expanding economy, suggesting a sizeable group among its population which lived well above subsistence level, thus able to indulge in luxury such as art. *(See Appendiz)*[8].

[8] My calculations for Thebes are based on the register T.T. 431 in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, from 1530-1540. The first pages of this register, containing the introduction and the date are missing. It is a so-called *mufassal defter*, a detailed register. Of the *mufassal* registers a synoptic register was made, the *icmal defteri*. The *icmal* which was made from the T.T. 431 is preserved. It is T.T. 196, which is perfectly preserved and well dated (Hidjra 946 = A.D. 19 May 1539-7 May 1540). For 1570 I used the *mufassal* Register K.u.K. 157 in the Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü in Ankara, well preserved and well dated: 977 H. = 16 June 1569 - 4 June 1570). The 1506 Register is T.T. 35, preserved in Istanbul. The section containing the towns of Chalkis, Athens and Salona (Amphissa) is missing but the last bit of the description of the taxes of Thebes is preserved, at the beginning of the register, which is also well dated. For 1466 I used the *icmal defteri* "Maliyeden Müdevver 66" in Istanbul, also well dated. The *mufassal* on which this register is based has not yet been found.

The tax on wheat and barley in the city and the district of Thebes is expressed in *haml* or "load". The Law Books (*kanunname*) prefixed to the detailed registers, tell us that the load used in Thebes was $6^1/_2$ Istanbul bushels (*kile*). One Istanbul bushel, the standard measure, was 25.656 kilograms. Thus the Thebes load was 166.764 kilograms.

The registers also give the value of the quantity of cereals taken as tax. At the base of these data the approximate average price of the articles in the given years can be deducted with ease. In the instructions given to the commissions sent to the provinces to make a census we read that the highest, the lowest and the medium prices over three successive years had to be taken as the basis for the general average price to be recorded in the register. As the two parties interested in village produce were confronted when a registration was made, the villagers as actual producers, and the Ottoman *sipahi* who lived from the tax on the village production, there is some sort of guarantee that the prices arrived at indeed reflect approximately the real average price. A comparison of several registers of one and the same district shows that prices indeed went up over the years. Producers of a surplus could thus sell more profitably in 1570 than in 1540 or earlier. This is very clearly reflected in our numbers. In 1540 a Thebes load of wheat cost 36 *akçe*, in 1570 46 *akçe*. In between the mentioned dates falls what Braudel called "the Turkish wheat boom" for a large part due to the bad performance of the Italian wheat producers. The price per bale of cotton was 5 *akçe* in 1540, 6 *akçe* in 1570, 1 bale was 4 *okka*, or c. 5.10 kilogr. The silk price went up from 31 *akçe* in 1540 to 46 *akçe* in 1570. The price for sheep in the entire Ottoman province of Eğriboz (the district between Lamia in the north and Cape Sunion in the south and from the approaches of Lepanto in the west to the island of Euboia in the east, including that big island) went up

The link between population growth, increased prosperity and an expanding art is also suggested by the village of Aedhipsos (Ottoman Lipsos on northern Euboea, close to the Ottoman administrative centre of Oiros. (*See Appendix)*[9].

Another example is that of Avlonari, itself the centre of an Ottoman administrative unit. (*Ill. 9, table*)[10]. It will be clear after seeing this that the suggested link between material possiblility and expanding artistic activity is an acceptable one. More building meant gaining more experience and for the painter the possibility

from 18 *akçe* per sheep in 1472 to 28 *akçe* in 1570. The wine price per *medre* went up from 10 *akçe* in 1472 to 13 *akçe* in 1570. Silk was expressed in *ledre*. I am unable to tell how they are related to the metric system. Most probably it varied from place to place, as does the bushel and the load. The *kanunnames* give insufficient data to solve this problem.

As a strict rule a total of 13% tax was taken from agricultural products, 10% as tithe, 3% as *salariye*. This 13% is the basis of the reconstruction of the total production (as given in my tables). An example of an instruction of how to make a *tahrir* was published by N. Beldiceanu — Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Règlement ottoman concernant le recensement" *SOForsch*, 37 (1978), 1-40. There are a number of such instructions. As an indication of the value of the *akçe* I may say that in 1506 there where 56 *akçe* in a *florin* and 60 *akçe* in that gold coin in the 1560's and 1570's. The great devaluation of the Ottoman currency took place after 1585 and thus leaves our numbers untouched. In the mid 16th century the *imam* of a normal mosque in a city earned 3 to 5 *akçe* daily as his salary. Good workman carpenters, stone cutters or masons, could come to 7 to 9 *akçe* daily. The rank and file soldier of the garrisons of the fortresses in Central Greece got 1200 to 1600 *akçe* yearly, thus about as much as an *imam*.

I am currently working on the publication of all extant registers for Central Greece. In the study which will be the product of that research I will go in to detail on prices and wages and the sources from where they derive. For this brief report the information given may perhaps suffice.

9 For Aedhipsos I used the registers 0.73 in the Muallim Cevdet Yazmaları Collection in the Atatürk Kitaplığı in Istanbul, a codex which contains the complete *icmal* and *mufassal defteri* of the island of Euboia from the year 878 H. (May 1473 - May 1474), for 1490 the T.T. 989 (Başbakanlık Arşivi Istanbul) previously unidentified and undated but which after careful examination has to be placed around 1490; T.T. 35, mentioned previously, and K.u.K. 157 in Ankara. The 1540 register is damaged at various places. Hence no detailed account of the village production could be obtained from that register without help of ultra violet lamps and other technical equipment. In Aedhipsos and all the other places on Euboia the "load" for cereals was 8 Istanbul bushels or just over 205 kilograms. The wheat price went up from 20 in 1473, 35 in 1506 to 60 in 1570.

10 The same registers as mentioned in note 9, p. 75, p. 102-104, 129-131 and p. 87-91.

to make the step from icon painter to mural painter, which is a large one and only possible when large surfaces to be decorated are available.

An example of how the Ottoman sources can help to clarify specific details is the case of the village of Politika, situated just north of the *sancak* capital of Chalkis. According to Johannes Koder and Friedrich Wild's *Tabula Imperii Byzantini, Hellas und Thessalien* (Wien, 1976), p. 230, and Koder's fine monography *Negroponte, Untersuchungen zur Topographie und Siedlungsgeschichte der Insel Euboia während der Zeit der Venezianerherrschaft* (Wien, 1973), the Byzantine monastery of Panagha Perivleptos of Politika was "probably destroyed during the Turkish conquest" and rebuilt as a *Metochi* of the monastery of Galataki "in the second half of the 16th century". This assumption is based on a Greek document of 1582. The Ottoman tax registers, however, show that it was rebuilt more than half a century earlier, if it was destroyed at all. Moreover, these sources show that in the 16th century the monastery progressively enriched itself and clearly was in the position to do so. (*See Appendix*)[11].

The monastery of Galataki itself, situated near the village of Limni on the north-western coast of the island, is a specifically Ottoman period creation. Local tradition tells it that it was revived by Osios David Geron, who lived in the first half of the 16th century and whose *vita* is preserved[12]. The *tahrir* of 1540 mentions it for the first time[13]. A *firman,* presumably from 1542[14], gives permission to build the large tower which had to

11 For Politika see the same registers as mentioned above, p. 121-122, 17-18, 388-390, p. 158-159.

12 For this *vita* see: *O vios tou osiou kai theophorou patros imon David tou en Evvia ti niso askisandos,* ed. Nikodemos Thomas (Athens, 1967).

13 T.T. 431 in Istanbul. The 1473, 1506 and 1540 registers do not mention any monastery in or near Limni. The 1540 register explicitly states that the monastery of St Nikolaos was a new one, not existing before. This statement does not mean that there was no ruin of an old monastery, decayed long ago, ruins which were rebuilt later. It only means that there did not exist a monastic community at that site or an object which had some property, which in turn could be taxed.

14 The document is mentioned by Gianni Anastasopoulos in his *Ton Evvoikon Monon,* (Athens, 1967), 37, who gives a basic description of its

protect the monastery against pirate attacks. The 1540 *tahrir* indeed mentions a severe attack of pirates on the Atalanta district, just opposite Galataki and within sight, many people being killed or carried off as slaves[15]. Another *firman* of Süleyman the Magnificent, from 1561[16], allows the (re)construction[17] of the church, one of the largest of post-Byzantine art. The preserved donor's inscription mentions that it was "built from the foundations" in the year 1566. The paintings, in the style of the School of Thebes, are from a decade later. The register of 1570 shows that the monastic property increased threefold in 30 years! (*See Appendix*)[18].

Our last example is that of the village of Ano Vathia, to the south of Chalkis. Koder places the monastery of St Nikolaos in this village on his list of Orthodox monasteries from the Venetian

content. Koder, *Negroponte,* 158-59, mentions the same *firman* but gives the date as 1558/59 (also Koder and Wild, *T. I. 6,* I, 225) but makes this rather unlikely by the statement that it was from the time of Sultan Selim II (who actually ruled between 1566 and 1574!). Koder's source is Maria Christonymphe, *Syntomon istorikon tis Ieris Monis Aghiou Nikolaou Galataki Evvoias,* (Chalkis, 1965), which was unaccessible to me. I briefly inspected the 16th-century *firmans* of Galataki in 1984 and suggest the date of the document as 949 (1542-1543), but need closer inspection to be sure. The nuns of Galataki unfortunately did not allow that.

15 T.T. 431, p. 480, a long note at the beginning of the description of the subdistrict of Talanda (Atalanta), giving the reasons of a change in the status of the Christian subjects of the town of Talanda and the village of Livanates. These places were privileged in exchange for a participation in a system of guarding the coast. In the register T.T. 431 this note is not completely legible. The same note, however, is repeated in the perfectly preserved Register K.u.K. 183 in Ankara, p. 109, with the help of which the difficult parts of the 1540 register could be read.

16 Anastasopoulos, *Evvoikon Monon,* 37; the date again is not perfectly certain and needs to be revised.

17 In order to build a new church or monastery it was necessary to keep up the legal fiction that there existed an older monastery or church, from before Islamic rules came in. According to the strict application of Islamic Law new churches could not be built. Yet the registers themselves and the monuments point in a very different direction. I dealt with this discrepancy between Law and practice, very characteristic of pragmatic people like the Ottomans, in my work *Art and Society in Bulgaria in the Ottoman Period, 1370-1700* (Assen, 1985), chapter VI.

18 See the registers Or. 73 from 1473, p. 132. T.T. 898, p. 8/9, T.D. 35, p. 164, and K.u.K. 157, p. 205-206.

period, but suggests that the evidence for such an attribution is slight. The Ottoman *tahrirs* of 1472, 1490, and 1506 do not mention any monastery in this village. The 1540 register has one monastery but this is the wrong one[19]. Our monastery, built in a style combining local and pronounced Ottoman elements, has a damaged donor's inscription which mentions that it was built in the time of Patriarch Joasaph. There are two of them: Joasaph I Kokkas, who was Patriarch of Constantinople between 1465 and 1466, and Joasaph II of Great Prespa, Patriarch between 1555-1565. Anastasios Orlandos[20], who first described the church, decided for the second possibility because of the pronounced Turkish features. The *tahrir* of 1570 is the first to mention the monastery[21], thus pinning down the date of construction of this singularly beautiful building in the Süleymanic age. The fine multi-coloured bowls and tiles, adorning the walls of the church belong to the best the Iznik kilns produced and give another indication of that period. Motives and colours used are characteristic of the second half of the 16th century. (*Appendix*)[22].

19 The register gives its name as Manāstir-i Alḳurī' or "Alġevarī". As the administrative shorthand used for Ottoman registers does not use diacritical dots it is sometimes impossible to read non-Turkish or non-Arabic personal names and place names properly. It seems that behind the letters the name "Aghlephero" is hidden, the name still given to the church of a long deserted monastery in the hills above the villages of (Ano)Vathia, one km. to the SE of the monastery of St Nikolaos. The 1570 register again mentions the monastery of "Alḳurī" etc. but then also has the monastery of St Nikolaos, as a new one. The little known church of Aghlephero was also adorned with Ottoman bowls and plates but these are all long stolen. The church is dedicated to the Zoodochos Pighi.

20 His "Stavrepistegoi naoi Vatheias Evvoias", *Archeion ton Vizantinon Mnimeion tis Ellados*, VII (Athens, 1951), 120-27.

21 K.u.K. 157 in Ankara, p. 44.

22 See Or.73, from 1473, T.T. 35, 1506, p. 40/41, and K.u.K. 157, p. 42-44. The register T.T. 898 from ca. 1490 is incomplete. The preserved part does not contain the village of Vathia. The two drawings of the church were made by Orlandos (cf. note 20).

While writing this article I could have used with great profit two unfortunately unpublished works: J.C. Alexander, *Towards a History of Post-Byzantine Greece: the Ottoman Kanunnames for the Greek Lands (circa 1500 - circa 1600)*, (Ph.D. dissertation Columbia University, 1974); and: Evangelia Balta, *L'Ile d'Eubée à la fin du XVe siècle d'après les registres No 0.73 de la Bibliothèque Cevdet à Istanbul*, (Paris, 1983). Alexander offers an English translation of all extant *kanunnames* concerning Greece and a transliteration of

This church, a combination of the best what Byzantine and Ottoman art created, symbolises, to my taste, the quintessence of the 16th century, the expansion of Ottoman power and Ottoman art combined with an expanding economy and a revival of Christian art, both brought about by the Pax Ottomanica, the true nature of which we can understand better only if we combine Byzantine and Ottoman sources *and* the results of art historical research.

the original script for control. Balta offers facsimiles, transliteration and French translation of the *icmal* and *mufassal defters* of 1473, all excellently done, but the bulk of the work consists of calculations of agricultural products of which the principal one, of cereals, is based on the assumption that the load used on the island of Euboia was maximum 128,048 kilogram. In fact it was not 4 or 5 bushels per load as Balta has it, but 8 bushels (of Istanbul), as the *kanunname* makes very clear. This brings us to 205,248 kilograms for one Euboia load instead of the meagre 128,048 which was constructed by Balta. This means that the total cereal production of the island (wheat and barley) was not 4,782,370 kg but 7,665,602 kg! This at once invalids all her conclusions as to which villages were deficit as to grain production and which were on the margin of subsistence level. Balta could not make use of the *kanunnames* in which the different values of the load is stated per administrative unit because she could not work in the Ottoman archives and John Alexander's valuable Ph.D. thesis was not used by her. Yet the way she included two whole registers in her work, in a well controlled manner, still makes that part of the work extremely useful. (For the crucial calculation see Balta, Eubée, II, 35-39).

I hope to come back to this singularly important question in the forthcoming work mentioned in note 8.

APPENDIX

Village of LIMNI

Date	Households	Mills
1473	44	
1490	63	1
1506	66	3
1570	81	7

Total value of Wheat, Barley, Sheep, Flax, Cotton and Wine:

		akçe per household
1473	9633	219
1490	17004	270
1506	34733	527
1570	74264	916

Number of MONASTERIES		Total value of monastic production in akçe
1473	/	/
1490	/	/
1506	/	/
1540	2	1154
1570	3	2923

Village of VATHIA

Date	Housholds	
1473	31	this village had an expanding textile production which is not reflected here
1490	82	
1506	104	(1506 154 sheaves of flax)
1570	121	1570 346



Fig. 2. The synoptic register M.M. 66 from 1466, showing the number of inhabitants of Thebes, its taxes and the military duties.



Fig. 3. The end of the description of Thebes in the detailed register T.D. 484 from 1570. The number of households of the Muslim, Jewish and Christian sections of the population are shown as well as the principal taxes on the production, presented as 13% of the total production per article.

Total value of Wheat, Barley, Sheep, Flax, Cotton and Wine:

		akçe per households
1473	7723	249
1506	52585	641
1570	73961	611

Number of MONASTERIES		Total value of monastic production in akçe
1473	/	/
1490	/	/
1506	/	/
1540	1	461
1570	2	1238

Village of POLITIKA

Date	Households:
1473	31
1490	51
1506	69
1570	41

Total value of Wheat, Barley, Sheep, Flax, Cotton and Wine:

		akçe per household
1473	9329	283
1490	13655	268
1506	27185	494
1570	72266	1763

Number of MONASTERIES		Total value of monastic production in akçe
1473	/	/
1490	1	385
1506	1	1154
1570	2	5230

Barley			
1473	78941	652	44
1490	99466	612	45
1506	78941	403	39
1570	168935	797	175

Mills		
	1473	4
	1490	6
	1506	9
	1570	15

Total value of Wheat, Barley, Sheep, Flax, Cotton and Wine:

		akçe per household
1473	32549	269
1490	73760	461
1506	85456	436
1570	240620	1135

Number of MONASTERIES		Total value of monastic production in akçe
1473	/	/
1490	/	/
1506	/	/
1540	3	1300
1570	7	5954

Sheep :		value / akçe	akçe per household
1473			
1490			
1506	562	11240	57
1570	1300	36400	172

Flax Production:	sheaves	value	akçe per household
1473	423	846	7
1490	846	1692	11
1506	2692	5384	27
1570	769	2308	11

Village of AVLONARI

Date	Households	Mills
1473	97	1
1490	133	4
1506	190	6
1570	150	11

Total value of Wheat, Barley, Sheep, Flax, Cotton and Wine:

		akçe per household
1473	8598	89
1490	54961	413
1506	104467	550
1570	182007	1213

Number of MONASTERIES		Total value of monastic production in akçe
1473	/	/
1490	/	/
1506	2	615
1540	5	5000
1570	8	11115

Village of AEDHIPSOS

Date	Households
1473	121
1490	160
1506	196
1507	212

Wheat Production	Total Kg.	Kg. per household	in akçe per household
1473	78941	652	64
1490	205248	1283	200
1506	165777	846	144
1570	418390	1973	577

Cotton:	bales	value in akçe	akçe per household
1473	423	846	7
1490	115	231	2
1506	461	2308	12
1570	1154	6923	33

Wine:	medre	value in akçe	akçe per household
1473	1785	17846	147
1490	3261	32610	204
1506	3077	30770	157
1570	2730	35490	167

City of THEBES

Households:

1466	487
1506 c.	900
1540	1467
1570	1497

		Kg per household	akçe per household
Wheat Production:			
	1540	660	229
	1570	666	296

Sheep:		value in akçe	per household
1506	1100	22000	24
1540	2100	50400	34
1570	12000	336000	224

Cotton Production:				
1540	2460	bales	12300	9
1570	4060	,,	24360	16

Silk Production			
1540	361	ledre	11200
1570	770	,,	35000

Mills	1505	17	
	1540	22	
	1570	31	(of which 20 wool presses)

Market dues and revenue of Public Weighing-House

1506	14000 akçe
1540	19000 akçe
1570	30000 akçe

VI. PATRONAGE IN ART AND LITERATURE : 4

MANUEL II PALAIOLOGOS: INTERPRETER OF DREAMS?*

GEORGE CALOFONOS / BIRMINGHAM

> Frankish garments [in one's dream] point to very great freedom; in like manner, Franks, Tartars, Turks, Indians, Skythians and every other race of men signify freedom.

This somewhat curious passage appears under the heading "concerning Frankish clothing and colours" in the dreambook attributed to the late Byzantine emperor Manuel Palaiologos.[1] It has been suggested that it reflects his extensive visits to the West and Russia, as well as his captivity at the Turkish court.[2] The authorship however of Manuel Palaiologos has been disputed, mainly on stylistic grounds.[3] The reason which would explain this false attribution – a common practice for most Byzantine dreambooks[4] – is said to be the interest of

*I would like to thank the "Onassis Scholarship Foundation", whose generous support allowed me to carry on my research on the subject; I am also grateful to Mrs. Anna Frangedaki for her help with Manuel's contorted Greek.

[1] "Oneirokritikon kata Manouêl Palaiologon", in A.Dellate (ed.) *Anecdota Atheniensia* 1 (Paris, 1927), 511-24, esp. 516. For the translation of the text see S.Oberhelman, *The Oneirocritic Literature of the Late Roman and Byzantine Eras of Greece* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1985), 597-618, esp. 603.

[2] S.Oberhelman, *ibid.*, 615 note 35.

[3] See K.B.Hase, *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrites de la Bibliothèque Imperiale* 8 (Paris, 1810), 317, where the dreambook is presented to be written "...dans un langage barbare et tout-à-fait disparate avec le style soigne et élegant de notre auteur..."; and also M.Berger de Xivrey, "Memoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue", *MémAcInscr,* 19 (1853), 11.

[4] See eg. D. del Corno, "Ricerche Sull' Onirocritica Greca", *Instituto Lombardo Academia di Scienze, Lettere, Memorie della Classe di Lettere,* 96 (1962), 334-66; and S.Oberhelman, "Prolegomena to the Byzantine Oneirokritika", *Byzantion,* 50 (1980), 487-503. For the implications of his false attribution of authorship see G.Calofonos, "Dream Interpretation: A Byzantinist Superstition;", *BMGS,* 9 (1984/85), 215-20: in

Manuel in dreams, evident in his letter to Andreas Asan which is a philosophical treatise on their origin.[5]

Thus the "barbaric", "superstitious", "popular" text on dream interpretation has been contrasted to the "elegant", "pious", "philosophical" work of the "real" Manuel.[6] It is true that the two texts belong to two distinct traditions. The first is an oneiromantic one, which includes dreambooks from Antiphon and Artemidoros to several Byzantine ones, and involves the practical skill of dream interpretation. The second is oneirological, and consists mainly of philosophical discussions on the origin and prophetic value (if any) of dreams. These traditions are usually conceived as belonging to two different worlds: the refined, cultivated circles of philosophers on the one hand, and the credulous and superstitious masses on the other.[7] In our case, style and genre of the texts is assumed to be sufficient evidence for stressing the division once more.[8]

It is not my intention to refute the attribution of these texts to

accordance with M.Foucault's analysis of the function of author-name, it would seem that false attribution of authorship in the Byzantine dreambooks was intended to validate these texts in the eyes of their contemporary readership, rather than devalue their supposed authors in the eyes of modern critics. See also Margaret Alexiou, "Literary Subversion and the Aristocracy in Twelfth Century Byzantium: A Stylistic Analysis of the *Timarion* (ch. 6-10)", *BMGS,* 8 (1982/3), 26-45, and "The Poverty of Ecriture and the Craft of Writing: Towards a Reappraisal of the Prodromic Poems" *BMGS,* 10 (1986), 1-40, who has argued the relevance of Foucault's ideas on authorship to Byzantine literature.

[5] D. del Corno, *ibid.*

[6] This attitude, evident in both K.B.Hase, *op.cit.* (note 3), and M.Berger de Xivrey, *op.cit.* (note 3), is carried further by D. del Corno, *op.cit.* (note 4), with his division between oneirology and oneiromancy which I summarize below.

[7] D. del Corno's division was accepted by A.H.M.Kessels, "Ancient Systems of Dream Classification", *Mnemosyne* 4/22 (1969), 389-424, for the classical period. It would be wrong however to accept its implications for the Byzantine period, when the concept of superstition had changed. See A.Mogmiliano, "Popular Religious Beliefs and the Late Roman Historians", *Studies in Church History,* 8 (1971), 8; and G.Calofonos, *op.cit.* (note 4).

[8] Stylistic level, however, is not considered anymore sufficient evidence for a definite conclusion on authorship in Byzantine literature. See I. Ševčenko, "Levels of Style in Byzantine Prose", *JÖB,* 31 (1981), 289-312, and 32 (1982), 220-33. For a relevant analysis of the problem referring to the Prodromic Poems see Margaret Alexiou, "The Poverty of Ecriture...", *op.cit.* (note 4).

different authors. I would rather suggest a closer examination of their content before drawing any conclusion on their relative position in Byzantine culture. Here I will confine myself mainly to Manuel's letter which has never been translated, commented upon, or otherwise studied although it is the most extensive Byzantine oneirologic text.[9]

Discussion on the origin of dreams and the art of dream interpretation always fascinated the Byzantines and other medieval people as it is evident, not only within the numerous texts on the subject, but also in hagiographical and historiographical sources.[10]

To turn to the letter of Manuel Palaiologos, it was written in fact as an answer to his friend Andreas Asan who believed that all dreams are prophetic if one interprets them correctly, and asked the emperor's opinion on the matter.[11] This demonstrates the fact that, whichever Manuel's opinion was, the so-called superstitious belief in oneiromancy had infected even the close circle of the theologian emperor. In answering the question, Manuel produced a small philosophical treatise which in a true Byzantine manner draws extensively on Ancient Greek sources and is validated by New Testament and patristic references.[12]

A tripartite classification of dreams, according to their origin and nature, is proposed. First, there are dreams that originate from the dreamer's disposition and profession, as well as his or her bodily condition, caused by imbalance of the four humours or excess of food. Those dreams, according to Manuel, have no prophetic value.[13] His second category of dreams includes the ones that derive from the dreamer's soul. During sleep the soul comes closer to its divine origins, but is still under the negative influence of the body. Thus, the soul's

[9] Manuel II Palaiologos, "Peri Oneiratôn", in J.F.Boissonade (ed.), *Anecdota Nova* (Paris, 1844), 239-46.

[10] Byzantine hagiographies and chronographies are full of references to prophetic dreams. Specific examples of oneiromantic and oneirologic texts will be mentioned below.

[11] Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 240,6-14.

[12] There are references in the text to Plato (*ibid.*, 240,4; 243,9-11), but also to Gregory the Theologian (244,5-8), Saint Paul (245,21-24), and "the saints" (242,5-7).

[13] *Ibid.*, 242,9-12.

dreams can be prophetic, but in an indirect and confused way.[14] The third category consists of the truly and wholly prophetic dreams, that originate from God and are sent to those who have pious and pure souls. The best of those people can also have waking visions.[15] To those major categories a fourth one is added which includes dreams of troubled people who find the solution of their problems in sleep.[16]

Prophetic dreams, which derive from divine providence, can be intended not only for their recipients, but also for the guidance of people, irrespective of moral qualities. In the letter's conclusion they are contrasted to the pseudo-prophecy that comes from the devil.

Some prophetic dreams and omens, as well as some other divinatory techniques – excluding dream interpretation[17] – are the ways used by the evil spirit in order to deceive. The devil, however, does not have the gift of prescience: he can only speculate by calculations that either come true or not, and therefore he can be deceived as well as deceive.[18]

As Manuel himself acknowledges, a great part of the views expressed are not his own. His section on false dreams, more specifically, incorporates Ancient Greek medical and philosophical theories on dream origin and funcitions.[19] First, the theory of the four humours and their relation to dreaming, which is also included in the dream classification of Psellos[20] as well as in Islamic dreambook compila-

[14] *Ibid.*, 245,12-5: "Μικρά τινα ἄρα καὶ τεθολωμένῳ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, ὡς ἄν εἴποι τις, καὶ λοξῶς αὕτη δύναται, εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο δοτέον, ἐν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις μαντεύεσθαι καὶ χρησμωδεῖν."

[15] *Ibid.*, 245,15-20.

[16] *Ibid.*, 245,20-4.

[17] *Ibid.*, 246,6-9: "*Oneirokritikê*" (i.e. dream interpretation) is not mentioned: it had been formally removed from Byzantine lists of evil practices with the *Basilika* of Leo the Wise. See Photios, *Nomokanon,* in G.Ralles-M.Potles (eds.), *Syntagma tôn Theiôn kai Hierôn Kanonôn* 1 (Athens, 1852), 192.

[18] Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 246,12-3.

[19] For Ancient Greek and Roman views on dreaming see E.R.Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1954), 102-34; A.H.M.Kessels, *op.cit.* (note 7); R. van Lieshout, *Greeks on Dreams* (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1972); and F.X. Newman, *Somnium: Medieval Theories of Dreaming and the Form of Vision Poetry* (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1962), who mainly deals with the Western Medieval period.

[20] Michael Psellos, *De omnifaria doctrina,* ed. L.G.Westerink (Utrecht, 1948), 63.

tions,[21] is first found in a pseudo-Hippocratic work on dreams[22] and in Galen:[23] dreams – the soul's activities in sleep – are conceived as reflections of the operation of the body and thus become an index of the actual physical condition of the dreamer. Manuel did not consider the diagnostical aspect of this theory, but used it merely as an explanation for non-prophetic dreams. In that way, an excess of warm humour causes dreams of cool waters, while the lack of it causes dreams of fire.[24]

The second theory involves the belief that the mind dreams of what it is accustomed to when awake. It is quite common to many thinkers including Aristotle,[25] Lucretius,[26], Petronius,[27] Macrobius,[28] as well as Anastasios of Sinai[29] and Psellos.[30] Even the specific examples of such dreams given by Manuel, strongly resemble those of his sources: "The coward dreams of escape, the valiant dreams of victories, the sailor dreams of waves..." etc.[31]

Thirdly, the belief that an excess of food causes false dreams, combines the opinions of pseudo-Hippocrates and Galen[32] with those of philosophical schools which attributed a gnostic value to dreams. It

[21] See e.g. Abdalghanī an-Nabulusī, *Ta'tīr al-anām fī ta'bīr al-manām* (Cairo, 1316), I, 3-4, cited in G.E. von Grunebaum, "The Cultural Function of the Dream as Illustrated by Classical Islam", in G.E. von Grunebaum and R.Caillois (eds.), *The Dream and Human Societies* (Berkeley, 1966), 7ff.

[22] [Pseudo-] Hippocrates, *Regimen,* 4. 87, Loeb 4 (London, 1931), 422.

[23] Galen, "De dignatione ex insomniis", in C.G.Kühn (ed.), *Medicorum Graecorum Opera que Exstant* (Leipzig, 1823), 6. 832ff.

[24] Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 241,3-6.

[25] Aristotle, *De insomniis,* 460b, in H.J.Drossaart Lulofs (ed.), *Aristotelis De Insomniis et De Divinatione per Somnum* (Leiden, 1947).

[26] Lucretius, *De rerum natura,* 4.962-5, ed. C.Bailey (Oxford, 1947).

[27] *Poetae Latini Minores,* 4.110, ed. A.Baehrens (Leipzig, 1879-83).

[28] Macrobius, *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis,* 1.3, ed. J.Willis (Leipzig, 1970).

[29] Anastasios of Sinai, *Quaestiones,* PG 89 (1865), col. 761.

[30] Michael Psellos, *op.cit.* (note 20).

[31] Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 241,8-13. Cf. Lucretius and Macrobius, *op.cit.* (notes 26, 28). It should be noted that Macrobius' work had been translated into Greek less than a century before by the influential scholar Maximos Planudes. See N.G.Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium* (London, 1983), 230.

[32] [Pseudo-] Hippocrates, *op.cit.* (note 21), 4.93; Galen, *op.cit.* (note 22), 832.

is found in Plato,[33] Aristotle,[34] and the Pythagoreans.[35] It continued to be popular in the Middle Ages and it appears in the classifications of Anastasios of Sinai and Psellos,[36] but also in the popular dreambooks of the Byzantine period.[37]

Manuel's discussion of dreams originating from the soul occupies the largest part of the letter and includes his original contribution to the subject, which is a combination of Platonic and Christian doctrines on the soul.[38] He placed these dreams on the borderline between the prophetic and the false ones, disputing the belief that, in sleep, the soul, freed from the influence of the body, is revealed in its divine aspect and looks unhindered into the future: a belief evident in Plato,[37] Xenophon,[39] and Aristotle,[40] as well as in Cicero's *De divinatione,*[41] and also shared by the Stoics.[42]

In Manuel's opinion, the soul being divine and imperishable, has indeed the power of prophecy. Its long bondage inside the earthly and perishable body however, draws it towards evil and thus weakens its divine powers.[43] Sleep conjures the illusion of freedom from the body but the effort to forecast clearly is still doomed. The soul can only prophesy in a narrow scope, in an indirect and cloudy way.[44]

This view of Manuel is quite important for it leaves an open door to dream interpretation. Although he does not explicitly state it, these

[33] Plato, *Republic,* 571, Loeb (London, 1935).
[34] Aristotle, *op.cit.* (note 25), 461a.
[35] Cicero, *De divinatione,* 2.58.119, ed. A.S.Pease (Urbana, 1920-24).
[36] *Op.cit.* (notes 29, 30).
[37] "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Nikephoros", ed. F.Drexl, *Festgabe für Albert Ehrhard, Beitrage zur Geschichte des Christlichen Altertums und der Byzantinischen Literatur* (Bonn, 1922), 94-118, esp. 100; and "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Germanos", ed. F.Drexl, *Laographia,* 7 (1923), 428-48, esp. 448.
[38] Plato, *op.cit.* (note 33), 572a.
[39] Xenophon, *Cyropedia,* 8.7.20-1, Loeb 2 (London, 1914).
[40] *The Works of Aristotle: Select Fragments,* ed. D.Ross (Oxford, 1952), 12, 84f.
[41] Cicero, *op.cit.* (note 35), 1.32.70.
[42] See E.Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicurians and Sceptics,* trans. O.J.Reichel (Lonodn, 1880), 377. The same view is expressed also by Philo Judaeus, *Perî tou theopemptous einai tous oneirous (On Dreams),* 2.1, Loeb 5 (London, 1934).
[43] Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 242f.
[44] See note 14 above.

hazy and unclear predictive dreams could be allegorical and symbolic visions which require the skills of a dream interpreter. In a similar manner, the second century pagan dreambook of Artemidoros, which was in use throughout the Byzantine period, implies a contrast between clear god-sent dreams, and the ones that require interpretation, originating from the dreamer's soul.[45]

Manuel's classification is the last Byzantine example of a series that appeared within the Christian Era. They derive from the effort of the minor Neo-Platonists to combine the various, sometimes conflicting views on dreams of Antiquity.[46] What is original in Manuel's work, is his discussion of souldreams, but also his organized and detailed exposition of his theories. What is interesting in both Manuel and the other authors, is that they do not condemn oneiromancy as one might have expected.

To go back to the dreambook attributed to Manuel Palaiologos, I should note that it is quite unique in both its content and form. Together with the Middle-Byzantine dreambook of Achmet,[47] they organize their material into thematic chapters while the rest of the dreambooks are really just alphabetical lists of dream-symbols.[48]

Furthermore the so-called "Dreambook of Manuel" is the only Byzantine one to include explanations of its dream-interpretations. For example, it makes a conscious and extensive use of puns for the derivation of its dream-symbolism, which was a very popular method

[45] Artemidoros Daldianos, *Onirocriticon,* 32.69 ed. R.A.Pack (Leipzig, 1963), 195,3-7. Moreover, Philo Judaeus states that those god-sent dreams which are received via the dreamer's soul are unclear and require professional interpretation: *op.cit.* (note 42), 2.3-4.

[46] See F.X.Newman, *op.cit.* (note 19), 66.

[47] Achmet, *Oneirocriticon,* ed. F.Drexl (Leipzig, 1925).

[48] This fact has escaped del Corno [*op.cit.* (note 4), 342] who describes the dreambook as "...uno dei soliti onirocritici alpahabetici..."(!) If this was true, it would had strengthened his case against Manuel's authorship. The surviving alphabetical dreambooks are five: "Das Traumbach des Propheten Daniel nach dem cod. Vatic. Palat. gr. 319.", ed. F.Drexl, *BZ,* 26 (1926), 290-314; *Astrampsichi Onirocriticon,* ed. S.Obspeus, in *Sibillina Oracula* (Venice 1599); "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Nikephoros", *op.cit.* (note 37); "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Germanos", *op.cit.* (note 37); and "Das Anonyme Traumbuch des cod. Paris gr. 2511", ed. F.Drexl, *Laographia,* 8 (1925), 347-75.

of both Ancient Greek and Byzantine oneiromancy.[49] Thus, mosaic icons in a dream mean a fair judgement, because, as the dreambook states, the word for mosaic pebble (psêphos) also means a judgement.[50] But this and many other intpretations found in Manuel's dreambook do not occur in other works of this kind, which are all interrelated through direct and indirect borrowings.[51] Although it belongs to the same oneiromantic tradition, it is original in its content.

The two surviving manuscript of the dreambook date from the late fourteenth century and make it contemporary to our emperor.[52] Could he then be the author of the text? Could Manuel II Palaiologos be an interpreter of dreams?

I believe that still one cannot give a definite answer, although his letter and the dreambook show some similarities. Both texts are systematic, lengthy, and quite original. If Manuel was not the author it could be someone from his immediate circle.[53]

Apart from the passage on Frankish clothing, which I quoted in the beginning, there are some other novel dream interpretations that point to this direction: "If one dreams that he walks into St.Sophia in Constantinople, one will find himself in the midst of a catholic and universal tumult";[54] and this, in the times of the upheavals caused by the attempt to heal the schism[55] Also, if one sees that one becomes

[49] Alexander's satyr-dream [Plutarch, *Alexander,* 24,8-9, Loeb 7 (London, 1971); Artemidoros, *op.cit.* (note 45), 260] is the best known example from Antiquity. A quite similar example from the Byzantine period is the dream of Constans II recorded in Theophanes, *Chronographia* I, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 346.

[50] "Oneirokritikon kata Manouêl Palaiologon", *op.cit.* (note 1), 518.

[51] See. S.Oberhelman, "Prolegomena...", *op.cit.* (note 4).

[52] *Ibid.,* 501.

[53] This can be also supported by the fact that the dreambook describes specific dreams of Byzantine officials of the times to illustrate various dream-symbols. Those dreams, and in some cases the names of the individuals involved, are not mentioned in the historical sources of the period, indicating that the author of the dreambook was in a position to have first-hand information concerning the imperial court of Constantinople. These historical aspects of the dreambook will be covered in a future study of mine.

[54] "Oneirokritikon kata Manouêl Palaiologon", *op.cit.* (note 1), 518.

[55] There were two attempts by John V Palaiologos to convert his subjects to the Roman faith, in return for military support from the Pope Innocent VI, in 1355 and 1357. His

emperor, one will "face humility, dishonour, persecution, and accusations at the hands of many people";[56] a fact Manuel only knew too well.[57]

Indeed, one could argue that Franks, Russians, and Turks were becoming associated with alternative freedoms, at a time when many Byzantines were facing the choice between the Papal tiara and the Sultan's turban.[58]

plan involved also his six year old son Manuel II himself, who was going to serve as a hostage to the Pope. It failed because it met the disapproval of the Byzantines, and was never taken seriously by the Pope. See G.Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State,* trans. Joan Hussey (Oxford, 1980), 535; and *CMH* 4/1 (1966), 368f; and J.W.Barker, *Manuel II Palaiologus: A Study in Late Byzantine Statemanship* (New Brunswick, 1969), xix.

[56] "Oneirokritikon kata Manouêl Palaiologon", *op.cit.* (note 1), 521.

[57] George Ostrogorsky gives the following description of the imperial office at the time of Manuel's accession to the throne: "The responsibility of the imperial office was indeed far more of a burden than a privilege. Each day brought fresh humiliations, new misery and terror for the Emperor of the Romans." *CMH* 4/1 (1966), 375.

[58] A similar view has been expressed by N.Oikonomidès, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIIIe-XVe siècles),* (Montréal-Paris, 1979), passim. I thank Archie Dunn for bringing this to my attention.

PLATES



Ill. 1 Morača, nave, donor Vukić Vučetić and archangel Michael, 1574.

Plate II

Ill. 2 St. Trinity of Pljevlja, narthex, donors — monk Georgije of Poblaće and Vojin spahi, 1592.

Ill. 3 Studenica, Church of the Virgin, St. Georgije of Kratovo, 1568.

Plate IV

Ill. 4 Morača, icon of St. Sava of Serbia and St. Simeon of Serbia, detail, 1645.

Ill. 5 Patriarchate of Peć, narthex, The Seventh Ecumenical Synod, detail, 1665.

Plate VI

Ill. 6 Patriarchate of Peć, Last Judgment, detail, 1565.



Ill. 1 Markov Manastir, south side.

Ill. 2 Markov Manastir, fresco above the south entrance.



Ill. 3 Markov Manastir, portrait of King Marko.

Plate X

Ill. 4 Markov Manastir, fresco above the south entrance, detail.

Ill. 5 Markov Manastir, fresco above the south entrance, detail.

Plate XII



Ill. 6 Markov Manastir, fresco above the south entrance, detail.

Ill. 7 Markov Manastir, Samuel (naos, area under the dome).

Ill. 1 Monastery of Galataki.

Ill. 2 A Wall Painting of the Thebes School.

Ill. 3 Monastery of St. Nikolaos.

Ill. 4 Monastery of St. Nikolaos.

Plate XVIII



Ill. 5 Monastery of St. Nikolaos.

Ill. 6 Monastery of St. Nikolaos, detail.